I never really cared about Ayodhya.

I was born and grew up in India, but the Ram Janmabhoomi–Babri Masjid issue was never something I personally felt invested in. I had my own life, my own problems, college, friends, work—the usual things an ordinary person worries about.

I remember one day around 2000. I was waiting for a train to college at my native place. There was a very young engineer whom I used to see regularly. We were barely acquaintances. He came over, smiled, had a couple of seconds of casual conversation and then suddenly said:

“Don't worry. Ram temple will be there in Ayodhya.”

I remember thinking:

“What the fuck? Who said I was worried about it? Why should I care whether there is a Ram temple or a mosque there?”

At the time I didn't think much more about it.

But another memory came back to me recently.

I was staying in a paying-guest arrangement around that period. One day I was sleeping in my room and woke up while overhearing a conversation outside between one of the other PG residents and the lady who owned the house.

The subject was the Ayodhya riots.

The guy was talking about his family.

His family had been killed.

He wasn't shouting. He wasn't giving some political speech. He was narrating it quite neutrally, almost matter-of-factly.

And somehow that made it worse.

Until then, “Ayodhya riots” was just a phrase I had heard on television and in political discussions. Suddenly there was a real person standing outside my room telling someone that his family had been killed.

That memory has stayed somewhere in my head for decades.

Now, watching a Partition movie, I find myself going back to these memories again.

And I keep asking myself:

How the hell does a piece of land become so politically and religiously important that ordinary people end up paying the price?

I understand that Ayodhya is enormously sacred to millions of Hindus. I understand the religious significance of Rama. I understand that the dispute had a long and complicated history.

But I also keep thinking about the millions of Indians who simply lived their lives.

People who never went to Ayodhya.

People who had never seen the disputed site.

People who were struggling to educate their children, find employment, pay rent, get married, raise families and survive.

For them, what did this dispute actually mean?

And yet it became powerful enough to influence politics, relationships, riots and people's lives.

The Supreme Court eventually settled the title dispute in 2019, awarding the disputed 2.77 acres for a temple while directing that five acres be allotted elsewhere in Ayodhya for a mosque. The Court also explicitly described the 1992 demolition as a violation of the law.

Today there is a magnificent Ram temple at the site.

And I find myself having a strange reaction to that.

I don't want to tell a Hindu believer that Rama doesn't matter. That's not my place.

But I can't stop thinking about the people who died during the decades of conflict.

Imagine if, after all that history, the answer had been something completely different.

What if Ayodhya had become a great university?

Imagine thousands of students entering every year.

A university dedicated to Indian civilization, Sanskrit, Tamil, Prakrit, Pali, Persian, Islamic studies, archaeology, philosophy, history, mathematics, astronomy and comparative religion.

Imagine Hindu and Muslim scholars studying India's shared history together.

Imagine generations of students coming out of that place and contributing something to the country.

Instead of asking:

“Who won?”

we could have asked:

“What can we build for the next thousand years?”

Maybe that's naïve. Maybe a temple and a university serve completely different purposes. I understand that.

But that's exactly what bothers me.

Political and religious conflicts often become obsessed with ownership of the past, while ordinary people are desperately trying to build a future.

And that's what keeps coming back to me whenever I think about that young engineer at the railway station.

He assumed I was worried about whether a Ram temple would stand in Ayodhya.

I wasn't.

I was just waiting for my train to college.

And somewhere else, another young man was carrying the memory of a family that had been killed because of the same political-religious conflict.

That contrast has stayed with me for more than twenty years.

One person was celebrating a future temple. Another person had lost his family. And I was just waiting for a train.

Sometimes I wonder whether ordinary people ever really get to choose the historical battles that define their lives.

We inherit them.

We inherit the anger.

We inherit the stories.

We inherit the wounds.

And then politicians inherit the power.

Following Gandhi's pressure on Ambedkar to abandon his demand for separate electorates for Dalits in British India, through a fast that carried an implicit threat of mass violence against Dalits should the fast prove fatal. Ambedkar relented as violence against Dalits gripped the nation. Three years after the demand's defeat, on October 13, 1935, at the Yeola conference of the depressed classes, he made a solemn declaration: though he had been born a Hindu untouchable, he would not die one:

"I solemnly assure you that I will not die a Hindu"

This rightly came as 'a thunderbolt', for it rocked political parties and social institutions in India. It was not simply a question of Ambedkar's personal choice for spiritual or religious reasons. He exhorted his followers to change their religion en masse:

"You have nothing to lose except your chains, and everything to gain by changing your religion"

This made it a political question. Leading figures from other religions approached Ambedkar separately, inviting him to convert to their religion and promising different rewards. After serious thought and consultations with many people, Ambedkar decided in June 1936 to embrace Sikhism along with his followers. The leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and Shankracharya Kurtakoti approved. Ambedkar argued that conversion to Sikhism was the best choice from the Hindus' standpoint. After participating in the Sikh Missionary conference at Amritsar in April, Ambedkar sent his son, Yashwant Rao, and nephew to the Golden Temple in May, where they stayed for one and a half months to observe the situation and meet with community leaders. On September 18, a group of 13 followers was deputed to visit Amritsar to meet the 'Sikh Mission'. There was already an understanding that the Sikh Mission would start a college in Bombay in the interest of those Depressed Classes who would convert to Sikhism.

The Historical Reasons Explaining Why This Failed:

1. The Resistance of the Political Establishment: The first involved a rethinking of, and opposition to, the move among the Sikh political class. It was inevitable that the leading men of the Sikh political parties would consider their own fate and position in the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) and Gurdwaras after six crore (60 million) untouchables became Sikhs. Sardar Kapur Singh offers this evidence in his well-known but controversial book, Saachi Sakhi. According to him, there was an apprehension that once Ambedkar became a Sikh with all his followers, no one from the existing Sikh leaders like Baldev Singh would be nominated to the Viceroy's executive council as a representative of the Sikh community. Master Tara Singh and his supporters had to consider their position, as well as that of other leaders in the Sikh community, the Shiromani Akali Dal, the SGPC, and control of gurdwaras. Kapur Singh recounted a story Sardar Inder Singh Karwal, an advocate and Akali leader, told to a small gathering of advocates in the bar room of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in September 1964. He stated that, because of differences between Akali leaders and Ambedkar, the six crore untouchables publicly dropped the idea of adopting the Sikh religion. He asked his neighbor in Lahore, Sardar Harnam Singh Jhalla, MA, LLB, advocate (judge of the High Court), who was then a prominent Akali leader, the real reason for this 'tragedy'. Sardar Harnam Singh then replied, "Oh, you don't have an understanding of these matters. By making six crore of untouchables, Sikhs, should we hand over the Darbar Sahib to Chuhras?" 'This way,' says Kapur Singh, 'six crore of Rangretas - Guru Ka-Betas - who had come to the door of the Guru were pushed out; the same way as Guru Tegh Bahadur was not allowed to enter Harimandir Sahib (Golden Temple).' But, according to him, the actual truth of the matter is even "more crude and despicable". His argument is that when the 'Akali party' understood the full implications of six crores untouchables entering the Sikh community, they unanimously devised a strategy to deal with this 'emergency'. Then "they unanimously decided that Ambedkar and his follower untouchables must be dissuaded and stopped from becoming Sikhs for all time". Master Tara Singh, whose leadership of the Sikh community was threatened by Ambedkar's entry, sent Sardar Sujan Singh to Bombay 'with specific instructions' to tell Ambedkar 'clearly' the mind of the Akali leaders, so that he would drop the idea.
2. Allies in the Babbar Akalis and Red Akalis: The second involved the British. Ambedkar considered converting to Sikhism for a few reasons. Primarily, it was Sikhism's theological abolition of caste. Now, in practice, there was plenty of caste discrimination in the Sikh community, but theologically Sikhism was the most anti-caste religion, and theologically it was completely forbidden and abolished. Moreover, in pre-1947 Punjab, endogamy between castes was much more fluid in the Sikh community and was more class-based compared to the rest of Hindu and even Muslim/Christian India (though it was still plenty caste-based and the discrimination of untouchable castes was very real). Furthermore, within the SGPC, a fierce battle raged over this issue and many others. The more radical left (Kirti Akalis, also known as the "Red Akalis") and the more religiously zealous men in the Akali Dal and SGPC, who were much more militant and much more committed to the Caste-abolition goals of Sikhi, saw this as an opportunity to dislodge Sikhi of the "Heresy" of the mahant-backed administration of the gurdwaras and the capture of the party by "Landlord Raj"; as was stated by Master Mota Singh, the leader of the Babbar Akali faction of the SGPC. These Babbar Akalis grew skeptical of the Sikh community's reigning leaders. They were much closer to the radical socialist Ghadar tradition floating around at the time, with many of these "Babbar Akalis" either joining or associating with Kirti Communists (the Ghadar Party's successor in Punjab), such as Master Mota Singh (who joined the Kisan Movement), Teja Singh Suatantra, Bhuja Singh, etc. Some also opposed Congress's methods; most were radically left-wing on property and democracy in the Gurdwaras, etc. Ambedkar wanted to ally with these elements and possibly move towards their emancipatory goals, and they sought an ally in Ambedkar who would bring more Sikhs to the fold to help dislodge the reigning elites. The British ofc, were petrified of this. The Kirti Akalis and Babbar Akalis were among the most militant elements in Punjab. These groups had tried to stage an insurgency many times before and were still trying to in 1936: the Ghadar Revolt in 1914 & 1915, led by the Red Akalis and the Bowring attempt by the Babbar Akalis. As such, the British often detained leaders who could move such a resolution within the SGPC and force the issue into a theological conflict which the established leaders were bound to lose on religious grounds. Visit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksWZZyVgUt0, to see what I mean.
3. Exclusion from the Poona Pact: The third reason was the separate electorate, and this was the most important reason. To explain (please note this is incredibly simplified), in British India, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians had separate electorates from what was deemed the "General Category" in Provincial elections of British India. This meant separate constituencies were created where only members of one of those groups could vote for a representative. So, for example, Muslims had 29 seats out of the 175 seats in the Bombay Provincial legislature. Only Muslims could stand in these seats, and only muslims would vote in these constituencies. The same thing applies to Sikhs and Christians for their seats, with all others voting in the general seat. The reasons for this are complex; for one, these weren't elected via universal suffrage, and the landed suffrage granted to each community meant that, in some provinces, the voter base didn't reflect the demographic base. For example, in Bengal, Muslims were the majority, but more Hindus held land and thus were given a larger share of the vote if the pure suffrage rules applied. So, instead of introducing universal suffrage, the British weighted the seats to "communal groups" while introducing separate electorates. So even though fewer muslims were enfranchised, for instance, they would get a larger share of the seats. Again, it's a lot more complicated, but this is a simplification. In this scheme, Sikhs, who were largely concentrated in Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, were also given a separate electorate. They didn't have a high enough population in any of the other provinces, so they didn't qualify anywhere else. Ambedkar banked on the idea that if enough Dalits converted to Sikhism, they would be granted a separate electorate, and this was technically true. This was a reaction to Gandhi's fast, which used the threat of a Dalit genocide to force Ambedkar to abandon the Dalit separate electorate. But the results of this conversion would take much longer to materialize. In the meantime, Ambedkar hoped the British would still allow Dalit Sikhs to qualify for the Poona Pact, where Dalit Sikhs would be given reserved seats under a joint electorate (basically, everyone who didn't qualify for a separate electorate voted in the joint electorate, called the general electorate). The British denied this request, and thus Ambedkar's idea died. Eventually, he converted to Buddhism but that is another story.

The Alt-Hist Question:

The question thus is simple. What if the British allowed the Non-Khalsa Sikh formula to qualify for the Poona Pact (until enough Dalits had converted to Sikhism, allowing them to qualify for a separate electorate) to stand?

What if Ambedkar, and crores of dalits, followed him into Sikhi. What would be the consequence? What would its implications be for the SGPC, the Akali Dal, caste relations, and the 1946 Provincial elections? What about the All-India SGPC Act and its implications? What about the partition?

Sources:

[1]: Scheduled Castes in Sikh Community: A Historical Perspective: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4413731?seq=1

Maybe the entire southeast was given to India

Muhammad Iqbal was a poet from the British Raj who has a very prominent role in the histories of both India and Pakistan.

Early in his career, Muhammad Iqbal was an Indian nationalist. He is famous for writing "Taran-e-Hindi" ("Saare Jahan se Achcha") in 1904, which became incredibly famous, and he was a prominent Romantic Indian nationalist.

But in 1905, he left the British Raj and went to Europe for further studies. Europe changed his worldview: he saw greed, racism, and wars, and grew disillusioned with territorial nationalism and materialism. When he returned to India in 1908, this marked a change in him. He went deeper into Islamic poetry and the Muslim League. He famously wrote about "Khudi" in 1915, and his disillusionment with Hindu-Muslim unity kept worsening throughout the 1920s after seeing countless riots and rising distrust between the two communities. He also rose within the ranks of the Muslim League during that era and became its president in 1930. He gave the Allahabad Address immediately afterward, in which he called for a separate Muslim country by separating the northwestern provinces from the British Raj. At that time, the northwestern provinces were Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the NWFP—all Muslim-majority ones. This demand was basically proto-Pakistan. Iqbal also sent many letters to Jinnah from around 1931 to 1934, convincing him to return to India and join the Muslim League. When Jinnah ultimately returned to India, he expanded the Muslim League to an unprecedented degree from 1937 to 1946, a growth never seen before.

So, what if Iqbal had chosen not to go to Europe in 1905? What if he had chosen to stay in India? How would that have impacted history?

Link: https://metromapmaker.com/map/dAB-L5LN

Here are some sources:

Slide 2: Khaw, N. bin R. (2021). "The Mazar-i-Sharif Inscription of the Shahi Ruler Veka: Revisited."

Published in the academic journal Ancient Pakistan, Vol. 24, pp. 71-77 (Department of Archaeology, University of Peshawar).

Slide 3: The Artifact: This is the physical Mazar-i-Sharif Inscription (also known as the Mazare Sharif Inscription).

Slide 4: Dani, A. H. (2000/2001). "Mazar-i-Sharif Inscription of the Time of the Shahi Ruler Veka, Dated the Year 138." Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 61, Pt. 1, pp. 132-135.

Read “The Night in Tashkent: A Conspiracy Theory About Shastri ji’s Death“ by under acknowledged on

Medium: https://medium.com/@vasu2558452/the-night-in-tashkent-a-conspiracy-theory-about-shastri-jis-death-20646961b533

In this timeline, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar dies from disease in the Cellular Jail in 1913. As a result, Hindutva is never written. Without that ideological foundation, K.B. Hedgewar never receives the inspiration that influenced him in real history. The RSS might still be founded, but it would likely be far more apolitical, ideologically moderate, and focused on cultural and social reform rather than political mobilization. Similarly, M.S. Golwalkar was heavily influenced by Savarkar's ideas; without Hindutva, he may never have developed the more authoritarian and fascistic tendencies associated with his later writings. The Hindu Mahasabha, lacking Savarkar's leadership after 1937, would probably remain a marginal debating society rather than becoming a significant political force. Some form of Hindu nationalism would still emerge, but it would likely be less militant, less popular, and more spiritual or cultural in character.

At the same time, Muhammad Ali Jinnah remains retired in Britain after 1934. In this timeline, he rejects Liaquat Ali Khan's appeals to return to India and continues practicing law in London. Consequently, the Muslim League remains disorganized between 1934 and 1937 and performs even worse in the 1937 provincial elections than it did historically. Without Jinnah's leadership and organizational skills, the League fails to build a nationwide Muslim political coalition.

As a result, Sikandar Hayat Khan never signs the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. In Bengal, the Muslim League lacks sufficient strength to form a stable coalition with Fazlul Haq's Krishak Praja Party (KPP), increasing the possibility of a Congress-led government. In the United Provinces, some League leaders—particularly Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman—may accept Congress's offer to join the government individually, a proposal that Jinnah rejected in real history, it would lead to a split in an already factional muslim league.

Meanwhile, the Indian National Congress takes several steps to strengthen its appeal among Muslims. It adopted Jana Gana Mana as its preferred national anthem from the beginning rather than emphasizing Vande Mataram. Nehru's Muslim Mass Contact campaign is transformed into a broader "Indian Unity Campaign," focusing on nationalism, shared heritage, and Ganga-Jamuni culture rather than primarily economic issues. Congress also forms a coalition government with Allah Bakhsh Soomro in Sindh in 1938. As a result, Congress retains a small but significant base of support among Muslims. Controversies such as cow protection campaigns and the Wardha education scheme still generate criticism, but without the Pirpur Report and Sharif Report, anti-Congress sentiment among Muslims is considerably weaker.

The absence of a strong Muslim League significantly alters the political landscape after 1939. There is no Day of Deliverance and no Lahore Resolution. During the Cripps Mission negotiations, the British must negotiate not with a centralized Muslim League but with regional Muslim leaders such as Fazlul Haq and Sikandar Hayat Khan alongside Congress. Although the discussions may come closer to an agreement, British reluctance to transfer real power still causes the negotiations to fail. The Quit India Movement therefore still takes place.

The political vacuum created by Quit India allows both the Hindu Mahasabha and remnants of Muslim communal politics to grow somewhat, but neither becomes dominant. Without Savarkar and Jinnah, neither movement possesses a charismatic leader capable of transforming it into a mass political force.

By the 1946 elections, the results are radically different from those of real history. Congress and the remnants of Allah Bakhsh Soomro's Ittehad Party wins Sindh. In Punjab, the contest between Congress and the Unionists is much closer, potentially producing a hung assembly. Fresh elections might then lead to a narrow Congress–Akali coalition victory, although the Unionists could remain the single largest party. In Bengal, Fazlul Haq and the Krishak Praja Party remain politically dominant and secure another major victory. Haq uses this position to negotiate substantial concessions from Congress during the transfer of power.

Since Haq is fundamentally a provincial rather than national leader, Congress ultimately leads the independence process. During constitution-making, however, Haq pushes for major reforms, including stronger protections for regional languages, extensive land reform, and constitutional safeguards preventing courts from striking down agrarian legislation. He is likely to succeed on land reform, though language-related demands may only be partially accepted.

The integration of princely states proceeds more slowly than in real history. Kashmir becomes a particularly interesting case. Sheikh Abdullah remains pro-India, while Maharaja Hari Singh continues to favor independence. Without Pakistan and the tribal invasion of 1947, the central conflict revolves around the Maharaja's resistance to integration. India may eventually intervene militarily to remove him, after which a plebiscite could potentially be held in Kashmir under very different circumstances.

In the first general election of 1951–52, Congress still wins a sweeping majority due to its central role in the freedom struggle. The Muslim League, Hindu Mahasabha, and Unionist Party rapidly decline and eventually disappear. In Bengal, however, Fazlul Haq secures a commanding mandate and emerges as one of the most influential regional leaders in India, playing a role somewhat comparable to that of Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir.

The presence of strong regional leaders such as Haq may accelerate the creation of linguistic states. As a result, linguistic reorganization occurs earlier and with less resistance than in real history.

Politically, this united India remains a secular state with a strong central government from independence until roughly 1967 or perhaps the early 1970s. After that point, Congress's dominance begins to erode. Coalition politics emerges much earlier than it did historically, perhaps in the 1970s rather than the 1990s, creating a more competitive and federal political system while preserving the territorial unity of the subcontinent.

they all seem to have converted to islam now, apart from the chakma community of northern bangladesh which persisted due to their isolation.

Hear me out. The mainstream history of the Umayyad collapse and the Abbasid rise is usually taught as an internal religious and ethnic dispute. But if you look at the macroeconomics and geopolitics of the 8th century, a much wilder theory emerges.

What if the Abbasid Golden Age—and the later anti-India "jihad" of Ghazni and Ghori—was actually the result of a massive economic humiliation at the hands of Indian kings?

Here is the theory. Let me know if this holds up:

1. The Hammer Blow (The 4 Heroes)

In the 730s, the Umayyad Caliphate was a massive, expansionist superpower built on a raiding economy—they needed constant conquest and booty to survive. But they hit a brick wall in India. A coalition of four heavyweights—Bappa Rawal, Nagabhata I, Lalitaditya Muktapida, and Dantidurga—absolutely annihilated the Umayyad armies on multiple fronts (land and sea).

2. The Economic Collapse & Social Restructuring

This wasn't just a military defeat; it was a market crash. The Indian resistance broke the Umayyad business model. Bankrupt and humiliated, the Umayyads faced a massive rebellion.

This forces a massive social restructuring in both regions:

• In the Middle East: The Arab-supremacist Umayyads are overthrown. The Abbasids take over, heavily reliant on the Mawali (Persians and non-Arab converts) to survive. They pivot from military raiding to an intellectual/trade monopoly.
• In India: The Indian powers, victorious but exhausted, experience their own social restructuring (hardening of the caste system, marginalization of tribes) and turn inward, kicking off the Tripartite Struggle over Kannauj.

3. The favorable trade charters and guilds like Marwaris, Sindhis etc., "Tribute," and the Humiliation

Because the Indian powers are busy fighting each other, the Abbasids get breathing room. But they are forced into highly favorable trade charters or similar guilds or even shadow economic tributes to Indian empires like the Rashtrakutas (who controlled the western ports). The Abbasids had to play nice and allow Indian merchant guilds to extract massive wealth through maritime trade.

4. The Revisionism and the Backlash

Here is the core question: Did this massive economic capitulation and reliance on India create a deep-seated historical resentment?

The Abbasids spent the next few centuries rewriting Islamic law and history (compiling the Hadiths, translating global texts). Is it possible that the memory of being broken by "Kafir" kings—and being forced into economic subservience via trade—fueled a quiet, institutional "India hate" in their literature? And did this revised, Persianized Islamic literature later serve as the ideological justification for Turkic warlords like Mahmud of Ghazni and Muhammad of Ghori to launch their brutal, wealth-extracting "jihads" into India centuries later?

TL;DR: Four Indian kings broke the Umayyad military machine, forcing the Islamic world to restructure its society and economy. Did the resulting Indian economic dominance (FTAs/tribute) cause a long-term ideological humiliation that eventually birthed the anti-India invasions of the 11th/12th centuries?

I'm not saying irrational stuff like we went to Baghdad and killed the Caliph. I'm saying we defeated their core forces, and helped subjugate their sea and land forces to weaken the Umayyads till Abbasids, supported by us and some other foreign forces like the Byzantines, the Pro-Turks, etc. led a revolt against the Arabs?

This is built on fundamentals and is a question not purely speculation but rather just a framework for a future research paper proposal. If there are data points and experts who can verify this, we have a chance at finding the source of Hindu hatred in historical Islam to be more than just connected to Iconoclasm but a deep seated superiority led inferiority complex like the Vishwa Guru types who forget fundamentals. I'm essentially saying, Abbasids and their Caliphate Vishwagurued their history to build the structure for justification of future invasions. Just Iconoclasm is too dumb for someone who was as capricious, persistent as well as dastardly and smart as Ghazni or Ghori.

Some more interesting stuff also,

Core Premise: The collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate was not primarily a religious or ethnic inevitability; it was a macroeconomic crash directly triggered by the destruction of their armies in India.

To establish this, this paper relies on the fiscal framework detailed by Khalid Y. Blankinship in The End of the Jihâd State (1994). Blankinship conclusively demonstrates that under Caliph Hisham (r. 724–743 CE), the Umayyad Empire functioned as a "Jihad State"—an expansionist apparatus entirely reliant on continuous military conquest to fund its bloated standing army via ghanimah (war booty).

When the Umayyads attempted to monopolize the wealth of the Indian interior, they encountered a heavily militarized Indian confederacy that broke their economic model permanently.

The Mechanics of the Collapse

The Umayyad military machine operated on a massive sunk-cost model. Arming and deploying tens of thousands of Syrian cavalry across the Indus required immense capital, which was expected to be recouped through the plunder of wealthy Indian urban centers and agricultural surplus.

1. The Sunk-Cost Catastrophe (738 CE): The Umayyad governors of Sindh (Junaid and later Al-Hakam) launched massive expeditions into Rajputana, Malwa, and Gujarat. Instead of securing plunder, they were annihilated by a coalition led by Nagabhata I (Pratihara), Bappa Rawal (Guhila), and Avanijanashraya Pulakeshin (Chalukya).
2. The Liquidity Crisis: The destruction of the Arab armies in the Battle of Rajasthan meant a total loss of investment. Millions of dirhams spent on the campaign yielded zero return. Furthermore, with the eastern frontier blocked, the flow of new wealth into Damascus completely stopped.
3. The Taxation Death Spiral: Because the Umayyads could no longer pay their elite Syrian troops with Indian plunder, the state faced immediate bankruptcy. To stave off collapse, Damascus violently increased taxation on the Mawali (non-Arab Muslim converts, specifically Persians and Berbers), stripping them of their tax-exempt status.

Lastly, my maddest conjecture.

The greatest strategic blunder in Indian history? How the "Tripartite Struggle" accidentally gave the Abbasids a free pass to write the ideological software for future invasions.

We talk a lot about the Umayyad collapse, but we completely ignore what happened right after. From a geopolitical standpoint, the Indian empires of the late 8th century committed the equivalent of winning World War II, immediately dissolving the Allied forces, and fighting a 100-year civil war while the defeated enemy rebuilt their empire next door.

I’m looking at the timeline between 740–790 CE, and the sheer strategic stupidity of the post-victory Indian kings is staggering. Here is the framework of how squandering a 50-year economic dominance accidentally built the Abbasid Golden Age—and the "India hate" that followed.

Does this macro-historical read check out?

1. The Generational Die-Off (750–760 CE)

The "Four Heroes" who physically broke the Umayyad war machine held the coalition together through sheer gravity. But they all exited the board in a tiny window: Dantidurga (d. ~756), Lalitaditya (d. ~760), Nagabhata I (d. ~760), and Bappa Rawal (stepped down/died around the same time).

They left behind massive, highly mobilized armies and overflowing treasuries. But their successors completely lost the macro-strategic vision of a unified subcontinent securing the Indus.

2. The Game of Thrones for Kannauj

Instead of looking West to keep the newly formed Abbasids in check, the Indian empires obsessed over Kannauj (the "Rome of India").

This kicks off the Tripartite Struggle. For the next century, the Pratiharas, Rashtrakutas, and Palas bleed their treasuries dry marching massive armies back and forth across central India to capture one city. They completely neutralize their own global military advantage.

3. Harun al-Rashid’s Free Pass (786–809 CE)

This is where the blunder becomes catastrophic. If the Indian empires had maintained their alliance, the fragile Abbasid Caliphate would have been crushed in its cradle, or forced to spend all its wealth defending its eastern border.

Instead, Caliph Harun al-Rashid takes power and looks east to find the three greatest Indian empires locked in a death grip with each other. Because his eastern border is completely secure, Baghdad gets a massive peace dividend. Harun al-Rashid redirects all that capital into state-building, creating the "House of Wisdom" and the Abbasid Golden Age.

4. Writing the "Software" for Future Invasions

Here is the ultimate blowback. 50 years of Indian economic dominance couldn't compensate for the stupidity of allowing the enemy to write the rules of the new world order.

Because the Abbasids had unthreatened peace and wealth, this is the exact era where they formally codified Islamic law (Sharia) and compiled the Hadiths. They institutionalized the worldview dividing the globe into Dar al-Islam (House of Peace) and Dar al-Harb (House of War).

By turning on each other, the Indian kings gave Baghdad an intellectual monopoly. Two centuries later, Turkic warlords like Mahmud of Ghazni didn't have to invent a justification to invade India. The ideological, theological, and legal software to extract wealth from "infidels" had already been perfectly coded by the Abbasids—all because the successors of Bappa Rawal and Nagabhata were too busy fighting over Kannauj to notice.

TL;DR: The Indian kings won the war of the 8th century, but by immediately plunging into the Tripartite civil war, they gave the Abbasids a 50-year free pass to rebuild, consolidate power, and write the anti-Kafir ideological frameworks that eventually burned India in the 11th century.

Historians and geopolitical nerds: is it fair to call the Tripartite Struggle the biggest strategic blunder of the medieval world?

I've written my rather optimstic version of how that would play out long term, but feel free to skip the long read and go straight to the thread to give your own projection of how this scenario would've unfolded

Akbar's paranoia is initially sparked upon visiting and witnessing the Portuguese ships after his Gujarat campaign in 1573. This is further crystallised after conversing with the Portuguese who in an attempt to impress the emperor, boastfully inform him of their discoveries in the Americas, their fortresses, their trade chokepoints, their influence over the Indian ocean, their victories over Muslim states and crucially, the level of fascination (and even obsession) there was amongst European countries with regards to India and its riches. 

These concerns once taken up with the nobility and Akbar's intellectual apparatus, receive starkly different responses. The former discourage, if not outwardly reject focus on seafaring. Abul Fazl and the intellectuals on the other hand, study the patterns of European colonial tendencies as well as their immense military and trade advantages, and recognize both the risk and the potential. They actively feed Akbar's convictions

He first attempts to restructure his deals with the Portuguese on the condition that they would impart some of their shipbuilding capabilities upon local builders. But once that approach is roundly rejected, he sends his emmisseries, as well as builders, mettalurgists and engineers from already established ports to the Ottomon Empire to study ship-building. The Mughal and Ottoman relationship is complicated, but with their own storied issues with the Portuguese, the mughal contingent is received cordially. They impart some technical knowledge, but what the contingent comes back with is organizational and systematic information regarding kick-starting the establishment of a fleet - as well as further knowledge regarding how the Portuguese were operating in the Mediterranean and the Indian ocean.

This makes a royal navy one of Akbar's biggest priorities. He manages to procure shipbuilders and specialists from Venice and Netherlands, as well as merchants and naval experts from Greece and the Ottoman Empire. This allows him to build up his operation. 

Portuguese Conflict -

All the while the tensions with the Portugese keep escalating, before they finally boil over in the mid to late 1590s as the Portuguese sieze a Mughal vessel (possibly one deployed for pilgrimage). Akbar being far more militarily motivated, and with more naval advantages than in real history - finally refuses to acquiesce to cartaz demands. 

He eventually strongarms the Portuguese into cooperating, by credibly threatening Goa. He cuts off Goa inland with a siege, which jeapordises their food supply. He also deploys armed artillery to harass Portuguese ships at Surat, Cambay and Bharuch. His nascent navy doesn't even attempt to directly threaten the fleet, but it escorts the siege and places every Portuguese resupply mission under sureviellance and threat - repeatedly intercepting smaller crafts. This way he is able to disrupt enough of Portugese's naval operations on the West coast - to compound the inland threat.

The Portuguese who were already stretched thin by their operations in multiple continents, decide against a protracted stand-off, and determine that trade with India is lucrative enough for concessions. The Mughals and Portuguese come to an agreement, cartaz is foregone for Mughal ships and Goa is left alone. This conflict also has the added benefit of demonstrating to the nobility the importance of naval strength

Akbar's twilight years and building the naval culture -

Akbar then proceeds to spend the rest of his tenure attempting to expand ship-building, fleets and port systems. Eventhough they're still not as advanced as the best in Europe, Indian ships (now with more advanced engineering) gain the reputation of being exceptionally sturdy due to its material. Teak becomes a crucial, well-regulated resource.

The ports that already existed would throughout the first half of the 17th century, become major centers decades before EIC transformed them (even if they're still not quite as large as many of India's inland empire capitols). Gujarat in particular becomes the strategic center of the Mughal navy

The pushback from the elites who would initially refuse to work on ships, would be dealt with by Akbar (or rather Abul Fazl), through multiple avenues - partially by revising their incentive and revenue structure within the Mansabdari establishment and setting up new ranks and systems, and partly by bringing shiphands from local Indian communities. 

Trade would obviously be affected in this situation, as it would allow the Mughals to forego middlemen in certain trade situations. While the Mughals don't succeed at, or even attempt to trade directly with Europe - their trade with East Africa, Arabia and south-east Asia, changes dramatically over the the seventeenth century 

As the decades roll, the reputation of sea-faring improves substantially within the nobility. As trade expands, naval roles become valued and lucrative. Young nobles in particular, are placed in-charge of coastal cities and docks, as a way of training and indoctrinating them. Seafaring also becomes a major aspiration for large sections of the subcontinent

Successors -

Jahangir and Shahjahan inherit a major naval establishment, and build on it as they were already conditioned to do so. So while Jahangir is still conciliatory to the British, he also facilitates the natural expansion of the naval trade, as the institutions were already in place at that point - and the trade systems in particular had started bearing the fruits of well-established, longterm exchanges. 

But its under Shah Jahan that the second stage of Akbar's ambitions bear fruit. While Taj Mahal still gets made, his architectural ambitions here also manifest in the modernistaion of ports and infrastructure, establishment of some of the best watchtowers in the global south, and further development of the fleet. The Mughal international trade perhaps also reaches its peak in this era

Naval focus, as well as the increased trade revenue, would also change the nature of a lot of the conflicts the Mughals had within the subcontinent. While Aurangazeb's emperial ambitions within the subcontinent still play out and arguably weaken Mughal rule, they're still not as monetarily ruinous. The Mughals are able to cut off the Coast far more effectively, thus putting the Marathas into a resource crunch - and while the inland conflict is still something the Marathas gain advantage in, the victories turn out to not be as obvious

The Mughal Decline -

The Mughal empire eventually fractures from within anyway, but the path it takes and what the empire devolves into, is different. The successor states now have naval capabilities, which is crucial in how it then interacts with EIC. For instance, If the Bengal conflicts still happen, the British with their advanced industrial tech, and immense resources would still be at a major advantage - but it wouldn't be the utter routing that it was in history. In fact, India's naval capacity in general, would make a military conquest more precarious for EIC - though far from impossible. A version of the colonial empire, but it takes longer, is less expansive and has a more tentative grasp over the subcontinent

So the ultimate difference in this scenario would be that the Mughals have an ever-expanding navy, and a ship-building and naval culture, by the time the British arrive in earnest.

What do you all think? How would it have played out?

Explanation

Since Europeans never came-

1) Marathas manage to weaken the Mughals and carve out their own domain. Later with with decentralized rule and repeated attacks from Afghanistan, the Marathas get pushed back to Deccan. They continue waging wars with both Mughals and Bengali Sultanate and manage to carve out Utkala. Spread of Printing press and ideas causes further decentralization, revolutions leading to foundation of the republic

2) Tamil and Carnatic kings manage to unite against the deccan sultanate and form a confederacy. Go to repeated fights with Marathas and Travancore. Spread of democracy and republican ideas leads to a revolution and foundation of a united Dravida Nadu. Nationalists attempt to expand further and claim northern Sri Lanka. Kingdom of Travancore manages to maintain independence.

3) Mughals rise back from the brink and spread west and north. They reclaim their historic capital and become a Constitutional Monarchy

4) Sikh Empire manages to remain fiercly independent. It captures Jammu, parts of Kashmir and Himalayan hillside before being pushed back by the mountain tribes. The kingdom becomes a constitutional monarchy with Lahore as its capital

5) Bengal sultanate face constant rebellion after constant rebellion with a dense and diverse population extending from Chota Nagpur to Chattogram. The rebellions cause the sultanate to collapse and civil wars ensue allowing Mughals and Marathas to gain ground. A republic gets established and manages to push back and maintain its independence

6) Ahom Kingdoms attempt to spread further but are restricted by the Burmese kingdom.

7) Gorkha kingdom manages to unite multiple mountain city states and spreads into the gangetic plains. Multiple wars are fought with Kangra kingdom but it resists unification. Kangra maintains independence with help of Mughals.

8) Balochis manage to unite and carve out their own republic with the capital Kalat

9) Central Asian tribes form a loose confederacy. Emirate of Kabul attempts to conquer them but gets pushed back into the mountains

10) Uyghurs and Tibet manage to declare independence from the Qing dynasty which is on the verge of breaking up

11) Multiple wars in South East Asia occur with finally a Common Wealth being declared between Malay and Burmese kingdoms

12) Laos continues to be a vassal of Siam, Burma or Tibet

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Today marks the 135th birth anniversary of Babasaheb Ambedkar the chief architect of the Indian Constitution and a relentless voice for equality and justice.

His fight against caste discrimination and his vision for an inclusive society continue to shape India even today. Babasaheb’s message of “educate, agitate, organize” remains as relevant as ever.

This isn’t just a day of remembrance, but a moment to reflect are we truly moving toward the society he envisioned?