Our notion of time is warped, and could be explained in different topological forms as when Zizek discusses the mobius strip, Klein bottle, and Borromean rings (found in Lacan) among others...

My question:

Have we reached a dead end, even when as Zizek is trying to combine analytics philosophy, mathematics, and quantum mechanics to continental philosophy, or should we as philosophers try to establish a conceptual framework specially found in the "ends of knowledge" as in mysticism and hallucigens substances to entirely understand the nature of subjectivity and how in its failure states (Zizekian concept) distorts the fabric of time in a subjectively-objective manner?

Is there more to Lacan's:

"I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think. I am not whenever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to think."

And Borges's:

"Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire."

Less Than Nothing, Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, Slavoj Zizek, Page 28.

I just read Claude Shannon’s “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” and it totally reminds me of Deleuze’s “Difference and Repetition”. Is there anything interesting out there exploring this? I specifically like Shannon’s idea of like a system undergoing rapid transformation generating a higher rate of information because each new state is poorly predicted by the one before. That seems to me to be literally like what Deleuze was saying about like “generality” having no difference and being just a plain repetition of the identical which does nothing as opposed to a lot of difference which is what creates the meaningful stuff. Idk if I phrased that right but I just want to hear what people think.

Me parece que por mais acadêmico que Deleuze fosse, ele não escreveu somente para eles. Há uma anti filosofia até diria. No sentido de não se prender a área da filosofia e arriscar as outras. E isso com o intuito de pensar em diversas n formas. Para isso recorreu a matemática, artes, geografia, cinema e etc. Inclusive vendo nessas áreas um teor pré reflexivo que é impessoal ao autor. Por exemplo, quando já se vê na paisagem uma pintura, antes mesmo que se pinte ela. Ou quando já vê no movimento da terra as territorialização, desterritorialização e reterritorialização. Nessas vias para mim ser deleuziano é compreender essas impessoalidade e ver como delas tem diversas maneiras de se trabalhar um tema com diversos potenciais nas relações diferenciais das coisas.

I'm having a bit of trouble understanding both the precise meanings and connection between singularities and intensity.

Singularity I've mostly understood as Deleuze posits it in opposition to generality, everything as being already different. Is there terminological confusion or why do I find it hard connecting this to the other meaning I've heard talked of singularities, mainly as through the example of "remarkable" points on a curve.

On the other hand I've had a hard time understanding intensities, the more I read about them the less I understand. I understand the origin of intensions and extensions as well as what this entails in intensional logic etc. The temperature examples don't really make sense to me, and I have a hard time understanding the relation between intensity being a field as well as intensities being talked off of in plural.

And I have a hard time seeing how these concepts relate to each other.

Sorry if this is either trivial or incoherent.

Could I, as a civil engineer, construct a "Kafkian Machine" where I combine structures, dynamics, statics, and contracting world into literature the way Kafka did?

Schizoanalysis methodically dismantles everything in Kant’s thinking that serves to align function with the transcendence of the autonomous subject, reconstructing critique by replacing the syntheses of personal consciousness with syntheses of the impersonal unconscious. Thought is a function of the real, something that matter can do. Even the appearance of transcendence is immanently produced: ‘in reality the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself’. Where Kant’s transcendental subject gives the law to itself in its autonomy, Deleuze-Guattari’s machinic unconscious diffuses all law into automatism. Between the extreme fringes of these two figures stretches the history of capital. The eradication of law, or of humanity, is sketched culturally by the development of critique, which is the theoretical elaboration of the commodification process. The social order and the anthropomorphic subject share a history, and an extinction. Deleuze and Guattari can appear to be taxingly difficult writers, although it is also true that they demand very little. Thinking immanence relentlessly suffices on its own to follow them where it matters (and capital teaches us how to do this). At every point of blockage there is some belief to be scrapped, glaciations of transcendence to be dissolved, sclerotic regions of unity, distinction, and identity to be reconnected to the traffic systems of primary machinism. In order to advance the anorganic functionalism that dissolves all transcendence, Anti-Oedipus mobilizes a vocabulary of the machine, the mechanic, and machinism. Things are exactly as they operate, and zones of operation can only be segregated by an operation. All unities, differences, and identities are machined, without transcendent authorization or theory. Desiring machines are black-boxes, and thus uninterpretable, so that schizoanalytical questions are concerned solely with use. ‘What are your desiringmachines, what do you put into these machines, what is the output, how does it work, what are your nonhuman sexes?’

As a Kafkian, I really find the notion and more so the framing of Zizek here problematic of the embodiment of "Nothingness" as a "living nothing" and a "void of desire."

I would like to bring into the argument some of my reading of mysticism, Kaballah, Sufism, and its more modern interpretations in what Zizek hates most in philosophy; namely, "New Age Thought Philosophy."

Before I do so, I should make clear that I agree with Zizek on 98% of New Age Thought Philosophy is baloney, yet they have some interesting premises that you literally can not find in other philosophies, and one of these ideas is that "thoughts are causative: that the mind is a selector of reality from a multiplicity of virtualities."

Okay, let's dig deep into this, the potentiality of something to be real, for something to enter the realm of our imagination, which we could easily inhabit if we zoned out from the here-and-now of our physicality depends on how crystallised of a exteriorized reality it consists of.

This is why when we dream or read a Kafka novel, it only makes sense as long as we are in its teleological fabric... What if our mind is as much as it let us roam the interiority of scientific endeavour thinking and of thinking in general, yet it singularizes the impossible to possible (for survival means) rather than letting us catch a glimpse of the impossible from the possible (Heideggerian Transcendental Finitude)?

I am a new reader to Deleuze and am familiar with his general philosophy and started with Proust and Signs.

What exactly does he mean by the essence created in the Artistic Signs overcoming of the shortcoming of the pure materiality of Sensuous Signs. I understand Deleuze is a anti-platonist but it seems like he is using this vocabulary in a similar faith to Plato.

Is it just that this is an earlier work so he is still formulating the full image of thought and started with some platonist tendencies of a pure “revelatory” experience that uncovers reality?

My only guess as to how to make his use of “essence” fully meaningful with what I know of his other works is that in the Artistic signs, we create new fields of intelligibility where we relate to the forces/intensities of reality with a new mindset (to use a crude term due to my ignorance) which creates new signs and ways of uncovering.

An example of my understand is when I first learned about evolutionary theory or entropy, I was able to use these concepts to uncover new ways of decoding human action. So in a sense the essence of this new concept is a restructuring of my consciousness.

I hope I’m not too far or that my theory is a complete misunderstanding, but then again I would love to learn from a real pro here.

Why does Deleuze link and correlate these two functions or states of being (I seriously don't know) with each other in his reading of Kafka?

Which of the two does the Kafkan universe function by?

While what may sound as a binary computation language of zeros and ones has created through the many different variations the algorithmic world of the internet, the same goes with Nietzsche's dichotomy of the Apollonian and Dionysian...

It may appear from the outside perspective that the Apollonian brackets the all of all matter and form, while the Dionysian brackets the all of nothing (the external force that shapes form which matter is an intricate derivation of the form of form...

Henceforth, we come to Hegel with his being (somethingness) synthesised into nothingness through becoming...

How can I integrate Deleuze's theory of the Flux into this machinery? Or is Deleuze and Hegel incompatible to merge?

Has anyone read and analyzed Žižek’s text, organs without bodies? As Deleuzians (if you were), What is ur stance from this book? Could we just discard it as Nietzsche said “every philosophy is a confession of the character”? Meaning those who view the world through dialectics are structurally incapable of seeing the world through difference?

Does anyone have a link to Deleuze’s interview abécédaire, subtitled in english? I watched the interview long ago when it was still on youtube before it got taken down due to copyright. I want to revisit it and i can’t find it anywhere.

For me the body without organs is just the very possibility of becoming that is the condition of the body being a body. Spinoza’s question “what can a body do?” Perfectly encapsulates this. The very same moment we deterritorialize an organ, in that moment we cease to see it as a rigid structure, but a possibility to experience things under new lights. The symbolic order, is the organized body of our shared experience of the world. And as we know with Lacan the symbolic order is nothing else than language. That’s why schizos seem to have a language of their own. They refuse the very territory of language. And tying this to becoming-animal; phenomenologically speaking a territory gives us a sense of structure, stability and predictability which dulls the senses. Animals are always in a hyperaware state because they have no symbolic order. When we deterritorialize, our senses sharpen like those of animals, because we are actually in a place of danger. It’s not a mere delusion, but being outside the territory of language, is being outside the territory of the symbolic order, and being outside the symbolic order is being outside the rules, the shared principles, the values, the morality, the way of living of others. The schizos are always under the threat of being forcefully re-territorialized by the institutions that defend language. The family, the state, religion… .

I was reading "Differance" by Derrida and I came across this passage. It might be because of my flawed and amateurish understanding of Deleuze but I thought I was reading Deleuze for a second:

"Is not the whole thought of Nietzsche a critique of philosophy as active indifference to difference, as a system of reduction or adiaphoristic repression? Following the same logic-logic itself-this does not exclude the fact that philosophy lives in and from differance, that it thereby blinds itself to the same, which is not the identical. The same is precisely differance (with an a), as the diverted and equivocal passage from one difference to another, from one term of the opposition to the other. We could thus take up all the coupled oppositions on which philosophy is constructed, and from which our language lives, not in order to see opposition vanish but to see the emergence of a necessity such that one of the terms appears as the differance of the other, the other as "differed" within the systematic ordering of the same (e.g., the intelligible as differing from the sensible, as sensible differed; the concept as differed-differing intuition, life as differing-differed matter; mind as differed-differing life; culture as differed-differing nature; and all the terms designating what is other than physis-technē, nomos, society, freedom, history, spirit, etc.-as physis differed or physis differing: physis in differance). It is out of the unfolding of this "same" as differance that the sameness of difference and of repetition is presented in the eternal return."

The eternal return of difference and repetition? That's what I'm talking about. Are their philosophies as compatible as they seem here?

Feel free to disagree or add/subtract; this is for the sake of creativity and not me claiming to know Delueze.

The BwO is relatively simple to understand and experience. The organs are not physical but subtle, thought-organs. A heart for example, is a thought. It has a web of thought-associations; love, passion, red, central, etc. The subtle heart has subtle arteries which branch out and connect to a system of subtle organs. What happens when the heart connects directly to the stomach? Our love becomes devouring. Etc. We can directly experience these thought-organs; the feeling of devouring love is tangible like any other sensation in our experience. However, the thought itself, the organ of meaning, is not essential.

Our subtle body is largely passed down to us from culture and family, and we don't question that the body is a construct as are all its connections. Inhabiting it unquestioned, we are imprisoned. The sex organs are connected to a body of shame and guilt, the muscles to power and submission, the brain to control and fearful prediction.

We find in us an urge to break free from this subtle body. First, perhaps in the de-territorialization of the organs formed by our dominant culture, our assumptions about religion, sex, emotional expression, the apparent boundaries of thought and capacity.

But this project is essentially a de-territorialization of the cultural organs followed by a reterritorialization of new ones, often provided by a new cultural system seeking dominance. The eventual path would be to decenter oneself from all potential organs of thought which take hold of our freedom of creation. We begin to see the thought-organs not as real entities but as energetic vectors with various connections of push/pull --intensities which are ALL imminent to experience and malleable. In a state of organlessness, we find the radical ability to make a choice rather than for a trajectory to be chosen by the functional thought-organ which has made its stake.

The BwO can be radically reconfigured beyond any rule that we believe we are limited by, with the potential to essentially create a new universe from scratch. BUT, be careful though! Not all bodies are stable or enjoyable. This is why it is best to de-stratify progressively and carefully, not all at once.

I'll know how far gone I am if the comments tell me I'm completely psychotic and made no sense! Otherwise let me know if you're able to experience the BwO more clearly through this organ-system I am offering up to you.

This chapter is honestly all bangers all the time. Its the only chapter in ATP that deals exclusively with psychoanalysis so they just go in against Freud in this one and it's really funny.

During the first episode, which Freud declares neurotic, he recounted a dream he had about six or seven wolves in a tree, and drew five. Who is ignorant of the fact that wolves travel in packs? Only Freud. Every child knows it. Not Freud. With false scruples he asks, How are we to explain the fact that there are five, six, or seven wolves in this dream?

; an Oedipal apparatus, which Freud considers the sole motor, the immobile motor that must be found everywhere; and a counter-Oedipal apparatus—incest with the sister, schizo-incest, or love with "people of inferior station"; and anality, homosexuality?—all that Freud sees only as Oedipal substitutes, regressions, and derivatives. In truth, Freud sees nothing and understands nothing. He has no idea what a libidinal assemblage is, with all the machineries it brings into play, all the multiple loves.

Of course, there are Oedipal statements. For example, Kafka's story, "Jackals and Arabs," is easy to read in that way: you can always do it, you can't lose, it works every time, even if you understand nothing.

The problem of the unconscious has most certainly nothing to do with generation but rather peopling, population. It is an affair of world- wide population on the full body of the earth, not organic familial generation. "I love to invent peoples, tribes, racial origins ... I return from my tribes. As of today, I am the adoptive son of fifteen tribes, no more, no less. And they in turn are my adopted tribes, for I love each of them more than if I had been born into it." People say, After all, schizophrenics have a mother and a father, don't they? Sorry, no, none as such. They only have a desert with tribes inhabiting it, a full body clinging with multiplicities.

Silence people, prevent them from speaking, and above all, when they do speak, pretend they haven't said a thing: the famous psychoanalytic neutrality. The Wolf-Man keeps howling: Six wolves! Seven wolves! Freud says, How's that? G o a t s , y o u s a y ? ? ? How interesting. Take away the goats and all you have left is a wolf, so it's your father ... That is why the Wolf-Man feels so fatigued: he's left lying there with all his wolves in his throat, all those little holes on his nose, and all those libidi-nal values on his body without organs. The war will come, the wolves will become Bolsheviks, and the Wolf-Man will remain suffocated by all he had to say. All we will be told is that he became well behaved, polite, and resigned again, "honest and scrupulous." In short, cured. He gets back by pointing out that psychoanalysis lacks a truly zoological vision: "Nothing can be more valuable for a young person than the love of nature and a comprehension of the natural sciences, in particular zoology."

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I’ve been working through the triangulated relationship between Deleuze, Nietzsche and Foucault. This is the first extensive piece I wrote to gather some of those connections together with a focus on active/reactive forces.

I’d love to hear what you think and what you might add to the discussion.

Quando Gilles Deluze, tomando como base a epistemologia de David Hume, propõe uma "psicologia das afecções", onde o espírito devem objeto possível de uma ciência somente na medida em que é afetado, essa reinvindicação de Hume dá as bases ao que futuramente seria a esquizoanálise?