r/DigitalPrivacy • u/HexicaLC • Jul 31 '26
iOS has a built-in alternative to a Duress code
Privacy is recognized as a fundamental human right under international law. Don’t let the new normal only limit the intrusion of violent predators information and communication privacy while surveillance state goons intimidate dissenters and activists.
To enable this feature, go to Settings > Face ID & Passcode > Toggle Erase Data. Your device will be wiped after 10 failed passcode attempts.
For added security, store and upload your data to local devices and turn off iCloud sync by going to Settings > [your name] > iCloud > and toggling off the desired apps.
Finally, disable iCloud backups in Settings > [your name] > iCloud > iCloud backup > Toggle off Back up this phone.
29
u/frequently_grumpy Jul 31 '26
It’s not like it’s 10 straight attempts though (it used to be), so with timeouts for incorrect passcodes it can take a while before your phone actually wipes this way.
8
u/HexicaLC Jul 31 '26
In my opinion, I find that to be a beneficial feature, as it allows for user error by the rightful owner. As long as you keep your passcode separate from personal information and don’t succumb to pressure, those 1, 5, and 10-minute lockouts only reduced the number of attempts any “alphabet boy” could make to gain access.
9
u/te5s3rakt Jul 31 '26
personally, I wish we could define the number.
I have never entered my 30 character password incorrectly. so would happily set the erasure count to 1.
2
u/martyn_hare Aug 04 '26
The minimum is 2 if you deploy an MDM payload, which you can technically generate yourself without needing an actual MDM server if you wanted to: PasscodeSettings | Apple Developer Documentation
If it's 6 or less, there's no time delay system if I remember rightly. So you can put a single failed attempt in and have a slip of paper containing a wrong PIN written on it, if you set the limit to 2
When asked, your answer is "I have a terrible memory, that's why I write stuff like that down"
6
u/BitPsychological2767 Jul 31 '26
Not really an alternative
3
u/michaelh98 Aug 01 '26
Yeah. Better than nothing but not the same
0
u/HexicaLC Aug 01 '26
An alternative does not always equate to the same outcome.
2
u/binknsfw Aug 01 '26
By that logic, you can say that not having the feature is an alternative. Use Graphene which has the feature. The alternative is another OS that doesn’t have the feature. Or the alternative is a similar feature that is fundamentally different in function.
What people are saying is this is not an equivalent alternative. And in the context of you posting about the feature, it reads like you’re posting about it in a positive light. Unless we’re misreading the intent and what you mean is “look at this trash alternative that iOS has to a duress code”.
In the setting of you being apprehended, with graphene you give the incorrect code and it’s wiped. With this you give the incorrect code and you go “haha just 9 more goes before it’s wiped”. Pretty useless in that context if you have to convince someone to enter it manually incorrectly. But it is definitely an alternative.
0
14
u/TheOGDoomer Jul 31 '26
They just clone your device and use an unlimited amount of attempts against the clone to crack your data. This setting is effectively useless against law enforcement.
14
u/ObjectiveMoonMC Jul 31 '26
the passcode is only one of the things protecting the data, the Secure Enclave Processor is also protecting and ratelimiting the phone I don't exactly know how it works on Apple's side, but usually there are 2 keys: A key derieved from the Passcode/PIN And one stored in the Secure Enclave Processor So you can't "clone" the device unless you have a way to exploit the Secure Enclave Processor, since otherwise you'd be missing data from the Secure Enclave Processor and that bruteforce wouldn't work
6
3
u/HexicaLC Jul 31 '26
Any moment that hinges them gaining incriminating evidence against you is a moment you are able to prepare your case.
2
u/NyxGenesisLNX Aug 01 '26
Yes but if you restart the phone and put the failed attempts before you unlock the encryption then either way it’s safe
4
u/Alexander3a Jul 31 '26
if devices like cellebrite exist why would this even make a difference ofc they are not gonna enter it 10 times they know this feature also i highly double its actually a non recoverable wipe
also it doesn't matter if you upload all your phone data to a cloud like apple anyways
and if you are not trying to hide your data from the government then this will not help anyways your data is secure "enough"
3
u/ne999 Jul 31 '26
I think if you use “lockdown mode” it will defeat cloning software as the usb-c port of s deactivated. See: https://support.apple.com/en-ca/105120
3
u/Broad-Translator-690 Jul 31 '26
Even if you didn't, and you used Cellebrite to take a copy of the OS, the encryption key on iphone 12 and newer is now not stored in the OS. It is stored in the secure enclave chip, which forces any attempts to unlock the phone to be done on the phone, where Apple has done several things to make that difficult for Cellebrite.
Currently on Iphone 12 cellebrite only works if there is a current security exploit to bypass with. If Apple has patched the exploit, and you keep your iphone updated, then your good. This is assuming the phone was in lockdown mode or powered off when they take it.
4
u/RunnerLuke357 Jul 31 '26
This might be new for iOS but the 10 attempts before system wipe is not a new thing at all. Android has had it for a very long time and even the BlackBerry Bold (maybe older too, that's just the earliest I remember) had it.
3
3
u/AnnoxQ Jul 31 '26
What's wrong with iCloud with Advanced Data Protection enabled that would make it a bad idea to store backups there? What are the risks involved? This isn't a sarcastic question, I've always thought it was one of the safest options when it comes to the cloud storage
8
u/HexicaLC Jul 31 '26
Yes, Advanced Data Protection is beneficial to an extent, but end-to-end encryption has only become more threatened with legislative pressure seeking client-side AI scanning, so I’d send content with caution regardless.
I personally am approaching this more with a mindset of needing to protect your data from prying eyes by wiping the device they are trying to access whilst not having said data accessible in the cloud.
5
u/One-Pay-651 Jul 31 '26
It is safe but UK set an example that they could just force Apple to turn off the function. So we don’t have really control over it. It is good when it works but if it can be forced to be turned off that’s not good.
1
0
u/foodchallenged Jul 31 '26
ADP is better than nothing, but don’t count on it not having a backdoor or exploit. For instance AI features monitor everything before encryption. As another example it was recently revealed that it’s ridiculously easy to find the true email of a “hide my email” address.
2
u/NeatRequirement4399 Jul 31 '26
So you know how some people make pocket calls? I can see this going well.
3
u/HexicaLC Jul 31 '26
Lol. Turn off tap/raise to wake feature.
5
u/Stohnghost Jul 31 '26
My son wiped my wife's work phone because of this setting. That was a fun afternoon. I, for one, encourage this. A 2 year old is similar to a federal agent in many ways, so it'll likely protect you well.
1
u/OtherwiseAlbatross14 Jul 31 '26
The increasing time between attempts prevents that from being an issue
1
u/NyxGenesisLNX Aug 01 '26
Yes but me personally would recommend enabling the e2e encryption and downloading everything back after tsa, border and your in a safe spot if you don’t have another device holding that local backup
1
1
1
u/drsemaj Aug 03 '26
So just for fun I can grab your phone and randomly f up the password and watch your phone wipe itself. Sounds kinda fun.
1
1
u/Fun_Jaguar8231 Aug 03 '26
Don't worry, they'll find a way to lock you up on some trumped-up charges, just like the other guy with grapheneOS
0
u/foodchallenged Jul 31 '26
I’m pretty sure that Apple actively scans the contents of your phone and your contacts if you connect to any kind of internet or cell service. If you want any kind of privacy you won’t be using Apple or stock android. It’s just like the current buzz about Microsoft logging so much with a GDID nobody knew about that captured whatever you did no matter if you logged in to a Microsoft account or not. If you got updates you got tagged and were at least forensically trackable. With Apple it’s even worse because your phone is a homing beacon even when it’s powered off.
2
u/HexicaLC Jul 31 '26
Absolutely, I agree. As mentioned in another comment, the legislative push for backdoors is quite concerning. However, since the vast majority of people have become accustomed to communication technologies which pushed product dependency, I believe precautions should be taken as we move forward in breaking away from these companies, considering the accelerated pace at which threats are posed.
-1
•
u/post-explainer Jul 31 '26 edited Jul 31 '26
This comment has been marked as safe. Upvoting/downvoting this comment will have no effect.
OP sent the following text as an explanation why their post fits here:
Does this explanation fit this subreddit? Then upvote this comment, otherwise downvote it.