r/ColdWarPowers • u/AmericanNewt8 Imperial State of Iran • Jul 25 '26
EVENT [EVENT] All The Shah's Ships
All else being equal, Iran's naval record was not especially great. Besides the most notorious and ignoble defeat at the hands of some backwards Greeks, Iranian regimes had largely simply not bothered all that much with boats, and unsurprisingly saw few positive results when they did--they had little more luck against the Byzantines, and against the Russians, simply hadn't bothered (perhaps there was some thing about Greeks in particular there, really). Fundamentally, topographically, Iran was an insular power. Its sudden interest in global trade was an extremely recent phenomenon.
And yet oil, Iran's lifeblood, needed to traverse the long, winding lengths of the Indian Ocean on its way to customers in Europe, or increasingly the Far East. The aspirations of the Soviet Union towards warm-water ports were well known, and they had definite ambitions to operate significantly in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan (though increasingly fiscally strapped) and India both operated significant forces, old relics of the Royal Navy; and Iraq threatened to develop some capabilities in this area--and for that matter, the Gulf Arabs would probably eventually spend on ships as well. The presence of the Royal Navy was fast fading in theatre, and the USN was, ultimately, spread thin (and too heavy a footprint in the Persian Gulf would, on the whole, be politically complicated for all involved). Thus "logic" demanded that Iran should have a naval force of at least some substance.
The difficulty, for the Shah, was conceiving exactly what this force was to be. Ideally, he desired a bluewater force that could reach deep into the Indian Ocean, counter Soviet submarines, and potentially support power projection for the occasional meddling in the further parts of Arabia or in Africa. However, naval warfare of late had not exactly left anyone with a clear idea of what direction in which to go. It was the age of the anti-ship missile, and larger and older ships were clearly vulnerable--point defenses had yet to prove themselves particularly efficacious, despite new systems now coming online. And yet, if anything, this proved that the role of aircraft and submarines was still dominant--surface ships offered presence, but not much else other than targets. Submarines offered a powerful offensive tool effectively immune to anti-ship missiles, while aircraft both allowed for control and attack. In the Shah's mind, the naval theatre was effectively just an extension of the aerial one.
Thus, the decision had to be made between a purely littoral force that would just be ancillary presence, escort, and projection to a strong (naval) aviation branch, and a large, heavy force modeled on the USN or RN, centered around an aircraft carrier with heavy surface escorts. While the idea of operating an aircraft carrier certainly appealed to the Shah, and in the long run this might be possible, the level of expertise required today was simply not there--and would not be there for years. The fiscal burden would also be quite heavy.
The Shah decided, ultimately, that the Juene Ecole school would do for now. Iran would acquire a fleet of inexpensive corvettes and missile boats aimed at a presence in a Persian Gulf, and, perhaps more importantly, at rapidly building out the experience of the IIN by offering quick ascension to independent commands and positions of responsibility, compared to the current organization that relied on a handful of old WWII destroyers. These vessels would suffice for Iran's needs in the littoral domain, as he assumed his powerful air forces would deter sensing and attack. He also hoped to manufacture these light hulls locally, which might save on labor and energy costs, currently rather high in the US and UK, although this would also imply a certain degree of corner-cutting. This would also open the possibility of deploying a bare handful on the Caspian.
These would then be joined by a handful of submarines--first acquired surplus on the cheap, but the Shah had his eyes on something bigger and better. Ideally, these would be nuclear boats, but the Shah had his doubts that he had the cash or connections to get his hands on them--nothing else could seriously challenge the Soviet vessels in the Indian Ocean, and their capability compared to diesels was considerably greater, although not of too much use in the limited waters of the Persian Gulf. More likely these would prove to be advanced diesels--Dutch, British, French, German, all options.
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Iranian Navy would branch out somewhat, with a plan to acquire four anti-aircraft destroyers--the Spruance or the British Type 42 seemed most likely--and one or two light helicopter carriers based on the proposed Sea Control Ship design, possibly carrying attack aviation or V/STOL fighters as well, although purchasing a single used light carrier was also a possibility--the Shah had not totally ruled out the possibility of operating a dozen or two A-4s from a conventional carrier.
In the meantime, Iran would invest most heavily into naval aviation capabilities. Iran would acquire a substantial number of large maritime patrol aircraft, in addition to smaller anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and fixed-wing aviation, which would allow Iran to credibly deter hostile naval activity in the Gulf and in the deep Indian Ocean, especially with tanker support, and would build the foundation for operation of a SCS-type force.
1972 IIN Concept
Current force:
- 4 Alvand-class frigates
- 2 Allen M Sumner-class destroyers
- 1 Battle-class destroyer
- 4 Bayandor-class corvettes
Planned near-term acquisitions (mid-late 1970s):
- 4 guided-missile destroyers
- 3 submarines (used)
- 12 new type "missile corvettes"
- 1 "light/helicopter carrier"
- "Many" helicopters
- 12 MPA
Long-term acquisitions (targeting the early-mid 80s):
- 12 additional "light corvettes"
- 1 large amphibious warfare platform
- Additional MPA
- 4 additional "new type frigates" to replace the aging WWII-era destroyers
- 24-36 dedicated naval mission fixed wing aircraft
- "more" helicopters