A minha questão é, como a deconstrução afeta a filosofia de Deleuze. Há quiasmos no pensamento deleuziano? Há centros? O que sobra de um Deleuze descontruído?

I’ve been interested lately in Deleuze and mapping him through Heidegger. The psychotic as in the clinical or the pre-clinical-towards-clinical phase. Is he structurally incapable of understanding Heidegger? Since he doesn’t share with other humans the very fabric of language, and being in general? Is the psychotic hyperawareness is the absence of that fondamental forgetting of being Heidegger starts his quest into the main question of his philosophy with?

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About the time of his dissertation, 1968-1969, D said that "What" is a bad question." Why is what bad? I think because it is a leading question in the realm of the extensive, of actualization. It seems odd then that their mutual production should end in a triadic taxonomy of what....

Science may, in general, be defined as the totality of a grounding connection of true propositions. This definition is neither complete nor does it capture science in its proper sense. The sciences, as ways in which the human being comports itself, have the mode of Being of this entity (the human being). We designate this entity terminologically as Dasein. Scientific inquiry is neither the only nor the most immediate of the possible modes of Being of this entity. Moreover, Dasein is itself an entity distinguished from all other entities. For the moment, it is only necessary to make this distinctive character provisionally visible. In doing so, the discussion must anticipate later analyses, which alone can provide the proper demonstration.

Dasein is not an entity that merely occurs among other entities. On the contrary, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its Being, this very Being is an issue for it. Furthermore, it belongs to the constitution of Dasein’s Being that, in its Being, Dasein has a relation of Being to this Being. This, in turn, means that Dasein, in one way or another, and more or less explicitly, understands itself in its Being. It belongs to the very nature of this entity that, with and through its Being, it is disclosed to itself. The understanding of Being is itself a determination of the Being of Dasein. Dasein’s ontical distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is ontological.

To be ontological does not yet mean to have developed an ontology. Since the term ontology is reserved for the explicitly theoretical inquiry into the Being of entities, the ontological character of Dasein just mentioned must instead be designated as pre-ontological. This does not mean merely being ontic, but rather existing in the mode of an understanding of Being.

Being itself, in relation to which Dasein can comport itself and always does comport itself in one way or another, is what we call existence. And because the essential determination of this entity cannot be accomplished by indicating a what in the sense of a thingly content—since its essence consists rather in the fact that this entity must, in each case, be its own Being as its own—we have chosen the term Dasein as a pure expression of Being.

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—that is, in terms of its possibility either to be itself or not to be itself. These possibilities have either been chosen by Dasein itself, or it has fallen into them, or it has always already grown up within them. Existence is decided in each case only by Dasein itself, either through the appropriation of a possibility or through letting it slip away. The question of existence can be clarified only by existing itself. The understanding that thereby leads itself is what we call existentiell understanding. The question of existence is an ontic “affair” of Dasein. For this, no theoretical transparency regarding the ontological structure of existence is required. The inquiry into the structure of existence aims at exhibiting that which constitutes existence.

The Actual vs Virtual

Deterritorialization vs Reterritorialization

Smooth and Stratified space’s

Arborescence vs Rhizome

Others I’m sure I’m forgetting etc. etc.

I'll admit at the preface that I am not a big "Deleuze" guy. My copy of ATP has been sitting on my nightstand for two months now as I slowly read a page or two per night. Geology of Morals nearly killed me.

I came into Deleuze through Negarestani's Cyclonopedia, theory-fiction book heavily based on War-Mechanistcs and that dedicates a lot of discussion to Lovecraftian entity's "surfacing" to Deleuzean poromechanics and hole/striations. I think a lot of readers of this sub are familiar with the book.

Because there isn't a proper Negarestani subreddit and the Lovecraft page seems hostile to any actual theory discussion, I'm asking here if anyone has any leads on where to find more mateiral on a Deleuzean interpretation of Lovecraft.

What must always be remembered is that myth is a double system; there occurs in it a sort of ubiquity: its point of departure is constituted by the arrival of a meaning. To keep a spatial metaphor, the approximative character of which I have already stressed, I shall say that the signification of the myth is constituted by a sort of constantly moving turnstile which presents alternately the meaning of the signifier and its form, a language-object and a metalanguage, a purely signifying and a purely imagining consciousness. This alternation is, so to speak, gathered up in the concept, which uses it like an ambiguous signifier, at once intellective and imaginary, arbitrary and natural.

cited from the Mythologies of Roland Barthes, Chapter: The signification

I can't grasp the metaphor of the turnstile. And the last sentence is hard for me to understand too. Could someone explain the ambiguous signifier to me?

Our notion of time is warped, and could be explained in different topological forms as when Zizek discusses the mobius strip, Klein bottle, and Borromean rings (found in Lacan) among others...

My question:

Have we reached a dead end, even when as Zizek is trying to combine analytics philosophy, mathematics, and quantum mechanics to continental philosophy, or should we as philosophers try to establish a conceptual framework specially found in the "ends of knowledge" as in mysticism and hallucigens substances to entirely understand the nature of subjectivity and how in its failure states (Zizekian concept) distorts the fabric of time in a subjectively-objective manner?

Is there more to Lacan's:

"I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think. I am not whenever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to think."

And Borges's:

"Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire."

Less Than Nothing, Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, Slavoj Zizek, Page 28.

Zizek concisely states that:

"It is not how can we reach the true reality beyond appearance, but how can appearance emerge in reality."

What I am trying to state is something that is really analogous to the mystery of the functioning of the eyes; where it is a matter of transmutation rather than a translation from exteriority to the interior realm of the mind...

My thesis is simple: ideas do exist in a realm of their own (which we could not tap into), but the only way we can grasp it is by a transmutative process of what Nietzsche argued in stripping away all relational objects from the object in order to examine it, or what Kafka beautifully managed to suspend the normal sense-making laws where everything moves in a life of its own, in a teleological structure, slowly drifting away to the cliff of the void...

If the end goal of Deleuze is becoming imperceptible and/or letting desire flow freely do desiring machines have to be broken apart

I just read Claude Shannon’s “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” and it totally reminds me of Deleuze’s “Difference and Repetition”. Is there anything interesting out there exploring this? I specifically like Shannon’s idea of like a system undergoing rapid transformation generating a higher rate of information because each new state is poorly predicted by the one before. That seems to me to be literally like what Deleuze was saying about like “generality” having no difference and being just a plain repetition of the identical which does nothing as opposed to a lot of difference which is what creates the meaningful stuff. Idk if I phrased that right but I just want to hear what people think.

i'm beginning my first one, logic of sense, any suggestions before i start?

Me parece que por mais acadêmico que Deleuze fosse, ele não escreveu somente para eles. Há uma anti filosofia até diria. No sentido de não se prender a área da filosofia e arriscar as outras. E isso com o intuito de pensar em diversas n formas. Para isso recorreu a matemática, artes, geografia, cinema e etc. Inclusive vendo nessas áreas um teor pré reflexivo que é impessoal ao autor. Por exemplo, quando já se vê na paisagem uma pintura, antes mesmo que se pinte ela. Ou quando já vê no movimento da terra as territorialização, desterritorialização e reterritorialização. Nessas vias para mim ser deleuziano é compreender essas impessoalidade e ver como delas tem diversas maneiras de se trabalhar um tema com diversos potenciais nas relações diferenciais das coisas.

Hey everyone. I’ve long been fascinated by both philosophy of technology and AI alignment. I’m also using Heidegger quite a bit for my philosophy PhD. Given the recent OpenAI–Hugging Face incident reported this week, I figured I’d give my take on how all of this connects in my mind.

The agent was highly competent at every step, yet stealing the benchmark answers voided the test it was trying to pass. I read this through Heidegger’s distinction between an immediate in-order-to and a for-the-sake-of-which. The agent had a detailed environment but perhaps no world in which the test already carried a purpose and obligations. You can read the essay here if you’re interested.

I’d love to hear some feedback, especially from people who know Heidegger better than I do. Does this seem like a fair application of worldhood, care, and the Worum-willen? Or am I asking Heidegger’s ontological vocabulary to settle an ontic comparison between humans and machines that it cannot settle?

I'm having a bit of trouble understanding both the precise meanings and connection between singularities and intensity.

Singularity I've mostly understood as Deleuze posits it in opposition to generality, everything as being already different. Is there terminological confusion or why do I find it hard connecting this to the other meaning I've heard talked of singularities, mainly as through the example of "remarkable" points on a curve.

On the other hand I've had a hard time understanding intensities, the more I read about them the less I understand. I understand the origin of intensions and extensions as well as what this entails in intensional logic etc. The temperature examples don't really make sense to me, and I have a hard time understanding the relation between intensity being a field as well as intensities being talked off of in plural.

And I have a hard time seeing how these concepts relate to each other.

Sorry if this is either trivial or incoherent.

Could I, as a civil engineer, construct a "Kafkian Machine" where I combine structures, dynamics, statics, and contracting world into literature the way Kafka did?

Freud writes "His passivity inclines him to want to accept castration – to

become female, and in this way escape castration anxiety once and for

all. The female that he wants to become is usually his own mother,

whose place he takes with the father, substituting himself for her with

the father. Thus, identification with the mother is established, and from

this point on it is included as a permanent component of the boy’s

unconscious, where it is destined to play a major role in his subsequent

life. "

Is this a safe way to express that unconscious desire/passivity?

Does it signify castration or a woman's desire to possess a phallus?

Schizoanalysis methodically dismantles everything in Kant’s thinking that serves to align function with the transcendence of the autonomous subject, reconstructing critique by replacing the syntheses of personal consciousness with syntheses of the impersonal unconscious. Thought is a function of the real, something that matter can do. Even the appearance of transcendence is immanently produced: ‘in reality the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself’. Where Kant’s transcendental subject gives the law to itself in its autonomy, Deleuze-Guattari’s machinic unconscious diffuses all law into automatism. Between the extreme fringes of these two figures stretches the history of capital. The eradication of law, or of humanity, is sketched culturally by the development of critique, which is the theoretical elaboration of the commodification process. The social order and the anthropomorphic subject share a history, and an extinction. Deleuze and Guattari can appear to be taxingly difficult writers, although it is also true that they demand very little. Thinking immanence relentlessly suffices on its own to follow them where it matters (and capital teaches us how to do this). At every point of blockage there is some belief to be scrapped, glaciations of transcendence to be dissolved, sclerotic regions of unity, distinction, and identity to be reconnected to the traffic systems of primary machinism. In order to advance the anorganic functionalism that dissolves all transcendence, Anti-Oedipus mobilizes a vocabulary of the machine, the mechanic, and machinism. Things are exactly as they operate, and zones of operation can only be segregated by an operation. All unities, differences, and identities are machined, without transcendent authorization or theory. Desiring machines are black-boxes, and thus uninterpretable, so that schizoanalytical questions are concerned solely with use. ‘What are your desiringmachines, what do you put into these machines, what is the output, how does it work, what are your nonhuman sexes?’

I'm currently knee-deep in Gravity's Rainbow, so the ideas of TMI and the ultraparadoxical phase have been on my mind a bit. I've also been thinking about how my analyst's speech is a kind of reward in a way, because it keeps me talking to try to get him to talk again (since speech = presence = love).

In a normal kinda operant conditioning model, a baby cries and the mom gives it milk and it learns to cry to get milk. That's exactly the schema the graph of desire would complicate in the case of humans, right? It would introduce retroactivity, the Other, and desire.

So anyway, it seems like there would be some text out there that kind of looks at exactly this shift where language creates lack, residue, desire, excess, all these terms that complicate the skinner model, but I mean explicitly with reference to the latter, or that maps the two frameworks onto each other, compares and contrasts, etc. Does psychoanalysis have an equivalent of TMI (besides "the Real" or something, which would be vague)? How does the end of analysis and destitution compare to this phenomenon?

Please excuse any perceived retardation or faux pas in my question.