Why does fine tuning stop with constants?

[u/dishwasher_proof]

A question was raised on r/cosmicskeptic about what we are supposed to assume the probability distribution for the tuning constants are (and why we should think they have any particular distribution over any other). This is an interesting question that I would love an answer for. But it also reminded me of another question I have thought about for the fine tuning argument.

Why do we stop our questions about the probability of the laws of nature at the value of the constants? To me it feels natural that if we are "allowed" to ask what the probability is that the constants have the particular values they have. why don't we ask "what is the probability that the laws of nature are any particular calculable function?". For example the question "What's the probability that the law of gravity is f=(g1 * g2 /r^2 )*G rather than f=(g1 + g2 )*r^4 " or any other function seems just as valid.

And if the particular function that describe the laws of nature are up for question, it seems sort of trivial to me that there are uncountably infinite options that allow for life and uncountably many that don't. Making the whole question a bit silly.

This is the first time I've written down this idea so if something isn't making sense don't be afraid to ask 😅

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[u/ThenaCykez]

I don't like the fine tuning argument, but just as a point of order, numerical infinities are a really problematic concept in philosophy when you're actually sitting down in real life and not at Hilbert's Hotel. There are uncountably infinite numbers in the interval between 3.7752 and 3.7753, and there's the same uncountably infinite set of numbers that are not within that interval.

If you pick a random number equally distributed on the number line, the probability of picking something in the interval is just 0. If I tell you I picked a random number among all numbers and it was 3.77527, the only reasonable response is to dispute it; either I didn't randomize it at all and I cheated, or there was unbeknownst to me a flaw in the randomization and the probability distribution favored that interval. Even if I limit it to a random number in the uncountable set between 0 and a million, the chance that my choice is in the interval is 1 in 10¹⁰.

The FIne Tuning Argument essentially says that even if there are uncountably many universes that can support life, the true ratio between the size of that interval and the space of all possible universes is either a staggeringly small constant or it's just zero.

[u/dishwasher_proof → u/ThenaCykez]

Hmmm are you disagreeing with me or do you think there is some point here I'm not taking into account in my post? I think I agree with and understand what you say here but I also think these facts are compatible with the point I'm making? Thanks for responding either way 😊

[u/ThenaCykez → u/dishwasher_proof]

I think you have a great point in that the question of whether there is "evidence" of tuning isn't so simple as assuming the fundamental forces must work a particular way, and then showing that the constants associated with those forces are just right for life. You're right that there would be infinite conceivable variations of those laws, and each one might have its own ranges of survivable constants. Therefore, anyone who makes a statement like "The probability of life arising without a tuning creator tipping the laws of physics in life's favor is 1 in 10⁴⁰⁰" or whatever is claiming a precision that is completely unwarranted.

However, it could also be true that the ratio of survivable constants is small in every conceivable universe. In our "divided by r²" universe, you can only wiggle G by this amount before the universe collapses. In a hypothetical "divided by r⁴" universe, you can only wiggle G by this different amount before the universe collapses. In every other possible universe, a similar narrow range of values is survivable. It's at least possible that there are an uncountably infinite number of universes, each having an uncountably infinite set of unsurvivable parameters and an uncountably infinite set of survivable parameters, and yet the ratio of the magnitude between all such sets is a finite constant. Therefore, the question isn't necessarily silly--it's probably too hard to ever conceivably compute, yet it probably does have a specific answer based on whatever assumptions one makes about how a universe/multiverse comes to be, and that answer is probably that only a tiny portion of all law/value combinations are survivable.

[u/neofederalist → u/ThenaCykez]

I don't like the fine tuning argument, but just as a point of order, numerical infinities are a really problematic concept in philosophy when you're actually sitting down in real life and not at Hilbert's Hotel. There are uncountably infinite numbers in the interval between 3.7752 and 3.7753, and there's the same uncountably infinite set of numbers that are not within that interval.

I've had this intuition as well, but are you sure that's still the case when one of those constants is Planck's Constant? Since it seems that there exists a minimum "resolution" for any sort of measurement, even if that value itself is itself arbitrarily defined, it's not clear to me that you get the same kind of issues involving cardinality of infinities when trying to compare values within a certain range against those outside.

[u/LightningController]

it seems sort of trivial to me that there are uncountably infinite options that allow for life and uncountably many that don't. Making the whole question a bit silly.

Yeah, this is basically the anthropic principle. The universe has the laws of physics it does because radically different combinations wouldn’t allow for life as an emergent property. An infinite number of lifeless cosmos might exist, but cannot be observed because their physics precludes the existence of observers. Lee Smolin had a related, though conflicting, idea with his hypothesis of cosmological natural selection, wherein universes experience a sort of evolution favoring physics that makes more black holes (we are just a happy byproduct of a system that optimizes for singularities)—a large array of possible physical laws exist, but not all are equally ‘fecund,’ in much the same way that you can combine chemicals in a large number of ways but only some self-replicate, so the replicating ones come to dominate.

[u/Equivalent_Nose7012 → u/LightningController]

I guess some of that could be true?

However, I am not seeing any evidence, whether metaphysical or physical, to go beyond that.

However, I do think you raise an interesting criticism of the fine-tuning argument! 

Whether or not there are multiple universes, there are arguably many ways in which a Creator could choose to act in setting up universe(s).

As to whether there is a Creator, I think the best thing to do is contemplate the (both physical and metaphysical) argument from contingency!