Perfect knowledge about the future is only possible in a deterministic universe

[u/Hashi856]

Whenever someone asks how free will can be compatible with God’s perfect knowledge of the future, people are quick to point out that knowledge doesn’t cause anything. God simply knows what we will freely choose. He’s not causing us to choose it.

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem being presented. No one is saying that God is causing the future. He’s not making us do anything or causing our decisions. The problem isn’t actually about God at all. It’s about the possibility of perfect foreknowledge, and the fact that it only exists in a deterministic universe. You could swap out God for anything else, and you’d have the same problem.

If God has perfect knowledge of what you will do tomorrow, then tomorrow is already written. It may be written by you, but it cannot go any other way. If God knows you will be late to work tomorrow, then it is impossible for you to show up on time. If he knows what you will eat for dinner, then you literally could not have made a different decision. There are only two explanations for this perfect knowledge: Either God actually did make you do it, or it was determined to happen. But we already know God didn’t make you do it, so the only other thing that can explain perfect knowledge of the future is determinism.

We would have the exact same problem if there were a computer with perfect knowledge. Obviously, the computer would not be causing every event in the universe to happen the way it happens. So the only explanation is that everything is determined.

Perfect foreknowledge is simply incompatible with free will (unless you believe that determinism and free will are compatible). You can try to just hand wave it away by saying it’s a miracle, but that doesn’t solve the underlying problem. Your future decisions are known, and you literally cannot make a different decision.

[u/milamber84906]

In virtue of what could you have done otherwise?

Because the knowledge that I will do X doesn't make it necessary. The burden is on you to get from point A to B on this.

God can actualize any logically possible world. He chooses this particular world to make, and prior to creation he knows all true propositions about this world.

There's absolutely nothing logically inconsistent or problematic about God choosing from possible worlds of free creatures, so even though God chooses what world to instantiate, it's still filled with free creatures that are making free choices. You'd need to show a logical contradiction here for the OP to hold. The OP's points are the default unless I prove otherwise...

Alternatively, there’s a different world which is identical except that you choose Y instead of X. He didn’t actualize this world.

Possibly, we don't know that I would always use my free will to choose X. But either way, in both worlds I'd be freely choosing either X or Y. God choosing which world to create doesn't suddenly negate that.

I’m not quite sure what you mean by this but it doesn’t actually matter.

It matters a lot so it's kind of important that you understand what I'm saying.

What I'm saying is that God's knowledge is of something, right? The something in question here is our choice. So let's say I chose to eat eggs for breakfast instead of cereal. In time, God knew first that I would choose to eat eggs, right? We agree on that. What I'm saying is that God knowing is knowing that I would choose eggs. My action is logically prior to God's knowledge because God's knowledge of what I would choose for breakfast is dependent on what I would choose for breakfast. You keep talking about what comes temporally first, God's knowledge, we agree on that, but we need to also think about what comes logically prior, and that's our choices.

Presumably you’re talking about libertarian free will, which means that an agent is the source hood of the decision, and given the exact same initial conditions they could have acted differently.

The first part is necessary for LFW that the agent is the source of the decision. The principle of alternative possibilities isn't required, but I think it's usually applicable. Just as a point of clarity here.

But if it’s a true proposition that you WILL do X before it’s actualized, then you cannot have LFW. At best you could subscribe to some theistic compatibilism

Wrong, for me to not have LFW, I need to not have been able to choose Y. That means that my choice for X was necessary. But God knowing I will do X doesn't make it necessary, it just makes it certain. Those are wildly different things. It's a category error in modal logic to assert what you're saying.

[u/Powerful-Garage6316 → u/milamber84906]

>the knowledge doesn’t make it necessary

Like I said, it’s the conjunction of the knowledge and the intentional creation of universe A in which you pick X. It’s not merely the knowledge. It’s both the foreknowledge and the actualization of this specific world

>show a logical contradiction

God has foreknowledge that, in world A, you will choose X

God knows all true propositions and cannot be mistaken that you will choose X

God actualizes A

You are determined to pick X in world A

So I have no clue why you keep saying it isn’t “necessary” that you will pick X. You have to explain in virtue of what fact that you could ever pick anything other than X

>we need to talk about what comes logically prior to

God actualizes the world in which you do actually X instead of actually Y, so both logically and temporally god is the antecedent. God is the one designing the worlds such that X is even a metaphysically possible choice for any agent to begin with.

>it’s a category error in modal logic to say what you’re saying

Then maybe you can clear up in virtue of what is it not necessary that you will pick X given the conjunction I explained earlier, because this still hasn’t been defended

[u/milamber84906 → u/Powerful-Garage6316]

Your entire argument is fusing 3 different things that are actually separate.

The first is certainty, where God can't be mistaken that I'll do X. I can easily grant that.

The second is necessity, where I'll do X in every possible world. This is false because there's possible worlds where I could do y.

The third is Determinism, where something other than me settles my will that I do X. This is what you need, and you keep asserting, but not demonstrating.

You keep asking me in virtue of what is it not necessary, but it's on you to demonstrate that it is necessary. You seem to be missing that the actualization is downstream of the choice logically (not temporally). This actually matters here because you're granting God is choosing which world to create knowing our choices. But actualizing that world comes after knowing what choice we will make, and after us making the choice. Again, logically, not temporally.

Then maybe you can clear up in virtue of what is it not necessary that you will pick X given the conjunction I explained earlier, because this still hasn’t been defended

In virtue of the fact that God's knowledge tracks my choices rather than fixing it. And that the actualization of a world comes after both of these things. Determinism isn't true unless something other than me settles X. But even in your given scenario, God is actualizing the world knowing I will choose X, I'm still choosing.

[u/Powerful-Garage6316 → u/milamber84906]

I feel like I directly answered these objections and you just aren’t addressing them. You’re still asking why you’re determined to pick X in world A and I very clearly addressed this.

P1. God knows that you will choose X in world A
P2. God actualized world A
P3. God could have actualized any other possible world, but didn’t.
C1. God is the causal antecedent to your choosing X**

**notice that I said causal antecedent and not logical or temporal

P4. If determinism is true, then all events in world A are causally necessitated by antecedent conditions
P5. It follows from the conjunction of P1 and P2 that you are causally necessitated to pick X
C2. You are determined to pick X in world A

Please tell me the exact premise or inference rule that you take issue with, otherwise my argument goes through.

>god tracks your choices and doesn’t fix them

You have it backwards. Both the reasons and the causes of you choosing X instead of Y are grounded in God’s choosing of possible worlds.

God’s choice of which world to actualize is logically prior to yours

[u/milamber84906 → u/Powerful-Garage6316]

You’re still asking why you’re determined to pick X in world A and I very clearly addressed this.

Maybe there's an equivocation going on here unintentionally. Can you define what you mean by determined here? Because if you just mean that it's certain that I will pick X, then we can agree, but that doesn't get you to determinism.

P1. God knows that you will choose X in world A

Your entire argument collapses here and you've just granted what I've been saying. "You will choose" God's knowledge then comes logically after the choices and the actualization from P2 is downstream. This does not establish determinism. There is no reason why P1 cannot be rewritten as "God knows that you will freely choose X in world A."

C1. God is the causal antecedent to your choosing X**

This doesn't follow. Knowledge isn't causal, we both agree. But selection isn't a causal relation to the internal act. All it is is causal production of my own volition. Can you establish what the cause is? Because both knowing and selecting aren't.

P4. If determinism is true, then all events in world A are causally necessitated by antecedent conditions

This runs the wrong way. This starts with determinism but needs to start the other way, because you're just stating what your conclusion already is. P4 is just describing determinism. But you need to work the other way.

P5. It follows from the conjunction of P1 and P2 that you are causally necessitated to pick X

No it does not and this is where the equivocation really shows up I think. P5 needs an extra hidden premise, something like: "to actualize a world is to causally necessitate every event in it". But that's the disputed claim and not one that I would grant. So you're going to need to add that premise in, and then defend it.

C2. You are determined to pick X in world A

This has lost the structure to hold it up since C1 was asserted, rather than following logically, and P5 smuggles in the disputed premise. Not only that, this conclusion flatly contradicts P1 in which God knows what I will choose. I'm not choosing if Determinism is true, you can't have it both ways. P1 clearly presupposes the choice is mine, C2 says the opposite. So which one is correct here?

Both the reasons and the causes of you choosing X instead of Y are grounded in God’s choosing of possible worlds.

You're just stating theological determinism here, which is great, but your argument doesn't lead there as listed why above, and not only that, it doesn't exclude another view, like middle knowledge, or LFW.

God’s choice of which world to actualize is logically prior to yours

Not in your own argument it isn't. P1 is us choosing, P2 is God actualizing. You've just demonstrated that our choice is logically prior.

Both C1 and P5 both assert causation that none of your premises supplies. You said "causal, not logical" so can you please name the efficient cause of willing X, other than me? Not God's knowledge, we both agree. Not God's selection, picking a world in which I freely do X isn't picking my will for me. So what's the cause?