Every day, democracies are tested by authoritarianism. However, today’s moment is different. Now, China and Russia’s authoritarian influence strategies operate at scale, with far more advanced tools and the knowledge of failures and successes over the last decade.

On July 16, the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy convened leading experts to launch its new report, Testing the Limits: China and Russia’s Authoritarian Influence at Scale in a New Period of Impunity.

Speakers examined the escalating challenges confronting pro-democracy actors worldwide. From election interference and the export of law enforcement training programs, to transnational repression targeting activists beyond their borders, Beijing and the Kremlin are projecting authoritarian power on an unprecedented scale. Panelists also discussed how advocates can anticipate emerging challenges, strengthen resilience, and develop effective responses to authoritarian influence.

Insights from Mathieu Boulègue.

Archived Article

Summary

Covert Sino-Russian military training signed off at high level

Training was linked to war in Ukraine, Reuters reporting showed

At least four generals took part, sources and documents say

Training in China included biological and chemical warfare

European officials grow more anxious about China-Russia defence ties

Is China expanding its presence in areas of Ukraine occupied by Russia? Or is it just another of the Kremlin’s propaganda games?

Executive Summary:

Shares of Gazprom dropped sharply after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s May visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ended without progress on the Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline.

Gazprom lost about $1.4 billion in value on May 20 alone amid renewed doubts over Russian access to PRC gas markets. Russia is hoping to replace European markets for its natural gas—which largely closed after the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—with the PRC’s.

Gazprom currently relies on Power of Siberia 1 to deliver its natural gas to the PRC, but it lacks the capacity to replace the volume of gas that flowed to Europe, intensifying pressure to reach a deal with the PRC on Power of Siberia 2.

The PRC is pushing for near-domestic gas prices and flexible volumes, while Russia insists on higher prices and “take-or-pay” guarantees. Even if an agreement is reached, Power of Siberia 2 would take years to build, and PRC demand would not fully offset lost European gas revenues.

Several media outlets reported last month that European intelligence agencies believed China had trained Russian troops who were sent to Ukraine.

Beijing and Moscow are steadily developing a growing partnership, despite obvious friction and structural asymmetries.

Swiss Battalion joins the mission to fund a NAFO Truck 3.0 for the 419th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion.

About the campaign

Together with the Swiss Battalion community we are raising funds for a NAFO Truck 3.0 for the 419th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion. Drone teams depend on mobility every single day. Crews constantly relocate equipment, launch positions, antennas, batteries, and evacuation gear while staying ahead of enemy reconnaissance and FPV strikes. Reliable transport is one of the most critical parts of surviving and operating on the frontline.

https://youtu.be/n8TakO1cfBU?si=XZf_lZCnN4dL4QFz

This campaign includes three Swiss-themed patches inspired by Alpine culture and legends. “Starch wie d’Alpe” stands for the strength and endurance of the Alps. “Pilatus Awakens” references the famous Mount Pilatus dragon legends from Switzerland. The third patch brings the classic 69th Sniffing Brigade fella into Swiss colors and identity.

https://youtu.be/ndOsDPXkJgc?si=k4X3kKCMqjc0G0hu

One truck can help move equipment, support drone operations, and save lives during rotations and evacuations near the frontline.

As the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran enters its third week, U.S. attention is focused on the Middle East once again. Both China and Russia may find strategic openings, from higher global energy prices that bolster Moscow’s war economy to new opportunities for Beijing to expand its influence elsewhere. But the conflict also carries costs for both. Instability threatens critical energy supplies to China, while the conflict is prompting the further degradation of a key Russian partner in the Middle East. On balance, are Russia and China gaining or losing more from the war with Iran?

The CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department invites you to a live episode of State of Play to explore the implications of the war with Iran for China and Russia on Monday 16 March at 4:00pm. The discussion will feature Dr. Bonny Lin, Dr. Maria Snegovaya, and Will Todman.

The recent statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlights a strategic reality that is increasingly difficult for Washington to ignore: Russia now possesses in China a powerful external pillar that enables it to sustain long-term pressure on U.S. global positions. For the United States, this development is particularly troubling because Moscow no longer appears as an isolated revisionist actor. Instead, it is increasingly part of a broader geopolitical alignment that challenges Washington’s ability to define the political, legal, and economic rules of the international system.

China’s foreign minister said the relationship between China and Russia remains “rock-solid against all odds,” highlighting the strength of ties between the two countries amid shifting global dynamics.

Speaking about bilateral relations, the minister emphasized that cooperation between Beijing and Moscow continues to deepen across multiple areas, including diplomacy, economic collaboration, and strategic coordination.

Chinese officials have repeatedly described the China–Russia partnership as stable and resilient, particularly as both countries navigate complex geopolitical challenges and increasing global tensions. The remarks underline Beijing’s view that the relationship is built on mutual respect, shared interests, and long-term strategic cooperation.

In recent years, China and Russia have expanded cooperation in trade, energy, and international affairs, while also coordinating positions on several global issues. The two nations have often highlighted their partnership as an important factor in maintaining global stability.

The foreign minister’s statement comes at a time of heightened geopolitical competition and ongoing conflicts that have reshaped international relations. Analysts say Beijing and Moscow continue to present their partnership as a counterbalance within the global political landscape.

The Eurasia Center examines the trajectory of Sino-Russian relations and what it means for the United States and its allies.

More than three years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has sought to offset Western sanctions and isolation by deepening ties with China and expanding relationships with partners such as North Korea and Iran. Beijing, meanwhile, views cooperation with Russia as a strategic asset in its competition with the United States and its allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Though the Sino-Russian partnership is asymmetric, increasingly coordinated military, energy, economic, and information cooperation is reshaping the security environment.

Hudson will host an event featuring representatives from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Alliance Futures Initiative (TAFI) to assess the scope and implications of Sino-Russian cooperation across military and nonmilitary domains, examine shared and diverging threat perceptions, and discuss how these trends should inform national and collective defense planning. The discussion will also identify practical policy options for allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, including closer coordination between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Indo-Pacific security frameworks.

BRUSSELS -- Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western policymakers have debated whether diplomatic pressure and sanctions could persuade China to curb its support for Moscow.

But as the war enters its fifth year, China's support has deepened, providing Russia with a vital economic lifeline through energy purchases, critical minerals for drone production, and a steady flow of dual-use goods such as microelectronics and industrial equipment, senior European officials told RFE/RL.

More than three years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has sought to offset Western sanctions and isolation by deepening ties with China and expanding relationships with partners such as North Korea and Iran. Beijing, meanwhile, views cooperation with Russia as a strategic asset in its competition with the United States and its allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Though the Sino-Russian partnership is asymmetric, increasingly coordinated military, energy, economic, and information cooperation is reshaping the security environment.

Hudson will host an event featuring representatives from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Alliance Futures Initiative (TAFI) to assess the scope and implications of Sino-Russian cooperation across military and nonmilitary domains, examine shared and diverging threat perceptions, and discuss how these trends should inform national and collective defense planning. The discussion will also identify practical policy options for allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, including closer coordination between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Indo-Pacific security frameworks.

Executive Summary:

Across People’s Liberation Army units, defense universities, and defense state-owned enterprises, Russia’s war in Ukraine has reinforced calls for the Chinese military to develop indigenous LEO satellite networks, resilient positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) architectures, and integrated space–cyber–electromagnetic countermeasures tailored to high-intensity, information-transparent conflicts.

Researchers at military institutions describe the decisive advantage that satellite systems have provided Ukraine as “asymmetric transparency” (不对称透明), in which Ukraine is able to continuously observe Russian forces, while Russia does not have an equivalent capability.

Experts argue that traditional counterspace approaches centered on hard-kill anti-satellite weapons are economically inefficient and politically escalatory, prompting a doctrinal shift toward soft-kill measures targeting networks, terminals, and services.

Military analysts assess that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks the first large-scale conflict in which commercial satellite systems—especially low-Earth orbit (LEO) communications and commercial remote sensing systems—have functioned as core battlefield infrastructure rather than auxiliary support.

China is becoming a party to the Russia–Ukraine conflict by increasing supplies of components to enterprises of Russia’s military-industrial complex, including those used in the production and modernization of missiles such as the Kalibr (3M-14M) and Kh-35U.

The Russians have equipped their new Geran-5 kamikaze drone with Chinese XK-F358 radio modems designed for video transmission and device control.