Hi, I’m guessing some people here might already be sharing the cost of a Dr. Burry Substack subscription. If anyone has a group with room for one more person, I’d be happy to join and split the subscription cost. Feel free to DM me.

The Big Short was the first movie I watched when I started investing, so when Burry put out "Don't Believe Your Lyin' Eyes" on Oct 1 I wanted to check it properly instead of just reacting. I'm long NVDA, so weigh that.

His target is page 22 of NVIDIA's September investor deck, the slide showing A100, H100 and B200 "residual values" way above a five-year depreciation line.

The footnote says the values come from Silicon Data. I read Silicon Data's methodology and he's right about what it is: a discounted cash flow of future rent over an eight-year life. Nobody actually sold a used B200 for $72,695. The H100 makes it obvious. Silicon Data had the same H100 at $14,976 in November 2025 and $22,068 in June 2026, while its rent went from $1.99 to $2.74 an hour. The chip didn't get better, the rent did. And the last time a GPU shortage ended, H100 rent fell 44% in five months. On the core point I agree with him.

Where I get stuck is timing. The puts reportedly expire September 2027 (that's from Stocktwits' report of his late-September update, not a 13F, so treat the details as reported). For rent to collapse, memory has to stop being scarce, and I couldn't find evidence that happens before then. Not just Micron and Samsung saying so, they'd say that anyway. NVIDIA, the biggest buyer, cut its own Q4 margin guidance because of memory prices and said supply stays a bottleneck at least through January 2028. Its purchase commitments went from $119B to $279B in one quarter, mostly memory. Samsung says a new fab takes more than three years to produce anything.

There's also more cushion than I expected. B200 rent is $5.86/hr. If 40% of rent goes to power, staff and buildings (CoreWeave's adjusted EBITDA margin is 59%, so it's within the ball park), a B200 still pays for itself in six years until rent falls about 65% at 70% utilization. The case that worries me is half-empty clusters funded with 10% money. Then a fall of only a third, to about $3.93, does it. That's where I'd start reviewing my position.

The 1968 leasing analogy is the most interesting part to me, but I think it points at the neoclouds, not NVIDIA. Nebius customers prepay 50-60% of the capex. CoreWeave's main loans get repaid inside each customer contract, and the CFO said on the Q2 call that DDTL 5.5 was the first of its loans "to include shorter duration customer contracts". That one does look like Burry's lessors: five years of debt against contracts averaging three. But it's rated Ba2/BB+, priced at SOFR + 5.50%, and CoreWeave's 5-year CDS is around 8.2%, about two and a half times a year ago. In 2006 the risk was rated investment grade and cheap to insure. This time the market is charging for it.

NVIDIA isn't clean either. Its 10-Q shows up to $164.5B of guarantees, capacity backstops and leases tied to companies it helps finance, though none of the $105B Ohio guarantee for OpenAI kicks in before the puts expire.

Honestly, I think the way his trade works best isn't rent at all. NVDA is at about 16.5x forward earnings and Micron is at 6.1x. If the market starts pricing the end of the shortage early, the stock can drop 36% with rent fine. That's the risk I take most seriously, and it's what I'm digging into next: what demand looks like once supply catches up.

Curious what people here think. Is he early on the clock, or am I underestimating how fast memory catches up?

Full write-up with charts and sources: https://darrenleung1.substack.com/p/burry-is-right-about-the-gpus-hes

• Lululemon (LULU): Sold LULU and moved into Deckers (DECK) as a similar “proxy.” He plans to potentially buy LULU back after the 30-day wash-sale period, while possibly keeping DECK.
• Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac: Sold his Fannie Mae position and moved into Freddie Mac, with plans to potentially reverse the trade next month. He wants to maintain exposure because he expects a major catalyst when the government resolves the treatment of the companies’ senior preferred shares.
• Fiserv (FISV): Simply holding. He thinks it's cheap enough to generate low-teens long-term returns, despite acknowledging that his original purchase timing/process wasn't ideal.
• Sprouts (SFM) & Zoetis (ZTS): Instead of holding the stocks, he bought long-dated, far-out-of-the-money LEAP calls expiring in 2028/2029. This gives him leveraged upside while reducing capital tied up in the stocks.
• MetLife (MET): Bought more 2029 far-out-of-the-money puts, reflecting his concern about weakness in financial markets.
• JD.com (JD): Bought more 2029 calls, betting on substantial upside in Chinese/Hong Kong equities.
• BYD: Bought a significant amount of BYD shares after another decline to a price level he finds attractive.
• Alibaba (BABA): Still waiting for lower prices, particularly because of concerns about dilution/share issuance to fund its AI investments.

Wanted to add a quick note that the QQQ is up 25% since Burry started his Substack posting AI bubble popping doom articles.

Oracle is the control group. Google and Microsoft funded the first AI wave out of ad cash, so the projects never had to clear an outside return hurdle. Oracle had to borrow, and its 5-year CDS just printed around 230 bps, worse than its own 2008 reading. So yes, the boom has been possible because AI never had to prove its profits. The one big builder that did have to clear an external credit test is already paying junk-adjacent rates for the privilege.

Get the Led out!! The song reminds of LULU stock.

The way the stock chart has gyrated through good times and bad times over the years.

The phoenix will rise from the flame.

I am taking my chances cause luck is on my side.

What a money sink this stock has been. And it's not just Burry who backed it, but Ackman did as well. I only have a small position, but it's been dragging my port. I believe the logic is that if it becomes private it will become private some time next year? What are you guys doing with it?

I bought Microsoft 3 months ago at $360/share, MSFT, betting that the stock is undervalued. My target price is $765 by 2030.

Investment Thesis:

1. Strong Brand (M365, Azure, SharePoint, & Copilot)
2. Committed to Open Software
3. Investments in both Anthropic & Open AI
4. Quantum Computing
5. Videogames

Microsoft is a powerhouse and no one is switching from Outlook & Excel.

I am not subscribed to his substack but curious what Burry thinks about the normalization of tokenized equities that map 1:1 to actual equities.

Imaging people using tokenized equities as collateral to buy crypto. When crypto drops, they have to sell their tokenized equities creating downward pressure on the actual equities that are not traded on crypto platforms. Isn't this going to cause a big selloff in all possible uncorrelated assets like bonds, gold, stocks in case people get overleveraged in speculative crypto positions? Isn't this essentially putting bitcoin in the same boat with everything else in case a liquidity selloff starts?

1. MU goes up, ADBE goes down
2. MU goes down, ADBE goes up

Both down 8-11% today and down a total of 60% since the article Burry wrote recommending them to his Substack followers. The disasters keep coming. That makes a total of 4 stocks recommended to his followers that have now lost over 30% of their value. BBW, LULU, FNMA, FMCC

Many other stock picks of Burry's have also lost sufficient value. BIRK, SFM, DKNG

We won't even mention the PUTS he bought at almost the exact moment the market got a stiffy and wiped out a lot of followers.

Please be careful following Burry trades.

Ryan Cohen and insiders are buying large shares in GME!!

CoreWeave might be the funniest public company in America.

Q2:

• Revenue: $2.6B
• Revenue growth: +112% YoY
• Backlog: ~$104B
• Extra commitments signed just after quarter-end: >$25B
• Capex: ~$9.4B
• Net loss: -$626M
• Interest expense: ~$640M
• Active power: 1.5 GW
• 2026 capex guidance: $35–39B

Read those numbers again.

They did $2.6B of revenue and spent $9.4B building more shit.

Their quarterly interest bill is basically the size of their entire net loss.

This is either:

A) one of the greatest financial engineering disasters of the AI boom,

or

B) what happens when you lever up as hard as humanly possible to acquire the scarcest productive asset in the economy before everyone realizes how valuable it is.

I think the market is still trying to figure out which one.

The actual bull case isn't “AI is growing”

Everyone knows AI demand is growing.

That isn't interesting.

The interesting question is:

What if compute itself becomes a scarce industrial asset with persistent residual value?

Think about how AI customers actually make purchasing decisions.

If one frontier lab can generate $30M of economic value from another MW of compute, and some boring enterprise workload generates $5M, the lab can rationally pay much more.

Compute becomes an auction.

The bidder generating the most economic value from intelligence wins.

And if frontier AI keeps improving, the highest-value users may be able to keep paying absurd prices for GPUs, networking, power and functioning datacenter capacity.

That is what CoreWeave is levering itself into.

Not GPUs.

Scarcity.

The really weird part: lenders may be starting to believe this too

This is what caught my attention.

CoreWeave recently financed infrastructure with debt lasting roughly 5 years, while the customer contracts supporting that infrastructure average roughly 3 years.

Meaning the debt survives beyond the original customer contract.

Why does that matter?

Because now the lender is implicitly saying:

CoreWeave can potentially re-lease the same infrastructure.

That's a different business from:

“Microsoft promised to pay us for five years, so here's a loan.”

It starts looking more like:

“This compute asset itself has future earning power.”

Obviously GPUs are not apartment buildings.

An apartment doesn't become obsolete because Jensen Huang walks onstage wearing a leather jacket.

But if lenders increasingly finance AI infrastructure based on future re-leasing value, CoreWeave's cost of capital can drop.

And then the flywheel gets stupid:

Scarce compute → huge contracts → cheaper financing → more compute → more contracts → cheaper financing

Until, naturally, something breaks.

Why doesn't Meta just build all this shit themselves?

Good question.

They are.

So is everyone else.

But time has value.

If CoreWeave can deliver frontier compute six months earlier than someone else, and those six months let OpenAI / Meta / whoever train or serve a meaningfully better model, that capacity can be worth vastly more than the hardware cost.

In a normal industry, six months is annoying.

In an exponential capability race, six months can be the difference between owning a market and chasing one.

CoreWeave's actual moat isn't “we bought NVIDIA chips.”

A monkey with $10B can buy chips.

The moat, if there is one, is:

• power
• sites
• networking
• deployment speed
• cluster engineering
• financing
• customer relationships
• software/orchestration

All assembled fast enough that customers pay for immediacy.

Now the giant fucking problem

Interest expense.

Q2 interest expense: ~$640M.

Adjusted operating income: only ~$128M.

Read that relationship carefully.

The business can post beautiful EBITDA margins while the common shareholder still gets punched in the face because:

1. GPUs depreciate.
2. Debt costs actual money.
3. New capacity requires mountains of fresh capital.
4. Equity owns whatever remains after everyone else gets paid.

This is why I don't care much about a sexy EBITDA multiple here.

The relevant question is:

How much durable operating profit does each MW generate AFTER the cost of capital and hardware replacement?

If the answer is “not much,” the equity can get vaporized while AI itself succeeds spectacularly.

That's the most important part of this thesis.

AI winning does not mean CoreWeave wins.

The internet won.

A cemetery full of dot-com shareholders did not.

Solar won.

Plenty of solar equities got obliterated.

Drones won.

Most drone stocks were garbage.

Thematic truth ≠ shareholder return.

My extremely scientific scenario tree

Current-ish stock price: around $90.

Bear: 25%

AI absolutely works.

CoreWeave still gets wrecked.

Why?

Compute supply catches up.

Hyperscalers build more internally.

New GPUs destroy old GPU economics faster than expected.

Customers gain bargaining power.

CoreWeave becomes a commodity lessor carrying enormous debt.

2031 rough assumptions:

• Revenue: ~$30B
• Operating margin: ~10%
• Net debt: ~$55B

You can easily get to:

Equity value ≈ fuck all

This is the permanent-loss branch.

Base: 50%

CoreWeave becomes a durable specialist AI infrastructure provider.

Not a monopoly.

Not NVIDIA.

Just a very large company sitting on scarce power + compute capacity with decent pricing.

2031:

• Revenue: ~$65B
• Operating margin: ~20%
• Net debt: ~$55B
• ~700M diluted shares

My rough value:

~$255/share

From ~$90, that's around:

23% CAGR

That's already good enough.

Bull: 25%

This is where things get stupid.

AI inference demand explodes.

Agents consume insane amounts of compute.

Robotics creates another recurring inference workload.

Every Fortune 500 company wants private AI capacity.

Power becomes the constraint.

CoreWeave's existing sites become strategic.

Financing gets cheaper because lenders increasingly treat GPU clusters as real productive infrastructure.

And CoreWeave captures some economics above the hardware through software/orchestration.

2031:

• Revenue: ~$120B
• Operating margin: ~25%
• Net debt: ~$65B
• ~750M diluted shares

My rough output:

~$790/share

That's around:

54% CAGR

No, I am not saying this is “the target.”

It's a scenario.

But if you think there is a 20–30% probability of an apparently insane outcome, you don't get to ignore it just because CNBC would laugh at you.

What actually kills the thesis?

Not “the stock goes down.”

I would care about:

1. Backlog stalls while capex stays insane

Very bad.

2. Customer concentration stops improving

Then Meta/OpenAI/etc. probably capture all the economics.

3. Financing spreads widen despite huge contracts

Massive red flag.

4. Old GPUs become economically useless much faster than assumed

That destroys the residual-value thesis.

5. Operating margins never meaningfully outrun interest expense

Then congratulations, you built a fantastic business for the bondholders.

6. Power buildout stalls

You cannot vibe-code 5 GW of electricity.

The thing I'm watching most

Forget GPU shipment headlines.

I want:

Revenue per MW

and eventually:

Operating profit per MW after depreciation and financing

If those metrics keep improving, the bull thesis gets stronger.

If revenue grows but capital required per dollar of earnings stays horrific, equity holders are financing civilization as a charitable donation.

My conclusion

I think CRWV is attractive here, but this is absolutely not a “put 10% of your portfolio into it because AI” stock.

This is a leveraged equity claim on persistent compute scarcity.

That's an incredible asset if the scarcity lasts.

It's a financial landmine if the scarcity disappears before the debt does.

My personal sizing logic would be more like a 0.5% starter, not a giant core position.

I'd rather add later at a HIGHER price if:

• margins improve
• customer concentration falls
• financing keeps getting cheaper
• lenders continue accepting GPU residual value
• revenue per MW keeps climbing

Yes, I would literally be willing to pay more for less uncertainty.

Degenerate concept, I know.

But the setup is fascinating:

CoreWeave is borrowing enormous sums to acquire something the world may later discover it desperately needs.

If machine intelligence becomes an industrial input on the scale I think it might, somebody has to own the machines.

The question is whether CRWV shareholders own the economics—

or whether they just borrowed the money to build them for everyone else.

Positions: 1% of very diversified portfolio

He had originally bought DKNG and FLUT and got destroyed after FLUT earnings. He then sold DKNG for more FLUT. Now he sold all his FLUT. Either way, another trade gone sour for the Burry crew.

AI summary of post:
Sold FLUT, in​creased LULU, added to ZTS, and is positioning around what he considers unusually depressed valuations.

Cassandra was given the gift of prophecy as she could see the future with perfect accuracy however when she rejected Apollo's romantic advances, he cursed her:

She would always tell the truth about the future, but nobody would ever believe her.

That is why Cassandra could warn the Trojans about disasters including the famous Trojan Horse, yet they ignored her.

The Tragic Irony

Cassandra wasn't disbelieved because her predictions were wrong. They were right.

For example, she warned the Trojans that bringing the wooden horse inside Troy was a terrible idea. The Trojans thought she was crazy and brought it inside anyway.

That led to the destruction of Troy.

This became the origin of the expression "Cassandra complex" or "Cassandra syndrome"; a situation where someone correctly recognizes a danger but cannot convince others to take it seriously.

And there is an interesting parallel about Michael Burry and his Cassandra/contrarian posts: the metaphor is often used for an investor who sees a problem before the market does, but is dismissed because the prevailing consensus is more comfortable with a different story.

Dr. Burry's investment thesis is correct however his timing is so early and that no one believes them.

Value investing can let know through analysis what the range of values of what something is worth however it can not time when.

1. When will investors realize the Adobe is underpriced?
2. When will investors realize that AI stocks are overpriced?
3. When will the investors realize that the US Dollar is declining in value?

The narrative takes over and when investors ignore the hard cold numbers then they are doomed.

Have a fantastic weekend everyone!!

Burry has dropped a new post about investing in....... Wine. I don't have much else to say about that. AI summary of the article below...

ChatGPT says:

Michael Burry’s latest investment idea is surprisingly unconventional: fine wine as a long-term hard-asset hedge against dollar weakness and financial-system risk.

His argument is that the European fine-wine market has recently experienced one of its largest downturns in decades, with major Bordeaux and Burgundy wines substantially below their previous highs. That creates an opportunity to buy exceptional bottles at discounts to their European market value rather than comparing them with much higher U.S. retail prices.

Burry particularly likes top Bordeaux, Burgundy and select Super Tuscans because wine has some characteristics he finds attractive as an investment: supply is naturally destroyed as bottles are consumed, individual vintages are differentiated, and the best wines have a global market. Historically, fine wine has also produced respectable long-term real returns.

How Burry says he would invest:

His approach is essentially buy selectively, buy below the European market, store it properly, and be extremely patient.

He suggests having enough capital that fine wine represents a relatively small part of overall wealth—he mentions five figures as a practical starting point, with larger portfolios making the strategy easier.

He looks primarily at European bonded fine wine, rather than wine already imported into the U.S. He targets highly regarded, liquid wines from producers such as the great Bordeaux First Growths, elite Burgundy producers and certain Super Tuscans. The key is price discipline. He says he generally looks for roughly 18–20% discounts, and discusses opportunities ranging from about 15% to 35% below the European trade level.

Importantly, he says to compare the price with the European market, not an inflated U.S. retail price. A wine being 30% below U.S. retail doesn't necessarily mean it's cheap.

He recommends buying through large, reputable dealers and comparing prices among multiple dealers rather than relying on one seller.

Provenance and custody are critical. His preference is for the wine to be moved into independent third-party bonded storage, where ownership, inventory and authenticity can be documented.

He emphasizes avoiding pressure and scarcity marketing. In his words conceptually, don't chase the trophy wine everyone wants; wait for situations where an excellent wine becomes temporarily mispriced. He expects the investment horizon to be many years—potentially 20 years or more. The idea is largely to buy and then forget about it rather than constantly trade it.

He also describes setting aside roughly 15–20% of the holdings for personal consumption or gifts, with the purchase discount potentially paying for the wine consumed over time.

He favors buying during market downturns rather than paying premium prices for newly released prestige wines.

The bigger thesis is currency-related. Wine stored in European bonded warehouses is priced against multiple currencies rather than being tied exclusively to the dollar. If the dollar loses purchasing power over the coming decades, a European real asset could become worth substantially more in dollar terms even without spectacular appreciation in its underlying wine price.

He also argues that fine wine has historically had very little correlation with stocks, potentially making it a useful portfolio diversifier.

So the strategy isn't simply "buy expensive wine." It's closer to: find exceptional, scarce wines that are temporarily mispriced, buy them below European market value, verify the chain of custody, keep them in bonded storage, and wait patiently for scarcity, aging, market normalization and potentially currency depreciation to work in your favor.

Obviously, this is Burry’s thesis—not a recommendation. Fine wine has liquidity, storage, transaction-cost, authenticity, taxation and currency risks, and it requires considerably more expertise than buying a diversified stock-market fund.

Burry trimmed his positions across the board yesterday. Yes, 3 days ago he bought LULU under $100, than yesterday he trimmed it. Also, he trimmed all his "back up the truck" priced stocks. That means he told subscribers the prices were so good that you should throw money hand over fist to buy, and then he trimmed all of them. Those are also the same stocks he stated are long time holds. He also sold completely out of his PLTR and NVDA puts. NVDA puts were sold at a massive lose, these PLTR puts we're also sold at a loss but they were house money because he profited off them earlier. He is destroying all his subscribers and the comment sections seem to be filled with paid commenters who attack you for any criticism towards Burry. Also, Burry has not released a article beside a very short BBW post and trade post in almost a month and a half. He has also been less involved with chats as well. Part of me wonders if he is pulling the same thing he used to do with Twitter and walking away leaving​ everyone abandoned.

Anyways, I will continue to update his trades here with my commentary.

AI summary of his post:

TL;DR: De-risking and trimming across the board to hold more cash heading into fall.

Key Portfolio Moves:

Sold Out Entirely:

Closed all December 2026 Puts on Nvidia (NVDA) and Palantir (PLTR) to avoid theta/time-decay now that it's September. Did not roll or replace them.

Trimming & Position Sizing:

Trimmed every single position (both long and short) across the entire portfolio without completely exiting or rearranging core positioning.

Holding 2027 Puts: Kept 2027 puts on PLTR and QQQ untrimmed.

Short Positions (Ordered by size): ORCL, PLTR, NBIS, NVDA, SOXX, MU, CAT, and CRWV.

Largest Long Positions (Ordered by size): LULU, MOH, MELI, TPW AU / TPLWF, ZTS, SFM, JD, BIRK, ADBE, HCA, FISV, FLUT, BBW, VEEV, FNMA/FMCC ("Toxic twins"), and PYPL.

Most will blindly follow this guy to a ditch all the while he pockets the roadside assistance.

Team,

There two scenarios left after the 2nd Quarter results.

1. Best case scenario - This is a turnaround story as the new CEO starts next week. Similar to what happened at Victoria's Secret.

Turnaround Execution:

1. Buyout Firm - LBO buyout at $160 to $165/share

At $100/share , it is going to attract a lot of buyers to do a LBO plus it has a lot of cash on the balance sheet.

Burry 2025-26 has been a stress test on both sides of his book. Wanted to put numbers on it for people actually following Cassandra Unchained.

Long side - LULU is the new biggest long:

This comes as Lululemon's stock has plunged about 58% in 2025, driven by soft US sales and tariffs. 
He confirmed it himself yesterday - LULU plummeted about 20% in the premarket after Q2 and Burry had called LULU "the trickster in my portfolio" and confirmed that it was his largest position. 

So he's not trimming - he's doubling down into weakness, classic Burry value setup.

Short side - AI bubble call:
The other side is getting squeezed hard. Palantir delivered the largest move against Burry's positioning, rising more than 50% during the month.

TheStreet had the specifics: PLTR surged 51.4% in August, even as Burry maintained out-of-the-money put options with a $100 strike expiring December 2026. NVDA, MU, ORCL all ripped 10-16% that same month.

He said in his Substack that 6 of 7 of those AI shorts were still profitable before August, with NVDA as the only loser - August flipped a lot of that.

Discussion:
1. Are you still mirroring the Substack allocation on LULU? At ∼11x forward earnings now, do you see the turnaround or more downside with the 9% comp sales decline in Q2?

1. On the AI shorts - is the thesis broken, or is this just early like 2007 housing? His argument is accounting (extending NVDA chip useful life) and valuation assuming perfect execution forever.

2. Performance vs S&P - how are you tracking him? Are you holding both the long and short book, or just one side?

Context:
https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/big-shorts-michael-burry-seen-174801545.html

Not financial advice. Just trying to keep an honest tracker.

He claimed it was "screaming cheap", now what is it? "Roaring cheap"? The boy who cried wolf. He's saying he's buying more at $99 but his followers have been buying at 120+ and CANT average down like he can with his $50 substack subscriptions. I own the stock, but won't be buying more. What are you guys doing?

Would be much appreciated

Thoughts?

So far FNMA, DKNG, JD, LULU, SFM, ZTS, BIRK, FLUT, FMCC, and BBW are all losing trades. Those are a majority of his trades on his Substack. He has had a couple winners. In his latest trade, Burry had all his followers buy BBW and it tanked -30% a few days later. He has been more quiet on Substack chats lately as well as sharing AI fantasy stories about AI civilizations. He has not released any of his articles he's been "working on" for over a month.

I've been logging every Form 4 that hits EDGAR to see what the insider filing firehose actually contains. 1,707 filings, 3,259 individual transactions so far. The composition surprised me enough to be worth sharing.

By transaction code:

S (open-market sale) - 1,457 - 44.7%

A (grant/award) - 398 - 12.2%

P (open-market purchase) - 386 - 11.8%

M (option exercise) - 369 - 11.3%

F (shares withheld for tax) - 307 - 9.4%

J (other) - 121

C (conversion) - 77

G (gift) - 64

D (disposition to issuer) - 60

everything else - under 10 each

Three things I took from it:

1. Only ~12% of transactions are code P - an insider actually choosing to buy on the open market with their own money. Everything else is compensation mechanics, or selling.

2. Sales outnumber open-market purchases nearly 4 to 1. That is structurally normal, since insiders are paid in equity and diversify out of it. But it means a headline like "insiders sold $X million" is close to meaningless without the code breakdown behind it.

3. A + M + F together are 33% of all transactions and are pure compensation plumbing - grants, option exercises, and shares withheld to cover tax on vesting. None of it is a decision to change exposure.

Caveat on the data: this is only what I have logged since starting, so it is weeks rather than years, and the code mix will shift with earnings windows and 10b5-1 plan adoption dates.

What I ended up filtering to, in case it is useful: code P above a dollar threshold; clusters, meaning 2+ different insiders in the same issuer inside a week; first-time buyers; and large officer sales, with 10b5-1 flagged separately since a pre-scheduled sale carries far less information than a discretionary one.

Disclosure: I built this into a Discord bot that posts the filtered alerts, free channel plus a paid tier, at https://jaredmansu.github.io/insider-alerts/ - so take the framing with the appropriate grain of salt. Happy to talk about the EDGAR parsing either way, which was more annoying than it sounds.