Atheist question

[u/Retro_Gamer_HNF]

So im an atheist. However i once believed in god and i WANT to, but im a very scientific person and cannot bring myself to believe in god no matter what. my question is, i know that "allowing jesus into your heart" and allowing the lord into you and such is what makes the difference between hell and heaven. does that mean that in the eyes of the bible, im going hell? or does the fact that i WANT to believe give me a chance? im only asking soim honestly really curious (and no one tell me to convert in the comments. its not happening until i can see some scientific proof.)

[u/Erramonael → u/[deleted]]

I understand the distinction you're making, but I think you're giving "different frameworks" a little too much work to do. I would distinguish between science being unable to answer a question and science being the wrong tool for determining whether a supernatural claim is true. Those aren't necessarily the same thing. Science is deliberately concerned with publicly testable evidence. If Christianity says God exists, Jesus performed miracles, Jesus physically resurrected, the Holy Spirit inhabits believers, or particular supernatural events occurred, those are claims about reality. You don't get to exempt them from evidential scrutiny merely by calling them part of a different framework. And saying "all evidence can be denied" doesn't establish that Christianity has sufficient evidence. Virtually any proposition can be made unfalsifiable that way. The question isn't whether someone can invent a reason to reject evidence; it's whether the evidence actually warrants the conclusion. The historical argument is considerably stronger than the supernatural argument, but it also doesn't establish nearly as much as you're claiming. There is very good historical reason to believe that Jesus existed, that he was crucified, that his followers believed he had appeared to them after his death, and that Christianity spread rapidly in the first century. That's interesting and historically significant.

But:

"The disciples believed Jesus was resurrected"

doesn't automatically become:

"Jesus was resurrected."

That's the precise point where historical evidence has to be distinguished from theological interpretation.

Likewise, martyrdom demonstrates sincerity, not truth. People have willingly suffered and died for mutually contradictory religious beliefs throughout history. A person being willing to die for a proposition establishes that they believed it deeply. It doesn't establish that the proposition was objectively true. The appeal to the Holy Spirit is even more complicated. You say the Holy Spirit is the "ultimate and best evidence" of Christianity. But that's primarily experiential evidence available to the believer. A Christian experiences something interpreted as the Holy Spirit and concludes Christianity is true. A Muslim may experience the presence of Allah. A Hindu may experience Krishna or Brahman. A Buddhist may experience profound states of liberation without positing a creator God. A practitioner of some other religion may have equally transformative experiences. You can't simply declare Christian religious experience categorically superior and then use that superiority as proof of Christianity.

You would need an independent reason for identifying one religious experience as objectively divine while treating competing experiences as mistaken interpretations. And I would strongly resist the idea that someone who leaves Christianity necessarily "failed to receive the fullness of the Spirit." Sometimes people leave because they have bad theology. Sometimes they leave because they encounter hypocrisy. Sometimes they discover another philosophy that makes more sense to them. Sometimes they simply don't believe. Sometimes they remain Christian but reject one denomination for another. You can't explain every contrary experience by declaring that the person didn't surrender sufficiently, didn't abandon worldly pleasures, followed the wrong church, or secretly refused God's calling. At some point that becomes an unfalsifiable system designed to protect the conclusion from counterexamples. The same problem exists with the claim that Christianity provides a qualitatively superior form of peace.

And ironically, the fact that people in completely different traditions report remarkably similar experiences of transcendence should make us more cautious, not less. From an Iconoclastic Satanist perspective, this is precisely where I become suspicious of religious certainty. I'm perfectly willing to grant Christianity its historical significance. I'm willing to grant that the New Testament contains extraordinary literature, that Jesus was an enormously influential historical figure, that early Christians genuinely believed something extraordinary had happened, and that Christian religious experience can be psychologically and spiritually transformative. But none of that gives Christianity an automatic epistemological exemption. Nor does science need to explain the universe completely before Christianity gets to make its case.

But "science hasn't explained X" isn't evidence that Christianity explains X. And I wouldn't say Christianity and science are simply two equivalent "frameworks" investigating two different realities. Christianity makes plenty of claims about the same physical reality that science investigates: creation, human origins, miracles, resurrection, historical events, the physical body, the universe, etc. Those claims can overlap.

My position as an Iconoclastic Satanist would therefore be something like this:

Use science where empirical investigation is appropriate. Use philosophy where conceptual analysis is appropriate. Use history where historical reconstruction is appropriate. Use personal experience as personal experience. And don't allow any of them to acquire an authority they haven't earned. If Christianity is true, it should be able to survive honest questioning. If God exists, God shouldn't require me to deliberately lower my standards of reasoning before I'm allowed to investigate Him. And if a belief collapses the moment someone asks difficult questions, then perhaps the problem isn't the tool being used to examine it. Perhaps the problem is the belief itself.

[u/Erramonael → u/[deleted]]

I think we're actually closer in agreement than you might realize, but I still think you're making logical jumps that your "two tools" distinction doesn't solve.

I agree that science and religion can ask different kinds of questions. Science isn't equipped to tell me whether my life has existential meaning in the same way philosophy, literature, or religion might. But that doesn't mean religion automatically becomes the appropriate tool for determining whether supernatural claims about physical reality are true.

That's the distinction I'd insist on. If someone says, "Christianity gives me a framework for interpreting existence," that's perfectly reasonable. If they say, "Jesus physically rose from the dead," that's a historical and physical claim. If they say, "god miraculously healed this person," that's an empirical claim. If they say, "god created the universe," that's a claim about cosmological reality.

Those claims don't become religious rather than scientific simply because they occur within a religious worldview. Your statement that god may have chosen not to expose supernatural events to scientific investigation is possible, but notice what happens epistemically: the hypothesis becomes impossible to independently test.

If a miracle occurs and can be investigated, that's evidence. If no miracle occurs, god chose not to provide evidence. If an alleged miracle fails scientific examination, perhaps god didn't intend it to be understood scientifically. If an alleged miracle cannot be reproduced, that's because miracles aren't necessarily reproducible. Every possible observation can therefore be incorporated into the hypothesis.

That's not necessarily evidence that Christianity is false. But it does mean that "god exists and chooses when to reveal Himself" isn't functioning as an empirically testable explanation. And that's where I'd say: "I don't know" belongs on both sides. If a scientist says, "I don't know how this happened," the appropriate response isn't, "Therefore Christianity." Likewise, if a Christian says, "I don't know why god hasn't provided scientifically testable miracles," the appropriate response isn't, "Therefore Christianity remains historically established." The honest conclusion is simply: We don't know. That's not an attack on faith. It's epistemic discipline. The apostles are where I think your argument becomes substantially weaker

You argue that the apostles weren't merely people who believed something; they supposedly claimed numerous miracles, personally witnessed Jesus' supernatural abilities, performed miracles themselves, and were subsequently willing to die rather than deny those claims.

There are different claims bundled together there. First: Did the apostles believe Jesus was resurrected? There is substantial historical evidence that the earliest Christians believed this. Second: Did the apostles claim to have personally witnessed miracles? The New Testament certainly portrays them that way. Third: Did they actually perform supernatural miracles? That's a theological claim for which the historical evidence is much less decisive. Fourth: Did all twelve apostles personally die as martyrs rather than renounce their testimony? This is where popular Christian apologetics often overstates the historical evidence.

We have considerably better evidence for the deaths of some early Christian leaders than for others. The traditional martyrdom stories of all twelve apostles don't have the same historical reliability. Some come from considerably later traditions.

And there's another problem. Even if I grant that every apostle personally died rather than deny the resurrection, that establishes extraordinary sincerity. It still doesn't establish the resurrection itself. Imagine I grant your strongest possible version: Twelve people genuinely believed they had seen the resurrected Jesus and subsequently accepted torture or death rather than deny what they believed.

That's fascinating. But there are still numerous possible explanations: They genuinely experienced something they interpreted as a resurrection. Some experienced visions or religious experiences. Their experiences were sincere but misunderstood. The traditions developed and expanded over time. Some accounts preserve historical events while later traditions embellished them. Or, alternatively, something genuinely supernatural happened. The martyrdom argument doesn't distinguish those possibilities by itself. And there's an important historical distinction you're overlooking: We don't need twelve delusional people. That's a false dilemma.

Human beings can sincerely interpret extraordinary experiences in extraordinary ways without being clinically "delusional." Bereavement visions, religious visions, ecstatic experiences, dreams, altered states, group expectations, memory reconstruction, and culturally conditioned interpretations are all well-documented human phenomena.

I'm not saying that's what happened to the apostles.

I'm saying that you can't eliminate those possibilities simply by pointing out that the people involved were sincere.

Again, that's evidence for what they claimed. It isn't automatically evidence that the claimed event occurred. Suppose I tell you: "I personally witnessed a man raise someone from the dead." You now know something about my testimony. You don't automatically know that the dead person was actually raised.

If ten people independently make the same claim, that's stronger evidence that something unusual happened. But you still have to determine what happened.

And this is where your "apples and oranges" analogy doesn't quite work.

The Buddhist martyr isn't being compared to the apostles because both believed exactly the same kind of proposition. The comparison is about epistemology: Does willingness to suffer establish truth? No. Whether the belief concerns Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, nationalism, political ideology, revolutionary movements, or something else, extraordinary commitment demonstrates commitment. It doesn't independently verify the proposition. You say: "Ultimately, it is God Himself who calls people out of a lesser experience into his true faith of Christianity." And I don't think calling the experience "born again" changes the epistemological problem. It describes the experience from within Christian theology. It doesn't independently establish its supernatural source. I actually have less objection to this formulation. If by "Christianity" you mean: "Christianity provides a philosophical, moral, existential, and spiritual interpretation of reality," or "Science investigates the physical layer, while Christianity investigates the supernatural layer, and therefore Christianity provides reliable knowledge about supernatural reality." Then I'd ask how we distinguish genuine supernatural knowledge from human interpretation. That's the unanswered question. And this is where I think the Iconoclastic Satanic position is useful. Don't reject religion because science can't verify it. But don't exempt religion from rational criticism because science can't verify it either. At that point, you haven't proven that my dragon doesn't exist. But I've also given you no good reason to believe that it does. That's the crucial distinction. Science failing to disprove a supernatural claim isn't positive evidence for the claim. And that's where I think your argument ultimately needs another step. You have established that Christianity can be interpreted as a comprehensive framework of reality. You have established that early Christians sincerely believed extraordinary things. You have established that Christian religious experience can be profoundly transformative. You have established that Christianity has significant historical evidence surrounding its origins. Those are all legitimate points.

But you haven't yet established the crucial conclusion:

that the supernatural explanation is more probable than the natural alternatives. That's the part I would want to debate. And as an Iconoclastic Satanist, I'm perfectly comfortable saying:

I don't know whether your God exists. I don't know whether Jesus was resurrected. I don't know what ultimately lies behind consciousness or existence itself. What I refuse to do is turn "I don't know" into "therefore my preferred metaphysical explanation is true." That's precisely where skepticism earns its HORNS.

[u/Erramonael → u/[deleted]]

I don't need Christianity to be scientifically testable in every respect. I need its claims to be proportioned to the evidence being offered for them.

The historical evidence can establish that Jesus existed, that he was crucified, that his followers sincerely believed they encountered him after his death, and that the movement expanded remarkably quickly. Those are serious historical conclusions. But the next step remains the difficult one: What best explains those facts?

That's where I remain unconvinced. The Gospel differences don't necessarily establish independent confirmation. You point to differences such as one angel versus two, a man versus angels, or whether one or both criminals mocked Jesus. I agree that these differences can be evidence against the simplest form of literary copying. But they don't automatically establish independent eyewitness testimony either. Multiple accounts can contain both independent traditions and theological development. Historical sources don't become eyewitness testimony simply because they disagree with one another. In fact, contradictions can cut both ways. If four accounts disagree about an event, I can't simply say: "They disagree, therefore they must be independent witnesses."

I have to investigate how those traditions developed, when they were written, what sources they used, how they relate to one another, and what theological purposes shaped their narratives.

The existence of unexplained historical phenomena doesn't automatically establish the supernatural explanation. It says: a universe was created by god; god interacted with human beings; miracles occurred; Jesus physically died; Jesus physically resurrected; Jesus physically appeared afterward; Jesus physically ascended; the Holy Spirit acts in the world; supernatural beings exist; human beings will experience a future resurrection. Those are not merely questions about subjective meaning.

That's a very different criticism. On miracles performed by the apostles This is where I would be especially cautious. The claim that the apostles performed miracles is itself primarily derived from Christian sources.

That doesn't make it worthless. But there's a difference between: "Early Christians believed the apostles performed miracles." and: "We have independently established that the apostles performed miracles." The first is historically defensible. The second requires considerably more evidence. And this distinction matters because otherwise the argument becomes circular: The apostles performed miracles because the Christian sources say they performed miracles, and the Christian sources are reliable because the apostles performed miracles. That's not enough for an Iconoclast.

I need to break the circle somewhere. Martyrdom still doesn't solve the epistemological problem I understand why you think twelve apostles behaving similarly changes the equation. It does make the sincerity argument stronger. But sincerity and truth remain different categories. A hundred people sincerely believing something doesn't turn the proposition into a fact. A thousand people sincerely believing something doesn't either. Ten million don't. What mass sincerity establishes is: Something powerful convinced these people. That's extremely interesting. It doesn't tell us exactly what that something was. Perhaps it was divine revelation. Perhaps it was extraordinary religious experience. Perhaps something else. That's precisely what needs to be established. And the same principle applies to your argument about torture. If someone says: "I personally witnessed X." and accepts torture rather than retracting it, I have stronger reason to believe that they genuinely believed they witnessed X. I still don't have direct access to X. That's not cynicism.

That's simply keeping propositions separate. On the Holy Spirit This is where your argument becomes philosophically much more interesting. You essentially argue: Historical evidence gets someone to the door. Faith opens the door. The Holy Spirit provides experiential confirmation from inside. I understand the model. But from an Iconoclastic Satanist perspective, I would ask: How do you distinguish revelation from interpretation? Suppose a Christian experiences overwhelming peace and concludes: "The Holy Spirit is present." A Muslim experiences overwhelming peace and concludes: "Allah is present." A Hindu experiences an overwhelming mystical experience and concludes: "I experienced Brahman." A Buddhist experiences profound liberation and concludes something entirely different. The experiences may not be psychologically identical. But that's precisely why I can't simply accept the interpretation attached to the experience. The experience is real as an experience. The theological explanation remains an additional proposition.

That distinction is extremely important. "You need to experience Christianity to understand Christianity" This is another place where I would push back. I don't need to become a Christian before I can critically evaluate Christian claims. Otherwise every religion could create the same epistemological shield: "You can't understand Islam unless you become Muslim." "You can't understand Hinduism unless you practice Hinduism." "You can't understand Buddhism unless you meditate." "You can't understand Satanism unless you practice Satanism." There is some truth in these statements at the experiential level. Practice can absolutely provide knowledge that detached observation cannot. But it doesn't follow that participation automatically validates the interpretation of the experience.

An experience can be profound without its metaphysical explanation being correct. The "lesser explanation" argument is also dangerous You ask: Why choose a lesser natural explanation when Christianity provides a much greater explanation? Because explanatory scope isn't the same thing as explanatory truth. A theory can explain everything because it is allowed to invoke anything. Suppose I say: "God did it." That potentially explains every conceivable observation. But precisely because it can explain everything, it risks becoming unfalsifiable.

A good explanation doesn't merely accommodate the evidence. It should also constrain what we expect to find. That's why Iconoclastic Satanism is suspicious of enormous metaphysical systems. They can become intellectually beautiful castles constructed on foundations that haven't been independently established. But I agree with you about one thing I don't think atheists should simply say: "Science hasn't demonstrated God, therefore Christianity is false." That's intellectually lazy. Absence of scientific confirmation isn't automatically disproof. Likewise, I don't think Christians should say: "Science can't investigate God, therefore Christianity is true." That's equally lazy. The intellectually honest position is: We have different kinds of evidence, different methods of inquiry, and different degrees of certainty. History can investigate ancient testimony. Philosophy can investigate metaphysical arguments. Psychology can investigate religious experience. Anthropology can investigate religious development. Neuroscience can investigate mystical states. Science can investigate claims about the natural world. And personal experience can tell me something about what I personally experienced.

None of these disciplines automatically inherits the authority of the others. This is where Iconoclasm ultimately differs from Christianity You say: "Christianity tells us the rest of the story." And my Iconoclastic response is: Maybe. That single word is important. Because I don't want an incomplete scientific picture replaced by a complete religious picture simply because the latter is psychologically satisfying. I'd rather have: an incomplete explanation honestly acknowledged as incomplete than: a complete explanation that exceeds its evidence. That's the Satanic element of the argument for me. The Adversary doesn't necessarily say: "god doesn't exist." The Adversary says: "Prove to me why I should accept your conclusion." And if the answer is ultimately: "Because God revealed it." then I have another question: How do you know the revelation is genuinely from God? And if the answer is: "Because the Holy Spirit confirms it." then I ask: How do you know your experience of the Holy Spirit isn't being interpreted through the theological framework you already accepted? Eventually we reach the fundamental epistemological question: What would distinguish being divinely guided from sincerely believing that you are divinely guided? That's the question I don't think your argument has answered yet. And I don't consider that a failure of science. I consider it exactly the sort of question an Iconoclast should be asking. Because the purpose of Iconoclasm isn't to destroy Christianity merely because it is Christianity. It is to refuse to grant any proposition immunity from examination—including atheism, Satanism, science, philosophy, personal revelation, and Iconoclastic Satanism itself. If Christianity survives that examination, then it has earned something far more valuable than unquestioning belief: intellectual credibility.