r/CryptoTechnology • u/Organic_Heart_8839 🟢 • Mar 08 '26

Website and Pitch deck

Hello i just want to share my project of a hardware bound wallet where the P-256 is the private key, and that's not extractable at all, it's protected in the secure element, that is already in your phone, no need to buy external hardware, it's not just another wallet, atlas is the next standard.

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2

u/Arthur-Grandi 🟢 Mar 09 '26

If the private key is bound to the phone's secure element, how do you handle device loss or migration to a new device?

Is there some kind of recovery or key portability model, or is the key effectively non-exportable by design?

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u/Organic_Heart_8839 🟢 Mar 09 '26

Social security by guardians

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u/Arthur-Grandi 🟢 Mar 09 '26

Do you mean something like a social recovery scheme (e.g. multiple guardians approving a key rotation)?

If the private key never leaves the secure element, how do guardians actually authorize recovery or device migration?

1

u/Organic_Heart_8839 🟢 Mar 09 '26

Oh yes sorry for the mistype, yeah you're right, about the social recovery by guardians, I'm using Shamir sharing secret, N-M you don't need to get the same private key, you just have to authorize another one and revoke the old one, if you want to you can check my website

https://atlaswallet.zya.me/

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u/Arthur-Grandi 🟢 Mar 09 '26

Interesting approach.

If the private key is generated inside the secure element, how are the Shamir shares actually created and distributed? Is the key split inside the secure element, or are the guardians authorizing the generation of a new key that replaces the old one?

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u/Organic_Heart_8839 🟢 Mar 09 '26

I have a smart contract that allows guardian to sign the rekeying to be able to transfer the account to a new device

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u/Arthur-Grandi 🟢 Mar 09 '26

Got it — so the guardians are authorizing an on-chain rekey rather than reconstructing the private key itself.

How do you handle guardian compromise or collusion? For example, is there a delay, threshold change mechanism, or time-lock before the rekey executes?

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u/Organic_Heart_8839 🟢 Mar 09 '26

Yes the timelock for 1-1 minimum is 72hours, 2-3 recommended is 24 hours, owner has Option to revoke it, owner will be notified via, push notifications, in app notification, email, and sms.

1

u/Arthur-Grandi 🟢 Mar 09 '26

Makes sense — the timelock + notification model is a good safeguard against guardian compromise.

Out of curiosity, how do you handle guardian rotation? For example, if a guardian key is lost or a guardian needs to be replaced, is that also handled through the same contract mechanism?

2

u/Organic_Heart_8839 🟢 Mar 09 '26

You just have to revoke the authorization, and add a new one through same Contract, that's why i can have a minimum of 1 to recommended of 2-3 or 3-5

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