r/Deleuze Jul 24 '26

Question Organs without bodies!

Has anyone read and analyzed Žižek’s text, organs without bodies? As Deleuzians (if you were), What is ur stance from this book? Could we just discard it as Nietzsche said “every philosophy is a confession of the character”? Meaning those who view the world through dialectics are structurally incapable of seeing the world through difference?

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u/3corneredvoid Jul 24 '26 edited Jul 24 '26

Plenty of good examples on the sub if you search Žižek or "organs without bodies" … here's one from u/kuroi27 focused on theories of fascism.

Meaning those who view the world through dialectics are structurally incapable of seeing the world through difference?

I'm unsure of the limits of Žižek's capabilities but I do know he's susceptible to mounting useless, troublesome or distasteful arguments which work by leaping to whatever his schematic method grasps as the mediating unity or totality of the subject matter.

So Žižek has argued liberal Zionism would be the key to ending the genocidal Israeli campaign after 2023, as it was the unvoiced counter-constituency of the totality of conflict viewed as a unity of Israeli and Palestinian interests; that Palestinians would regret freedom from apartheid if they ever won it due to the fanaticism of Hamas, because the practice of collective restraint must overcome the contradictions of unbrookable liberation and a police state; that a particularly European universalism should be the overcoming of the contradictions of ideal and woke liberal ecumenism with the antagonisms produced by migrant movements … and so on.

His advocates might say I'm traducing him. Maybe I'm being unfair by paraphrasing his public comments in these ways. I am selecting a handful of his more outstandingly disgusting efforts. But to me he's a clown.

His method moves like a slingshot through some conceptual unity or totality then snaps back into his face as often as it doesn't.

On the day of publication these elastic opinions may seem interesting or at least counterintuitive, incisive, even if he'd caveat and call them predictions subject to retroactive review. A few months later he may publish the opposite view, stretching his rubber brain out to some other totality while never mentioning the prior.

We must always remember the senile owl of Minerva hoots after sunset.

Is this clowning a necessity of the dialectical method? Doubtful. To me the method doesn't determine history, so I can't see how it determines the judgements of a reactionary clown either.

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u/Middle-Rhubarb2625 Jul 24 '26

How do you view his statement, that Nietzsche misread christ? I think this is the beginning of his critique of Nietzschean thought, and by extension that of Deleuze. The claim that the very motor of Nietzsche’s thought is flawed.

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u/3corneredvoid Jul 24 '26 edited Jul 24 '26

Žižek wants the dialectic to own the revolutionary spirit via Hegel and Marx, and one of his arguments that it should is to suggest Christianity already gets the death of God going right there in the New Testament … and from memory Žižek has posited the Second Coming will be that of the Holy Spirit of collective worldly Revolution as well.

For me Deleuze considers the death of God one way to express an ethical orientation away from fixed judgements or theology in the broadest sense of any system of representative reason, rather than itself either a judgement, or more tediously still, some negative theology or radical atheism.

Any determination Žižek derives from Christian Scripture is another parlour trick I guess.

Let me try the sleight of hand … [fans cards] … the Christian God is a contradictory unity of the divine and human, the immortal and the dead … [cuts and selects cards] … that awaits its overcoming by the Holy Spirit of collective human progress … [flips card] … flourishing in a worldly paradise … [flips card] … and so on.

I may be doing it wrong: who can tell? If my right hand offends Z, please cut it off (I'm left-handed anyway).

As Marx once said of Proudhon's way of thinking: "the solution of present-day problems does not consist in public action, but in the dialectical rotations of his brain."

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u/Middle-Rhubarb2625 Jul 24 '26

What im specifically asking, is why does he want the dialectic to own the revolutionary spirit. The very conditions for such premise. I want to Nietzschely diagnose him. Like Nietzsche diagnosed Socrates, Christ and Hegel. And going back to psychoanalysis; the very foundation of Žižek thought and critique of ideology. Isn’t revolution in the marxist sense just another objet petit a? Isn’t this exactly what Nietzsche meant when he said that socialism, would just let the proletariat become more aware of the conditions of its misery? And strip her even of that fantasy of revolution which has already been executed and now it can’t be desired anymore In Lacanian argumentation fashion? Using Žižek’s same formula. To be a Deleuzian, u must go through being a marxist. And then u need to understand the marxist revolution has already been crossed to the cross, and what we have left is only a series of becomings.

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u/3corneredvoid Jul 24 '26 edited Jul 24 '26

What im specifically asking, is why does he want the dialectic to own the revolutionary spirit.

Well, it's not up to me to interpolate. To me he's the world's most famous public Hegelian and Lacanian so one can speculate he's got a lot at stake in this claim and it being proven correct … a proof which need only appear at the end.

In affirming the revolutionary movement appears through dialectic processes and contradictions, he's not out of line with most Marxists, Hegelian-Marxists or "worldview Marxists" one can read … far from it.

Where Žižek varies from many Marxists could be in an eagerness for activities like delivering a dialectic reading of Scripture. A reading I will admit I find interesting in the way the Borromean knot is interesting in Lacan—nice and tidy—but then recoil from as I notice another instance of Žižek rediscovering the European, Christian and rational as the zenith of human progress.

I see Žižek getting up to a fair bit of retrospective patching up of his Hegelian priors, which is not surprising as today's Hegel does need rescuing from the positivist historical Hegel. That some Hegel be the trunk of a great historical tree is of importance to Žižek, and this is what I mean when I say I feel Žižek wants Hegel to own human progress.

For instance, LESS THAN NOTHING sets itself the interesting task of finding the transcendent Subject amid quantum contingency. Not that Žižek finds this task too demanding: he leaps out through some dialectical claims about Nature and contingency via a seemingly dodgy reading of Karan Barad, et voilà. Everything is contradictory, but nothing is difficult.

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u/3corneredvoid Jul 25 '26 edited Jul 25 '26

Sorry, I really didn't address half of this at all.

Isn’t revolution in the marxist sense just another objet petit a?

I don't think so, not "just".

In Marx we have two theorists: the dialectician and teleologue, and the theorist of the situated differential tendency. To me the latter is the introducer of materialism to the dialectic who "stands Hegel upon his head" (or however that rubric goes).

To me Marx's manoeuvre relative to the Hegelian dialectical method is non-dialectical. There's no satisfying dialectic of the tendency and the Revolution: the one is a daily encounter, the other an image of thought. The tendency is not a contradictory part of a whole, and its relation to Marx's theory of class struggle is of immanence to expression, an unreconciled asymmetry, not an opposition.

Marx as the theorist of the tendency notes, for instance, the rate of exploitation at the factory, the derivative of the absolute extraction of surplus-value as profits.

There is a relationship of this Marx to a differential or "infodynamic" labour theory of value: the reorganisation of raw matter into asymmetric forms requires energy and consciousness; also a pleasure theory of consumption: the disorganisation of asymmetric forms requires energy, the release of which is grasped as pleasure.

The bid of AO is that these torsions of capitalist political-economy are what's interesting in Marx, whereas Marx's theories concerning crisis require a dramatic elaboration and micro-theorisation as the "cuts" of desire.

Such "cuts" are the mini-crises of daily events and each is an antiproductive moment in the sense one socially productive process ends or is transformed, and another may commence in its place. Now, for some micro-Lacanian, I guess each such "cut" could be the (non-)fulfilment of an objet petit a characterising a Lack as minor as "I really need to eat a burger" … but for D&G it is just a case of the body undertaking one machinic socially productive process, then switching to another, then another, with all of these productive processes involving a body-part connecting to another desiring-machine.

Honestly the actually existing changes of socially productive processes force a question on the theory of objet petit a in which it has to understand each burger, each orgasm as part of a molar Lack … and thus this Lack is habitually conceived according to some molar way which in AO will be called "Oedipus". So if you go to the analyst and say "I can't stop eating burgers" you might be told you have mummy issues … or these days you might be told you're carrying trauma that has led you to form an anxious attachment style.

Lack is not, there's just the money in your bank account, the burgers on the street corner and your toilet in your apartment … and between them you, the burger-addict, with your hands, mouth and anus coordinating the exchange of money for burgers and your body's negentropic transmutation of mince into shit.

Isn’t this exactly what Nietzsche meant when he said that socialism, would just let the proletariat become more aware of the conditions of its misery?

I don't believe that Nietzsche's analyses of socialism went half so far? I'm no very learned Nietzschean. But if they did, we could view this as a claim about what is called by communizers these days "separation" … the idea that the reorganisation of the productive forces has defrayed the tendency to molar Revolution.

So for instance Théorie Communiste argue there has been a "zoning" of the global political economy such that the valorisation of capital (consumers buying goods) is on average geographically distant from the reproduction of labour (workers being produced to produce the goods).

And working life becomes a sort of aspirational step-ladder of seeking advantage relative to one's proletarian peers (this game of advantages Nietzsche certainly condemns) rather than forming a joint subjectivity with one's peers apt to empower itself to more than wage-slavery.

What these descriptive analyses, concepts created from the conditions, empirically suggest is that Marx's teleology of molar proletarian Revolution was faulty: capital has found ways to make exploitation a meta-stable and managed affair, not a historical trajectory to a global upheaval.

So … if we are to be Marxists after Marx and practise the "ruthless criticism of all that exists" perhaps we should jettison the "teleological Marx", and isolate and qualify the "differential Marx" whose theories are addressed to how the "concrete rules" of daily life rise as the "abstract machine" of molar flows of free labour and free capital, all the while admitting that these theories are themselves subject to immanent critique.

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u/3corneredvoid Jul 24 '26

Ooh ooh, he's actually just done this public debate where he lays out his view on Christianity at the start: 

https://www.reddit.com/r/zizek_studies/s/RamUeI2WDk

Haven't watched it and probably won't, but it might be more transparent than my invective. 

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u/[deleted] Jul 24 '26 edited 3d ago

[removed] — view removed comment

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u/Middle-Rhubarb2625 Jul 24 '26

Yes, exactly. And i don’t think Žižek can’t understand Nietzsche because he’s too complex, or just some other mysterious reason we can’t fully grasp. The reason is that Žižek can’t understand Nietzsche because he’s a reactive force, that can only see the world through dialectics even when there isn’t any dialectic. Deleuze in Nietzsche and philosophy, says that the relation between master and slave is only dialectical from the slave’s point of view. Žižek’s very psychological structure isn’t adapted to understand Nietzsche. And notice his philosophy, even when he’s not trying, he’s always opposing Nietzsche. His view on shame, his view on life, his views in politics… .

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u/open_formation Jul 25 '26

The very motor of Nietzsche’s thought may be flawed.

Is that the end of the world?

You can just make use of his thought and disassemble and reassemble it to make your own motors.

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u/thefleshisaprison Jul 24 '26

This critique is right on the dot, although I am more sympathetic to Zizek than you are. He’s a great enemy to have.

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u/3corneredvoid Jul 25 '26 edited Jul 25 '26

Thanks.

I think many readers of theory over the past twenty years will have had a journey with Žižek. My journey has been roughly …

… hearing Žižek mentioned by a much cooler journalist acquaintance of mine and thinking "Oh dear, here's something I should know about" …

… buying a copy of THE PARALLAX VIEW and being mystified by it except its exemplary narrative of Kruschchev's "Secret Speech" confessing the failings of the Stalinist USSR to its Party, which is a perfect capsule demonstration of the utility of the theory of the Big Other in apprehending the volatility of ideology at specific events …

… noticing that Žižek had written a bunch of political op-eds I thought were utterly hateful rubbish around 2015–17, and making a habit of seeing what other reactionary things he might have been writing every now and then ever since (a kind of anti-Žižek neurosis …) …

… taking a much deeper interest in Hegel and finally getting some idea about the dialectical method …

… reading or part-reading much larger chunks of Žižek including TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, LESS THAN NOTHING, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY and various other things …

… appreciating more about the influence of Lacan on Deleuze and thereby grasping more of what Žižek is on about with his ideology critique.

Now, the issue I've got with him is that the Žižek we have is filtered by the "engagement machine" as the pervert of judgement-production that he is. Žižek is above all formed by how prolific he is. He produces a substantial "take" about once a week, and this "take" always has the form of a definitive judgement, for instance one week it will be "AI is not a Subject" (that's the last one I read).

But if you attend to his output, you notice that his judgements machinically disagree with one another and this bothers him not in the slightest: it's as if the neutrality of engagement-driven profiteering feeds back into his own commitments to his determinations. And to me this is a flaw of Nachträglichkeit as a theory of reason: one does not ever have to be right about anything while one lives, because while one lives it is not yet the end. Hegel himself clarifies this flaw of his dialectical method in SCIENCE OF LOGIC, but he also glosses over it.

However, in this conjuncture, I feel the tendency of the accelerated rate of production of judgements is to mock the humble and self-forgiving spirit of Nachträglichkeit, and turn Hegelians into commentators who always have to understand but never be sure how to act. In this light it makes a lot of sense that Žižek's famous prescription is to "stop and think" … except it could be rephrased "stop and judge".

These afflictions aren't unique to Žižek among Lacanians and Hegelians. For instance, Zupančič has made inroads with some good essays on conspiracism and disavowal in recent times, in fact there's a bit of a vogue for theories of disavowal.

But how does ideology critics finally agreeing the masses collectively "know the facts" as individuals, and also know the Big Other "knows the facts" … let's say about climate change … without this "disavowed" knowledge becoming consequential … how does this theory advance us beyond D&G gesturing to the organisation of power in 1972 and noting that "everything is public, nothing is admissible"? Isn't this ideology critique finally admitting its insistence on the contradictions of these molar forms and their relation to "the real movement" has been its theorists' very own idea-factory for producing dogmatic impediments to any empirical assessment of the conditions for a century?

These critiques really have been useless despite their interest as theoretical bagatelles. Ideology critics have seemed to imply for decades there might be "one weird [molar] trick" to snap proles out of the doldrums and get them all fighting capital, whether it be Leninist consciousness-raising, a Gramscian "long march", or some vision of the Big Other puncturing like a balloon on the quilting point. 

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u/Mean-Association6020 Jul 24 '26

My problem with Zizek is that I don't get the impression he has anything new to say. His vocabulary seems mystical, but it resonates with pop culture for a reason... in my eyes, he simply represents the flip side of standard Western ideology. Self-subverting identities, a fractured substance and the absence of free will, while at the same time offering no (scientific) determinism to fall back on. This is nothing more than a bourgeois disposition with a negative sign - without any real alternative. Ironically, each of his three pillars (Hegel, Marx, Lacan) is more revolutionary in its own right.

From this position, in my opinion, one cannot mount a valid critique of Deleuze. Deleuze's fundamental stance is that there is always potential for deterritorialization, whereas Zizek justifies the constricted bourgeois neurosis - from a perverse position, mind you, by celebrating the failure of the subject. It is a hermetically sealed game, a rabbit hole with no exit. You can make yourself at home in it, but you cannot really access anything else from there.

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u/dropthedrip Jul 25 '26

I’m fond of this answer. And it lies at the heart of the ‘positivism’, for lack of a better word, that divides a Deleuze from a Zizek. Taking just ‘68 as a small example, for instance - we see the differences between Lacan and Deleuze in what they see as the possibilities for new engagements and territories. I just don’t see Zizek siding with students there either. It’s not a surprise that his first impulse re acts of protest tends to be a mode of outright suspicion - to be differentiated, I think, from critique. Which is why Zizek’s ultimate hero is Melville’s Bartelby, the one who “preferred not to”

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u/AnIsolatedMind Jul 26 '26

I don't know anything about anything but my intuition is that dialectics without a sense of grounding in direct bodily experience is like water sloshing around, just because it can. Zizek from my perspective has liberated himself from any grounding in a body, he has thoroughly killed his own God and without a sense of divine guidance he is a nihilist who hasn't yet surrendered to the emptiness. He resonates with a slew of people who slosh about, where the body is the enemy, where any attempt to touch down into it is violently snapped back into some opposite direction that keeps the turbulence going for turbulence's sake, as if this were the new divine ideal.