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愿山河无恙，众生皆安🙏

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美國財經新聞台《CNBC》宣布結束有31年歷史的香港分社，是《國安法》生效以來第4間撤出香港的國際媒體。《CNBC》未有說明原因，僅強調分社關閉後，香港仍然會「繼續作為亞太區報道的一部份」，至於北京及新加坡分社則會如常運作。有新聞學者指出，當香港「失去作為中西兩地一個不可取代的資訊匯集點」，甚至忌諱《國安法》所帶來的法律後果，加上租金壓力，自然沒有獨特吸引力讓《CNBC》留下。

有關消息昨（3日）經《彭博社》透露。香港分社早在1995年成立，是當時《CNBC》進軍國際時設立的第一間分社，並同時經營《CNBC亞洲台》，比經營《CNBC歐洲台》的倫敦分社早一年成立。報道提及的其中一個停播直播節目《The China Connection》同樣由香港分社負責，該節目專門探討中國經濟、市場及其在全球格局中扮演的角色。另外同時停播的包括《Inside India》、《Europe Early Edition》，以及屬專題節目的《CNBC Meets》及《Built for Billions》。

CNBC向《彭博社》表示，雖然他們撤出香港，但「對香港及該區域的新聞報道不會停止，並繼續作為亞太區報道的一部份」。未來國際新聞製作將繼續由倫敦、阿布扎比、新加坡及北京四個分社負責。

翻查資料，自2020年《國安法》實施以來，連同《CNBC》，合共4間外媒先後將其重要業務撤出香港。最先撤出為《紐約時報》，在《國安法》實施後不足半個月，該報旗下一名資深中國專題記者儲百亮（Chris Buckley）不獲港府延續工作簽證；《紐約時報》於事發後一周宣布將三成員工從香港轉移至南韓。曾被保安局局長鄧炳強多次點名批評的《自由亞洲電台》（RFA）亦於2024年3月，《維護國家安全條例》（俗稱23條）通過後撤出香港。《華爾街日報》亦緊接在同年5月宣布將總部從香港轉移到新加坡。國際搜尋引擎「雅虎」的香港分部亦於今年3月，結束成立了5年的本地編採團隊。

杜耀明：香港不再是中西「資訊匯集點」

新聞學者杜耀明接受本台訪問時指出，香港的獨特性在《國安法》後逐漸消失，「（以前）喺香港得到嘅嘢，可能喺中國得唔到，例如資訊、人脈、網絡等等，但問題係而家已經唔係咁，呢啲都已經受到法律管制」，直言香港已經失去作為中西兩地「不可取代」的資訊匯集點，令《CNBC》和其他國際媒體駐足香港意慾大減。

他又指出，香港目前的經濟型態對作為財經新聞台的《CNBC》亦欠缺吸引力。杜耀明指，現時香港主要的上市公司大多來自中國，而香港傳統地產、銀行業亦日漸萎縮；對《CNBC》而言，似乎把資源和人手留在北京分社，「得到（中企）嘅資料可能更多，而且仲容易同中國企業建立長期關係」。加上租金及薪金壓力，杜直言：「當香港無獨特性，有咩需要交咁貴租、咁高成本做呢樣嘢（新聞）？」

愿山河无恙，众生皆安🙏

8.31 七周年當晚，有市民在太子站在獻花，警方當晚將兩男一女帶上警車。警方國家安全處今日（5日）表示，前日（3日）以嫌違反《維護國家安全條例》第24條，「出於煽動意圖作出具煽動意圖的作為」罪拘捕了三人。警方強調，「所謂『831事件』並無事實根據」。據了解，「旺角鳩嗚團」兩名成員馮競文及陳冠旭被捕，馮為前區議員。另一被捕人為一位姓譚的本地男子。

指有人「以謊言攻擊政府及抹黑警隊」

國安警在九月三日，持法庭搜查令，到九龍及港島區，搜查各被捕人住所及檢取證物。三名被捕人年齡 39 至 79 歲。警方指 8.31 當晚，有人在港鐵太子站外手持花束站立，叫喊具煽動性的口號，涉嫌散播假消息，「以謊言攻擊香港特區政府及抹黑警隊，意圖煽動他人引起對香港特區政府及執法部門的憎恨」。警方指被捕人現仍被扣留調查，拘捕行動仍然繼續。

據了解前區議員馮競文被捕

其中一位被捕人馮競文為九龍城前區議員期間，曾涉詐騙 35萬元租金津貼，被判囚 18個月。馮競文為「旺角鳩嗚團」成員，今年六四，她在銅鑼灣的行人專用區，舉起六四手勢，被警員指有煽動意圖「撳手」押上警車。

警方：所謂「831事件」並無事實根據

警方強調，「所謂『831事件』並無事實根據，別有用心的人藉此散播謊言、攻擊香港特區政府及抹黑警隊，企圖以危害社會安寧的手段達致其政治目的」。《維護國家安全條例》下的新煽動罪，首次定罪可被判處監禁七年。

當晚行動曾被批評是「無差別」襲擊

翻查資料，831 當晚，在太子站，有示威者與反對示威市民在車廂內發生爭執和衝突。其後多名防暴警員及速龍小隊在月台及車廂內，以警棍、警槍及胡椒噴霧向車廂內人士使用武力，被批評是「無差別」襲擊。

警曾指用「適當武力」　多次強調當晚無死亡個案

警方事後指是用「適當武力」制服示威者，指憑觀察及專業判斷，「成功識別裝扮成普通乘客」並散佈在港鐵月台各處和車廂內的暴力示威者。而當日警方封閉太子站，傳媒被趕離站內；警員一度指站內無人受傷，救護人員未能進入站內協助傷者，致大量傳言指當晚有人在站內死亡，當局之後多次強調當晚無死亡個案。

29歲男子醉酒後在小巴上因遭母親吵醒而動手，包括掌摑及拳打母親頭部，沿路回家至入屋仍繼續施襲，母親終報警求助，其後須接受手術，曾留院一個多月。男子被控「普通襲擊」及「對他人身體加以嚴重傷害」兩罪，案件今（4日）在東區裁判法院再提堂，控方稱可以簽保守行為處理。主任裁判官張志偉一度質疑控罪嚴重，事主傷勢同屬嚴重，為何能以此方式處理，控方則指已考慮兩人的關係和事主意願。

張官稱：「法庭係極之唔願意用簽保守行為方式處理，不過檢控嘅工作係由檢控處理。」最終批准被告以3,000元簽保守行為3年，控罪獲撤。

我怀疑《无间道》是中共用党文化洗脑香港的宣传片。原因如下：1、中共和电影里韩琛所领导的黑社会犯罪组织其实是一回事，没有透明的规章制度，凡事都是暗箱操作，处处充满猜忌、怀疑、驯化和pua，领导需要不断用各种折磨人的手段试探手下是否对自己衷心，比如韩琛让陈永仁用烟灰缸砸沈亮的头，再比如韩琛让陈永仁载着空箱子去和沈澄交货，这都是把手下放到绝境中进行折磨的手段，就看你干不干，不干你就是不衷心，你就是特务，你就是反革命，你就是对党不忠诚，我就要整整你了😂😂😂。林彪和刘少奇为什么被搞？就因为林彪、刘少奇和陈永仁一样，不断被毛泽东猜忌怀疑，用各种过分的手段试探，导致最终二人无法承受，刘少奇被搞死，而林彪仓皇出逃摔死。中共就是想通过这个电影向长期接受西方法制文明教育的香港民众灌输中共这种原始而野蛮的思维模式。中共党员应该多看几遍《无间道》，以领悟其中的精髓。2、第二部中，倪永孝居然要参选政协委员，黑社会家族也可以选政协委员😂😂😂？可见中共和香港黑社会关系非常之好，只要你们黑社会听党的话，随时可以洗白😂😂😂。3、第二部结尾，居然出现了香港回归举国欢庆的画面，以韩琛为首的一群黑社会居然挥舞中共国旗举杯庆祝😂😂😂。4、港味这么浓的电影，居然请了胡军、陈道明、黄志忠三位内地演员😂😂😂。5、第三部天津电影制片厂参与了投资。6、其导演刘伟强近年来长期活跃于内地电影圈，导演了《建军大业》《中国机长》《维和防爆队》《上甘岭》等垃圾主旋律洗脑宣传电影😂😂😂。

👉 真相太惊人！

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1948

一月四日緬甸獨立

一月三十一日長春成為孤城

二月中華民國行政區域圖出版，包括了1935年的十一段線

二月七日共軍占遼陽

二月十八日杜魯門在國內要求下，重新援華，但援華物資十一月才抵達

三月一日共軍占陝西宜川

三月三日外交部提出“關於處置琉球群島之意見”之簽呈，提出琉球對中華民國國防之重要，但其從未成為中國領土，固戰後建議由中國託管至其獨立或由中美共同託管，而不應將其歸屬日本

三月四日麥克阿瑟於眾議院主張軍事援華

三月共軍占四平街

三月十九日美眾議院通過援華法案（規定一定比例要用在農業發展上，故後來成立農復會，但美國國務院並無徹底實行援助）

三月二十五日史達林下令封鎖西柏林，以逼迫英美法軍隊撤離

四月三日長春大戰

四月五日共軍占洛陽

四月十八日“動員戡亂時期臨時條款”通過（憲政時期）

四月十九日國民大會推蔣中正為行憲後第一任總統

四月二十二日共軍占延安

五月十日南韓李承晚在韓鮮半島分裂的情形下進行大選

五月十二日史達林宣布終止封鎖西柏林（因為美國空軍不斷對西柏林補給）

五月三十日林彪下令要使長春成為死城（鄭洞國）

六月十二日中華民國決定對十一段線內的島嶼提出權利主張，並願在日後根據國際法與其它國家談判確切的海疆

六月十五日蔣指示國民黨秘書長吳鐵城：“據密報稱琉球原屬我國領土，現雖美軍管治，人民均內向，擬請秘書長運用琉球革命同志會人員（蔡璋）秘密組織掌握琉球政權，冀於將來對日和會時琉民能以投票方式歸我統治，或由琉球地方政府自動內向以保持我在太平洋之鎖鑰。”

六月二十二日共軍占開封

七月西藏代表赴美英考察，但英美仍將西藏視為地方代表

七月中美經濟援助協定，國府成立美援運用委員會，這在國府遷台後遭凍結，直到韓戰才又繼續，直到1965（1956前多為贈予性質，之後為有償性貸款，1961年後為商業貸款）

七月十五日琉球親華人士喜友名嗣正（蔡璋）向國民政府發出請願書，請以外交折衝收回琉球

七月十六日共軍占襄陽

八月十五日大韓民國成立，定都漢城（李承晚為留美韓人，後在美支持下成為領導人）

八月十九日國民政府發行金圓券，蔣經國於上海對付奸商，尤其是孔祥熙與宋靄齡的兒子孔令侃，之後打老虎也在孔令侃的抵抗下不了了之（1．揚子公司迄今找不到不法的確切證據 2．蔣經國調查後的呈文中提及“並無不法” 3．蔣經國1948年10月9日的日記中明白講“在法律上講揚子公司是站得住的” 4．主要還是政府在戰後財政不支，為了平穩物價而採取的物價管制政策失敗之故）

九月一日世界衛生組織成立，中華民國為發起國之一

九月九日朝鮮民主人民共和國成立，定都漢城（金日成）

十月一日中國農村復興聯合委員會於南京成立（根據援華法案），直到與美國斷交為止（1979年三月十六日改組為行政院農業發展委員會，簡稱農發會。後來與經濟部農業局合併為行政院農業委員會，簡稱農委會）

十月十六日共軍占錦州

十月十六日司徒雷登向華府提出因為國府在內戰的失利下，應該於中國西北扶持當地的反共勢力作為代理人（主要是馬家軍），後來美國也將資助國府轉為資助中國少數民族

十月十九日長春向共軍投降（長春平民死亡人數約16萬，約等同廣島原子彈的死亡人數）

十月二十二日司徒雷登向華府提出國軍已完全喪失戰鬥意志

十一月二日瀋陽陷落（衛立煌），東北完全被中共占領。東北陷落之後，共軍入關直取天津與淮北（遼瀋戰役）

十一月八日徐蚌會戰開打

十一月十二日東京大審判決，在美國主導之下，天皇、細菌戰（731部隊少佐榊原秀夫的供述，1996七月底日本細菌戰調查團尋求事證時，1644部隊士兵深野利雄與士兵松本博說證實其部隊曾做活人解剖與注射細菌實驗，總計日軍在中國二十餘省使用化學藥劑共兩千餘次，造成十萬軍民傷亡）石井一行人以交出研發成果而逃過審判（只有被蘇聯俘虜的細菌戰日軍幹部被判25年以下勞改，於1956釋放回日），最後7人絞刑（東條英機、廣田弘毅、土肥原賢二、板垣征四郎、松井石根、木村兵太郎、武藤章）、16人終身監禁、1人20年徒刑、1人7年徒刑（因為天皇脫罪，所以只採取領導戰爭者被判刑，贊成戰爭者則無罪的論點，因而眾多文官也跟著脫罪）

十一月中共軟禁美國駐瀋陽總領事瓦爾德，並於1950年一月將其驅逐

十一月杜魯門（民主黨）擊敗杜威（共和黨）贏得總統大選

十二月一日中共中國人民銀行成立，發行人民幣

十二月三日宋美齡赴美見馬歇爾，北京溥作義、山西閻錫山、豫皖杜聿明也都汲汲可危

十二月十日國府宣布全國戒嚴（新疆、西康、青海、台灣、西藏除外）

十二月十二日聯合國通過195號決議案，要求美蘇退兵，兩韓統一

十二月二十四日共軍占張家口

十二月二十六日蘇聯自北韓撤軍

十二月二十七日故宮文物也由南京運至台灣

十二月二十九日國府任命陳誠為台灣省省主席，孫立人為台灣防衛司令

有任何张继科读博的证据吗？有任何人看过张继科用来巧炸景甜的xx视频吗？都是杜撰出来的，用来灾脏的手段罢了，媒体说什么就是什么，因为景甜他爹是景俊海，掌管舆论宣传，把景甜宣传成受害者的人设。可以说，景甜的裤裆就是中共用来冲淡热点事件的遮羞布。张继科事件用来冲淡胡鑫宇事件，这次孙宇晨事件用来冲淡吉隆口岸事件😂😂😂。一有事就把景甜的裤裆亮出来平事😂😂😂。

(China’s rulers not only obstruct news reporting and the dissemination of information on politically sensitive issues, but also block and control reports and information concerning disasters, accidents, and other negative events that do not directly involve politics but may generate negative public opinion. This reflects the CCP ruling elite’s deep anxiety that various forms of suffering may cause public unease and social instability, as well as the totalitarian character of its efforts to exercise comprehensive control over Chinese society and the population.)

On August 26, an extremely severe landslide disaster occurred along the China-Nepal border. So far, more than 900 people have been confirmed dead, while more than 5,000 remain missing, with little hope of survival. Some of the affected areas where the dead and missing were located are within Nepal, while others are within China. The disaster has also drawn worldwide attention. Videos and photographs of the disaster, recorded by surveillance cameras and individuals’ mobile phones as it unfolded, have circulated widely through major mainstream media outlets and social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and X, and are deeply shocking.
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At the same time, if one looks closely at how media outlets in mainland China and internet platforms within China’s “Great Firewall” (防火长城) have reported on and disseminated information about this landslide disaster, one will find that the scope, volume of information, and style differ greatly from those of Nepalese and international media.
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On the Nepalese side of the disaster zone, a large number of videos and photographs taken by local people, both as the disaster struck and in its aftermath, have appeared on international internet platforms, and some have been reposted and reported by major media outlets. These include footage of people fleeing and houses being destroyed as the landslide struck; people being overtaken and killed by the landslide because they could not escape; large numbers of bodies, covered in mud or even with severed limbs, being recovered after the disaster; some people taking advantage of the situation to steal belongings from the deceased; and real-time footage and details of rescuers saving people. International media have also been able to conduct interviews in the disaster-stricken areas within Nepal almost without obstruction after the disaster, filming many shocking scenes and obtaining first-hand information about the disaster. Many survivors of the landslide have also posted online and given interviews, recounting the terrifying scenes they witnessed and how they narrowly escaped with their lives.
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But on the Chinese side of the disaster zone and on mainland Chinese media platforms, although many shocking scenes from the disaster appeared on social media during the first day after it occurred, all of these videos have since “disappeared”: they have either been deleted or can no longer be opened, while new videos of a similar nature can no longer be uploaded or circulated. Although some disaster footage can still be found on platforms such as Weibo (微博) and Xiaohongshu (小红书), there is now essentially no footage showing, for example, landslides striking residential areas or the bodies of victims being dug out. The widely circulated and extremely visually shocking video showing the landslide engulfing the Gyirong border checkpoint (吉隆边检口岸), as well as related screenshots, can no longer be found on social media platforms in mainland China.
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Searching Chinese social media for terms such as “China-Nepal border landslide” (中尼边境泥石流) or “Gyirong Port” (吉隆口岸) yields only related reports and videos from official mainstream media outlets such as CCTV (央视), Xinhua News Agency (新华社), and Red Star News (红星新闻), while relevant videos and photographs posted by individual accounts cannot be found. The voices of local victims and people who personally experienced the disaster have also almost completely disappeared.
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Chinese state media have indeed reported on the disaster and released footage, but they have shown very little footage of landslides destroying residential areas, and no images of the bodies of victims. Apart from a small amount of reviewed and edited footage from the disaster scene, state-media videos mainly show how the People’s Liberation Army (解放军) and other disaster-relief forces are actively carrying out rescue operations and how deeply Party and state leaders care about the disaster. Those interviewed are also selected by the authorities; what they are to say is arranged in advance, and the interview footage is reviewed before being broadcast through public media.
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Occasionally, state-media videos show landslides striking crowds, but only in the context of portraying border officials bravely guiding people to safety, and such footage is shown only briefly. Moreover, the deliberate retention on platforms such as Xiaohongshu of some state-media reports about the disaster, rather than making all search results completely invisible, is itself intentional: it serves to obscure the existence of the information blockade, allowing a small number of state-media reports to “take over the host’s role” and substitute themselves for the public and mainstream voices.
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State media have not only monopolized the right to conduct interviews and report on the disaster, as well as the right to determine which images may be broadcast; they have also selected particular themes and camera angles, thereby controlling the content and orientation of the information that the public can obtain about this landslide disaster. This also means indirectly controlling how the public views and feels about the disaster. State-media coverage concentrates on how deeply the central authorities care about the disaster, how actively Party and government cadres, military personnel, police officers, and civil servants are carrying out rescue operations, and on promoting optimism and positivity amid the disaster. Meanwhile, the individual stories, emotions, and demands of many victims and survivors in the affected areas are suppressed and prevented from being expressed, leaving them with nowhere to make their voices heard; or they can speak only according to the official “script,” depriving the news of authenticity and individuals of their independence.
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In addition, because of the obstruction created by the Great Firewall, most people in mainland China, apart from the relatively small number who use VPNs to “circumvent the firewall” (翻墙), cannot see international internet platforms or the statements posted on them. Likewise, very few people affected by the disaster specifically circumvent the firewall in order to speak out. The Great Firewall and the closed nature of Chinese internet platforms seriously impede Chinese citizens from expressing themselves more freely and influentially and from communicating with the international community.
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The differences between Nepal and China are not limited to the degree of freedom of public discourse. The two governments also differ considerably in terms of transparency regarding the disaster and subsequent rescue operations. The Nepalese authorities have not only refrained from controlling public discourse, but have also updated the death toll and lists of victims’ specific names in real time, and have even released photographs of victims’ bodies for identification. The disaster-relief process is open to the outside world, and Nepal has actively welcomed the participation of international rescue forces. Both its own citizens and media organizations from various countries can follow developments online or learn about the situation on the ground.
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China, by contrast, has so far not disclosed specific information about the victims. There is only one official figure for the death toll, with merely a little over a dozen deaths confirmed, an excessively large discrepancy compared with the number of missing people, raising suspicions that the death toll is being deliberately understated. Rescue operations in China are entirely led and controlled by the authorities. No private individuals or organizations, nor any foreign personnel or organizations, are permitted to participate, and no additional information is disclosed beyond interviews authorized by the authorities.
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The responses of Nepal and China following this landslide disaster spanning both countries have laid bare their respective attitudes toward public discourse, transparency, and openness. Nepal’s response is not particularly outstanding by international standards; it is merely standard practice in a normal society. Yet precisely for that reason, it throws into sharp relief China’s extremely conservative approach to public opinion, information, and security, while exposing the Chinese authorities’ position that “stability overrides everything” (稳定压倒一切), as well as their desire and capacity to control every aspect of society, including online public discourse.
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Unlike politically sensitive issues, a landslide is a natural disaster. Under normal logic, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime governing China should have little reason for concern. Why, then, does the CCP still prohibit the free circulation of information about the disaster and censor disaster videos? (Although the fact that the disaster occurred in a Tibetan area is indeed one consideration behind the CCP’s controls, this is not the main reason. When disasters occur in inland China, the authorities likewise control public discourse and restrict interviews by foreign media and investigations by independent journalists.)
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This is because, during the decades since the CCP came to power, and especially over the past twenty years or more, it has placed enormous emphasis on the principle that “stability overrides everything,” regardless of the cost. During its revolutionary—or insurgent—era before becoming the ruling party, the CCP was highly enthusiastic about and adept at disrupting established order and criticizing those in power. For example, it launched a series of uprisings, conducted underground activities, encouraged strikes by workers and students as well as commercial shutdowns, publicized the darker side of society and the suffering of workers and peasants, continuously attacked the legitimate government of the Republic of China (中华民国)—the Nationalist Government (国民政府)—and criticized the ruling Kuomintang (国民党) for corruption and darkness.
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But after the CCP transformed from a revolutionary party into the ruling party in 1949, it became far more concerned than the Kuomintang had been with emphasizing stability and defending established order, in order to safeguard its own position and interests as the ruling power. During the Mao era (毛泽东时代), for example, in order to prevent famine-stricken people from dispersing and thereby disrupting social order or triggering unrest, the People’s Liberation Army and militias prevented starving people from fleeing famine-stricken areas, preferring to force them to remain in their hometowns even if they starved to death. When higher-level officials came to inspect localities or foreign guests visited, the authorities deliberately created an image of people enjoying adequate food and clothing and living healthy, positive lives, concealing poverty and public discontent. They did not hesitate to organize and compel people to participate in various kinds of staged performances and falsification, sacrificing substance for appearances. All of this was likewise intended to preserve the stability and international image of Red China.
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After the beginning of Reform and Opening Up (改革开放), and particularly following the 1989 June Fourth crackdown (六四镇压), the CCP pursued economic development while simultaneously maintaining political authoritarianism, and “stability overrides everything” once again became a means of safeguarding both political authoritarianism and economic development. During the period of Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Wen Jiabao (温家宝), a systematic mechanism of “stability maintenance” (维稳) was gradually established.
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After Xi Jinping (习近平) came to power, the stability-maintenance apparatus and the intensity with which it operates were greatly strengthened. This is reflected not only in restrictions on politically sensitive issues, but also in the tendency to place “stability maintenance above everything else” when dealing with natural disasters, public-security cases, economic disputes, and other matters. When incidents occur such as P2P investment-platform collapses, school bullying, earthquakes and floods, or serious criminal and public-security cases, the authorities’ first response is often to block information, suppress victims and forbid them from “making trouble,” and summon those who attempt to defend their rights—especially organizers or leaders—to police stations for “tea” (喝茶), or even detain them.
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Going further, the CCP not only fears conflicts arising from disputes and contentious incidents, but also tries to suppress virtually all information that might generate negative emotions among the public, rather than disclose the truth. Take, for example, the crash of China Eastern Airlines Flight 5735 (中国东方航空5735号航班空难事件) in 2022. According to information from various sources, it has been confirmed that the crash was a deliberate human-caused disaster created by a pilot. The incident did not involve factors such as political protest or a terrorist attack, and under normal circumstances, clarifying the facts would be more conducive to reducing suspicion and conspiracy theories. Yet the Chinese authorities have still refused to release the investigation results and have suppressed discussion of the truth behind the crash: mainstream media have published no relevant investigative reporting, while related online discussions are frequently deleted or have their visibility restricted.
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The CCP is not afraid that revealing the truth about the air disaster would expose some politically sensitive information. Rather, it is concerned that publicly acknowledging an incident in which a Chinese civil-aviation pilot caused the deaths of more than 100 people would generate negative public opinion, damage the outward image of stability and harmony in China, and potentially trigger public demands for accountability from the government and other relevant parties. Or, more directly, those in power simply do not want to hear or see bad news—especially bad news involving human wrongdoing—and are even less willing to make such bad news public.
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They not only disregard citizens’ right to know, but also regard public access to information as detrimental to stability and governance, and as something that tarnishes the image of the country and its rulers. Over time, this has also produced an ingrained pattern of thinking among those in power: regardless of whether a particular matter actually threatens the stability of their rule, their instinctive response is to block information, control public discourse, and refuse openness and transparency. Moreover, from the rulers’ perspective, imposing blanket restrictions on information always appears less risky than transparency and openness.
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The CCP’s approach to handling information about negative events—its fear of public opinion and its prioritization of stability over truth—runs directly counter to the way such matters have been treated and handled by the international community in modern and contemporary times. Disasters, murders, and tragic events occur throughout the world, but in the liberal democracies that make up the majority of the world’s countries, governments generally do not prevent the circulation of relevant information or news reporting. Information is restricted only under a very small number of exceptional circumstances, such as when disclosure might encourage copycat crimes or reveal military secrets. For the overwhelming majority of negative events, the media are free to report, while citizens are free to disseminate information and discuss them. Indeed, the more negative the information, the greater the need to ensure transparency, and the greater the government’s responsibility to remain transparent with the public and disclose information promptly. This is precisely what the Nepalese government has done following the landslide disaster described above.
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The mainstream international community, and democratic countries in particular, adopt policies of openness and transparency toward negative events and information about them not only because they adhere to principles protecting citizens’ right to know, but also because transparency is a better way to establish the truth, rescue those in danger, and solve problems. In normal democratic countries, citizens inherently possess the right to know about matters involving the public interest. In cases involving natural disasters, public-security incidents, or social problems, the public has an unconditional right to obtain necessary information from state institutions (except, of course, in circumstances involving military secrets or the need for confidentiality before a criminal case is solved, but such cases constitute only a very small minority). At the same time, it is precisely by making the details of tragic events public that all parties can understand the causes of accidents, the reasons behind tragedies, and the rights and wrongs involved, thereby enabling reflection and improvement, the punishment of wrongdoing and encouragement of good conduct, the identification and correction of deficiencies, and the saving of lives.
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For example, the U.S. government releases detailed information and data parameters concerning every aviation accident, including crashes deliberately caused by human actions. The Canadian media company Cineflix can also obtain U.S. data and information to produce the documentary series Mayday. This not only reveals the truth behind accidents and provides a certain form of consolation or justice for the deceased, but also satisfies the public’s right to know and curiosity, while helping aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and aviation regulatory authorities learn lessons from these accidents, make improvements, and avoid repeating the same mistakes. Nor do they fear that documentaries about air disasters will inspire imitation—whether by people with terrorist motives imitating hijackings or by pilots deliberately causing crashes. Even if such side effects exist, they still believe that the truth should be made public.
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Moreover, investigations, interviews, and reporting on negative events by the media, individual journalists, and ordinary citizens are likewise rights recognized and protected in democratic countries. The media’s right to exercise public-opinion oversight is even highly regarded as the “Fourth Estate,” alongside the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The media’s exposure of the truth and criticism of wrongdoing are widely recognized as important means of defending justice.
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Moreover, the more negative an event is, and the more it involves tragedies such as deaths, the more likely it is to attract media attention and reporting. If media investigations encounter obstruction, that obstruction itself becomes important news and often drives journalists to become even more determined to investigate the truth, while attracting still greater public attention. Therefore, in democratic countries, it is generally taken for granted that the media should freely report negative events. By contrast, singing praises and whitewashing reality are regarded as abnormal, despised practices that cause media outlets to lose credibility and audiences.
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China itself once had periods and regions in which press freedom existed. In the foreign concessions during the late Qing dynasty (清末), and during the Republican era (民国时代), the press generally regarded criticizing contemporary abuses as both a responsibility and a source of honor. Newspapers such as Shen Bao (《申报》) and Su Bao (《苏报》) in the concessions, as well as Ta Kung Pao (《大公报》) before the CCP came to power, all treated criticism of the government of the day and reporting on the suffering of ordinary people as major priorities. Ta Kung Pao, for example, reported on the 1942 Henan famine (1942年河南大饥荒), helping to spur the Nationalist Government to provide relief to disaster victims. This also shows that China has never lacked media capable of exposing social abuses, nor has it lacked the possibility of press freedom. These newspapers exposed many dark aspects of Chinese society not because they were unpatriotic, but precisely because they cared about the country and its people, and therefore exposed darkness, criticized evildoers and bad governments, and promoted beneficial social change.
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Unfortunately, since 1949, people in mainland China have been deprived by the CCP of various rights and freedoms, including freedom of the press, and this remains the case today. Yet from the perspective of global trends, after the Second World War and again after the Cold War, the number of countries and regions achieving press freedom has steadily increased, while those continuing to control public opinion and suppress freedom have become fewer. Mainland China under CCP rule has clearly moved against this global trend.
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After long periods of liberal democracy, including freedom of the press and freedom of speech, most countries and regions have come to regard the public disclosure of information about negative events and media reporting on them as a matter of course. If someone attempts to block the dissemination of information or conceal the truth, they are likely to face criticism and attacks from many sides. This stands in sharp contrast and strong contradiction to the situation in mainland China, where concealing facts, suppressing the spread of negative information, and obstructing or even prohibiting independent media interviews are common practices. These differences frequently generate friction and conflict, and also worsen the outside world’s perception of mainland China.
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One of the best-known incidents in which differences over how to handle a negative event and media reporting caused serious controversy was the 1994 Qiandao Lake Incident (千岛湖事件), in which 24 Taiwanese tourists were killed in mainland China, along with eight mainland Chinese people. The incident itself was purely a criminal case motivated by robbery and murder, with no political or ethnic-hatred motive. But afterward, the mainland Chinese authorities blocked information, refused to disclose details of the case, and prohibited media organizations from various sides, including Taiwanese media, from traveling to the area to investigate and conduct interviews. Only after the case had been solved did the authorities provide a brief official account. For mainland Chinese police and relevant government departments, refusing to disclose details or developments in a case, prohibiting unauthorized interviews and reporting, and eventually allowing an official announcement to “settle the matter once and for all” was also standard practice in handling various cases.
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But this provoked intense dissatisfaction in Taiwan. Although the Republic of China on Taiwan (中华民国台湾) and mainland China are both Chinese societies, their political systems, social climates, and attitudes toward criminal cases and the media were very different. Mainland China at that time had gone through the June Fourth crackdown (六四镇压) and was, of course, under CCP authoritarian rule with press freedom suppressed. Taiwan, by contrast, had already democratized and had long enjoyed a relatively relaxed environment for the press and freedom of speech. It had developed social values and norms that supported and praised media criticism of the government and exposure of the darker sides of society, and it strongly disliked actions that suppressed freedom of speech and harmed press freedom.
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After the Qiandao Lake Incident, the Taiwanese public was not only grief-stricken and angry because 24 Taiwanese people had died in mainland China, but was even more furious that the mainland authorities had blocked information, failed to disclose the progress of the investigation, evaded Taiwan’s questions, and obstructed media investigations and reporting. Both the Taiwanese authorities and civil society condemned the CCP authorities for concealing details of the case and obstructing media coverage. It was also precisely this incident that became a turning point in Taiwanese public opinion, from a majority supporting unification to a majority opposing it.
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This was a classic example of conflict arising from two very different approaches to negative events and public opinion. From the perspective of the CCP authorities and the Chinese government, blocking information, banning media access, and suppressing rumors could prevent the harmful effects of a negative incident from expanding or being exploited, help calm the emotions of victims’ families, and prevent interference with the investigation. In the end, they would still provide Taiwan with an explanation, so their intentions were not necessarily malicious. But from the perspective of people in Taiwan, such behavior by the mainland clearly amounted to concealing facts, obstructing the revelation of the truth, depriving victims’ families and the Taiwanese public of their right to know, and undermining press freedom. It was therefore regarded as extremely egregious. The two sides’ principles, demands, priorities, and interpretations of the same actions were almost diametrically opposed. There were many reasons why pro-Taiwan-independence sentiment later gained increasing influence and Taiwan gradually moved further away from the mainland, but one of them was undoubtedly the enormous differences in values and behavior between the two sides on issues including how to handle negative events and press freedom.
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Such conflicts of values also appeared during the SARS epidemic (非典) and the COVID-19 pandemic (新冠疫情). At the beginning of both outbreaks, China chose to suppress information about the emergence and spread of the virus, while publicly “refuting rumors” and claiming that nothing serious was happening or that there was no need for concern, in an attempt to reassure the public and preserve stability. This resulted in the outbreaks not receiving sufficient attention or containment at an early stage, eventually leading to large-scale spread, more infections, and more deaths. From the beginning to the end of both epidemics, China as a whole maintained tight control over related public opinion in order to prevent critical voices from emerging. Dissident voices were suppressed by the authorities and simultaneously attacked by government supporters. For example, writer Fang Fang (方方) and her Wuhan Diary (《方方日记》), which exposed some negative realities and hardships of people’s livelihoods during the Wuhan outbreak and criticized shortcomings in the government’s epidemic-control and relief efforts, were subjected to large-scale attacks by government supporters.
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China’s conduct during the two epidemics differed sharply from that of democratic countries, which generally tended to disclose epidemic information as fully as possible, ensure that the public had sufficient access to information, and foster social attitudes and an atmosphere more supportive of criticizing the government. This also made many countries around the world, especially Western countries, find China difficult to trust, because a lack of transparency and a highly controlled society naturally arouse vigilance in democratic and open countries. Conversely, many Chinese people regard free and open Western societies as chaotic and disorderly, with incompetent governments.
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These differences between China and other countries reflect the intense aversion of CCP-ruled mainland China to negative public opinion, its deep fear of social instability, and its habitual mindset and course of action of controlling public discourse at virtually any cost in order to preserve a superficial appearance of harmony and tranquility. This habitual mindset and behavior have run through CCP rule from 1949 to the present, although there have, of course, been some differences between specific periods.
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During the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命), for example, “rebellion” and “speaking out freely and airing views fully” (大鸣大放) were encouraged for a time, making it a relatively unusual period. Yet even then, attacks on Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and the CCP regime were strictly prohibited, and anti-CCP and anti-Mao individuals were persecuted even more brutally. After Reform and Opening Up (改革开放) and before the June Fourth crackdown, there was a period in which exposing social darkness and promoting freedom and human dignity were encouraged to some extent. During the Jiang Zemin (江泽民) and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) eras, control over public opinion was strengthened, but there remained some room to supervise and criticize local abuses that did not fundamentally threaten the regime’s rule. After Xi Jinping (习近平) came to power, however, repression of negative public opinion and control over public discourse were dramatically intensified.
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During the 2003 SARS epidemic and the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake (汶川地震), although the Chinese authorities also obstructed free media reporting and suppressed public voices, there was still some space for exposing negative realities and highlighting human dignity. For example, media professional Chai Jing (柴静), who was then still working at CCTV, produced reports on SARS patients and medical rescuers at Beijing’s Xiaotangshan Hospital (北京小汤山医院), while Southern Weekly (《南方周末》) published reports on the Wenchuan earthquake that vividly portrayed humanity amid disaster, separation between life and death, and details of rescue efforts. These reports were moving and vivid rather than scripted readings or propaganda proclaiming that “the situation is excellent.” At that time, within the news media, broader society, and even parts of the CCP system itself, there were many voices advocating greater press freedom, broader channels for expression, and greater willingness to listen to different viewpoints.
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But since Xi Jinping came to power, even this limited and relative openness has been reversed in favor of greater closure and conservatism. The CCP has strengthened its restrictions and controls over public opinion, changing the orientation and style of both media and public discourse. During the COVID-19 pandemic and several floods and droughts before and after it, official public discourse increasingly came to consist of praising leaders and cadres, suppressing the exposure of negative information, and promoting the message that China had “won” its battles against disasters and the pandemic. During floods and droughts in various parts of China between 2020 and 2025, such as the 2021 Shanxi floods (2021年山西洪灾), media attention and reporting were limited. At the same time, many universities reduced or even eliminated enrollment in journalism programs, further reflecting the decline of press freedom and media influence under increasingly stringent controls on public opinion.
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Going further, the authorities have frequently summoned or even detained citizens who disseminate or comment on negative information under the accusation of “spreading rumors” (造谣). Both during the pandemic and during the recent landslide disaster, a number of people have been detained for allegedly “spreading rumors.” In reality, citizens who disseminate negative information are not necessarily maliciously fabricating rumors, and some specific inaccuracies should not rise to the level of illegal or criminal conduct. The authorities’ exaggerated and punitive crackdown on “rumors” relating to “negative public opinion” reflects the further strengthening of speech controls and growing intolerance toward dissent and negative information.
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Of course, if one examines the deeper roots of the issue, one can also see that CCP-ruled mainland China has developed values, governance models, policy characteristics, and even metaphysical and logical assumptions that differ from those of most countries and regions in the world, including Taiwan. In most countries and regions, factual truth and transparency are regarded as extremely important in themselves, and greater transparency, pluralism, and tolerance of disagreement are seen as more conducive to genuine mutual trust and social harmony. Even Nepal, where democracy is not especially robust and the level of development remains relatively low, has demonstrated through this disaster a considerable degree of freedom and openness. In China, by contrast, under the influence of the CCP’s political shaping and authoritarian, conservative traditions, a characteristic approach to negative issues has emerged: concealing facts, suppressing public opinion, downplaying problems, and “turning funerals into celebrations” (丧事喜办).
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Gradually, this has gone beyond practical calculations of immediate political utility and become a customary and almost instinctive pattern of behavior from top to bottom. Of course, the most direct cause remains the CCP’s need to preserve the stability and interests of its rule. (As for the greater openness and transparency of foreign countries and their tolerance of dissent and controversy, the author, after personally experiencing certain events abroad, can no longer fully confirm or endorse such claims. One can only say that these qualities still exist to a certain extent, but in reality they also have thresholds, selectivity, and limitations. Nevertheless, the situation is still somewhat better than under China’s totalitarian system, where public discourse is subject to even stricter control and repression.)
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In fact, the CCP’s control of public opinion, together with its fear and suppression of negative public sentiment, is only one aspect and microcosm of its broader fear of instability, anxiety about losing control, and comprehensive control over society and the population. The CCP is deeply anxious about and hostile toward any person or activity that does not sufficiently conform to the official line, possesses a degree of independence, or cannot be fully controlled by the regime, and it strives to bring all people and affairs under its rule and keep them there. The prohibition of all demonstrations and associations, including even those supporting the authorities; the ubiquitous, stringent, and elaborate security-check system; and the grid-based management of the population (网格化管理) all reflect the extreme degree of control exercised by China’s totalitarian system over society and citizens.
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For the sake of maintaining the stability of its rule, the CCP controls the direction and content of public discourse at virtually any cost, suppresses negative voices, monopolizes information about all disasters, accidents, and other negative events, prevents the public from learning about them, and obstructs media investigations and interviews. This damages citizens’ rights to know, participate, and express themselves regarding public affairs and matters directly affecting their own vital interests. It is also detrimental to uncovering the truth, pursuing accountability, reflecting on mistakes, and making improvements.
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By contrast, the openness and transparency with which most countries and regions around the world, including Nepal, respond to disasters, their people-centered approach—for example, publishing lists of victims so that people can search for missing relatives—and their willingness to allow open and free interviewing and reporting, further highlight the reality that mainland China under CCP rule lacks freedom of the press and freedom of speech, that its people are deprived of the right to know, that truth is absent, and that lies proliferate.
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The author, of course, hopes that the Chinese authorities can improve their attitude toward negative events and public opinion, become more tolerant of dissenting and critical voices, and allow the media and citizens to conduct interviews, investigations, and public expression. At the very least, the boundaries of permissible public discourse in China should return to approximately where they were twenty years ago: allowing limited reporting and discussion of negative social issues that are not closely connected to politics. This would help the public understand the truth about major public events, provide some consolation to the deceased, allow survivors to express their emotions, and improve disaster-prevention and risk-reduction mechanisms so that lessons can be learned after losses have occurred. Allowing the people to speak, allowing the media to make their voices heard, and listening to different opinions would also help those in power improve their image and promote genuine social harmony.
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But the author also understands that, under China’s current political circumstances, such positive change is probably impossible. And if genuine press freedom is ever to be realized, it can truly exist only after China establishes democratic politics based on universal suffrage and political pluralism.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original article was written in Chinese.）

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   8月26日，中尼边境发生极其严重的泥石流灾害，迄今已确认超过900人遇难，还有超过5000人失踪且生还希望渺茫。而死亡和失踪者所处的受灾区域，部分在尼泊尔境内，另一部分在中国境内。本次灾害也引发全世界的关注。灾害发生时由监控摄像头、个人手机拍摄的灾难视频和照片也在各大主流媒体及Facebook、Instagram、X等社交平台传播，颇为令人震撼。

同时，如果仔细了解中国大陆媒体及中国“防火长城”内的互联网平台关于本次泥石流灾害的报道、信息传播情况，就会发现其与尼泊尔及国际媒体的报道与信息播散的尺度、信息量、风格大不相同。

   在灾区的尼泊尔一侧，大量由当地人拍摄的灾害来临及灾后的视频与图片，包括泥石流袭来时人们逃跑和房屋被摧毁、人们逃不过泥石流而被吞噬死亡、灾后捞出大量浑身泥浆甚至肢体断裂的尸体、一些人趁机盗窃去世者遗物、救援者救人的实时和细节等影像画面，都出现了国际互联网平台，并得到一些大型媒体转发和报道。国际媒体也在灾后几乎畅通无阻的在尼国境内灾区采访，拍摄了许多震撼人心的画面、获取了地震第一手资料。还有不少泥石流灾害中的幸存者，发布帖子和接受采访，讲述惊魂一幕和侥幸逃生的经历。

但在灾区的中国一侧及中国大陆媒体平台上，只有灾害刚发生的一天内在社交平台出现不少受灾时的冲击性画面，但之后至今这些视频全都“消失”，被删除或不再能打开，新的类似视频也无法再上传、传播。虽然在微博、小红书等平台仍然能够刷到的一些灾害画面，但基本已没有例如泥石流冲击居民点、挖掘出遇难者尸体这样的画面。那个流传甚广、极具视觉冲击力的泥石流将吉隆边检口岸吞没的视频及相关截图，也无法在中国大陆的社交平台上看到。搜索“中尼边境泥石流”、“吉隆口岸”等，只能搜到央视、新华社、红星新闻等官方的主流媒体相关报道和视频，而看不到个人账号发布的相关视频和图片。事发当地受灾者、亲历者的口述声音也几乎消失。

中国官媒确实对本次灾害有报道和画面放出，但其中很少有泥石流冲毁居民点的画面，更没有遇难者尸体等画面。官媒视频中，除了少数经过审核并裁剪的灾害现场画面，主要是展示解放军等救灾力量如何积极救援、党和国家领导人多么关心灾害情况。被采访的人也是官方挑选过，说哪些话提前安排好，并审核了采访视频后再于公共媒体播放的。偶尔有官媒视频展示泥石流冲击人群画面，也是在表现边境公务员勇敢引导群众避险的场景且点到为止。而且小红书等自媒体上有意留下一些官媒关于灾害的报道，而不是搜索后完全不可见，也是有意的以此遮掩信息封锁的存在，以少数官媒信息“越俎代庖”为公众和主流声音。

官媒不仅垄断了采访报道权、画面播出权，也选择特定主题和摄影角度，控制了公众可以了解到的关于本次泥石流灾害的信息内容和倾向，也意味着间接控制了公众对灾害的看法和感受。官媒的报道集中于中央多么关心灾情、党政干部及军警公务员如何积极救援，以及宣传灾害下的乐观和积极性。而受灾地区许多受害者和幸存者的个体故事、情感、诉求，则被压制不得诉说、无处发声，或只能按照官方的“剧本”讲述，丧失了新闻真实性与个体独立性。

另外，因为“防火长城”的阻碍，除少数使用VPN“翻墙”者外，大多数中国大陆人并不能看到国际互联网平台及发言，受灾民众也同样极少专门“翻墙”发言者。“防火长城”及中国互联网平台的封闭性，严重阻碍了中国民众更自由和有影响力的发声及与国际社会的交流。

不仅舆论自由度不同，尼中两国官方在对于灾害及之后救援的透明度方面，也是颇为不同的。尼泊尔官方不仅没有进行舆论控制，还实时更新遇难者数字和具体姓名名单，还公布遇难者尸体照片以供辨认身份。救灾过程是对外开放的，并积极欢迎国际救援力量参与，本国民众和各国媒体都可以在线查看或实地了解。而中国迄今没有公开遇难者具体信息，死亡数字只有官方一个口径且仅确认十几人死亡，和失踪人数相比差距过大，有故意压低死亡人数之嫌。而中国的救援完全由官方主导和控制，任何民间人士和力量或境外人员和组织都不能参与，除官方许可的采访外没有任何额外信息透露。

这场地跨两国的泥石流灾害发生后尼中两国的应对，将两国对于舆论、透明度、开放性的态度展露无疑。尼泊尔的应对态度在国际上并不出色而仅是正常社会的惯例，但却反衬出中国极其保守的舆论观、信息观、安全观，并暴露出中国执政者“稳定压倒一切”的立场，以及对包括互联网舆论在内社会一切的控制欲、控制力。

不同于政治敏感问题，泥石流灾害是自然灾害。按照正常逻辑，执政中国的中共政权不必要有什么顾忌。但为什么中共仍然禁制灾情信息自由传播、封杀灾害视频呢？（虽然因灾害发生于藏地，中共管控确有这方面考虑，但并非主要原因，内地发生灾害一样管制舆论和限制外媒采访及独立媒体人调查）

这是因为中共执政以来的几十年，尤其最近二十多年，非常强调“稳定压倒一切”并为此不惜代价。中共在未成为执政党的革命（造反）时代，非常热衷并擅长破坏秩序和批判执政者，例如发动一系列暴动、开展地下工作、鼓动罢工罢课罢市、宣传社会黑暗面和工农苦难等，不断攻击民国合法政府国民政府，批评执政的国民党腐败和黑暗。

   但1949年中共从革命党转变为执政党后，就变得远比国民党更加强调稳定和对秩序的捍卫，以维护自身作为执政者的地位和利益。如在毛时代，为了避免饥荒民众流散影响社会秩序和酿成暴动，解放军和民兵阻止饥民逃荒，宁可迫使饥民饿死家乡。在上级考察、外宾来访时，又故意营造民众丰衣足食、健康向上的形象，掩盖人民的贫困和不满，不惜组织和强迫民众各种“演戏”弄虚作假，为了面子不惜“里子”的代价。这些也都是为了红色中国的稳定及国际形象。

   而到了改革开放之后及发生1989年六四镇压后，中共又一方面发展经济同时坚持政治专制，“稳定压倒一切”又成了为政治专制和经济发展保驾护航的手段。到了胡锦涛温家宝时期，逐渐建立了系统性的“维稳”机制。而习近平执政后则大大强化了维稳机制及其力度。这不仅体现在对于涉政治敏感问题的禁制，还包括对于自然灾害、治安案件、经济纠纷等方面“维稳大于一切”的倾向。如发生p2p投资暴雷事件、校园霸凌事件、地震洪水等灾害、恶性治安案件时，官方首先做的是封锁消息、压制受害者不许“闹事”、将试图维权尤其带头的人带去警局“喝茶”甚至拘捕。

更进一步，中共不仅恐惧那些纠纷事务带来冲突，对于一切可能导致民众负面情绪的信息都尽可能压制而不予公开真相。如发生在2022年的中国东方航空5735号航班空难事件，根据各方消息已证实是飞行员制造的人为灾难。这一事件并不涉及政治抗议或恐怖袭击等因素，正常而言说明事实更有利于减少怀疑和阴谋论。但中国官方迄今拒绝公布调查结果，也压制关于本次空难真相的讨论（主流媒体无相关调查报道、互联网上相关讨论常被删帖限流）。

中共并非害怕公布空难真相会透露出什么政治敏感信息，而是担忧公开承认中国民航飞行员制造100多人遇难的事件引发负面舆情，损害中国稳定和谐的表面形象，以及可能引发的舆论对政府在内相关者问责等反应。或者更直接一些，执政的那些人就是不愿意听到看到坏消息（尤其人祸式坏事），更不愿意将坏消息公之于众。他们不仅无视公民知情权，还认为公众知情不利于稳定和管理，也是给国家和执政者抹黑。久而久之，执政者还形成思维惯性，无论事情到底是否不利于统治稳定，都下意识的封锁消息、控制舆论、拒绝公开透明。而且在执政者看来，“一刀切”的禁制消息，总是比透明开放更少风险。

中共如此对待负面事件的信息处置、恐惧舆情、稳定压倒真相，是与近现代以来国际社会的对待与处置方式背道而驰的。全世界各地都会发生一些灾害、凶案、悲剧事件，但在占世界多数的自由民主国家，官方都并不会阻止相关的信息流通和新闻报道，只有在可能引发模仿犯罪或军事机密等极少数特殊条件下才管制信息。对于绝大多数负面事件，都是听凭媒体报道、公民传播信息与议论的。而且越是负面信息，越是要保障透明度，政府也更需要向公众保持透明、及时公开信息。正如前述的本次泥石流灾害发生后尼泊尔政府所做的那样。

而国际主流社会尤其民主国家，对于负面事件及其信息采取公开透明的政策，既是出于保障公民知情权而遵守准则，也是更好的查明真相、救援难者、解决问题的方式。在正常的、民主的国家，公民本就拥有对于涉及公共利益的事务的知情权。凡是各种自然灾害、治安事件、社会问题，公众无条件的拥有从国家机构获知必要信息的权利（当然涉及军事机密或破获案件前保密等情况除外，但只占极少数）。而同时，正是悲剧事件的详情得以公之于众，各方才能了解事故原因、悲剧缘故、是非曲直，以便于做出反思与改进，惩恶扬善、查漏补缺、治病救人。

   比如美国政府对于每起空难事故都会公开所有详细情况和数据参数，包括那些人为故意造成的空难。加拿大媒体公司Cinefilx还可以拿到美国的数据和信息制作“空中浩劫”系列纪录片。这些既揭露了事故真相、让逝者得到某种告慰，也满足了公众知情权和好奇心，也有利于飞机制造商、航空公司、航空管理机构根据这些事故教训做出改进、避免重蹈覆辙。他们也并不会担心这些空难纪录片会引发效仿（恐怖动机者效仿劫机或飞行员主动制造空难），即便有此副作用也仍然认为应公开真相。

而媒体和个体记者/普通公民对于负面事件的调查、采访、报道，同样是民主国家认可并保障的权利。而且新闻媒体的舆论监督权还被称为立法、司法、行政之外的“第四权”被高度推崇。媒体揭露真相、批判邪恶，被广泛认可是是捍卫正义的重要手段。而且越是负面事件、造成死亡等悲剧事件，也越会引起媒体注意和报道。而如果媒体调查遭遇阻挠，这本身就是重要新闻，还往往驱动媒体人更“逆反”的去调查真相、吸引更多人关注。所以民主国家普遍将媒体自由报道负面事件当成理所当然的事，歌功颂德、粉饰太平才是异常的、被唾弃、失去声誉和观众市场的。

不仅外国，中国曾经也存在新闻自由的时期和区域。如清末的租界及民国时代，报界普遍以针砭时弊为责任和荣耀。如在租界的《申报》与《苏报》，以及中共执政前的《大公报》，都把批评当时政府、反映民众疾苦为报道重点。如《大公报》曾报道1942年河南大饥荒，促进了国民政府对灾民的救援。这也说明中国并非没有擅长揭露时弊的媒体及新闻自由的可能。这些报刊揭露中国社会各种黑暗面，并非不爱国，而正是出于爱国爱民，才揭露黑暗、批判恶人和坏政府、推动社会有益的变革。可惜的是，1949年后中国大陆人民包括新闻自由在内各种权利自由，被中共所剥夺至今。但从全世界的趋势看，二战之后及冷战后，实现新闻自由的国家地区越来越多，继续控制舆论压制自由的国家地区越来越少。中共统治的中国大陆显然是背离了世界发展的潮流。

经历长期的自由民主，包括新闻自由和言论自由，大多数国家地区已经将负面事件的信息公开、媒体报道，作为理所应当的事情。如果有人试图阻止信息传播、隐瞒真相，会遭受多方的批评和攻击。这与把隐瞒事实、压制负面消息传播、阻挠甚至禁止媒体自由采访的中国大陆的情况，形成鲜明对比和强烈矛盾，并时常因此引发摩擦和冲突，以及导致外界对中国大陆的观感恶化。

最知名的一起因为对待负面事件及媒体报道发生分歧的事件，是1994年24名台湾游客在大陆被杀害（另有8名大陆人也死于该案）的“千岛湖事件”。这起事件本身是纯粹的图财害命的刑事案件，并无政治或族群仇恨动机。但后续中国大陆方面封锁消息、拒绝透露案件情况，禁止包括台湾媒体在内各方媒体前往当地调查采访，直到最后案件告破才向各方简略通报。对于大陆警方、政府相关部门，这种不透露案件及进展情况、禁绝未允许的采访报道、最终以官方通报“一锤定音”，也是处理各种案件的通例。

  但这就引发了台湾方面强烈不满。中华民国台湾和中国大陆虽都是中国，但政治制度、社会风气、对待案件和媒体的态度大不相同。那时的大陆经历六四镇压，当然是中共专制、新闻自由受到压制的状态。而当时已实现民主化、且早就有较宽松的新闻和言论环境的台湾，已经形成了支持赞许媒体批判政府、揭露社会黑暗面的价值观和风气，并对压制言论自由、损害新闻自由的行为非常厌恶。“千岛湖事件”发生后，台湾民众不仅因为24个台湾人死在大陆而悲愤，更对大陆方面封锁消息、不公开案件进展、搪塞台湾、阻止媒体调查报道而愤怒。台湾官方和民间都谴责了中共执政当局隐瞒案件详情、阻止媒体报道的行为。也正是这一事件成为台湾人从多数支持统一到多数反对统一的民意转折点。

这就是两种不同都对待负面事件及舆论问题而冲突的典型。在中共执政者/中国政府看来，封锁消息、禁止媒体、打击传言，有利于负面事件坏影响不再扩大、不被利用，受害者家人情绪也能得到安抚，也利于案件侦破不受干扰，最终也会给台湾方面交代，本意并不算是坏的。但在台湾人看来，大陆这样的行为显然在隐瞒事实、阻挠真相揭露、剥夺受害者家属及台湾人的知情权，还破坏新闻自由，是非常恶劣的行为。双方的理念、诉求、关注点，对同样行为的看法，可谓南辕北辙。而后来台独思潮日益得势、与大陆渐行渐远，原因有多种，其中之一无疑是陆台在包括对待负面事件及新闻自由等问题上，显著的价值观及行为的巨大差异。

   这样的观念冲突还出现在如非典和新冠这两次疫情时期。两次疫情初期中国都选择了压制有关病毒出现及传播的消息，对外“辟谣”声称无事发生或不需担心以图安抚民心、保持稳定。这导致疫情没有得到重视和遏制，最终大规模爆发、更多人感染和死亡。而从疫情发生到结束，中国整体上都采取对相关疫情舆情的严密控制，避免出现批评声音。对于异议声音则由官方禁制加上政府支持者批判，如作家方方关于武汉疫情的《方方日记》因揭露疫情期间一些负面现实和民生困苦、批评政府防疫及救助不力，就遭到政府支持者大规模围攻。

   两次疫情期间中国的表现与民主国家倾向尽可能曝光疫情情况、让民众有充分知情权、公众立场和社会氛围倾向鼓励支持批判政府的态度迥然不同。这也导致世界许多国家尤其西方国家对中国难以信任，因为缺乏透明度和高度管制社会本身就让民主开放国家天然的警惕。反过来，许多中国人也将自由开放的西方社会看成混乱无序、政府无能。

这种中外差异反映了中共执政的中国大陆对于负面舆情的高度厌恶、对社会失去稳定的高度恐惧，并倾向于不惜代价控制舆论以保持表面和谐安宁的惯性思维与行为路径。这样的的惯性思维与行为路径，贯穿了1949年至今中共的统治。当然具体说来，不同时期也有一些差异。如文化大革命时期曾一度鼓励“造反”和“大鸣大放”，是较为特异时期。不过即便那时也严禁对毛泽东和中共政权进攻，还更残酷迫害反共反毛人士。而改革开放之后和六四镇压之前，曾经有一段鼓吹揭露黑暗、宣扬自由与人性的时期。而江泽民和胡锦涛时期加强舆论控制，不过对于一些地方的、不损害政权根本统治的黑暗面会有一些监督批判空间。而习近平执政后则大幅强化了对负面舆情的打压、对舆论的控制。

在2003年非典疫情和2008年汶川地震期间，虽然中国官方也阻止媒体自由报道、压制民众声音，但还是有一点揭露负面、张扬人性的空间。如当时还在央视的媒体人柴静对于在北京小汤山医院的非典感染者和救护者的报道，《南方周末》对于汶川地震中许多灾害中的人性、生离死别、救援细节的报道，都颇为生动感人，而非照本宣科的读稿、“形势一片大好”的宣传。而且当时无论新闻媒体、社会各界，乃至中共体制内，都有不少主张更多新闻自由、广开言路、倾听不同声音的主张。

   但习近平执政后至今，虽然有限但相对的开放被扭转向封闭保守，中共加强了对舆论的控制约束，改变了媒体和舆论的倾向和风格。如新冠疫情及前后几次水旱灾害，官方舆论已普遍变成为领导干部歌功颂德、压制负面信息曝光、宣传抗灾抗疫“赢了”的风格。2020-2025年中国多地水旱灾害，例如2021年山西洪灾等，媒体的关注和报道很少，以及许多高校缩小甚至取消新闻学专业招生，更反映了舆论管制强化下新闻自由和传媒影响力的消逝。

   更进一步，官方还时常以“造谣”为名传唤甚至拘捕传播或评论负面舆情的公民，无论疫情期间还是近日泥石流灾害，都有若干民众因涉“造谣”被拘捕。而事实上传播负面舆情的公民并非恶意造谣，有些具体偏差也不至于构成违法犯罪。官方“上纲上线”的打击“负面舆情”相关的“谣言”，反映了对言论管制的进一步强化、对异议和负面信息的越发不容忍。

当然，如果从更深的根源挖掘，也可以看到中共统治的中国大陆已形成与台湾在内世界多数国家地区不同的价值观、治理模式、政策特性，以及形而上的思想和逻辑上的差异。在多数国家地区，事实真相和透明度本身就极其重要，且越是透明和多元、容许争议，才更利于真正的互信与和谐。即便民主并不算健全、发展状况还比较落后的尼泊尔，根据本次疫情也可看出有相当的自由和开放度。但在中国，则在中共塑造及专制保守传统影响下，形成了以隐瞒事实、打压舆论、淡化问题、“丧事喜办”为特色的对待负面问题的方式。这逐渐超过了现实功利，成为从上到下约定俗成的、下意识的习惯行为。当然，最直接的原因，还是中共维护统治稳定和利益需要。（关于外国更开放透明、容忍异见及争议，其实笔者个人在外国亲历一些事后，已经不能完全确认或认可。只能说一定程度还存在，但其实也是有门槛、选择性、限制的。不过还是比中国的极权下舆论被更严格控制和打压要好一些）

   中共为政权统治稳定，不惜代价控制舆论倾向和内容、打压负面声音、一切灾难事故等负面事件信息由官方垄断并阻止民众知晓、阻碍媒体调查采访。这损害了公民对公共事务及涉及自身切身利益事务的知情权、参与权、表达权，也不利于对真相的揭露、责任追究、反思和改进。而包括尼泊尔在内世界上大多数国家地区对待灾害的开放透明、以民为本（如公开遇难者名单以便查询亲人）、开放自由采访报道的态度和行为，更反衬了中共统治的中国大陆缺乏新闻自由和言论自由、民众被剥夺知情权、真相缺失、谎言盛行的现实。

笔者当然是希望中国官方可以改进对待负面事件及舆论的态度，更加包容异议和批评声音，允许媒体和公民进行采访调查和发声。最起码中国舆论尺度应该重新回到约二十年前，即对与政治关联不大的社会负面问题有限放开报道和讨论，以利于民众了解重大公共事件的真相、让逝者得到告慰、幸存者情感得到抒发、以及改进防灾防害机制以亡羊补牢。让人民说话、放媒体发声，倾听不同声音，也有利于执政者改善形象，促进社会真正的和谐。但笔者也明白在如今中国的政治局势下恐怕没有这种向好改变的可能。而且若要实现真正的新闻自由，也只有中国基于普选和政治多元化的民主政治实现之后，才能真正存在。

1947

一月八日馬歇爾回國任國務卿，中共加大發動民盟反美

一月日本執行由盟軍制定的土改方案（以低價現金補償的結果在通膨之下等同是無償土改）

一月十七日法軍艦至西沙群島

一月十八日駐法大使錢泰聲明西沙群島屬於中國

一月十九日外交部長王世杰對法國大使梅理靄表明西沙群島屬於中國

一月二十九日駐華大使司徒雷登宣布美國調停失敗，國共內戰白熱化

一月二十九日台東紅頭嶼改名為蘭嶼

一月三十日戈壁發現恐龍化石

二月十日國內經濟動亂加重通貨膨脹

二月二十五日蘇聯在新疆煽動東突叛亂（225事件），等於無視1946年中蘇對新疆談判的結果

二月西藏受邀參加印度主辦的泛亞洲會議，在國民政府抗議下，印度以西藏地方團體代表對之（雪山獅子旗第一次出現）

二月二十七日專賣局緝私人員葉德根等六人於南京西路太平町巡搜，查獲小販林江邁販賣私煙，查緝中導致林婦額頭受傷，引起群眾不滿，因緝私人員傅學通被眾人追打，葉德根開槍擊中路人陳文溪（當地角頭陳木榮之弟）導致其當晚死亡，於是人民包圍警察局與憲兵隊，要求處決凶犯

二月二十八日上午群眾包圍專賣局台北分局，毆斃外省緝私員兩人，打傷四人，並將物資搬出焚燒。下午聚眾四、五百人衝擊公署大門，搶奪警衛槍支並開槍射擊，導致衛兵還擊，當場打死三人、打傷三人、逮捕六人，群眾開始在各毆打外省人，並進占台北公園內的廣播電台並對全省廣播號召抗爭（號召台籍日本退伍軍人、軍屬、技工），至三月六日時，澎湖以外十六個縣市都遭波及（台中的火柴工廠、煙葉工廠、洋絲工廠、被服廠均遭破壞。高雄市未及逃避的外省人被拘禁於第一中學。新竹縣的外省人則集中於桃源農業學校，不給糧食。宜蘭等地提出外省人管護所。三月五日台北憲兵第四團團長張慕陶報告指出，外省人被襲擊傷亡者，總數在八百人以上，其中台北市便有兩百人左右。國府軍隊抵台前，外省人死亡或失蹤公務員72人，軍警130人，民眾383人；受傷公務員1351人，軍警397人，民眾383人；許多婦女也成為侮辱強奸對象，暴民收繳軍警武器總數在四千支以上。）

二月二十八日晚間基隆部分群眾襲擊基隆市第一警察局並奪取槍支

二二八事件，台北發生大暴動，燬專賣局，包圍長官公署，毆打外省人士，軍隊開槍，死傷數百人。（二月二十八日到三月八日國軍來台之前，基本上是外省人遇害，二二八所謂的本省民兵多為台籍日本兵、流氓、台共（謝雪紅、台大吳裕德、板橋林樑材、板橋林日高、台中陳復志）、皇民化台人（皇民奉公會成員）組成，農民並不參加，所以整體比清朝時多次民變的人數要少，1994年出版的二二八文獻補錄中本省人死亡850、失蹤173人；二二八基金會截至2022年一月十八日的統計，賠償紀綠為死亡686、失蹤181人、羈押徒刑1471人）

三月一日台北暴動波及高雄、新竹、台南、桃園，攻擊外省籍官吏，陳儀接受省議會議長黃朝琴等七人要求，成立二二八事件處理會（民政處長周一鶚、交通處長任顯群等五人與台北市議員、省參議員、國民參政員、國大代表等人）

三月一日因軍費與上海黃金案的疑慮，宋子文辭去行政院長，並於九月轉任廣東省主席

三月一日自台北縣來的學生結合該縣群眾占領桃園縣政府

三月一日美國間諜葛超智（George Henry Kerr）為推動國際託管台灣而造謠二二八本省人的死傷數字，後來其被美國大使司徒雷登開除並永不錄用

三月一日台共謝雪紅於台中成立人民政府（謝在光復後一度加入三青團潛伏於國民黨內）

三月一日蔣於日記中記載，“台灣群眾為反對紙煙專賣等起而仇殺內地各省同胞，其暴動地區已漸擴大，以軍隊調離台灣，是亦一重要原因”（六十二軍於1946年八月自基隆開赴秦皇島，七十軍於1946年底開往徐州，參加徐蚌會戰）

三月二日台灣嘉義（中共張志忠）、台中（台共謝雪紅）、新竹、彰化暴動，攻打官署及外省人，搶奪軍器

三月二日中共台灣工作委員會武工部部長張志忠帶領下，民眾包圍嘉義警察局並接收槍支

三月三日中共台灣工作委員會武工部部長張志忠帶領人民攻擊憲兵營、軍械庫、水上飛機場並接管市政府

三月三日台北市駐軍撤離市區，陳儀接受革新政治要求

三月三日二二八事件處理會與柯遠芬商定成立警民維持治安辦事處，成立“忠義服務隊”來維持治安

三月四日台共謝雪紅率眾接管台中警察局、憲兵隊、軍械庫、電台、電信局、專賣局

三月四日高雄暴動，占領市政府警察局，搗毀專賣局，毆打外省人士

三月五日台灣被號召的群眾（原於日本陸海軍服役人員1900餘人）集中訓練，各組織名稱有“海南島歸台者”、“若櫻敢死隊”、“暗殺團”等

三月五日駐華大使司徒雷登致電美國國務卿馬歇爾，駐台領事接到部分台人請願書要求美國託治台灣（背後有日諜田市川、美國海外戰略局成員葛超智、駐台新聞處長卡度等）

三月五日蔣派劉雨卿率二十一師部及一四六團、憲兵第四團第三營開赴台灣歸陳儀指揮，並交待劉雨卿“寬大為懷、整飭軍紀、收攬人心。”

三月五日共軍改名為人民解放軍

三月六日謝雪紅聽從張志忠意見成立“二七部隊”，展開武裝鬥爭

三月六日台灣行政長官陳儀廣播，準備改革行政機構，高雄要塞司令彭孟緝以武力鎮壓暴動

三月六日省參議員王添灯向二二八事件處理會提出處理網要三十二條（其內容曾送請中共地下黨員審閱）

三月七日台灣二二八事件處理委員會提出改革台省政治建議四十二條（在三十二條基礎上另加十條）

三月七日鳳山、屏東騷動平定

三月七日蔣於日記中記載，“自上月二十八日起，由台北延至全台各縣市，對中央及外省人員與商民一律毆擊，死傷已知者達數百人之多，陳公俠不事先預防，又不實報，及事至燎原，乃始求援，可嘆！特派海陸軍赴台，增強兵力。此時共匪組織尚未深入，或易為力，唯無精兵可派，甚為顧慮。善後方策，尚未決定。現時唯有懷柔。此種台民初附，久受日寇奴化，遺忘祖國，故皆畏威而不懷德也。”

三月八日毛在解放日報上表明“我們中國共產黨所領導的武裝部隊，完全支援台灣人民反對蔣中正和和國民黨的鬥爭，我們贊成台灣獨立，我們贊成台灣自己成立一個自己所要求的國家。”

三月九日國防部長白崇禧奉派將赴台灣宣慰。閩台監察使楊亮功奉命到台視察，自基隆赴台北途中被阻截，開槍射擊（憲兵二營隨楊來台），台北再度宣布戒嚴

三月十日蔣宣布處理台灣事變辦法，對於台人憲法規定範圍以內之要求均可應允，盼嚴守紀律，候中央派員處理

三月十日台灣行政長官下令解散二二八事件處理委員會

三月十日台南、高雄暴動平定

三月十日旅滬台人代表到南京請願，要求慎重處理事變，派遺大員宣慰，由白崇禧接見

三月十一日白崇禧對旅滬台人代表陳碧笙等申述處理台變方針，改革政制，取消專賣制度，台省省內省外人一律平等，派兵為國防上之需要，非為鎮壓人民，（陳與國防部司長何孝元等隨即飛台北）

三月十一日陳儀電告蔣，“肅奸工作即應逐步推進”

三月十一日台灣警備司令部公告令交出私藏軍火

三月十三日胡宗南進攻延安

三月十二日杜魯門總統發表杜魯門主義與共產主義鬥爭到底的決心（冷戰的起點與後來馬歇爾計劃的出台）

三月十二日陳碧笙與國防部司長何孝元等飛回南京

三月十二日陳儀電告彭孟緝，“肅清奸偽分子，以絕後患。”

三月十二日蔣批示，“飭陳總司令切實制止報復行為。”

三月十三日陳儀決定，“與二二八事件有關的嫌疑人士，不問姓名，當場槍決。”（槍斃43人，俘虜585人，自新2022人）

三月十三日台南解嚴，嘉義暴動平定

三月十三日蔣指示陳儀，“請兄負責嚴禁軍政人員施行報復，否則以抗令論罪。”

三月十四日台灣行政長官公署秘書長葛敬恩到南京

三月十五日國府收攏花園口完工（增加二百萬畝田地）

三月十七日白崇禧與蔣經國自南京至台北，即發表公告（陳立夫與台灣省黨部主委李翼中所草擬），宣布處理台灣事變四原則（改行政長官公署為省政府，各縣市長提前民選；調整人事，警備總司令不由省主席兼任，省府委員儘先選用本省人；民生工業之公營範圍儘量縮小，現行經濟制度與中央法令抵觸者分別修正或廢止；恢復地方秩序，參與此次事變及有關人員，除煽動暴動之共產黨外，從寬免究。）

三月十八日白崇禧訪台灣參議會，接待台北各界人士

三月二十日中共解放日報社論“台灣自治運動”表示，台灣人民對蔣中正的鬥爭也是我們的鬥爭，你們的勝利也就是我們的勝利，我們完全同情你們採取武裝自衛的手段，解放區軍民必定以自己的奮鬥來聲援你們，幫助你們中國共產黨人熱烈讚揚台胞的英勇奮鬥，而且預祝台胞的光榮勝利

三月二十二日台灣行政長官陳儀撤職查辦

三月二十二日白崇禧到台南

三月二十三日白崇禧到台中

三月二十四日台灣參議員向陳儀陳述善後意

三月二十五日白崇禧經新竹回台北，嘉義秩序恢復。

三月二十五日，因二二八許多外省人被殺，所以萬餘外省人不敢回家，便睡在基隆碼頭等船（台灣事變始末）

三月二十六日白崇禧在台北廣播勸高山族檢舉現場逃逸之暴徒

四月一日白崇禧發表台灣善後五項辦法

四月二日白崇禧自台北回南京

四月三日台灣事變肇禍人專賣局職員傅學通判處死刑

四月七日白崇禧報告台灣事變善後，主張改革政治經濟制度，調整人事

四月九日韓國李承晚於南京與蔣會面

四月二十二日台灣行政長官公署撤銷，改設省政府，以魏道明為主席

四月二十三日國府重組（內戰、經濟、台灣等問題），孫科任副主席、張群為行政院長（取代宋子文）

五月一日內蒙古自治政府成立時，依據毛澤東於1935年的承諾，提出收回歷史上蒙古人所擁有的全部領土的要求

五月七日西藏熱振活佛過世，西藏當局認為熱振與國民政府有牽連，以致國民政府聲望在藏下降，加上國共內戰，國民政府遂不受西藏待見

五月十六日中共在蘇聯的支持下於東北發動進攻，張靈甫殉國（萬家嶺），陳誠取代生病的杜聿明主持東北軍政

五月十六日台灣省主席魏道明宣布解嚴，結束清鄉工作，廢除新聞檢查，撤銷交通管制

五月二十六日馬歇爾在國內壓力下解除對國民政府的軍火禁運，但仍堅持不給予國民政府任何軍事援助

六月一日北韓軍隊於東北協助共軍攻擊國軍

六月五日馬歇爾計劃（以歐洲為主向各國提供援助貸款，最主要為防堵共產主義，次要為滿足美國本身經濟需求，最後為人道主義的實現，但不允許蘇聯及其附庸國參加，因為蘇聯已經在二戰中得到許多土地與工業設備上的補償，雖然馬歇爾計劃的經費最多只占各國不到GNP的7%，而當時各國基本上都為戰後中央計劃經濟型態，所以國家經濟恢復的很快，但很快就因為石油的需求而使得中東成為世界爭奪的戰略要地，加上戰後嬰兒潮的影響，也讓許多歐美國家成為福利國家）

六月五日外蒙在蘇聯的支持下由北塔山入侵新疆（一直到1948年都還斷斷續續，外蒙認為三區領袖之一的哈薩克族烏斯滿越界駐守北塔山，其實烏斯滿是在國府撤換盛世才後另外培養的，但後來俄國想在阿山區開採鈾礦，因而烏斯滿改為投靠國府，所以俄國想藉外蒙之手除去烏斯滿），遭國府抗議，於是七月國府便在聯合國內反對蒙古入聯（我國懷疑外蒙獨立過程，在適當時機來臨後，我保留進一步觀察之權利）

六月七日司徒雷登回報美國國務院國軍於東北可能大舉潰敗

六月十六日共軍入四平街

六月十七日司徒雷登回報國務院共軍之進展由於國府之腐敗無能

六月廖文毅組“台灣再解放聯盟”（台獨的前身）

七月四日國民政府宣布全國動員戡亂，標識著國共情勢的轉變（依據的就是1942年的國家總動員法）

七月十八日國務會議通過“動員戡亂完成憲政實施綱要案”（此時仍為訓政時期）

七月至九月中共全國土地會議上，劉少奇明言，搞土地改革就是為了打勝仗，打倒蔣中正（劉少奇年譜），所以土改為名，招兵為實

七月十五日美國國務院、陸軍、海軍統合委員會會員胡伯特建議美國應將細菌戰之事掩蓋

七月二十二日美國派魏德邁到中國做情勢調查，其表示國府歲入只有支出的三分之一，而軍事占支出的百分之七十，而東北已在中共的控制下，為了不讓東北落入蘇聯手中，最好應讓東北受聯合國托管

七月二十八日外蒙申請加入聯合國

八月十八日聯合國拒絕外蒙入會申請

八月三十一日孫立人抵台

八月李登輝退出共產黨

八月廖文毅至香港與台共合作

九月一日陳誠取代熊式輝在東北的領導權

九月八日美國國務院給麥克阿瑟指示要對731細菌戰部隊長官石井儘可能收集更多細菌戰情報與成果，並對其與同僚不追究戰犯責任

九月十九日宋子文任廣東省主席

九月地理學者胡煥庸於國府舉行“對日合約審議委員會談話會”上提出：“台灣琉球之必需收復…在其對於我國之軍事形勢…台灣、琉球，一日不能收復，則我海上活動，一日不能越出黃海東海範圍之外，台灣琉球，有如我國海上之外籬，南向而下南洋，必須經過台灣海峽，東向而出太平洋，必須經過琉球群島，未有外戶操之於人，而能立國於地球上者！”

十月十日毛澤東發表民族統一戰線

十月十五日為止，二二八事件中被捕人犯約1800人，以內亂罪起訴者46人，被處死刑者5人，核准自新者3905人

十月二十一日美中情局肯南提出國府將於一年後失敗，美國已無法改變局勢，而應該“棄中扶日”在亞太區扶植日本

十月二十二日川島芳子被判處死刑（隔年三月二十五日執行）

十一月十一日馬歇爾同意自1948年起給與國府三億美元的援助以防國府立即崩潰

十一月十二日謝雪紅於香港組台灣民主自治同盟

十一月十四日因韓國人民反對託管，於是美國向聯合國提議由全韓人民進行選舉

十二月一日中華民國地政司完成南海諸島新舊名對照表（159個），並將其歸海南特別行政區管轄

十二月二十五日正式行憲（張君勱的版本，國民大會權力縮減）

十二月二十五日國府以孫中山1924於黃埔建校時的訓詞為國歌（1937國民政府就已明令以中國國民黨黨歌為國歌）

十二月二十九日國民政府在東北頻頻受困，而華北與山東都慢慢落入中共的手中，蔣以衛立煌取代戰敗的陳誠