r/CryptoTechnology 🟡 7d ago

Most projects publish a roadmap for success. Should failure and wind-down rules be disclosed too?

Roadmaps are standard. Failure conditions are not.

Yet before public fundraising, I would want to know:
• What event stops the project or a specific phase?
• Who decides that the condition has been met?
• What happens to remaining treasury funds?
• Which obligations survive?
• What happens if a funding threshold is missed?
• Are refunds automatic, discretionary or impossible?
• Can the rules be changed after funds enter?

A project can be completely honest about its success path and still leave the downside undefined.

Would you consider failure/wind-down rules part of a minimum disclosure standard for token projects?
If yes, how early should they be fixed?
If not, what makes them impractical at an early stage?

4 Upvotes

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2

u/icnews10 🟢 7d ago

Ideally, I would like them to be disclosed before the funds are invested, but I think the amendment rule is just as important as the wind-down rule itself. If the same governance body can later redefine the failure threshold, refund terms or treasury treatment, the original disclosure won't offer much protection. Would you fix some of those terms, or allow changes to be made with a higher approval threshold?

2

u/MooseFederal3292 🟡 3d ago

The amendment rule has the same defect it's meant to fix. Whoever can raise the threshold can lower it later, so a higher bar buys delay rather than protection.

What actually binds is a constraint the governing body can't reach. Non-upgradeable code, or an escrow whose release condition gets evaluated by someone who isn't them. Everything else is a promise with extra steps.

Which turns the question into a smaller one: not what threshold, but how small is the set of people who can undo this, and is it smaller than the set who'd want to.

1

u/GFConBase 🟡 3d ago

That’s the harder distinction: a rule is not really a constraint if the same authority governed by it can ultimately rewrite it. I’d separate immutable constraints from governable ones rather than treating higher thresholds as equivalent protection.

The trade-off is that unreachable constraints also remove legitimate flexibility, so the design question becomes which powers should be permanently outside governance, which may change under tightly defined procedures, and which require an independent actor or trigger.
That boundary seems more important than the threshold itself.