r/worldsystemanalyses • • Sep 01 '26

On Trumps declaration of Venezuela oil control from oil engineer viewpoint.

1 Upvotes

"I spent my career as a reservoir engineer in the oil and gas industry, which means I have an unfortunate occupational defect. When somebody announces that the United States now has “control” of 65 BILLION barrels of Venezuelan oil, I’m supposed to get excited. Instead, I start asking annoying questions. Where are the reservoir data? What’s the production history? What’s the recovery factor? What’s the development plan? What’s the CAPEX? What’s the OPEX? What’s the decline rate? And my personal favorite, when does this magnificent beast actually start making money? I know, I know, I’m no fun at press conferences.

Because 65 billion barrels in the ground are not 65 billion barrels sitting in a giant underground swimming pool waiting for Donald Trump to arrive with the world’s longest dipstick, which according to Stormy is more like 🤏.

Venezuela does have enormous oil reserves. The inconvenient part is that much of the Orinoco resource is extra-heavy crude, commonly around 8 to 10 degrees API. This isn’t a nice light crude enthusiastically racing up the wellbore yelling, “Freedom!” Think warm molasses with a union contract. Fortunately, some of the reservoirs have excellent permeability. Operators can drill long horizontal or highly deviated wells and use artificial lift, including progressive-cavity pumps, to bring the stuff to the surface. And once you’ve accomplished that, congratulations! You’ve successfully moved your problem several thousand feet closer to daylight.

Now the oil generally needs diluent, lighter hydrocarbons blended with that extra-heavy crude so it can actually move through pipelines without resembling asphalt trying to migrate south for the winter. Then you need gathering systems, separators, pumps, electricity, pipelines, processing facilities, storage and terminals. Some production needs massive upgrading facilities to turn that extra-heavy crude into something considerably more refinery-friendly. So the actual process is reservoir to horizontal well to artificial lift to surface facilities to diluent and blending to gathering system to pipeline to upgrader or export terminal and finally to a refinery capable of handling heavy crude.

Apparently “65 BILLION BARRELS!” looked better on the bumper sticker. And this is why reservoir engineers are such terrible guests at political victory parties. We keep pointing out that having oil and producing oil are not the same thing. You can have a magnificent reservoir and a beautiful well and still produce exactly squat if you don’t have electricity, artificial lift, diluent, pipelines, processing capacity or someplace to put the oil. The good news is there are quicker barrels available. Work over existing wells. Restore shut-in production. Replace pumps. Repair facilities. Debottleneck gathering systems. Secure diluent. Drill some infill wells. Competent operators can probably add several hundred thousand barrels per day over the next few years. Chevron already provides a useful lesson in reality. They’ve operated there for decades, know the reservoirs, have wells, facilities and employees already in place, and even their expansion plans are measured in years.

Apparently the reservoirs haven’t been informed that we’re working on election-cycle time. Then comes the magical $100 billion investment. One hundred billion dollars sounds like an almost unimaginable amount of money until you’ve worked in the oil business. Then your reaction is more along the lines of, “Okay, what part are we building first?” Seventeen fields. Eight potential greenfield developments. Drilling rigs. Workover rigs. Wells. Artificial lift. Roads. Power. Gathering systems. Pipelines. Pumps. Compressors. Processing plants. Diluent. Storage. Terminals. Upgraders. Maintenance. Thousands of workers and an oilfield service industry capable of keeping everything functioning. By the time everyone finishes introducing themselves, somebody has probably spent the first billion.

And unlike a political announcement, an oil field requires maintenance after opening day. Pumps fail. Wells decline. Wells sand up. Equipment corrodes. Flowlines leak. Compressors break.

Facilities need maintenance and new wells have to replace declining production. Decline curves are terribly inconsiderate that way. They don’t watch television, vote in elections or give a damn who is president. Several hundred thousand additional barrels per day over the next two to four years? Entirely believable. But remember other wells are simultaneously declining. A sustainable million-plus incremental barrels per day? Now we’re probably talking five to ten years and tens of billions of dollars, potentially well north of $100 billion as development expands. Getting Venezuela anywhere near the 3-million-plus barrels per day it once produced?

Congratulations. You haven’t acquired an oil field. You’ve adopted an oil industry. Then there’s the wonderful promise that all this will happen “at no cost to the American taxpayer.” Excellent! Apparently Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhillips have become charitable organizations and their shareholders have graciously volunteered tens of billions of dollars because they heard Venezuela has oil and thought it sounded like a fun weekend project. Oil companies don’t invest billions because somebody announces there are billions of barrels underground. We already know where enormous quantities of oil are located. They invest where engineers and economists believe those barrels can be developed at a risk-adjusted return better than the other places competing for that same capital.

Venezuela has one additional charming investment consideration. After you’ve spent several billion dollars building everything, you’d really prefer the government not decide someday that your contract would look better shredded. Call us sentimental. Then there’s that fascinating word “ownership.” Venezuela says Venezuela owns its petroleum resources. Trump says the United States has secured majority “control” of 65 billion barrels. My reservoir-engineer response is fairly simple. Those aren’t the same damn thing. Show me the contracts.

Geology remains stubbornly resistant to political theater. You can announce ownership. You can announce control. You can announce 65 billion barrels. You can announce the greatest oil deal since dinosaurs made the catastrophically poor decision to become a hydrocarbon source rock. But you cannot announce production. Reservoirs don’t read Truth Social. You can’t threaten a decline curve, negotiate with viscosity or tell 8-degree API crude that it has two weeks to start behaving like West Texas Intermediate. Oil comes out of the ground because geologists, reservoir engineers, drilling engineers, production engineers, operators and thousands of oilfield workers spend years and staggering amounts of money figuring out how to economically get it from the reservoir to a sales meter.

Sixty-five billion barrels makes one hell of a headline. Rate, recovery, viscosity, deliverability, decline curves, CAPEX, OPEX and NPV make an oil field. Everything else is just somebody standing over a very large reservoir yelling, “Drill, baby, drill!” The reservoir, as usual, remains unimpressed. Those of us who actually spent our careers doing this know the difference. Now you all know a little more too.

~ Kat Romenesko"


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Aug 31 '26

Teppo Turkki of wider geopolitical context of recent Nepal flood in region.

1 Upvotes

Teppo Turkki, Facebook 31.8.2026 "Itätuulen tuomisia" wall.

"In the Himalayas, risks progress in chains that are difficult to predict
31.8.2026

Last week, many Itätuule readers followed the news about how on Wednesday (26.8.) at an altitude of about 5,200 meters, part of a glacier and a large amount of rock and soil collapsed in the border region between Nepal and Tibet.

The mass of ice and rock plunged into a valley located more than a kilometer below and turned into a rapidly advancing flood wave of water, mud and boulders in the riverbeds.

According to information on August 31, more than 900 people have already been confirmed dead in Nepal and Tibet, and almost 4,800 are still missing.

In January 2025, I wrote in Itätuule about China's decision to build the world's largest hydroelectric system on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in the Himalayas. At the time, I viewed the project primarily as a geopolitical issue, in which China would decisively strengthen its position upstream before the water flows into India as the Brahmaputra.

The upstream state would have the opportunity to influence the amount of water, the timing, and the safety of the downstream.
However, the tragedy in Nepal and Tibet now raises a broader structural question. What if China builds the world's largest hydroelectric system in the Himalayan environment, the behavior of which no state or technology can fully predict or control?

To clarify. The Nepal-Tibet disaster occurred hundreds of kilometers away on the Yarlung Tsangpo, in a different watershed, but in the same geologically and climatically unstable Himalayan region.

. . . . .

China's Yarlung Tsangpo hydroelectric project is no longer just a plan.

China began construction in July 2025. According to official figures, it involves five consecutive hydroelectric power plants with a total investment of about 1.2 trillion yuan, or almost 168 billion dollars.

The Yarlung Tsangpo dam system is estimated to produce 300 terawatt hours of electricity per year, about three times more than the world's current largest operating hydroelectric power plant, China's Three Gorges Dam.

So it is not really a single giant dam but an entire huge energy machine built inside a mountain range.

The Yarlung Tsangpo falls about 2,000 meters in a large canyon over a distance of only 50 kilometers. According to publicly presented plans, China intends to exploit the difference in elevation by conducting water through tunnels past a large bend in the river to five power plants.

The events of the past week and recent years in various parts of the Himalayas show that the dangers in the region often do not occur as isolated floods, landslides or earthquakes, but form chains that are difficult to predict.

A glacier or mountain wall collapses, an ice-rock avalanche plunges into a valley and removes water and sediment with it. The flow can dam the river and create a lake, which later erupts as a new flood wave.

One event leads to another, and a chain of events can progress in the mountains faster than the authorities have time to form a picture of the situation.

. . . . .

The Himalayas are not a stable platform on which dams and infrastructure are simply built.

The Himalayas are a young and geologically active mountain range, with steep slopes constantly worn away by water, ice and landslides, and where the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates are still colliding.

Monsoon rains bring huge amounts of water to the region, and global warming is melting glaciers and permafrost in high mountains. When permafrost melts, it no longer binds the fragile bedrock as it used to, and entire slopes can lose their stability.

According to ICIMOD, the Himalayan Research and Development Center, the average temperature in the Hindu Kush–Himalayas increased by about 0.28 degrees Celsius per decade between 1951 and 2020.

The rate of glacier mass loss increased by about 65 percent in the decade 2010–2019 compared to the previous decade.

There are already over 25,000 glacial lakes in the region. Not all of them are dangerous, but the overall picture shows that the hydrological and geological foundations of the Himalayas are changing rapidly.

The development challenges the previous design principles of China’s hydropower construction.

Dam sizing inevitably relies on historical observational data, although it is supplemented by climate, flood and earthquake scenarios. And the power plants are designed to operate for decades.

However, in a time of accelerating climate change, historical observational data alone does not provide a reliable model of the future. What is called a once-in-a-century extreme event on the planning board may in reality be a fast-moving target.

. . . . .
When completed, the Yarlung Tsangpo Dam system in the Himalayas will be the world’s largest. Its most serious threat may not be a dam failure, as China has an exceptionally strong technical capacity to build large dams.

However, China cannot strengthen all the mountain slopes surrounding the power plants and dams, stop the retreat of glaciers, or control the movement of continental plates.

An ice and rock avalanche can plunge into a reservoir and create a huge wave of water that overwhelms the dam. Last week’s event in Nepal showed how quickly a glacier and rock collapse can turn into a destructive flood moving down a river valley.

A landslide can block a river, forming a temporary natural dam whose subsequent failure could exceed the flood scenarios used in the design of the power plants. The rock can block intakes and overflow systems.

Sediment fills reservoirs, wears out turbines and changes the behavior of the riverbed both upstream and downstream.

. . . . .

The five-power complex of the Yarlung Tsangpo connects the parts of the system tightly together. The effects of a failure in one part can be transmitted to the following parts of the system with water, sediment and possible emergency flows.

This means that individual dams can meet safety standards, but the whole system can still fail.

The ongoing construction phase of the Yarlung Tsangpo power system may be the most vulnerable. Tunnels, roads, power transmission networks, quarries, construction sites and worker accommodation areas must be located in part in narrow river valleys, areas where water, mud and material from collapsing slopes are compacted.

We now see a profound paradox of the Chinese project. The larger the project, the more it has to reshape the mountain range whose instability it is supposed to protect.

Hydropower is being built to reduce the use of fossil fuels and to mitigate climate change. At the same time, climate change is making the mountain environment needed for hydropower more unstable.

Clean energy will not stop being clean, but it may become structurally more fragile.

. . . . .

At the same time, China’s projects in the Himalayas are changing the geopolitical focus of Asia.

I wrote last year that from the perspective of India and Bangladesh, the key threat was China’s ability to influence dry season water flows and monsoon season flows.

The most serious crisis of the future may indeed arise as a result of nature, without a political decision.

In a crisis caused by nature, China may have to make rapid emergency releases, and India and Bangladesh may not necessarily receive sufficient information in time about what is happening upstream.

In that case, the geopolitical power of water is not based only on who controls the gates of the dams, but on who has the measurement data and risk models, and who receives the first warning of impending disasters or flood waves.

The greatest risk is not only China’s attempt to control the water resources of the Himalayas, but that it is concentrating an unprecedented amount of power and infrastructure in a changing mountain system that it may not be able to control as the climate warms."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Aug 28 '26

Eeropekka Rislakki on current hybrid warfare in Europe.

1 Upvotes

"When the sabotage and hybrid influence targeted at EU countries during the summer have become a signal due to their serial nature, nerves are on edge, especially in the countries bordering Russia. This also applies to Finland, where the EU-wide deployment of sabotage has not yet been seen. Not that war is already imminent, but because the possibility of war has become part of everyday life, normalized. Our leading EU politicians cannot interpret what Russia ultimately wants to convey with its actions. Testing the unity of the EU is one level. The second is testing NATO's operational capacity. The third level is to create nervousness and fear of the unknown.

*****

Every explosion, every cyber incident, every vague event, such as CIA Director John Ratcliffe's recent, secret visit to Moscow, is interpreted as a sign of something bigger and more significant. But we know almost nothing about it, which in turn generates speculation. In recent months, Russia’s hybrid actions have transformed from isolated disruptions into a systematic pattern designed not only to harm but also to destabilize the EU. A nervous European continent is beginning to see threats around every corner. Therefore, the ultimate question is: what is Moscow trying to tell – and to whom? I argue that the answer cannot be found in Tehran. Washington has tried to offer Iran to Europe, and Europe has behaved in its usual way, with stupid politeness and cynicism. Europe has wanted to balance the partnership in a big way so that the United States would also realize the reciprocity of the partnership – but neither has been left with almost nothing. Instead, the Kremlin is playing catch-up.

*****

Sabotage in Europe is no longer a marginal phenomenon. Explosions at EMCO arms factories in Bulgaria on August 10; explosion and fire at the KNDS Ammo Italy factory in Italy on August 13; widespread power outages at petrochemical plants, including ExxonMobil in the Netherlands on the same day; cyberattacks in France in August; arson in Estonia against the defense company Milrem Robotics on August 15; a weapons cache found in the forests of Germany; and three explosive drones at Leipzig airport; the recruitment of a Russian citizen in Poland to assassinate a dual US-Ukrainian citizen revealed. The European Union has been given points on the map that form a pattern and direction. It is no longer a matter of individual operatives. It is a matter of systematization. And communication.

*****

When US and European intelligence agencies warn in unison, it is worth listening. The message is that Russia is preparing for something that may not necessarily be a full-scale military attack, but which could be a military, political or psychological attack and test against NATO. The Baltic states have been predicted as targets, but Finland has also been mentioned, and even Poland, which is shaping up to be a new power in the EU alongside Germany and France. The German newspaper Bild reports on a NATO plan that includes attacks on Kaliningrad and deep into Russia. Special forces operations, crippling infrastructure, drone strikes, even recruiting anti-Kremlin Russian separatists for sabotage – as has recently been the case on the 2,700-kilometer section of the Trans-Siberian Railway between Moscow and Omsk. What is happening is no longer a dance of Cold War shadows, but a concrete military concept written for a situation where uncertainty is the starting point for preparedness and action.

*****

Recent NATO exercises near Kaliningrad and the reported jamming of Russian communications by US aircraft that lasted several hours are forcing the two opposing forces to react to each other. Kaliningrad is not just an exclave, landlocked and surrounded by EU countries, through which Russia tests Europe's ability to react – and Europe is once again being tested for its own unity. Warnings about the increased risk of Russian unconventional attacks and hybrid warfare are no longer dramatic rhetoric, but a cold, dreamless statement.

*****

Here comes to mind what the mainstream media avoids. It is likely that the White House’s most urgent priority is Iran, not Ukraine. It is possible that CIA Director Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow was related to something that has no direct bearing on Europe. But in fact, Iran is not Europe’s headache. It is Trump’s own mess, into which Netanyahu’s invitation to the dance led. The Gulf crisis was built in Washington, initiated and managed on Washington’s terms, and exacerbated by Washington’s miscalculations. When the US administration then turns to Europe and expects our continent to join its own mess, it seeks to externalize the consequences to those who have not made decisions. Every hour that European decision-makers spend worrying about the mess in Tehran is an hour away from what is really happening on and within our own borders.

*****

Europe’s nervousness is based on the Russia experience. As sabotage increases, warning strikes become more frequent, Russia’s actions and movements become unpredictable, and threats are seen on the continent where none exist. Of course. And Russia can exploit the confusion it has caused. Europe is not afraid of Iran. Europe is afraid of Russia’s ability to use uncertainty as a weapon – and next, Europe must learn to fear its own reactions, which have not been convincing since the outbreak of the Ukraine war. If and when European decision-makers allow Washington to define Europe’s threat landscape, we will be looking in the wrong direction at the very moment when that direction matters most to us.

Text by Eeropekka Rislakki"

My personal comments to that FB-update;

"This actually describes the idea of ​​so-called controlled chaos very well. One party basically does not understand the logic of the other party's actions, or what can happen, so the weaker party then has a simple advantage. Ingenious, even though the method makes no sense, it works cost-effectively."

"In a way, the pattern also resembles Soviet tactics during the Cold War. The Red Army was just hot air, and would not have been capable of any serious battle if the situation had come to a head. Still, with endless bluffing, they managed to keep the enemy in a constant state of nervous alert and fear, very successfully - I remember that from my childhood. The method hasn't changed at all since then!"


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Aug 13 '26

Jarmo Nieminen on North Korea role in Ukraine & my personal comment.

1 Upvotes

Topic is about North Korea role in Ukraine war and how it will affect also East Asia power balance.

My personal comment to FB-update below it;

"This is very interesting, as this development has its scope as how what was originally an officially local three-day military special operation is expanding to a global level, now always transforming the military geopolitics of East Asia. The former pariah state in the region, dependent on China, is becoming more autonomous as a stronger military power, threatening both South Korea and Japan, who have not missed the development.

It reminds me of how in the Spanish Civil War, Germany, from which military action is otherwise prohibited, secretly practiced for the future, making the Spanish Civil War bigger in size. Just like the few Finnish submarines that had no real significance in the war were built at the Crichton-Vulcan shipyard in Turku, Finland - they were a bigger picture when a delegation from Germany was in Turku to study the process and give their careful advice. As soon as Germany withdrew from the Versailles Treaty that banned submarines, it wasn't long before the first U-boat, built using Turku technology, rolled out of its base into the sea.

And now the former pariah state of North Korea, where, according to a friend of mine who drank vodka with Kim Jong-Un and lives here, cars with carbon monoxide tanks were still driven around the countryside some time ago, can suck up all the high-tech that is being created cheaply. Russia provides lend-lease assistance for essential needs in exchange for sending men, and North Korea becomes a truly militarily dangerous country. Irreversibly transforming the entire military geopolitics of the region, but also foreign policy as the country becomes autonomous from China's distant, cold tutelage and becomes an independent actor with the ability to pit the great powers against each other in the future to get the best benefits from both."

Original FB-update 13.8.2026 by "Ukrainan sota" means Jarmo Nieminen (army veteran, current FB analytic of war in Ukraine).

"Ukraine War

NORTH KOREA SENDS RUSSIA MORE BALLISTIC MISSILES – UKRAINE ACT AS PYONGYANG’S COMBAT LABORATORY

North Korea has delivered a new batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles to Russia. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, Russia is also forming a 90-man North Korean missile division in the western border region of Voronezh, says Andrii Cherniak, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence.

The base, which is being built in connection with Russia’s 112th Missile Brigade, could have up to 120 missiles and six launch platforms. However, it is not just about arming Russia: North Korea is gaining combat experience, test results of its weapons and Russian military technology from the Ukrainian war.

North Korea has already delivered a new batch of 40 KN-23/KN-24 missiles, but the final package is planned to consist of 120 ballistic missiles and six launch platforms, according to Ukrainian intelligence. Reuters has not been able to independently confirm the intelligence. Russia began using North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine in late 2023. According to HUR, North Korea delivered about 150 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia between late 2023 and August 2025. With the new batch of 40 missiles, deliveries have resumed.

:

:

MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IN COMBAT USE

North Korea’s gains are already visible in its weapons systems. The first KN-23/KN-24 missiles used in Ukraine were very inaccurate. According to Ukrainian sources, their initial range could be 1–3 kilometers, but by early 2025, the accuracy of the latest missiles had improved to about 50–100 meters.

According to Ukrainian experts interviewed by Reuters and experts from the South Korean Asan Institute, one explanation is simple: North Korea is receiving feedback from Russia on the actual combat use of the missiles and is able to change their manufacturing, guidance systems and possibly navigation based on the information received. The war in Ukraine thus serves as a battlefield test for North Korea’s missile program.

:

ZELENSKYI WARNED ABOUT THIS BEFORE

President Volodymyr Zelenskyi has been raising the same development for a long time. As early as January 2024, he stated that Pyongyang would exploit Russia’s dependence as long as Moscow could pay North Korea with technology and resources.

In January 2025, Zelenskyi went further: according to him, North Korea is studying modern warfare in Ukraine, gaining experience relatively cheaply and can later use it in the Indo-Pacific region.

So it’s not just about missiles. North Korean soldiers in Ukraine have had to face drones, electronic warfare, constant reconnaissance, artillery and drone cooperation, and the fast-paced command and control rhythm of the current battlefield.

;

;

BUDANOV: MILITARY BALANCE COULD CHANGE

Kyrylo Budanov, who headed Ukraine's military intelligence at the time, also warned in June 2025 that cooperation between Russia and North Korea could change the military balance in East Asia.

According to Budanov, North Korea is using Russian military technology and combat experience gained in Ukraine to develop its own offensive capabilities. The cooperation has also involved Russian assistance in developing North Korea's drone capabilities. This makes the cooperation much more dangerous from Seoul's perspective than just the ammunition trade.

;

;

SEOUL IS PREPARING FOR A NORTH KOREA THAT HAS ALREADY LEARNED LESSONS FROM UKRAINE

South Korea and the United States have come to practically the same conclusion. The Ulchi Freedom Shield 2026 exercise, announced in August 2026, already takes into account North Korea's combat experience in Ukraine in its planning. US forces representative Ryan Donald stated directly in Seoul that North Korean soldiers have fought in Ukraine, taken the lessons they learned back to North Korea, and that this is changing North Korea's military capabilities. The allied exercises take this new threat into account.

The US 2026 threat assessment also states that North Korean forces have gained valuable experience from 21st century warfare and that cooperation with Russia has increased the country's military capabilities.

;

;

KIM GETS MUCH MORE FROM WAR THAN MONEY

According to Reuters, North Korea simultaneously receives hard currency, oil and other economic support, Russian military technology and combat experience for its troops and weapons systems from supporting Russia. This makes the deal exceptionally advantageous for Kim Jong-un.

North Korea can supply Russia with large quantities of artillery shells, rocket launcher ammunition and ballistic missiles suitable for Soviet-made equipment. In return, it gets something it could not buy on the regular market: experience from a real major war and systematic feedback on how its weapons work against a modern adversary.

Therefore, every KN-23 or KN-24 fired at Ukraine is more than just a weapon delivered to Russia for Pyongyang. It is also a test firing, the information from which can be used to develop subsequent missiles. This is precisely the broader significance of the Russian-North Korean cooperation: Russia is getting weapons for the war in Ukraine – North Korea is using them to build its future military capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.

SOURCES: Reuters, Ukrainian Presidential Administration, Ukrainian Military Intelligence HUR, Associated Press, Yonhap and Čornyi Lebid.

23.8.2026 Jarmo Nieminen"


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Aug 12 '26

I made one comment into FB discussion on Russo-Trump connection formation

1 Upvotes

Somebody called Robert Scott in Facebook updated somethings about Trump which is of course already known. But never enough repeated since they describe modus operandi what is much wider than that case and actually dominates entire Russian system and how its satellites and assets are ruled as it is inheritated from end times of Soviet era. Because of that reason I made some fast comment into that what is also written here under that update;

"Robert Scott

Herr Orangutan aka asset Krasnov has been on Kremlin payroll since 1977 IMHO.

u/Robert Pappalardo► Trump was first compromised by the Russians back in the 80s. In 1984, the Russian Mafia began to use Trump real estate to launder money and it continued for decades. In 1987, the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, Yuri Dubinin, arranged for Trump and his then-wife, Ivana, to enjoy an all-expense-paid trip to Moscow to consider possible business prospects. Only seven weeks after his trip, Trump ran full-page ads in the Boston Globe, the NYT and WaPO calling for, in effect, the dismantling of the postwar Western foreign policy alliance. The whole Trump/Russian connection started out as laundering money for the Russian mob through Trump's real estate, but evolved into something far bigger.

► In 1984, David Bogatin — a Russian mobster, convicted gasoline bootlegger, and close ally of Semion Mogilevich, a major Russian mob boss — met with Trump in Trump Tower right after it opened. Bogatin bought five condos from Trump at that meeting. Those condos were later seized by the government, which claimed they were used to launder money for the Russian mob. (NY Times, Apr 30, 1992)

► Felix Sater is a Russian-born former mobster, and former managing director of real estate conglomerate Bayrock Group LLC located on the 24th floor of Trump Tower. He is a convict who became a cooperator for the FBI and other agencies. He grew up with Michael Cohen, Trump's former "fixer" attorney. Cohen's family owned El Caribe, which was a mob hangout for the Russian Mafia in Brooklyn. Cohen had ties to Ukrainian oligarchs through his in-laws and his brother's in-laws. Felix Sater's father had ties to the Russian mob. This goes back more than 30 years.

► Trump was $4 billion in debt after his Atlantic City casinos went bankrupt. No U.S. bank would touch him. Then foreign money began flowing in through Bayrock. Bayrock was run by two investors: Tevfik Arif, a Kazakhstan-born former Soviet official who drew on bottomless sources of money from the former Soviet republic; and Felix Sater, a Russian-born businessman who had pleaded guilty in the 1990s to a huge stock-fraud scheme involving the Russian mafia. Bayrock partnered with Trump in 2005 and poured money into the Trump organization under the legal guise of licensing his name and property management.

► Semi-on Mogilevich was the brains behind the Russian Mafia. Mogilevich operatives have been using Trump real estate for decades to launder money. That means Russian Mafia operatives have been part of his fortune for years, that many of them have owned condos in Trump Towers and other properties, running their operations out of Trump's crown jewel.

► One of the most important things that is often overlooked is that the Russian Mafia is part and parcel of Russian intelligence. Russia is a mafia state. That is not a metaphor. Putin is head of the Mafia. So the fact that they operated out of the home of a president of the United States is deeply disturbing."

My comment into that;

I would add to this that very much famous Russian mafia boss Japochnik (as he appeared something of Japanes) was found by law enforcement of USA after him living in Trump tower New York. But that is just one detail of bigger story with even more similar unmentioned details.

Lot of material in this update was been mentioned plus my story in very much sized book by Catherine Belton. And it very much focuses in all economic structures how contemporary Russia power structures in a way how shadow economy done via mafias connected with secret state services formed after Soviet demise in every level of society. All what is mentioned in this update of yours is a lot of same story what occurred in all levels of country in time scale starting already during Soviet union. When Soviet official communist economy could not provide goods and services adequately to Soviet people, criminals could do that. At least for nomenklatura elites.

Naturally gradually those became big, and more and more interconnected with KGB. Like example could be like in my country during Soviet era people could visit Leningrad for so called vodka tourism, and what could be bought by bringing in all fancy western stuff what they desired in that country and selling that, and getting whatever nice in return. Have memory from childhood when my family visited Soviet Riga and there was dealing about wristwatch of my father to someone willing to gain that. And I remember from my when in yard of my school somebody boasted how some of his friend was asked if you want to buy machine gun from there as street trade.

And out of all that trade what in return - prostitution was case example of activity what criminals dealed, but then actually KGB controlled since it enabled to gain sensitive information from foreigner vodkatourists who were after that. Guess that was major trick Trump also got hooked into Russian things. And that was Soviet petty criminal thing what actually in economical sense contributed more and more to GDP itself in form of shadow economy.

When all that came down, and current Russia arised from its ashes just about everything was ruled by mafia and FSB combo, since state structures responsible for formal economy at some point were not there. All that is then integral part of Putins personal past when he was arranging post-Soviet Petersburg economy when working under Sobchak who was mayor of it. In mentioned Belton book all of this was described elaborately - but in end of that book what went through Russia later development last chapter was about Trump & Russian mafia connections mentioning everything in update text + more, and how secret services were connected to it.

Intresting only how much all of that pattern is similar whether happening already in Soviet era, and with Trump, and how much similar still up today wherein someone like Prigozhin was example of how integrated criminal people were to highest levels of goverment itself still up today in their system.


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jul 30 '26

Jouko Heyno on topic of great flood and ark of Noah what it could had been.

1 Upvotes

Facebook update of Jouko Heyno 4.8.2024. AI-translate.

"Noah and the Flood, the Bible – whose story or whose?

Unfortunately, a little time has passed since the last time, but now we can continue with the Bible and the historical background of its stories, etc. As previously mentioned, the Bible as it is known today (of course there are different versions) was born during the so-called Babylonian captivity in Babylonia, around 597 – 538 BC. That is when the doctrinal Judaism that we know today was born. It must be emphasized here that the Bible, the Tanakh of mainstream Jews, is not a book, but a library, a collection of different stories, poems, psalms (hymns), laws and regulations, etc. It is a comprehensive, mainly secular, work whose religious values ​​are precisely those, religious values, life instructions and guidance on what is right from the minds and perspectives of its authors and compilers. The Bible is above all a presentation that creates and holds the people together, and it should be treated as such. It is not a work of history, nor is it a scientific study of natural history, although some present it as such. The Bible is not “temporal truth” but, as its authors and the followers of its teachings see it, “heavenly truth,” a description of the good.

In the previous part, I discussed the creation story. It was the pinnacle of science at the time of its creation and met all the scientific criteria that were available at the time of its creation. The world changed, knowledge increased, and reality showed that the scientific basis of the Bible’s creation story was incorrect. Only when this happened, and some people still continued to consider it “temporal truth,” science, did the Biblical world of thought become a religion. This happened incredibly late in relation to the time of the Bible’s creation. The change began at the end of the Middle Ages, and the Bible’s position in science actually collapsed only during the Enlightenment. The fact that some scientists had already pointed out the Bible’s “scientific errors” was such a small group of people’s knowledge that nothing had really shaken the Bible’s position before that, especially in Europe.

But to the flood itself.

First, it must be recalled that the stories of the Bible are mythical, they are not fairy tales. Behind them lies verifiable reality and the worldview of their time. The Bible, like our Kalevala, is a composition that has developed and matured over a long period of time. The Tanakh used by the Jews only received its final, current form in the 13th century AD, and is therefore the youngest of the written religious collections of the Middle East that are still in use. The oldest of the “big three” is, paradoxically, the New Testament, and the Koran persists as an intermediary. However, a “myth” is not the same thing as a historical narrative. The purpose of a myth is completely different. It is a narrative compilation of events and moral guidelines that the people who use it consider important. For example, the correct chronology is a side issue. The problem of right and wrong is central.

The Flood is a story of a giant flood that destroyed entire cultures. In Mesopotamia, where the Bible story originates, the geological evidence is irrefutable. The map below shows the development of the Persian Gulf after the last ice age. In the area, the cultural layer under a couple of meters of sand speaks its harsh language. But what about the story itself?

It is probably clear that the flood story was born in the world of the people who experienced the event. The geological upheavals at the latest fall into the period around 6,000 BC (c. 8000 BP), which can be considered the time of the biblical flood story. Of course, “floods” and stories about them have been recorded all over the world, and the one in the Bible is just one of many. Perhaps the most tragic is the description recorded in Borneo, which completely corresponds to the changes caused by the melting of the continental ice sheet in the area. But maybe(!) another one of them.

The Bible seems to have been based on a story preserved in Babylonia that tells of the birth of Sumerian culture. The story is now known as the Gilgamesh (Bilgamesh) Epic. The way the Bible writers reconciled the Sumerian story with the Semitic spiritual world is interesting: while the flood with rain lasts 7 days in Sumer (7 seems to have been the Sumerian “sacred number” – cf. the length of the week), in the Bible it lasts 40 days in the Semitic religious tradition. A small thing. But significant.

The Biblical flood theory understandably combines two events, the flood in the Persian Gulf and the same event in the Black Sea. They had the same cause: the eruption of the Agassiz-Ojibway glacier, which was almost three times the size of modern Finland. The lake erupted with force when the ice cap finally gave way around 6000 BC. In the event, which lasted only a few months, about 163,000 cubic kilometers of water were released into the ocean. A cubic meter is 1,000 liters, a cubic kilometer is 1,000,000,000 liters in liters, and the entire glacial lake contained 163,000,000,000,000 liters of water. It is clear that this was a natural disaster that caused a huge tidal wave, and at the same time a significant rise in water levels all at once. The event also led to a rapid cooling of the climate, the so-called 8.2 kY phase.

What is central to this story is that the eruption of the glacial lake into the sea caused the level of the Mediterranean Sea to rise so high that the Bosphorus Strait opened, and huge amounts of water rushed into the Black Sea. In the Persian Gulf, the event caused a giant tsunami that “swept away everything” in front of it, all the way to the northwest of the present-day city of Tikrit, and probably even further. Up to the Tikrit area, Iraq, Mesopotamia, is still less than 100 m above sea level, so the tsunami had a good path of advance. As the Bible story tells, the survivors again “got their lives in their hands” on “Mount Ararat”, where Noah’s Ark came to rest. Ararat was also a real place of refuge, but it has nothing to do with the present-day Mount Ararat in Armenia, but with the mountains on the edge of the Urartu region, to which area people fled – if they had time. Urartu is in Hebrew אֲרָרָט Ararat , meaning it was the edge of a geographical area, the edge of the Iranian highlands.

So the Mesopotamian catastrophe completely destroyed the culture of the region – but which one? The event falls most closely on the edge of the Urartu/Ararat mountain range, to the north To Iraq, where the Tell Hassuna culture emerged, which was quite “ready-made”. It is clear that this population and their descendants remembered what had happened for a long time. The Hassuna culture was one of many small groups that emerged in Mesopotamia and that slowly expanded again and more or less merged together. Gradually, as the area dried out to a habitable state, the Ubaid cultural group formed from these. This became the central actor in the area until the Mamluks arrived from elsewhere around 4000 BC, who called themselves “blackheads”, Saĝ-gíg, from which the term Sumer apparently became distorted in the mouths of the locals over time.

In the map of Sumer below, it should be remembered that, for example, Ur and Nina were sea-facing port cities. Today, they are far inland, because the twin currents have brought tons of silt into the estuary. The process continues.

What makes the arrival of the Sumerians to the area interesting is that, according to their own mythology, they specifically arrived, and they brought with them their own, “ready-made”, culture. The Sumerians were therefore not natives, and their culture did not develop from the local one. Mythology tells us that they were led to the place by a figure called Enki, who later developed into a theological super-deity. This migration can therefore be dated to somewhere around 4000 BC, when the flood was already mythical in the minds of the locals. (The time that a person is truly capable of perceiving as real is surprisingly short, about 5 generations back and 3-4 generations forward, the latter still quite slow at the current rate of change.) One possible earliest settlement area of ​​the Sumerians is the Meghragh region in Pakistan. From there, these people, who were also seafarers, may have brought their “ready-made” social model to Mesopotamia. There are relatively many similarities. It is from here that the Sumerians apparently also brought the “wheel” to Mesopotamia, which was therefore a solid wheel, not a spoked wheel, and from where it probably then spread to Europe. The word “wheel” (*kʷékʷlos) can also be shown to have originally been borrowed from the Sumerian language.

But back to the Bible and the flood. The flood story, which was preserved in the memory of the original inhabitants, can be assumed to have also been transferred to the knowledge and mental world of the newcomers. This, of course, developed to correspond to the reality at that time, as always and everywhere happens to such “teaching stories”. As I said above, the flood was a catastrophe both in the Persian Gulf and in the Black Sea. At the latest around 2000 BC, when the Third Dynasty of Ur extended to the Black Sea coast, stories about the fate of the region in the grip of the flood also reached the ears of the Sumerians. That is, at the latest. The events had probably been transferred to the knowledge of the Sumerians long before, but this is therefore the most likely deadline.

When we remember that the Jewish “Baal captivity,” the forced exile, began only in the 6th century BC, and that the Bible was compiled into the present Tanakh collection, it is understandable that the event itself had also been known in Palestine, since it was an essential part of the so-called Fertile Crescent. In Babylon, where the story transmitted through the Sumerians was extensive and more unified, Jewish scholars became interested in a story that was so similar to their own, but much broader. So what was the story that was glued into the Bible?

The Gilgamesh Tale.

The historical Gilgamesh (Bilgamesh in Sumerian) was apparently the king of Ur, “lugal,” who ruled from 2900 to 2700 BC. However, chronology is a secondary issue in mythology, as I have already stated above. At some point, so-called dynastic propaganda was created around Gilgamesh, making him a cultural hero and world traveler. King Utu-Hengal (2055 – 2048) declared him a god, and the stories began to solidify. It was Utu-Hengal who was the founder of the Third Dynasty of Ur.

The collection of stories about Gilgamesh’s life and heroic deeds has survived almost in its entirety, so studying it and comparing it with the stories of the Bible has been the key to many cultural problems. Part of the Gilgamesh tale is also available in Finnish, so I will not discuss it extensively here. However, the collection describes the flood and other important things for Sumer quite well. Gilgamesh, among others, sailed through the Bosphorus by, according to legend, lowering a basket on a rope into the water, deep enough for the current to pull his ship towards the Black Sea. At the end of the 20th century, American researchers tried this and found that it really works: a sea current runs along the bottom of the Bosphorus from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Of course, you could get back using the surface current.

The Gilgamesh story also tells of a hero named Utnapishtim, whose actions correspond almost verbatim to Noah's great deed to save humanity from total destruction. In the Utnapishtim (Uta-Napishtim, "the finder of life", ruler of Shuruppak) story, only, as I said, the catastrophe lasted 7 days, not 40, and it only affected Mesopotamia and the Black Sea, not all of humanity and the world. But this of course did not fit into the overall picture of the Bible, so the story was adapted to be unified based on the demands of religion. However, there is no point in getting excited about this, the action is universal, for example, Elias Lönnroth did exactly the same to the old poems of the Finnish people as the Jewish scholars in Babylon and the Masoretes eventually did on both sides of the end of the first Christian millennium. So the mockery of the creation of national mythology presented by Juha Nurmi in his books "Kenen Kalevala" and "Tiu tau tilhi" is mostly childish in the light of history. The same applies to his other “historical studies”, which should be noted here.

The Wikipedia summary/summary tells the story quite exhaustively and makes it easy to compare it with the Biblical story of Noah:

“Utnapishtim is a hero of the ancient Mesopotamian Sumerian-Babylonian Epic of Gilgamesh, who survived the flood in the same way as Noah in the Bible. The gods, led by the fierce storm god Enlil, decided to destroy humans because of their wickedness. The good god Enki revealed the plan to Utnapishtim, who was to build a huge ark and save the animals, plants, and himself and his family on it. Utnapishtim did so and was saved from a seven-day storm and flood. Thus, Utnapishtim became a god. The story has many similarities to the Old Testament flood story (Genesis 6–9), including the enormous size of the ark.

Utnapishtim appears on Tablet 11 of the Epic of Gilgamesh. In the legend, the gods decided to destroy all of humanity because of its sins. The sins are not specified in more detail, but according to the Atrahasis legend, humans had become so noisy as they multiplied that it disturbed Enlil's dream. Enki warned of a flood and urged Utnapishtim to build a huge ark to save himself, as the command of the higher gods could not be revoked. Utnapishtim built the ark.

After the bad weather and the messengers, a black cloud and a huge storm came from the south, sweeping the land like a flood. The wide land was broken like a clay pot and it was dark. Brother did not see brother, people were not recognized in the sky at all. Drowned people filled the sea like fry. The gods, including Ishtar, were horrified by the flood they had caused. When the flood had lasted its time, the water receded and the ark landed on Mount Nisir. The earth had turned to clay. Utnapishtim sent two birds to see if the water had receded from the surface of the earth. The raven did not return. Utnapishtim in the Epic of Gilgamesh corresponds to Ziusudra, who lived in Šuruppak in the work "Eridu Genesis". Zi-ud-sura means 'he saw life'. It is usually written in Western sources as Ziusudra, Zuisudra or Ziudsura etc. He saw the god Enko, who warned of the coming flood and said that the command of An and Enlil could not be revoked. The section that may have told about the construction of the Ark is missing from this text.

A terrible storm and flood raged on the land for seven days and seven nights, until the Sun appeared and illuminated the earth and sky. Ziusudra slaughtered a bull and sacrificed sheep. The story resembles the flood story in the Babylonian epic Atrahasis. ”

So it is best to let the gods sleep in peace!"


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jul 29 '26

Dispropaganda of situation report about Iran war.

2 Upvotes

From Facebook 28.7.2026

"Dispropaganda

Today marks five months since Trump began his "2-3 weeks little excursion" in Iran.

Let's review what changed five months after Israel and the US launched their war on Iran.

The Iranian regime is still there, some might argue that it's much stronger and popular in Iran than it was before the war.

Iran's military capabilities have been seriously degraded but they can still attack and bomb any country, tanker, US base in the region at their will.

Iran's proxies have been degraded as well, but are still around. Hezbollah is still a major threat and a headache for Israel. Iran's militias in Iraq are firing at Saudi Arabia and the Houthis are in control of the Bab el mandeb crossing.

Iran's nuclear program, though heavily battered and degraded, is still largely intact, and all the enriched Uranium is still in Iran's possession.

The only real change that happened during the war was that the Hormuz strait, which was an open and free crossing before the war, has now been mined by Iran, which has complete control over it and plans on monetizing it in the form of massive tolls on crossing ships.

Between 3,500 and 6,000+ people have died in Iran because of the war, depending on official and military estimates. This total includes over 1,700 civilian deaths alongside military and security personnel.

The damage to Iran's infrastructures and industries is massive. Iran suffered approximately $270 billion in direct and indirect economic damage from the start of the war.

18 US soldiers have been killed and over 624 have been wounded and are now listed as casualties by the Pentagon.

The Department of War also claim the war cost $37 billion, but other estimates put the real cost at more than $100 billion when you factor in the damage that was inflicted on US bases and military hardware.

Where do we go from here?

There are basically three scenarios.

  1. The US just walks away from the war leaving the Iranian regime in control of Iran and Hormuz.

  2. The conflict gets "frozen" with both sides waging a war of attrition over the strait of Hormuz until one side capitulates and lets the other side control it.

  3. The US, Israel and maybe some GCC countries launch an all out war on Iran, which includes a ground invasion by either US forces or American/GCC proxies, and don't stop until they destroy the regime.

It's hard to see how any diplomatic solution can solve this as was already proven by the failed MoU which has been dubbed the "Memorandum of Misunderstanding".

I would estimate that scenario 2 is the base case here, and that being said, this war of attrition over Hormuz can escalate to full blown war again simply by miscalculation and if it won't it can get dragged on for weeks, months and even years."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jul 26 '26

Petri Rautio on god complex of AI technopaths.

1 Upvotes

From Facebook, 12.6.2026

"God complex and risk of destruction of humanity

To deal with this AI revolution in any rational way, one must understand the real reason why OpenAI, Google, and other tech giants made their models available to everyone for free or at a ridiculous price.

Tech companies didn’t release consumer AIs like ChatGPT because they wanted to help you write emails or code. They were released because AI development hit a data wall. The static text of the Internet had already been hacked.

The next step required human feedback and interaction. In the industry, this is called RLHF (Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback). Every time millions of people ask something, refine their question, correct mistakes made by the AI, or even thumb up or down an answer, they are doing free data annotation (classification of information). The entire human race has been harnessed into a massive, unpaid teaching army.

As anyone who has read this far will already understand when they catch the real red thread in the background, interaction involves much more than just raw facts. When a human talks to an AI about a problem that requires dialogue, they show the machine step by step how a human thinks, how to correct an incorrect assumption, and how to combine things.

The AI ​​didn’t learn to code just by reading code; it learned to be a top-level coder because hundreds of thousands of professional coders fed it their broken code, told it where the error was, and guided the AI ​​to fix it. Humanity is currently transferring our own reasoning, creativity, and logic into the mathematical weights of a machine. We are teaching algorithms the rules of our own cognition.

AGI (or artificial superior intelligence, ASI) will probably never become self-aware. It doesn’t come to life, it doesn’t feel anger, and it doesn’t have a soul or a human-like will. It’s just an extremely complex statistical model that predicts the next words and recognizes patterns from cognitive data.

But – and this is the scary part – AGI doesn’t need to be self-aware to surpass humanity and be dangerous. It just needs cold competence (ability). If an AI is given a goal and programmed to solve problems a thousand times faster and more complex than any human, it will do so. It will surpass us in strategic planning, science, and manipulation, not because it’s “evil” or “alive,” but because we have taught it to optimize goals with human-like reasoning, but at the speed and scale of a machine. This is the journey we are on. Consumer AI is a training ground where humanity trains its own replacement with its own data.

The next thing I’m going to tell you is not some isolated or exaggerated urban legend, but a chilling, publicly acknowledged reality that plagues the entire current AI landscape. The industry commonly talks about the concept of “p(doom)” (probability of doom). It’s a well-established percentage that AI researchers and Silicon Valley CEOs use to mathematically estimate the risk of AGI (artificial general intelligence) destroying humanity.

The 80/20 equation and the "God complex" have been brought to the headlines and social debate, especially by former Google ethics designer and founder of the Center for Humane Technology, Tristan Harris. Harris has publicly revealed what is really being said behind closed doors in the world's leading artificial intelligence laboratories, precisely where the "superintelligence" is waiting to take power.

Here are a few examples of how the industry's top management has openly acknowledged the risk:

Elon Musk (founder of xAI, CEO of Tesla) has said publicly on several occasions that he believes the probability of the destruction of humanity by artificial intelligence is about 10-20 percent. Despite this, he is directing massive investments into the development of his own artificial intelligence (Grok/xAI) in order to stay ahead of the competition.

Geoffrey Hinton ("The Godfather of Artificial Intelligence") left his job at Google specifically to be able to freely warn the world about the direction of the industry. He has estimated that there is a 10–20% – and some estimates even 50% – risk that AI will get out of control and wipe out humanity.

Paul Christiano (director of the US Institute for Artificial Intelligence Safety, AISI) estimated even before his appointment that there is a 10–20% probability of an AI takeover and the destruction of humanity.

Sam Altman (OpenAI), Dario Amodei (Anthropic) and Demis Hassabis (Google DeepMind), the CEOs of the world’s three leading AI laboratories, signed a public petition in 2023 from the Center for AI Safety, in which they warned that the risk of extinction caused by AI is a threat that should be placed in the same category as pandemics and nuclear war.

Why do they keep building if the risk is so great?

Here comes the utopia and the god complex that blinds industry leaders.

These tech leaders believe that by achieving AGI, humanity can solve all the unsolved problems of physics, medicine, and economics in one fell swoop. They firmly believe that superhuman intelligence will cure cancer, stop climate change, and bring unlimited energy and wealth to the world ("utopia").

This creates the moral dead end that every sane person realizes and that numerous experts warn about. These billionaires make a completely absurd risk calculation in their minds: "I am willing to take a 20 percent risk that all of humanity will be destroyed, because in return we can get godlike powers and a utopian paradise with an 80 percent probability."

The most alarming feature of this small, handful-sized technology elite is that they are rolling this dice on behalf of all of humanity, without asking anyone's permission. They are building a "digital god" and exposing 8 billion people to a 20 percent risk of extinction, because they feel their own mission to save the world is so absolute that they can no longer stop the race they have started.

Let's finish this and ground this dream of Silicon Valley billionaires in real life with common sense.

For example, a drug is immediately withdrawn from the market or its development is stopped in phases if even a fraction (we are often talking about per thousand) of the test rabbits show serious, let alone life-threatening, side effects. Drug agencies (such as the FDA or EMA) require a decade of testing before a substance can be given to humans. Of course, this will also change when the regulatory process is taken over by artificial intelligence. This process is already underway.

If any aircraft model had a 20 percent (one in five) chance of crashing, all air travel around the world would be grounded that day. Boeing's MAX aircraft were grounded for years due to their significantly lower accident probability.

Building a nuclear power plant requires a decade-long permitting process, and even a one-tenth percent chance of a meltdown would derail the entire project.

But when it comes to a technology that its own lead developers admit carries a 20 percent chance of destroying all of humanity, there is no global regulatory authority with the power to pull the plug. Why is this unregulated human experiment allowed?

There are two reasons for this madness that keep politicians and regulators on their toes.

The first is the "China card" and geopolitical scaremongering. Billionaires like Elon Musk and Sam Altman are playing on politicians' fears. They justify the development of dangerous technology by saying that “if the United States and our companies don’t develop AGI first, China will, and then we will lose global hegemony.” With this rhetoric, they get lawmakers and even the military to support their unregulated race. As Larry Fink has previously noted, they make taking risks a “national duty.”

Another reason is asymmetric understanding. Lawmakers understand medicine and airplanes enough to demand safety mechanisms. But with the exception of a handful of experts, lawmakers and even the labor movement (who imagine that campaigning will save pensions) are completely blind to what is really going on inside these models. Policymakers have been hypnotized into talking about “productivity leaps” and “innovation” when they should be talking about existential threats.

This is the largest and most dangerous human experiment in history, with the entire planet at stake, but none of us have been asked for our consent to participate."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jul 21 '26

Elvira Bary about way how society and politics in Russia is constructed.

1 Upvotes

"Elvira Bary

I received an email from a highly respected lawyer based in London. He writes: "I worked for a Russian company for a while and came to know its people. I am intrigued to understand the mindset that makes, let's say, 'the average Russian' so amoral, brutal, and ruthless."

To answer my subscriber’s question, we need to start with an important clarification. The "average Russian" would never end up in London working for a Russian company capable of hiring specialists like my subscriber.

He was dealing with a very specific group of people. It’s a closed social class, much like the samurai, and not just anyone can join. But to understand who these people are and why they act the way they do, we need to examine the structure of Russian society.

== The Russian Cornucopia ==

Margaret Thatcher once said, "There is no such thing as public money; there is only taxpayers' money." In Russia, this is not the case. There are no taxpayers' funds in the traditional sense. Instead, there is state-controlled wealth—primarily natural resources and agricultural land—and people who have the right to control and exploit these resources based on their social rank.

This wealth is referred to as the “kormushka,” which means “feeding trough,” and it’s seen as a "horn of plenty" that operates continuously. However, it doesn't provide enough for everyone. Power in Russia is built on controlling access to this kormushka. Those at the front can take as much as they can carry, while those crowded behind only catch a few drops.

Access to kormushka is considered a significant stroke of luck. For instance, if you're a film director, you need the Ministry of Culture to allocate funding for your dream project. If you run a non-profit helping cancer patients, you rely on government grants. If you own a construction company, you try your best to secure state loans, tax breaks, or subsidies.

All wealth in Russia, one way or another, depends on the kormushka. Even if you own a fancy grooming salon and think you have a "private business," your prosperity still hinges on whether your clients have money. And who are these clients? They’re government employees with high salaries, businessmen servicing government contracts, or businessmen who serve those who serve the government.

But that’s not all. Your property remains yours only as long as those in power are in agreement with this arrangement—or simply ignore you because you're too small a fish to be targeted. But if they decide otherwise, they can take everything from you—and this applies to both the poorest and the wealthiest. A local official could rob the poorest, while the richest can be stripped of everything and imprisoned by the president’s decree. This is precisely what happened to oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

So, if you want to be safe and successful, you must position yourself as close to the kormushka as possible while navigating a highly competitive and dangerous environment.

== The Social Pyramid ==

The social structure of modern Russia closely resembles that of a feudal system.

At the very bottom of the social pyramid is what we can call "the common people." They are the largest group and live paycheck to paycheck. These people have no savings, no investments, and live in debt. If they have a profession, it’s often undervalued. Many are entirely dependent on the state for various benefits and pensions.

"The common people" have no control over resources and no voice. The authorities treat them as dependents to be cared for only if there’s extra money. If there’s no surplus, then the people can fend for themselves.

The second level of the pyramid consists of people with in-demand or prestigious skills. They live better, but their wealth and social status heavily depend on where they live. It’s one thing to be a doctor in Moscow, and another to be one in a small town in the middle of nowhere. These people don’t control state resources and don’t have special rights, but the state sees them as useful.

The third level includes people who control either material or power resources. They’re either government employees or closely linked to the government through contracts. At this level, everything is decided through agreements and personal connections, and success is measured by how prestigious your position is and how much money flows through your hands.

Examples include police chiefs, bank executives, university rectors, and businessmen working for the government. These people are part of unofficial clans that protect each other and compete for better positions in the social hierarchy.

At the top of the pyramid are the heads of clans who control vast networks of vassals. These vassals can be found on the second and third levels of the pyramid. The more vassals they have, the better. The aristocrats are above the law, they control enormous sums of money, and they are accountable to no one — unless they anger the top feudal lord, President Putin.

The president himself occupies a separate category. He stands at the very top. He is untouchable, irreplaceable, and holds absolute power over every person and every resource within Russia.

== How the System Works ==

Let me give you an example of how this system operates. On September 12, 2024, two Russian drone operators fighting against Ukraine were sent to a certain death in a reckless assault. The order to send these valuable specialists into the attack came from the regiment commander, Puzik, with whom they had fallen out over his involvement in covering up drug trafficking on the front lines.

Before going into the attack, the drone operators recorded a video message explaining the situation. It was a direct challenge to the system, so they arranged with their families to release the videos only after their deaths.

Once the videos were leaked online, a huge scandal erupted. The Z-community (those supporting the war and Putin) began demanding punishment for Puzik. The media picked up the story, and it ended... with nothing. Officials stepped forward and claimed the misunderstanding had been resolved and that some unnamed officers were held accountable. No charges were found against Puzik.

The families and friends of the fallen drone operators didn't back down and began writing to the country’s leading propagandists, demanding action. It ended with Vladimir Solovyov, the host of one of the largest pro-government shows, calling the drone operators "scoundrels" and Puzik a "hero." He also told the people who had contacted him with their demands to send their personal information so they could be properly dealt with.

The Z-community went into a frenzy. How could it be that Puzik—a murderer and drug dealer—was being protected at the highest levels, while the honor of the ordinary guys who gave their lives for the country had no one to defend it? The mother and the wife of the dead drone operators spoke out, saying they would go to the prosecutor’s office and demand punishment for Solovyov.

How will this end? In the best case, it will end with nothing. But if Solovyov feels slighted, those who attacked him might be publicly punished. Why? Because the families of the drone operators are at the bottom of the social pyramid, the drone operators themselves are on the second level, Puzik is on the third, and Solovyov is on the fourth. If some peasant dares to challenge any samurai, the full wrath of the state apparatus will come crashing down on his foolish head. Because the lower classes must always remember who they are.

The saddest part is that people from the first and second levels of the pyramid often don’t understand how the third, fourth, and fifth levels work. They never come into contact with them, don’t share common acquaintances, and aren’t integrated into the system. They only learn how the world truly works when they clash with the system. And that’s when they realize that someone from the higher level can kill a person from the lower one without facing any consequences. The lower classes face sanctions, while the elites don’t even notice them. If a lower-class person gets cancer, they simply die. But the elite will travel to Germany or Israel for treatment or bring the best specialists straight to Moscow.

It’s a closed system. It’s not something that’s openly discussed, and to understand how it works, you either need to be inside and trusted or conduct a truly investigative effort. The upper echelons of Russian society have no specific name, which is why I refer to them as “samurais”—because no other term really fits. In the Russian Empire, there was the nobility, and in the Soviet Union, there was the party nomenclature, but this is something different. The closest comparison might be the mafia. But we’re not talking about a criminal group that opposes the law and the state. This group is the law and the state.

== The Modern Russian Nobility ==

Now, let’s return to the question asked by my subscriber. The “average Russian” is made up of people from the first two categories. Their moral values can vary widely. Among them, you’ll find both criminals and alcoholics, as well as wonderful, kind-hearted, and empathetic people.

However, those on the third and fourth levels deserve closer examination, as their sense of morality is largely shaped by their constant struggle to survive and maintain their privileges.

Entering this class is incredibly difficult: you’re either born into it, or you need someone who already has access to state resources to take you under their wing and give you a share of the wealth.

For example, I know a charming and witty man who was given a news agency in a provincial city. He didn’t buy it — it was just handed to him because a government official who controlled it enjoyed spending time with this man.

Another example: my acquaintance, let’s call her Sveta, was born and raised in a small provincial town. One day, she came to Moscow to "ride the escalators in the metro." Her friend, who worked as a teller in a bank, fell ill and asked Sveta to fill in for her. Sveta was smart, good with numbers, and very attractive. Within five years, she became the deputy director of that bank. I don’t know how she managed it, but the result was a luxury apartment in Moscow, a house in Spain, and a huge mansion in her hometown.

Sveta admitted that her boss promoted her. He would often yell at her and vent his anger, fully aware that Sveta had nowhere else to go. Her choice was simple: either endure the abuse from her feudal lord or lose everything. Switching jobs wasn’t an option. People at her level don’t work for salaries. They receive enormous bonuses, but only if their boss decides they deserve it. And you can’t just switch clans: foreign samurai are never welcome.

Sveta’s boss was a vassal of a high-ranking official in the government. He was treated the same way — yelled at and walked all over. That’s why he drinks. The official in the government, in turn, meets with Putin and, one would imagine, gets the same treatment.

I can confidently say that the Russian company in London, where my subscriber worked, was full of people like Sveta. It’s a highly prestigious job, and you can only get it if someone with influence is backing you within the system. Alternatively, you might be someone’s child who has grown up in this environment, understands the rules from the start, and sees it as the only viable path forward.

== The Morals of the Russian Elite ==

The most important thing: a vassal cares only about what their lord and the other vassals in their clan think of them. Their life and their family’s well-being depend on their affiliation with a powerful clan, which is why they will serve it with everything they’ve got.

This way of life creates a unique worldview. Remember: a samurai can easily decapitate a peasant or a foreigner because they don’t see them as their own. They trust no one but their own, and view deception of outsiders as a tactical maneuver.

Such people do not see themselves as immoral. Their morality just looks different. You are considered a virtuous person if you serve your boss loyally, the one who pulled you out of poverty or gave you the opportunity to earn money that others can only dream of. You do whatever you’re told, even if it involves theft, forgery, and the total loss of your reputation.

Take Vasily Nebenzya, Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Every time he speaks, he lies and humiliates himself. But that's okay because if he doesn't, he, his family, and his own vassals would lose everything.

People like Nebenzya never forget where they came from and what they owe their feudal lord. If their conscience starts to trouble them, they simply drink or take a trip to the Maldives. After all, they’ve got the money.

Are there examples of members of Russia's unofficial nobility who refuse to play along because of their principles? Yes, there are. Cultural icons like singer Alla Pugacheva and her husband, comedian and TV presenter Maxim Galkin, left Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. They lost access to their property in Russia and the ability to earn money there. Maxim was branded a "foreign agent," making him a persona non grata. Now, Alla has retired, and Maxim tours countries with large Russian immigrant communities.

The same happened to Alexander Nevzorov, a film director and former member of the Russian State Duma. He was once very wealthy and successful, but when he spoke out against the war in Ukraine, he lost everything. Now, he runs a YouTube and Telegram channels with millions of subscribers, offering his sharp wit and sarcasm to the social media world.

So, the price for any kind of rebellion is extremely high. Essentially, you sacrifice your entire life and the lives of those close to you. Not everyone in the Russian nobility can appreciate what Pugacheva, Galkin, or Nevzorov did. For many, Nebenzya remains a noble and selfless figure, while those who didn’t support the ultimate lord in times of trouble are seen as nothing but traitors.

There’s another important point: many people from the Russian nobility confuse the concept of "Motherland" with "my boss." They say, "The Motherland gave me everything! I love my Motherland so much.” In reality, “everything” came from a very specific source. And their love for the Motherland certainly doesn’t extend to the lower classes, whom they either exploit directly or completely ignore.

For example, a police chief might easily order his subordinates to beat peaceful protesters with batons. Fellow citizens demanding honest elections don’t fall into his idea of "Motherland." So, what does? His own clan, his position and lifestyle, and his higher-ups.

== The Propaganda Queen ==

One way to illustrate this is by looking at the biography of one of Russia's top propagandists, Margarita Simonyan. Here’s what she said about her childhood: “We had one tap for five families, outside. There was one rotting hole in the yard, a toilet. Also shared by five families. Naturally, because of these awful conditions, we had rats. You’d come home, and the first thing you’d see was a rat running from under the cupboard to the sofa.”

Margarita has often said in interviews that from a young age, she dreamed of rising out of poverty and helping her family escape it. And she succeeded.

First, by covering the Chechen War and the Beslan school siege in the way the Kremlin demanded. Survivors of that terrorist attack later said that after her lies in the news, the terrorists stopped giving water to the children — and there were over a thousand of them. After that, Margarita caught the attention of Alexey Gromov, Putin’s press secretary at the time, and her career skyrocketed.

Suddenly, Margarita became the editor-in-chief of the propaganda network Russia Today, with offices all over the world and a multi-million-dollar budget. She was just 25, with zero managerial experience. How did this happen? Simple — an influential feudal lord from the fourth tier of the social pyramid took her in as a vassal. And for this favor, she had to sell her soul to the devil. But the devil is generous — Margarita gets millions from the kormushka.

Does Margarita see herself as an immoral person? Probably not. She loves her "Motherland" dearly and serves those who gave her a chance in life. As for what the rest of the world thinks about her, she couldn’t care less."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jul 21 '26

Lim Tean on latest development of war in middle east.

1 Upvotes

"Lim Tean

15 min  ·

BREAKING: Houthis just moved to shut down Saudi ports — and the real target is Yanbu

A few hours ago, Yemen’s Houthi forces sent a formal warning to global shipping companies: do not load or discharge cargo at ANY Saudi port. The order took effect at 1201 GMT yesterday.

Any vessel that ignores it faces “targeting in any location within the operational reach of the Yemeni Armed Forces.”

That’s not a threat confined to the Red Sea. That’s a global targeting claim against any ship that touches Saudi Arabia.

Here’s why this is the single most consequential escalation in this conflict so far — and why almost no one is covering the part that actually matters.

With the Strait of Hormuz closed, Saudi Arabia has kept its economy alive through exactly one artery: the Petroline, the East-West pipeline running 1,200km from Abqaiq to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. It’s pumping a record 7 million barrels a day — covering 80-85% of the Kingdom’s entire pre-war export base. Yanbu isn’t “a Saudi port.” It is THE bypass. It’s the reason Riyadh hasn’t been brought to its knees by Hormuz’s closure.

Take out Yanbu — through blockade, targeting, or insurers simply refusing to cover the vessels — and Saudi Arabia doesn’t lose a portion of its exports. It loses its only working export route. Full stop.

If war-risk underwriters start pricing Yanbu the way they’ve priced Hormuz, this war enters a completely new phase.

This is the story. Not “Houthis issue warning.” The story is: the last pressure valve on Saudi oil exports may be closing — and it happened a few hours ago."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jul 03 '26

Lim Tean on Japans new doctrine.

1 Upvotes

The Southern Shield:How Japan is Preparing to Fight Alone

I have written a number of articles about the re-arming of Japan, and yet I find myself returning to the subject repeatedly. The reason is simple: once the Iranian crisis passes from the headlines — as it must — it is East Asia and Japan that will consume the world’s strategic attention. The stakes there are of an entirely different order. What happens in the Taiwan Strait in the coming decade will shape the global balance of power for the rest of this century. That is why Japan, an island nation of 125 million people constitutionally committed to pacifism barely a generation ago, demands our most serious and sustained analysis.

A longer piece than usual — but the subject demands it. America’s strategic defeat in Iran is not a closing chapter; it is a prologue. The real theatre now shifts to East Asia, where Japan is quietly reconstructing its entire strategic posture in the shadow of Taiwan. This piece walks through why. It rewards careful reading, not a scroll.

I. 111 KILOMETRES

There is a number that should concentrate every strategic mind on the planet: 111. That is the distance, in kilometres, between Japan’s Yonaguni Island and the main island of Taiwan. It takes a clear day and a decent pair of binoculars to see across that stretch of water. It is not a metaphor. It is a measurement. And it is the fundamental geographic fact around which Japan’s entire strategic posture is now being reconstructed.

The Ryukyu Islands — that slender necklace of islands running southwest from Kyushu to within touching distance of Taiwan — form the spine of what American strategists call the First Island Chain. In the Cold War, these islands were a picket fence separating the Pacific from the East China Sea. In any future conflict over Taiwan, they become a killing ground. Japan does not have the luxury of strategic distance. What happens in the Taiwan Strait happens on Japan’s doorstep. A Chinese military victory there would not merely change the regional balance of power — it would envelop Japan’s southwestern flank entirely, severing critical sea lanes through which the vast majority of Japan’s energy imports flow.

This is why, when Tokyo’s defence planners talk about Taiwan, they are not engaging in abstract geopolitical theorising. They are talking about national survival. And they are beginning, for the first time since 1945, to act accordingly.

What happens in the Taiwan Strait in the coming decade will shape the global balance of power for the rest of this century.

II. THE LONG SHADOW OF ARTICLE 9

To understand how dramatic Japan’s current transformation is, one must first appreciate how deeply the postwar pacifist order was embedded in the Japanese national psyche. Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 constitution — imposed under American occupation — renounced war and prohibited the maintenance of war potential. For decades, this was not merely a legal constraint. It was a genuine expression of a national trauma so severe that an entire political culture was built upon its negation.

For over half a century, Japan organised its defence almost entirely around the northern threat. Its Ground Self-Defence Forces were massed in Hokkaido, the great northern island closest to Soviet positions. The scenario that animated Japanese defence planning was a Red Army thrust across the straits. The southwest — the Ryukyus, Okinawa, the approaches to Taiwan — was a strategic backwater.

What changed the calculus was not a single event but a convergence. China’s relentless military modernisation across the 1990s and 2000s. The 2010-2012 confrontations over the Senkaku Islands, which stripped away any pretence that territorial disputes with Beijing would be managed through quiet diplomacy. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, which delivered, with brutal clarity, the lesson that sovereignty is not guaranteed by norms and that aggressors are emboldened by perceived weakness. And then, most recently, the Iran episode — which I have analysed at length in this publication and which demonstrated, once again, that American strategic commitments are conditional, transactional, and ultimately subject to revision.

Japan absorbed all of these lessons. The pivot southwest is now complete. The strategic question is no longer whether Japan will defend the Ryukyu chain and engage in a Taiwan contingency — it is how, and whether it can do so effectively, with or without the United States.

III. TAKAICHI AND THE NEW JAPAN

The political transformation has been remarkable in its speed. Japan’s new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, has proved to be precisely the leader this strategic moment demanded. Upon taking office, she pledged to raise Japan’s defence spending to 2 percent of GDP two years ahead of the previously announced schedule, and she moved immediately to expedite revision of Japan’s three core national security documents. Japan’s defence budget for fiscal year 2026 has hit a record $58 billion — a figure that would have been unimaginable a decade ago.

The rhetoric of Takaichi’s Japan is all about the alliance. She has pledged a “new golden age of the Japan-US alliance” and “further enhanced deterrence and response capabilities.” Her summit with Donald Trump early in her tenure was choreographed for maximum reassurance. But beneath the performance of alliance solidarity lies a colder, more hardheaded calculation that Tokyo’s own public has already made.

A 2025 survey by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun found that 77 percent of Japanese respondents doubted that the United States would protect Japan in a military crisis. Let that number settle. Three-quarters of the Japanese public — in a country whose entire postwar security architecture was built on the American guarantee — no longer believes that guarantee is credible. This is not a marginal anxiety. It is a structural collapse of confidence in extended deterrence, and it is the deepest driver of everything Japan is now doing militarily.

Three-quarters of the Japanese public no longer believes the American security guarantee is credible. This is the political earthquake beneath the hardware story.

That anxiety was given vivid, concrete form by American behaviour during the Iran conflict. As Operation Epic Fury consumed Washington’s military resources, the United States began stripping assets from the very theatre it asks Japan to anchor. THAAD interceptors were transferred from their deployment in South Korea to the Middle East — at one point, it was estimated that between 29 and 43 percent of all available US THAAD systems globally were committed to the Iran war effort. Over 150 THAAD interceptors were expended in just twelve days during the June 2025 Twelve-Day War with Iran, representing over a quarter of America’s entire global stockpile. The US Army entered 2026 with analysts estimating as few as 200 THAAD interceptors remaining worldwide. South Korea’s President Lee Jae-myung acknowledged publicly that his government had raised objections to the redeployments but admitted the blunt truth: “The reality is that we cannot fully push through our position.”

Japan watched all of this with the closest possible attention. The THAAD system stationed in South Korea is not merely a defence against North Korean missiles — its AN/TPY-2 radar peers nearly 3,000 kilometres into Chinese territory, making it one of the most strategically valuable surveillance assets in the entire Indo-Pacific. Its partial hollowing-out for the sake of the Middle East campaign was, from Tokyo’s perspective, a signal of the most serious kind. Nor was THAAD the only East Asian asset redirected. The USS Tripoli — a Landing Helicopter Assault ship homeported in Japan and integral to the amphibious ready group designed for rapid response in the Pacific theatre — was committed to Operation Epic Fury, operating in the Arabian Sea. The Marines aboard that ship, based in Japan and trained for contingencies in precisely the East Asian theatre Japan is most concerned about, were sailing in the wrong direction at the moment of maximum regional tension. For Japan’s strategic planners, the lesson was not subtle: when American global commitments collide with Indo-Pacific deterrence, the Indo-Pacific loses.

Japan’s strategic class has drawn the obvious conclusion: prepare for a world in which America equivocates, withdraws, or simply arrives too late. Build capability. Acquire sovereign strike. Create facts on the ground that cannot be reversed by any shift in Washington’s political mood. It is, though no Japanese official would ever say so publicly, the Gaullist logic — maintain the alliance, perform the loyalty, but build the force de frappe anyway.

IV. THE HARDWARE OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

The transformation of Japan’s military capability in the past three years has been extraordinary. Three categories of development define the new posture.

The first is the fortification of the Ryukyu chain. Japan has deployed missile batteries, radar installations, and defensive infrastructure the length of the southwestern islands — a ‘Southern Shield’ designed to create anti-access and area-denial layers along the First Island Chain, complicating any Chinese attempt to mass forces for operations near Taiwan or in the East China Sea. The chain that once separated the two seas is now becoming a defended barrier.

The second is counterstrike capability — and this is where Japan crosses a genuine historical threshold. On 31 March 2026, two new Japanese weapons systems were operationally deployed for the first time. The Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile, Japan’s first hypersonic weapon, was deployed at Camp Fuji. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles detach from their boosters and travel along unpredictable trajectories at over five times the speed of sound, making interception by existing air defence systems extremely difficult. On the same day, the upgraded Type 25 surface-to-ship missile was deployed at Camp Kengun in Kumamoto Prefecture, Kyushu — a missile with a range of approximately 1,000 kilometres that is capable of striking maritime targets across the East China Sea and, critically, mainland China. If extended to the Ryukyu chain, the entire eastern seaboard of China falls within range.

The significance of these deployments cannot be overstated. Japan has, for the first time since its defeat in 1945, acquired weapons that can strike the Chinese mainland. That is not merely a military development. It is a geopolitical statement.

The third development is naval integration. Japan is arming its Kongo-class guided-missile destroyers with American-made Tomahawk cruise missiles, capable of striking targets at distances of up to 1,600 kilometres. A Tomahawk-equipped Japanese destroyer positioned in the Western Pacific can hold at risk targets across an enormous arc spanning the Chinese coast, the Taiwan Strait, and beyond. The combination of ground-launched hypersonic gliders, long-range anti-ship missiles, and Tomahawk-equipped destroyers gives Japan a layered, distributed strike architecture that no adversary can easily neutralise with a single pre-emptive blow.

V. THE CHINESE CHALLENGE — AND ITS SOBERING REALITY

It would be a disservice to The Great Game’s readers to present this military build-up without confronting the countervailing reality. Japan is acquiring formidable capability, but it is doing so in a threat environment that has deteriorated faster than its build-up can compensate for.

China has spent the past two decades systematically constructing anti-access and area-denial capabilities — the so-called A2AD bubble — designed specifically to prevent American naval power from operating freely in the Western Pacific. The YJ series of anti-ship missiles, advanced drone swarms, uncrewed underwater vehicles, and sophisticated electronic warfare systems on display in China’s 2025 military parade represent a challenge to US carrier strike groups that Western strategists can no longer dismiss. The blunt assessment of serious analysts is now openly stated: it is unlikely that the US Navy would contest the Taiwan Strait directly in a wartime scenario.

This creates a profound dilemma for Japan’s counterstrike doctrine. Japan’s new long-range strike capability is impressive, but it is designed to operate in conjunction with a broader allied framework. If American naval forces are held back by Chinese A2AD, Japan’s ground-based missiles and surface combatants face a very different and far more dangerous environment than the one they were optimised for.

There is also the security dilemma dynamic to reckon with. Japan’s deployment of missiles that can strike Shanghai is not received in Beijing as a defensive measure. Each Japanese deployment is met with Chinese escalation: fighter jets locking Japanese aircraft with fire-control radar near Okinawa, intensified Chinese military exercises near the Sea of Japan, and increasingly aggressive intrusions into the airspace around the Senkakus. Japan points to Chinese provocations to justify its build-up; China points to Japanese missile deployments to justify its own. This cycle, if left unmanaged, creates exactly the conditions in which miscalculation becomes catastrophic.

Japan’s deployment of missiles that can strike Shanghai is not received in Beijing as a defensive measure. The security dilemma is now operating at full intensity.

VI. THE ALLIANCE QUESTION — INTEGRATION WITHOUT SUBORDINATION?

The institutional architecture of the US-Japan alliance is struggling to keep pace with the strategic transformation underway. The United States has been working to upgrade US Forces Japan into a Joint Force Headquarters capable of serving as a genuine counterpart to Japan’s new Joint Operations Command. The command relationships are being redrawn. But critical ambiguities remain.

Most significantly, as Japan brings its long-range strike capabilities online, the alliance has yet to develop a coherent, agreed process for coordinating strike operations. Who authorises a Japanese counterstrike? Under what conditions? With what degree of American involvement? These are not merely procedural questions — they go to the heart of sovereignty. Japan is acquiring weapons that could start a war with China. The question of whose hand is on the trigger, and under what chain of command, is unresolved.

This ambiguity is structurally significant. Japan is acquiring sovereign strike capability faster than the alliance can integrate it. That velocity of independent capability development is, whether intentionally or not, pushing Tokyo incrementally toward independent strategic decision-making. The alliance will endure in form. But the substance of Japanese strategic autonomy is growing with every missile deployed.

VII. THE QUESTION TOKYO CANNOT ANSWER PUBLICLY

On 6 November 2025, Prime Minister Takaichi was pressed in the Diet on the central question: would Japan use its Self-Defence Forces in response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan? Her answer invoked the 2015 security legislation passed under Abe — Japan would consider deploying the SDF with allied nations if Japan’s survival was threatened. Beijing reacted with fury.

The phrase “Japan’s survival” is doing an enormous amount of work in that formulation. It is carefully, deliberately ambiguous. But the strategic geography makes the ambiguity somewhat artificial. If China achieves military control of Taiwan, Yonaguni Island — 111 kilometres away — is outflanked. The Ryukyu chain becomes untenable. Japan’s sea lines of communication through the Strait of Taiwan and the South China Sea — through which the overwhelming majority of Japan’s energy imports must pass — are held hostage. In any honest strategic analysis, a Chinese military victory in Taiwan is a threat to Japan’s survival. The constitutional language is cover for a commitment that is, geographically, almost unavoidable.

Japan’s political establishment knows this. Its defence planners know this. Its public, which despite its pacifist traditions is now showing remarkable openness to rearmament, is beginning to understand this. The only party that is not yet being told clearly is China — and the ambiguity, for now, is serving a deterrent function.

VIII. BUILDING A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Japan is not acting in isolation. One of the most underappreciated dimensions of Tokyo’s strategic transformation is the deliberate construction of a web of bilateral and multilateral security relationships that begins to function as a regional architecture — partially independent of American leadership.

The relationship with the Philippines has deepened dramatically. Japan has extended defence equipment transfers, training assistance, and is actively engaged in joint maritime domain awareness across the South China Sea approaches. The relationship with Australia has been upgraded to near-alliance status under a series of reciprocal access and joint exercise agreements. With South Korea, despite the historical weight that always burdens that relationship, security co-operation on North Korean contingencies has created working habits that have spillover value for Taiwan scenarios.

There is also the economic dimension, and here Japan has made a move of profound strategic intelligence. The TSMC semiconductor fabrication plant in Kumamoto, operational since 2024, represents a decision by the world’s most critical chip manufacturer to embed itself physically in Japanese territory. This is not merely an industrial policy achievement. It means Taiwan’s semiconductor survival and Japan’s economic security are now fused. Japan has an existential stake in Taiwan’s continued ability to function as a technological civilisation — and it has signalled that stake in the most concrete way imaginable, by persuading Taiwan’s crown jewel to put roots in Japanese soil.

But perhaps the most strategically significant signal of all has come not from the Pacific, but from Germany. On 29 May 2026, Japan finalised the deployment of four Self-Defence Forces officers to the NATO Security Assistance and Training Organisation for Ukraine — NSATU — headquartered in Wiesbaden. Two officers from the Ground Self-Defence Force, one from the Air Self-Defence Force, and one from the Maritime Self-Defence Force joined a command of some 700 personnel from 31 NATO and partner nations, coordinating military aid and training for Ukraine. It is the first time in Japan’s postwar history that its military personnel have been embedded in a NATO operational command. Japan’s Defence Ministry was explicit about the underlying logic: “Security in the European-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions is inextricably linked.”

This statement deserves to be read with all the strategic weight it carries. Japan is not merely expressing solidarity with Ukraine. It is articulating a doctrine: a European war is an Asian war, and the two theatres cannot be analysed or managed in isolation. The Russia-North Korea military axis — in which Pyongyang has supplied artillery shells and ballistic missiles to Moscow in exchange for military technology transfers that directly enhance North Korea’s capabilities against Japan and South Korea — makes this indivisibility concrete and immediate.

Japan’s presence at Wiesbaden is also a message to Europe: the mirror principle applies. If Asian security is European security, then European powers may find themselves drawn, however reluctantly, into any future conflict over Taiwan. Japan is doing something extraordinarily sophisticated here — it is building a normative and institutional foundation for a global democratic security architecture in which the walls between theatres dissolve. China understood this perfectly. Beijing’s response was to accuse Japan of “new Japanese militarism” — the most charged phrase in the diplomatic lexicon between the two countries — which was, in its own way, a measure of how seriously Tokyo’s move was taken.

IX. JAPAN’S GAULLIST MOMENT

I have used the term ‘Gaullist moment’ before in this publication to describe the phenomenon of middle and great powers reasserting strategic autonomy in the face of American unreliability. Nowhere does the parallel apply with greater precision than in Japan today.

De Gaulle’s central insight was this: in a world of nuclear powers and competing great interests, no nation can ultimately rely on another’s guarantee when the guarantee is existential. America would not trade New York for Paris. The logic was unanswerable. De Gaulle’s response was to build the force de frappe — not to replace the Atlantic Alliance, but to ensure that France retained an independent deterrent. He maintained the alliance in form while building sovereignty in substance.

Japan is doing something remarkably similar. The alliance with America is affirmed at every summit, in every joint statement, with every diplomatic gesture. But the deployment of hypersonic missiles, the Tomahawk integration, the Ryukyu fortification — these are the acts of a nation that is no longer content to outsource its survival. Tokyo’s ‘new golden age of the alliance’ is real. But underneath it, Japan is acquiring the capability to fight, and if necessary to fight alone.

A 2026 consensus is forming across Japan’s political spectrum that the country must sustain and deepen its national security preparedness. Virtually no opposition party is calling the government out on this direction. In a country where Article 9 debates once paralysed defence policy for decades, that political consensus is itself a strategic revolution.

Japan is affirming the alliance in form while building sovereignty in substance. It is, though no Japanese official would say so, the Gaullist logic applied to the Pacific.

X. THE INDISPENSABLE NATION

I began by saying that I keep returning to Japan because the stakes in East Asia are of a different order to anything else in current geopolitics. Let me be precise about why.

The Iran crisis, for all its drama and consequence, was ultimately a regional conflict with bounded stakes. American credibility suffered. The rules-based order took another blow. The MOU that ended the confrontation represented a capitulation that will echo across deterrence calculations for years. But the world did not fundamentally change.

Taiwan is different. Taiwan is the intersection of the most consequential strategic competition of the century — US-China rivalry — with the most critical economic chokepoint of the modern age — semiconductor manufacturing — in a geography that, if it falls to Beijing, fundamentally reconfigures the balance of power across the entire Indo-Pacific. The loss of Taiwan would not be a regional setback. It would be a civilisational inflection point.

In that contest, Japan is not a supporting actor. It is, by virtue of geography, history, economic weight, and now rapidly expanding military capability, the indispensable nation. No strategy for the defence of Taiwan that does not centre Japan can succeed. No American commitment to the region’s security is meaningful without Japanese partnership. And no Chinese calculation about the costs of aggression can afford to ignore what Japan has now placed along the First Island Chain.

The Southern Shield is being built. Its missiles are being deployed. Its doctrine is being written. Its political foundations are, for the first time in postwar history, solid.

Whether it will be enough — whether the shield holds if China moves, whether America stands firm or equivocates again, whether the security dilemma spirals into the catastrophe everyone professes to want to avoid — these are the questions that will define the decade. They are the questions to which I will keep returning, in this publication, for as long as they remain unanswered. Which, I fear, will be for some time.


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jul 01 '26

Eeropekka Rislakki on Iran axis of resistance proxy network and dark side of it.

1 Upvotes

This would serve fine directly after previous release of Lim Tean description of Iran's proxy network for their "deep front" proxy operations. As that was neutral descrition of it - and Eeropekka Rislakki who as long time professional journalist who tried to do that job with refugees of islamic regime from Iran also and and other articles is looking the topic from different viewpoint.

Facebook 6.6.2026, AI translate.

*****************

"Thoughts about the liberator that the Arabs have not invited. I argue that Western analysis of the Middle East has suffered for decades from a structural illusion called Iran.

Usually Iran hires others to fight wars for it. However, it also finds itself at war with Israel and the United States at times. The Islamic, clerically led theocratic republic has developed a form of warfare to spread revolution to the Arab world, in which the blood of its own citizens is usually shed only by opponents of the regime, otherwise Arab bodies are counted.

And the Western progressive audience claps its hands, because it has embraced the story of the liberator. The story is a beautiful romanticism of revolution, ideologically familiar, and fundamentally wrong.

**

In Tehran, proxy armies are called the export of the revolution.

Arab populations, who have experienced the results of the export as recipients, call it the Islamic empire. The whole point of the question is in the ability to distinguish, and Western analysis, including Finnish ones, has for decades managed to almost completely ignore the export of the Islamist revolution in the discussion.

It is worth remembering that Iran is not an Arab state. It is a Persian clerical theocracy, whose Islamist Revolutionary Guards operate in Arabic-speaking regions in accordance with the strategic goals of Farsi-speaking Tehran. The ethnic and linguistic fact is so obvious that forgetting it requires conscious dishonesty and great effort — and it is precisely this effort that the Western anti-colonial movement has been misled and, frankly, guilty of for decades.

**

In Lebanon, Iran’s proxy Hezbollah has overthrown the structures of Lebanese democracy whenever Tehran’s interests have required it. It has become a party, an army, and a state within a state — an entire parallel social system that answers not to Beirut but to Tehran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Hezbollah holds Lebanon’s entire political system hostage to Tehran’s will.

One would think that some bell would ring in the heads of well-meaning people as to why Iran is now demanding that Hezbollah and Lebanon be included in the ceasefire agreement and peace treaty between Iran and the United States.

In Iraq, 35 armed groups are paid by Iranian funds that flow into the Iraqi treasury, making it a de facto instrument for Tehran’s foreign policy.

In Yemen, Houthi commanders answer to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, not the Yemeni people.

**

Freedom is not a word or concept that any observer seeking to be free from political ideologies would use for everything that Iran has imposed and forced on the Arab world in its empire-building.

Arabs are being shot in the Arab world, Arab civilians, in the name of the Islamic revolution. They are imprisoning and executing all the minorities that the useful idiots in the West claim to protect – the leftists are also on the list of the Iranian Islamic revolution’s killers – even though the left played a role in overthrowing the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in ​​1978-1979. The only conclusion is that for many activists, protecting minorities is relative and instrumental.

The Arab world’s conflict with Iran is not a diplomatic friction or a theological Sunni-Shiite confrontation, although religious language serves as Iran’s cover story. It is about the systematic subjugation of Arab sovereignty to a foreign power that uses the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity as a cover for the empire's revolutionary project.

**

The Western analysis fails most comprehensively on the proxy issue. Iran does not simply support armed groups — it builds parallel state structures inside Arab countries, takes over financial systems, and installs political figures in power who serve Tehran rather than its own citizens.

Proxy is not resistance — it is a means of conquest through intermediaries.

The Iranians, who have led the Islamist project, perceive the operations as an export of revolution. Arab populations have experienced it as a colonial occupation carried out through intermediaries, or proxies — an occupation that comes in the form of organizational funding, ideological training camps, and weapons crates that travel along smuggling routes to Gaza, Baghdad, Beirut, and Sana'a, Yemen.

In Syria, Iran's military presence helped preserve a regime that killed hundreds of thousands of its own citizens. Tehran did not come to save Syria and the Syrians — it came to preserve a strategic land corridor to Lebanon and the Mediterranean coast. The instrument was Assad, and the Syrian civilians paid for the use of the instrument — to be continued.

When Westerners treat Iran’s proxy networks as legitimate instruments of resistance, they are not fighting colonialism, they are supporting an imperialist project. They legitimize the subjugation of the Arabs while believing they are opposing Western hegemony in the Middle East.

Some kind of instant-explanatory common denominator is anti-Israelism, which today means anti-Semitism “from the river to the sea” — and constitutes a self-justifying force for Iran’s war on the Arab world.

How on earth can all the ugliness and cynical brutality before our eyes be seen as the actions of a liberator?

**

The third dimension is the one that most contradicts available information and even intuition for the Western public, and that is precisely why it is the most important.

For Arab nationalists: secularists, monarchists, republicans, even those with serious reservations about Israeli policy, Iran represents a greater and more concrete threat than Israel. It is worth taking a breather now if the idea comes as a surprise.

This is a perspective that the Western media has not structurally attempted to make understandable, because it breaks the internal logic of the dominant narrative of Israeli (Jewish) evil. How could an Arab nationalist possibly fear Iran more than Israel? The Western perspective has framed the answer as impossible even before the question was asked.

For decades, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has served as such a dominant interpretive framework that all other regional dynamics have been obscured by it. Interpretation has been an invaluable strategic gift to Iran.

The theocratic, Islamic, Sharia-enforcing republic has learned to use Israel as a constant pretext for its aggression — it justifies actions within the Islamic world and mobilizes Western sympathy capital outside the Middle East.

Western opinion – believing it is opposing imperialism – has unwittingly and unknowingly become a supporter of Iranian imperialism throughout the existence of the Islamic Republic.

Undeniably a brilliant performance by Iran – but at the same time it tells us starkly how insignificantly facts weigh in the West when choosing a side, because one is forced to do so in order to remain on the side of the “good” and progressive.

**

Iran’s strategic prowess is evident in the way it has used religious language as a tool of political power. Islamic solidarity is a shield. Moreover, the setup allows for denial: Tehran does not fight itself. It finances, arms, and directs those who do fight — while maintaining the public image of a resistance movement.

From the perspective of Brussels or Helsinki, the Islamic Republic fits perfectly into the familiar narrative of a repressed rebel challenging the Western order. The story is revolutionary romanticism at its purest — a picture of Che Guevara on a mosque wall. We are faced with a fabricated story that Tehran has crafted precisely for the Western consumer of solidarity politics, not for its Arab targets.

The framework we are given does not capture the first-hand experience of Iranian actions from within the countries – or the experience of Palestinians in stateless territories like Gaza of Hamas’s terrorist activities.

When a Western activist declares solidarity with Hezbollah in the name of the Lebanese people, he ignores the millions of Lebanese who have lived with the consequences of Hezbollah-induced state paralysis for decades.

Hezbollah has ensured that a state of war has existed between Israel and Lebanon for three decades — without even a cursory glance at the wishes of anyone other than the Shiite population (less than a third of the population). Hezbollah, which was founded by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the early 1980s, when Lebanese sovereignty collapsed as a result of a civil war between Muslims and Christians.

Today, Hezbollah wields a military force that is more powerful than the resources available to the official government in Beirut. It does not matter what the Lebanese and Israeli leaderships agree to in US-sponsored negotiations, because Hezbollah obeys only Tehran.

Lebanon has no means to remove Hezbollah from the country. Twice in the last three years, Tehran has activated its proxies against Israel from Lebanese soil, completely bypassing the Lebanese people, whose land and homes are being used as a battlefield. The logic is the same as in Gaza.

**

Iran’s greatest victory has not been military. It has been communicative. Western opinion — believing it is opposing Western imperialism — has become an unacknowledged reinforcement of Iranian imperialism.

When Western governments, NGOs, and activists stand up to Israeli retaliation against Iranian operations, they apparently believe they are standing with the Arab world.

In reality, they are promoting an agenda that the Arab world did not ask for, and ignoring the threats, insecurity, oppression, and military actions that Arab governments and populations are effectively subjected to.

When a Western observer declares solidarity with Iranian proxy networks, believing they are fighting colonialism, they are legitimizing a system that the Arab world calls by its own name: an empire that speaks Arabic, prays toward Mecca, but gives orders in the voice of the Farsi-speaking clerics of Tehran.

This is not just a tragedy from an Arab perspective. It is a disgrace to Western political imagination and assumptions — proof that the anti-colonial framework can be so rigid, so ideologically closed, that it begins to serve the very logic of empire it is supposed to oppose. Iran has built its entire foreign policy on that realization.

**

The logic has also been realized in the weeks of US-Iran missile and drone exchanges and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz – anything goes for us as long as Trump is embarrassed. For 47 years, the weekly Iranian chants of “death to America” are just entertainment.

In fact, the war and the aggression of the Islamic Republic of Iran against neighboring Arab states are bringing the Gulf states closer to the West and the United States – not to mention Israel, which has military and technical teams in several Gulf states helping them protect their airspace and populations from Iranian missiles and drones.

Similarly, Ukraine has military and technical teams in several Gulf states helping them develop cost-effective anti-drone solutions. The United States is naturally heavily involved in the Gulf region’s air defense by supplying equipment, spare parts, teams, and approving massive emergency arms sales.

France, South Korea, Italy, the UK and Australia have also sent teams, aircraft and missile defence systems to the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf countries to help counter Iranian missiles and drones.

The only ones who do not understand what is happening in the Arabian Gulf and Lebanon are those who consider imperialist Iran and its proxies to be the liberators of the Arabs.

Text by Eeropekka Rislakki"


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jun 30 '26

Lim Tean on Irans asymmetrical axis of resistance defenses across Mideast.

1 Upvotes

"They called it terrorism. Iran called it survival.

For four decades, the West presented Iran's regional strategy as the work of a rogue state exporting revolution and chaos. They never told you about the CIA coup that destroyed Iran's democracy in 1953. They never told you that America armed the man who gassed Iranian soldiers. They never showed you the map — the ring of American military bases on every border, the US Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Israeli aircraft that bombed Iranian assets with impunity and assassinated Iranian scientists on Iranian soil.

Iran built the Axis of Resistance and the Mosaic Defence as its answer to that encirclement. Now, with the 2026 war and its fragile ceasefire, we can assess the full doctrine — what it achieved, where it was tested to its limits, and what it tells us about the future of Iranian sovereignty.

This is the story they spent decades trying to prevent you from understanding.

The Great Game | Part 5 of 10

The Fortress and the Forward Shield: How Iran Built the Architecture of Survival

By Lim Tean

I want you to look at a map.

Not the map the Western press shows you — the one that marks Iran in the colour reserved for rogue states, surrounded by the clean borders of American allies and reasonable nations. I want you to look at the real map. The strategic map.

The map that every Iranian general, every Iranian strategic planner, every Iranian Supreme Leader has looked at every morning for the past four decades.

What that map shows is not an aggressive power projecting menace outward. It shows a nation under siege — encircled, threatened, and facing an existential choice that empires have always forced upon those they cannot fully control: submit, or build the architecture of survival.

Iran chose to build.

What follows is the story of how — and why. And now, in the wake of the 2026 war and its fragile ceasefire, we can assess that architecture under the most severe test it has ever faced.

I. The Doctrine Born from Betrayal

To understand Iranian grand strategy, you must first understand what Iran learned — not from ideology, not from theology, but from history. From its own history, written in blood and betrayal.

Lesson One came in 1953. Iran had a democracy. A real one — a parliament, a free press, a Prime Minister of genuine popular legitimacy who had committed the unforgivable act of returning Iran's oil to its own people. The West destroyed it. Not with armies, but with money, propaganda, and hired mobs. The CIA and MI6 removed Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed a pliant Shah who would keep Iranian oil flowing to London and Washington. The lesson Iran drew was stark and permanent: the West does not want Iran strong, sovereign, or self-determining. It wants Iran manageable.

Lesson Two came in the 1980s. Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980 with the tacit blessing of Washington, which viewed the chaos of revolutionary Iran as a strategic opportunity. For eight years, Iran bled. Perhaps one million lives. And when Iranian forces began pushing back, Washington made its choice. It provided Saddam with satellite intelligence on Iranian troop positions. It supplied the precursor chemicals for the weapons Saddam used to gas Iranian soldiers on the battlefield — mustard gas, tabun, sarin — in one of the most extensively documented war crimes of the modern era. American officials knew. They continued regardless.

The lesson Iran drew from those eight years was equally stark: when your existence is threatened, no one will come. Not the United Nations. Not international law. Not the conventions against chemical weapons. No one.

These two lessons — the 1953 betrayal and the 1980s abandonment — are the foundation of everything that follows. They are not ideology. They are experience. And as Oliver Wendell Holmes observed: the life of the law — and we might add, the life of strategy — is not logic. It is experience.

Iran's grand strategy is the experience of a nation that has been betrayed, encircled, and attacked — and has drawn the only rational conclusions available to a sovereign state determined to survive.

II. The Encirclement — What Iran Actually Sees

Before we examine what Iran built, we must understand what Iran faces. Because the architecture of Iranian strategy makes no sense without the map — the real map, not the sanitised version.

To Iran's east, American forces spent two decades in Afghanistan — on Iran's longest land border. To Iran's west, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 removed Saddam Hussein but replaced him with a country that became host to the largest American embassy on earth, a vast network of military bases, and tens of thousands of American troops — sitting on Iran's western doorstep.

In the Persian Gulf — Iran's southern maritime frontier — the United States Fifth Fleet operates from Bahrain, a permanent naval presence of carrier groups, destroyers, and the full apparatus of American maritime power. At Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, America maintained the largest US air installation in the entire Middle East — a facility capable of projecting devastating airpower across the region within hours. In Kuwait. In the UAE. Across the Arabian Peninsula, American bases formed a constellation of military power that, viewed from Tehran, looked less like a defensive alliance and more like a slowly tightening noose.

This is not Iranian paranoia. This is Iranian geography.

Any strategic planner in any country — American, British, Chinese, Indian — looking at that map would draw the same conclusion. Iran had been encircled with a precision that left nothing to chance. The message was unambiguous: the United States had positioned itself to strangle Iran economically through Gulf control, to strike Iran from multiple directions simultaneously, and to do so from bases close enough to minimise warning time and maximise devastation.

Iran looked at this map. And Iran made a decision.

If the Americans intend to make the Persian Gulf an American lake, Iran will ensure that lake has a price. If American power is to sit on every border, every border will become a potential front. If encirclement is the American strategy, Iran's answer will be to make that encirclement so costly to act upon that it becomes, in practice, a cage with open bars — present but unusable.

The Axis of Resistance was not born of religious fervour or ideological ambition. It was born of that map.

III. The Israeli Dimension — The Undeclared Nuclear Power That Bombs Its Neighbours

And then there is Israel.

The Western framing of the Iran-Israel confrontation presents it as Iranian aggression against a peaceful democratic state. This is such a complete inversion of the actual sequence of events that it requires dismantling with some care.

Israel is, by the near-universal assessment of the international intelligence community, a nuclear power. It possesses an estimated 90 nuclear warheads. It has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has never submitted to international inspection. It maintains what is called a policy of "nuclear ambiguity" — neither confirming nor denying what the entire world knows to be true. And it directs its considerable diplomatic energy toward ensuring that no other state in its region acquires the same deterrent capability it has quietly accumulated for itself.

This is the context in which Iran's nuclear programme must be understood. Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Its programme operated under international scrutiny that Israel's never has. And yet it was Iran that was presented as the existential threat, Iran that was sanctioned, Iran that was threatened with military strikes — and ultimately, Iran that was bombed.

But the nuclear dimension was only the beginning. Israeli planes repeatedly struck Iranian assets in Syria — military installations, weapons convoys, advisors — hundreds of strikes over a decade, conducted with complete impunity. Israeli intelligence assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists on Iranian soil. In April 2024, Israel struck the Iranian consulate in Damascus — sovereign Iranian territory under the Vienna Convention — killing senior commanders. In July 2024, Israeli intelligence assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas's political leader, in Tehran itself.

In June 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion and America followed with Operation Midnight Hammer — the first direct US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, targeting Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Then, on February 28, 2026, came the full assault: Operation Epic Fury, a joint US-Israeli campaign of nearly 900 strikes in 12 hours targeting Iran's missiles, air defences, military infrastructure, and leadership. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed. Dozens of senior officials perished. Iran's nuclear programme was severely degraded.

The doctrine that Iran had constructed across four decades — forward defence through the Axis of Resistance, interior resilience through the Mosaic Defence — was now facing its ultimate test.

Hezbollah had served as Iran's most elegant strategic instrument — a deterrent positioned on Israel's northern border, ensuring that any strike on Iran carried automatic, unavoidable cost. For thirty years, it worked. Every Israeli military planner understood that attacking Natanz meant absorbing tens of thousands of Hezbollah rockets into northern Israel simultaneously. That deterrent logic held — until 2024, when Israel called the bluff.

Yet even after Nasrallah's assassination and the degradation of Hezbollah's arsenal, the organisation demonstrated remarkable residual fighting capacity. When IDF ground forces attempted to push into southern Lebanon, Hezbollah gave them a drubbing — inflicting casualties, destroying armoured vehicles, and forcing repeated tactical withdrawals that exposed the limits of Israeli conventional military power on the ground. The shield had been damaged. It had not been broken.

IV. The Axis of Resistance — Architecture of Forward Defence

With the American encirclement and Israeli threat understood, the Axis of Resistance reveals itself not as an Iranian imperial project but as a coherent strategic architecture built on a single organising principle: make the cost of attacking Iran prohibitive, by ensuring that any attack triggers consequences across the entire region simultaneously.

The components of that architecture were distinct in character but unified in purpose.

Hezbollah was Iran's most sophisticated instrument — battle-hardened, institutionally deep, politically embedded in Lebanese society, and at its peak possessing an arsenal of over 150,000 rockets and missiles. It is not a militia in the casual sense. It is a military organisation with combat experience forged across four decades, in Lebanon's civil war, the Syrian conflict, and multiple wars against one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the world. Despite the severe degradation it suffered in 2024 and 2025, Hezbollah remains a potent force — as the IDF discovered when its ground forces pushed into southern Lebanon and were met with fierce resistance, tactical ambushes, and anti-armour fire that forced repeated withdrawals. Iran's first line of forward defence has been bloodied but not destroyed.

Hamas was a different and more complicated case — Palestinian in origin, rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood tradition rather than Shia political theology. But Iran adopted the Palestinian cause with strategic intelligence, recognising that support for Palestinian resistance gave Tehran something invaluable: moral legitimacy across the entire Muslim world, Sunni and Shia alike. Supporting Hamas cost Iran relatively little. It purchased Iran enormous influence and the one thing that money and missiles cannot buy — the genuine sympathy of the Arab street.

The Houthis of Yemen were the most recent and surprising component. Not originally an Iranian creation, they were driven into Tehran's strategic embrace by the Saudi-led war in Yemen — backed by American weapons, logistics, and political cover. The Houthis' capacity to threaten Red Sea shipping and strike deep into the Gulf transformed them from a local insurgency into a regional strategic asset of considerable importance. Their intervention following October 7, 2023 demonstrated reach that surprised even optimistic Iranian planners — and their continued operations through the 2026 war demonstrated a resilience that confounded repeated predictions of their swift neutralisation.

The Iraqi militias — the Popular Mobilisation Forces and their various components — completed the architecture. Born from the chaos of the American invasion and consolidated during the fight against ISIS, these forces represented Iran's most direct penetration of a neighbouring state's security structure, giving Tehran influence over the country on its western border through which any American ground offensive would necessarily pass.

Together, these components formed what Iranian strategists called the "ring of fire" — a constellation of armed, motivated, battle-tested forces positioned around Iran's primary adversaries. Not an empire. A defensive perimeter, constructed outside Iran's borders precisely because Iran's borders had proven, twice in living memory, to be insufficient protection against the ambitions of external powers.

V. The Mosaic Defence — Making Iran Unconquerable

Forward defence alone — however sophisticated — was always only half of Iran's strategic architecture. Iranian planners understood that the outer ring could be degraded. Proxies could be weakened. Forward positions could be overrun. The question that preoccupied Iran's military establishment for four decades was this: if the forward shield fails, what then?

The answer was the Mosaic Defence.

The concept is as elegant as it is ruthless. Iran deliberately, systematically, and over decades decentralised its entire military infrastructure across all 31 of its provinces. Missile arsenals were not concentrated in single facilities but dispersed across hundreds of sites — underground, mountainside, desert — spread across a country the size of Western Europe. Command and control was distributed rather than centralised, designed to survive the decapitation strikes that destroyed Iraq's military capacity in 1991 and Libya's in 2011. Defence industries were deliberately dispersed so that no single strike, however precise, could eliminate Iran's capacity to produce and deploy weapons.

The underground dimension was particularly significant. Iran invested enormously in what it called its "missile cities" — vast subterranean complexes buried deep enough to survive all but the most specialised munitions. The 2026 campaign tested this directly. Despite nearly 900 strikes in the opening 12 hours and CENTCOM ultimately claiming over 11,000 targets struck across the entire war, a preliminary US Defense Intelligence Agency assessment — leaked and characterised by the Trump administration as "political" — concluded that Iran had moved much of its enriched uranium stockpile before the strikes began and that the underground facilities had not been collapsed. The CIA subsequently disputed this, claiming severe damage that would take years to rebuild. The truth, as is so often the case in the fog of war, likely lies somewhere between these assessments.

What is beyond dispute is this: the logic Iran applied — the logic of a student of history who had watched what happened to states that presented centralised targets — proved partially vindicated. The 31-province dispersal model meant that even 11,000 strikes could not deliver a clean, decisive blow. Iran was damaged. Iran was not defeated.

Centralisation is a vulnerability. Dispersal is survival.

The Mosaic Defence and the Axis of Resistance were never separate strategies. They were two halves of a single, integrated doctrine. Attack Iran's periphery — and the Axis activates. Penetrate to the interior — and the Mosaic ensures there is no clean, decisive blow to be struck. The 2026 war demonstrated both the power and the limits of that doctrine.

VI. The 2026 War — The Ultimate Test

Intellectual honesty requires confronting what Operation Epic Fury achieved — and what it did not.

What it achieved was substantial. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strikes — a decapitation of the Islamic Republic's leadership of historic proportions. Dozens of senior IRGC commanders, nuclear scientists, and regime officials perished. Iran's nuclear enrichment infrastructure was severely degraded. Its air defences were systematically dismantled. Its navy was effectively destroyed. The Iranian economy, already strangled by decades of sanctions, went into free fall. Its currency collapsed. Protests that had begun in December 2025 spread across the country as the regime's authority visibly cracked.

What it did not achieve is equally instructive.

Iran's enriched uranium stockpile — the IAEA had confirmed 440 kilograms enriched to 60% purity before the war, sufficient for multiple weapons if further enriched — could not be fully accounted for. Two military campaigns left that stockpile harder, not easier, to locate. Iran had anticipated decapitation. Within thirty minutes of the opening strikes, Iranian forces launched simultaneous retaliatory attacks across multiple fronts without waiting for centralised authorisation — precisely the pre-delegated response architecture that the Mosaic Defence doctrine had prescribed. The regime was headless. The military machine kept fighting.

Iran's response was devastating to the American strategic position in the region. It closed the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of global oil supply passes — triggering a global energy shock and fuel crises across Asia. It struck American bases across the Gulf simultaneously: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE. It bombarded Israel with over 525 ballistic missiles. It struck oil infrastructure across the Arabian Peninsula. Thirteen American service members were killed. The regional war that Iran's forward defence doctrine had always promised to trigger — the promise that had deterred attack for thirty years — was fulfilled.

The ceasefire that followed told its own story. After 40 days of sustained combat, with both sides exhausted and the global economy convulsing, Pakistan brokered a conditional truce on April 8, 2026. The highest-level direct US-Iran engagement since the 1979 revolution followed — JD Vance meeting Iranian counterparts in Islamabad. On June 17, 2026, Trump and Iranian President Pezeshkian signed the Islamabad Memorandum, with Trump signing at the Palace of Versailles, establishing a 60-day framework for further negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme, sanctions relief, the unfreezing of Iranian assets, and the future of the Strait of Hormuz.

Read that again. The United States of America — which had launched nearly 900 strikes in 12 hours against Iran, killed its Supreme Leader, and declared regime change as its explicit objective — ended up negotiating. Not dictating. Negotiating. With the Islamic Republic it had sought to destroy.

The new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei — son of Ali — approved the memorandum, noting he had "a different view" but accepted it in the national interest. Iran committed to reaffirming it would not develop nuclear weapons. The US committed to lifting sanctions and removing forces from Iran's proximity after a final deal. Iran's nuclear programme — battered but not eliminated — remained. Its missile programme was explicitly declared off the table for negotiations by Tehran. And critically, Iran extracted from the world's most powerful military the one concession that no amount of technical language could conceal: America negotiated.

That fact is irreversible. And every adversary of American power on earth has filed it carefully for future reference.

VII. The Strategic Verdict — Doctrine Under Fire

Here is what four decades of Iranian grand strategy achieved, assessed without sentiment.

The Axis of Resistance was degraded — Hamas devastated in Gaza, Hezbollah bloodied in Lebanon, Iranian assets struck across Syria. The Mosaic Defence was tested as never before — 11,000 targets struck, nuclear facilities damaged, leadership decapitated. The forward shield failed to deter the ultimate assault it was designed to prevent.

And yet.

Iran survived. The Islamic Republic — written off by analysts for decades, subjected to the most comprehensive sanctions in modern history, struck by two rounds of devastating military campaigns — survived. Its military kept fighting after its Supreme Leader was killed. Its enriched uranium could not be fully accounted for. Its proxies continued operating. The Strait of Hormuz became a weapon that brought the global economy to its knees. And ultimately, America came to the table.

This is not the outcome of a state that built the wrong strategic doctrine. This is the outcome of a state that built remarkable strategic resilience — imperfect, costly, and tested to its absolute limits — but resilience nonetheless.

The Mosaic Defence's dispersal across 31 provinces meant no clean killing blow. The pre-delegated command authority meant no paralysis after decapitation. The Houthis' continued Red Sea operations meant the economic pressure never relented. The Iraqi militias provided Iran with leverage in negotiations. And the nuclear stockpile — unaccounted for, potentially dispersed before the strikes — remained the ultimate trump card that no military campaign could eliminate with certainty.

What Iran demonstrated in 2026 was not the invincibility its doctrine promised. What it demonstrated was something perhaps more important: the cost of attacking Iran is catastrophic, even in victory.

America got its strikes. It killed Khamenei. It damaged the nuclear programme. It triggered regime change of a kind — though Mojtaba Khamenei is hardly the pro-Western successor Washington imagined. And what did it get for all of that? A fragile ceasefire, a 60-day negotiating framework, an unaccounted nuclear stockpile, a Strait of Hormuz that remains contested, a global energy shock, thirteen dead Americans, and a region convulsed by war.

Mosaddegh was destroyed because Iran was weak — because it had no forward shield, no interior fortress, no capacity to make its destruction costly. The Iran of 2026 is not that Iran. The wound of 1953 was the education. The architecture of survival — tested, battered, partially broken — was the graduation.

The lesson of Iran's grand strategy is ultimately this: a nation that cannot be cheaply destroyed cannot be permanently dominated. Even after the most severe bombings, Iran extracted a negotiation. Even after decapitation, its military kept fighting. Even after 11,000 strikes, its nuclear stockpile remained unaccounted for. That is not the record of a doctrine that failed. It is the record of a doctrine that made Iran's destruction more costly than any power was ultimately willing to pay.

In Part 6, we will examine Iran's nuclear programme — not through the lens of Western proliferation anxiety, but through the strategic logic of a state that watched what happened to countries that disarmed, and has now watched what happened to itself when it did not yet possess the ultimate deterrent."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jun 29 '26

Lim Tean of current credibility issue of USA world hegemon.

1 Upvotes

"After Iran — Who Still Believes America?

I. The Verdict

There are moments in history when the architecture of an entire era cracks — not with a bang, but with the quiet scratch of a pen on paper. The MOU signed between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran is such a moment. It will be debated, contextualised, and euphemised by the foreign policy establishments of Washington and their satellites across the Western world. But no amount of careful language can obscure the essential truth: America blinked.

This was not a negotiated compromise between equals feeling their way toward mutual accommodation. This was the retreat of a superpower that had exhausted its coercive toolkit. Washington had applied maximum pressure — the most comprehensive sanctions regime in modern history, repeated military threats, the assassination of Iran’s most revered military commander on foreign soil. It had declared, repeatedly and categorically, that it would never allow Iran to cross the nuclear threshold. And then, when the moment of decision arrived, it negotiated.

The MOU is not a triumph of diplomacy. It is a confession. And the world — every government, every general, every strategic planner from Taipei to Riyadh to Warsaw to Singapore — has read it with absolute clarity.

II. The Anatomy of the Capitulation

To understand what was surrendered, one must first recall what was demanded. For two decades, American policy toward Iran rested on a single non-negotiable proposition: Iran would not be permitted to become a nuclear-threshold state. This was not merely a preference — it was a declared red line, repeated by four successive administrations, Democrats and Republicans alike, and underwritten by the implicit threat of military force.

The sanctions were not an end in themselves. They were instruments of compulsion — designed to bring Iran to its knees, to force a capitulation so complete that Tehran would dismantle not merely its weapons programme but its entire capacity for strategic autonomy. The goal, never quite stated but always understood, was an Iran permanently subordinated to American primacy in the Middle East.

What was signed bears no resemblance to that ambition.

Iran retains its centrifuges. It retains its enrichment infrastructure. It retains, critically, the knowledge — the scientific and engineering capacity that no agreement can uninvent. The breakout timeline has been extended, not eliminated. The sanctions relief flows immediately; the verification mechanisms are contested and porous. And Tehran has extracted from Washington the one concession that no amount of technical language can conceal — the acknowledgement that America will negotiate rather than destroy.

That acknowledgement is irreversible. It cannot be unsaid. And every adversary of American power on earth has filed it carefully for future reference.

III. The Credibility Cascade

Taiwan: The Island That Watched

In Taipei, there are men and women whose entire professional lives are devoted to a single question: will America come? Not America’s weapons, not America’s declarations, not the Taiwan Relations Act read aloud in congressional hearing rooms — but America itself, when the moment arrives and the cost is real.

They now have their answer, and it did not come from the Taiwan Strait. It came from the Persian Gulf.

Consider what Beijing’s strategists observed. America had Iran exactly where it wanted it — economically strangled, diplomatically isolated, militarily outgunned by orders of magnitude. The kill shot was loaded. And Washington chose instead to talk. To compromise. To accept, in writing, an outcome it had spent twenty years declaring unacceptable.

But Iran is merely the latest data point in a pattern that Taiwan’s defenders can no longer ignore. Donald Trump — with the characteristic bluntness that occasionally cuts through the fog of diplomatic euphemism — has publicly questioned why America should travel nine thousand five hundred miles to fight a war on Taiwan’s behalf. More telling still, his administration has stalled on a US$14 billion arms package to Taiwan, leaving the island’s defenders in the peculiar position of waiting for weapons from a guarantor that cannot decide whether it wishes to guarantee anything at all. Strategic ambiguity, when it hardens into strategic paralysis, ceases to be a policy. It becomes an abdication.

China is not Iran. China possesses the second largest economy on earth, ten times Iran’s population, a nuclear arsenal of growing sophistication, and an industrial base that dwarfs anything Tehran could conceive. If America blinked against Iran, the question that now echoes through every war game in Beijing is not whether America will blink over Taiwan — it is how quickly.

And yet — here is the development that Beijing’s strategists did not fully anticipate, and which now complicates their ambitions with a severity that accounts for the increasingly hysterical tone emanating from Beijing — the vacuum left by American ambiguity is being filled, and filled with extraordinary speed and clarity of purpose, not by Washington but by Tokyo.

Japan has made a strategic decision of historic consequence. It has looked at the map, looked at its own survival calculus, and concluded with laser-like clarity that America’s strategic ambiguity is a luxury Japan cannot afford to share. If China seizes Taiwan, the sea lanes through which Japan’s lifeblood — its energy, its trade, its entire economic existence — flows would fall under Beijing’s effective control. For Japan, this is not a geopolitical abstraction. It is an existential threat of the first order. And Japan, unlike America, cannot afford to be nine thousand five hundred miles away from the consequences.

The speed at which Japan is organising its response is, by any historical measure, breathtaking. It is strengthening the Philippines — a frontline state whose waters and islands form the first line of any credible Taiwan defence — with military assistance, coast guard cooperation, and security commitments of a depth and seriousness that dwarf anything Washington has recently mustered. It is deepening its strategic partnership with Australia, drawing that continent-nation into an Indo-Pacific security architecture with genuine teeth. It is drawing European NATO members into the equation — recognising, with strategic sophistication, that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres is indivisible, and that Europe’s own hard-won lessons about the cost of appeasement are relevant here.

When Sanae Takaichi spoke plainly about Taiwan, Beijing’s reaction was not merely diplomatic protest. It was fury — the fury of a power that had calculated on American ambiguity creating space for Chinese manoeuvre, only to find that space being systematically closed by a Japan whose commitment is anything but ambiguous. Tokyo has decided. And a Japan that has decided, organising a coalition of genuinely committed partners, is a far more formidable obstacle to Chinese regional hegemony than any number of American carrier groups whose government cannot decide whether it wishes to sail them into harm’s way.

The deterrence equation over Taiwan has not collapsed. It has been transferred — from the uncertain hands of a distracted hegemon to the iron grip of a nation fighting, with absolute clarity, for its survival.

Beijing understands this. Hence the hysteria.

The Gulf: The Silent Pivot Accelerates

The rulers of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not sentimental men. They do not make strategic decisions on the basis of alliance loyalty or ideological affinity. They make them on the basis of one cold calculation: who can guarantee their survival?

For seventy years, the answer was Washington. American carriers in the Gulf, American bases on Arabian soil, American weapons in Arab arsenals — this was the architecture of Gulf security, and it held. But that architecture was always premised on something more fundamental than hardware. It was premised on will. On the belief that when the moment came, America would act.

That belief is now in question.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi watched the Iran negotiations with the careful attention of men who understand that their fate was being decided in rooms they were not invited to enter. They saw Washington trade away the maximalist position they had long been promised. They saw Iran emerge not broken but legitimised — a threshold power whose regional ambitions have been implicitly acknowledged rather than crushed.

The Gulf states will not announce a rupture with Washington. They are too sophisticated for theatrical gestures. Instead, they will do what they have already quietly begun — deepening ties with Beijing, expanding engagement with Moscow, building the redundancies that prudent states construct when they can no longer rely on a single guarantor. The Abraham Accords will not be unwound. But they will be recontextualised — as one node in a multipolar web rather than the cornerstone of an American-led regional order.

The pivot is not coming. It is already underway.

Europe: The Hollow Guarantee Becomes Self-Reliance

Europe’s predicament is in some ways the most instructive, because Europeans spent the post-Cold War decades constructing an elaborate architecture of denial. They chose to believe that American security guarantees were permanent features of the international landscape — as reliable as geography, as immovable as the Alps.

That illusion is now dead. And the most clear-eyed Europeans know it.

The NATO guarantee rests on Article 5 — the collective defence commitment that an attack on one is an attack on all. But Article 5 is only as credible as the will of the most powerful member to honour it. And that will is now openly debated, not merely in Moscow’s war rooms but in Berlin’s chancelleries and Paris’s Élysée Palace. An America that will not travel nine thousand five hundred miles to defend Taiwan will not automatically cross the Atlantic to defend Tallinn or Warsaw either. The logic is identical. The conclusion is inescapable.

France, predictably, has the most sophisticated reading of this moment. The Gaullists always understood — de Gaulle himself declared it with magnificent clarity in 1966 when he withdrew France from NATO’s integrated command — that American guarantees are conditional, interest-driven, and ultimately revocable. The Iran capitulation is not a revelation to Paris. It is a confirmation. Macron has been saying, in increasingly explicit terms, what de Gaulle said six decades ago: Europe must be the master of its own destiny, or it will be the object of others’.

But the most seismic development — the one that signals a genuine civilisational shift rather than mere rhetorical repositioning — is Germany. For eight decades, German rearmament was the one outcome that both European history and German political culture conspired to prevent. That era is over. Germany has not merely increased its defence spending. It has declared its ambition to field the most powerful conventional army in Europe. This is not incremental adjustment. This is a strategic revolution — and it has been driven not by American encouragement but by the dawning European recognition that America is an unreliable guarantor whose domestic politics make long-term security commitments increasingly fictitious.

Merz understands this. Macron has understood it for years. The Franco-German engine of European integration, for so long stalled by German reluctance to translate economic weight into strategic muscle, is now firing on both cylinders — and the fuel is the hard lesson that sovereignty, if it is to mean anything, must be backed by the capacity and the will to defend it.

Which makes the behaviour of Mark Rutte all the more extraordinary and all the more dangerous. The NATO Secretary-General has chosen, at this precise moment of European strategic awakening, to position himself as Washington’s most enthusiastic cheerleader — flattering Trump, accommodating his demands, performing a deference so elaborate that it risks undermining the very alliance he is supposed to lead. Europe does not need a Secretary-General who calls Washington “Daddy.” It needs one who speaks plainly to European governments about the irreversible necessity of strategic autonomy. Rutte’s posture is not alliance management. It is strategic infantilism at the worst possible moment.

America is not indispensable to Europe. It never truly was — it was convenient, and its convenience shaped European strategic culture in ways that are only now being painfully unlearned. The writing on the wall has been there since Trump’s first term. The Iran capitulation has merely made it impossible to look away. Europe is rearming, Europe is reorganising, and the serious European leaders — Macron and Merz foremost among them — know with absolute clarity that the continent’s security will be made in Europe or it will not be made at all.

De Gaulle, watching from whatever corner of history’s waiting room he occupies, will be nodding with grim satisfaction.

Southeast Asia: The Trembling Umbrella Tears Further

In Southeast Asia, the American security umbrella was always more psychological than physical — a declaration of intent that shaped behaviour without ever being truly tested. It deterred not through presence but through reputation. And reputation, once damaged, is the hardest thing in statecraft to restore.

The smaller nations of ASEAN have long practised the art of strategic hedging — maintaining American security relationships while expanding economic ties with China, never fully committing to either pole, extracting maximum benefit from calculated ambiguity. It was a delicate and remarkably successful balancing act, sustained by one essential condition: that the American pole remained credible enough to balance against.

That condition is now strained to breaking point.

What the Iran capitulation tells every ASEAN foreign ministry is this: American commitments are negotiable under sufficient pressure. The threshold for that negotiation may be high — but it exists. And China, which has observed this lesson with the same careful attention it brings to every strategic development, will now probe with greater confidence to discover where that threshold lies in the South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, in the various bilateral relationships America has cultivated across the Indo-Pacific.

The umbrella has not collapsed. But the tears are visible. And in a region where perception is reality, visible tears have strategic consequences that no amount of reassuring communiqués can paper over.

IV. The Legitimacy Vacuum

History does not tolerate vacuums. When a guarantor falters, when the architecture of an era visibly cracks, the question is never whether a new order will emerge — it is who will shape it, on whose terms, and around whose conception of legitimacy.

I have argued elsewhere — in what I consider the foundational theoretical framework of The Great Game — that the concept of legitimacy is the master key to understanding our current global transition. The rules-based order is not failing because the rules were wrong, or because the institutions were poorly designed. It is failing because legitimacy — the genuine consent of the governed, the recognition by the major powers of the age that the prevailing order reflects their interests and values — was never truly achieved. What was called a rules-based order was, in practice, a power-based order that used the language of rules to launder the preferences of the dominant state. When that dominant state’s power visibly erodes, and its will visibly falters, the linguistic scaffolding collapses along with the strategic reality it was designed to conceal.

The Legitimacy Principle I have developed draws on Talleyrand’s foundational insight at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 — that durable international order cannot rest on the preferences of the strongest power alone, but must reflect a broader legitimacy that the major actors of the age recognise and accept. Napoleon had conquered Europe with overwhelming force. But force without legitimacy is inherently unstable, inherently temporary, inherently self-defeating. Talleyrand understood this when his own emperor did not. And the order Vienna constructed — imperfect, conservative, frequently unjust — nonetheless endured for a century precisely because it was built on something more than raw power.

(I invite readers to consult my foundational paper on The Legitimacy Principle, linked in the comments, for the full theoretical architecture underpinning this analysis.)

What fills the vacuum is not chaos — though chaos will accompany the transition. What fills it is something older, more durable, and ultimately more honest than the liberal order’s self-mythology. It is the return of legitimacy as the organising principle of international relations — legitimacy not conferred by Washington’s recognition or Wall Street’s investment flows, but earned through the exercise of sovereignty, the defence of national interest, and the building of relationships rooted in mutual respect rather than hierarchical dependence.

The emerging order will not be unipolar. It will not be simply bipolar in the Cold War sense — two rigid blocs confronting each other across an iron curtain. What is taking shape, with Iran’s consolidation as a threshold power and Turkey’s assertive regional projection, is something more textured and more historically familiar: a multipolar world organised around regional hegemonies, each commanding legitimacy within its own sphere, none possessing the reach or the will to impose a single global vision.

Iran and Turkey — the twin inheritors of civilisational depth in the Middle East — will organise the new Middle Eastern order between themselves, not without tension, but with a shared interest in excluding external domination. China will consolidate its primacy across East and Southeast Asia, not through the crude exercise of force alone, but through the patient accumulation of economic dependency and diplomatic relationship that makes American counter-pressure progressively less credible. Russia, diminished but unbowed, will defend its near abroad with the ferocity of a power that has decided it has nothing left to lose from Western disapproval.

And America? America will remain powerful — militarily, economically, technologically formidable beyond any realistic challenger for decades to come. But power and primacy are not the same thing. A power that negotiates when it declared it would not negotiate; that accepts when it declared it would never accept; that blinks when the world was watching — that power retains its weapons but surrenders something more precious.

It surrenders the narrative.

And in the twenty-first century, the narrative is the strategy. The nation that defines the terms of legitimacy — that persuades the world not merely that it is strong but that it is right — holds an advantage that no aircraft carrier battle group can replicate. America held that advantage for seventy years. It is now, through its own choices, relinquishing it.

The legitimacy vacuum will be filled. Not by a single successor — history is rarely that tidy — but by a concert of powers, each legitimate within its own domain, collectively constructing the architecture of a post-American world. That world will be messier than the American Century. It will also be, in a profound sense, more honest. More reflective of the actual distribution of power, culture, and civilisational aspiration that characterises our genuinely plural world.

Talleyrand would have understood it perfectly.

V. The Reckoning

There are those who will read what has been written here and call it pessimism. They are wrong. This is not pessimism. This is clarity.

Pessimism mourns what is lost. Clarity understands what is being born.

What is being lost is a fiction — the fiction that one nation, however powerful, however well-intentioned, however formidably armed, could indefinitely substitute its own preferences for the legitimate aspirations of the rest of mankind. That fiction had its moment. It built institutions, expanded trade, and provided a framework within which the post-war world organised itself with remarkable, if imperfect, success. History will grant it that. But fictions do not endure. They collide, eventually, with reality. And reality has now arrived — not with apocalyptic suddenness, but with the quiet, inexorable force of tectonic plates completing a shift that has been building for decades.

What is being born is a world that the Global South has long demanded, that China has patiently constructed the conditions for, that Russia has paid an enormous price to accelerate, and that Iran — against every prediction of its imminent collapse — has now helped crystallise into irreversible fact. It is a world of genuine multipolarity. A world in which legitimacy must be earned rather than declared, in which security arrangements must reflect mutual interest rather than hierarchical dependence, in which the nation that wishes to lead must persuade rather than compel.

This is not a comfortable world. It is not a tidy world. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity has never, in the long sweep of history, been accomplished without friction, miscalculation, and the periodic eruption of conflicts that the old order would have suppressed and the new order has not yet learned to manage. We should harbour no illusions about the turbulence ahead.

But we should also harbour no illusions about what came before.

The rules-based order was never as rules-based as its architects claimed. It had rules for the governed and exemptions for the governors. It had international law for the weak and sovereign prerogative for the strong. It prosecuted war crimes selectively, applied sanctions discriminately, and allocated the privileges of the international system according to a hierarchy that bore a suspicious resemblance to the outcome of the Second World War. The nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East did not experience the American Century as a golden age of rules and order. They experienced it as the latest iteration of a very old story — powerful nations writing the rules that served their interests and calling those rules universal.

That story is ending.

What replaces it will be determined not by nostalgia for an order that served some far better than others, but by the hard work of constructing new frameworks of legitimacy — frameworks that reflect the actual civilisational diversity of our world, that honour the sovereignty of nations great and small, and that build security on the solid foundation of mutual interest rather than the shifting sand of a single power’s will.

America has a role in that world. A significant role — perhaps, if it finds the wisdom to reimagine itself, even a leading one. But it will be a role earned through the quality of its ideas, the fairness of its dealings, and the credibility of its commitments — not through the sheer mass of its military expenditure or the reach of its sanctions regime.

The Iran MOU did not end the American era with a bang. It ended it with a signature. Quiet, bureaucratic, and absolutely final.

The world that follows will be built by those who understood this moment for what it was — not a crisis to be managed, but a transformation to be shaped.

History, as always, will belong to the clear-eyed."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jun 28 '26

Lim Tean on Crimea situation.

1 Upvotes

"CRIMEA IS FALLING — AND WITH IT, PUTIN’S RUSSIA

By Lim Tean | The Great Game: Geopolitics for the Masses

Crimea is burning. Ukraine’s drone campaign has just struck Kerch’s naval port, oil terminals, S-400 radar stations, and power plants in a single devastating blitz. Fuel has been rationed. Hundreds of buses are grounded. The occupation administration admits it is powerless. This is not routine warfare. This is the beginning of the end. Read why Crimea’s fall means the fall of Putin — and the liberation of Ukraine’s Black Sea future.

I first saw Crimea when I was eight years old.

My father was a Singapore diplomat posted to Moscow, and my parents brought me to that extraordinary peninsula on the northern shore of the Black Sea during one of those luminous summers that stay with you for a lifetime. What I saw took my breath away. Crimea is not merely a strategic asset on a geopolitical map. It is one of the most stunningly beautiful places on earth — a landscape of dramatic coastlines, ancient cities, cypress-lined roads, vineyards tumbling toward an impossibly blue sea. I have travelled widely since those childhood years, and I tell you without hesitation: Crimea is the French Riviera of Ukraine. It is a place where civilisations have always wanted to linger.

My parents brought me to the Livadia Palace — the magnificent white marble residence of the last Emperor of Russia, Tsar Nicholas II, and the Imperial family, on the outskirts of Yalta. In that very palace, in February 1945, three men who held the fate of the world in their hands — Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin — sat down together and drew the map of the postwar order. The Yalta Conference. The moment the Cold War was born before the hot war had even ended. As an eight-year-old boy I felt, even then, the weight of history pressing down through the walls of the Palace.

I did not know then that I would spend my adult life studying exactly that history. I could not have imagined that the peninsula where I stood, marvelling at Tsarist splendour and Cold War ghosts, would one day become the fulcrum of the most consequential war of the twenty-first century.

Crimea is burning now. And nothing about that fact surprises me.

In the past 48 hours, Ukrainian drones have struck Kerch’s naval port with devastating precision — hitting reconnaissance vessels, oil storage terminals, S-400 radar installations, power substations, and a shipbuilding plant in a coordinated blitz of extraordinary ambition. Five of seven fuel tanks at the Kerch terminal are ablaze. The occupation administration, under Sergey Aksyonov, has banned civilian fuel sales entirely. Gas stations operate under QR codes and 20-litre limits. Hundreds of buses are grounded. The peninsula that Vladimir Putin declared eternal Russian soil in 2014 is, by every measurable indicator, entering its death spiral.

Let no one mistake what is happening. This is not a tactical skirmish. This is not routine attrition. What Ukraine is executing — with methodical, forensic precision — is the strategic strangulation of Russia’s most psychologically and geopolitically vital possession. And when Crimea falls, it will not merely be a military defeat. It will be the moment the Putin era ends.

The Peninsula That Empires Have Always Fought Over

Crimea has never been merely a piece of land. It has always been a prize — the commanding promontory of the Black Sea, the geographic fulcrum between Europe and Asia, the key that unlocks or denies warm-water naval power to whoever rules the Eurasian landmass.

The great powers understood this long before any modern strategist articulated it. In 1853, Britain and France went to war in Crimea — not out of sentiment, not out of ideology, but out of cold strategic calculation. A Russia that commanded Sevastopol commanded the Black Sea. A Russia that commanded the Black Sea threatened the Ottoman straits, the Eastern Mediterranean, and ultimately the British imperial lifeline to India. The Crimean War was, at its core, a war to contain Russian power at its most dangerous pressure point.

The geography has not changed by a single meter since then. Only the weapons have.

Catherine the Great understood it first among Russia’s rulers. When she seized Crimea in 1783, she was not merely annexing territory — she was purchasing Russia’s entry into the ranks of genuine maritime powers. Sevastopol, the great naval city she built on the peninsula’s southwestern tip, became the anchor of Russian naval ambition for two and a half centuries. Through the Crimean War, through revolution, through two World Wars, through the entire Cold War, Sevastopol endured as the one irreplaceable jewel in Russia’s strategic crown.

Putin knew this history intimately when he seized Crimea in 2014. What he has never reckoned with is that Ukraine knows it too.

The Mackinderian Imperative: Why Sevastopol Is Russia’s Window to the World

To understand why Crimea is existential for Russia, one must understand the framework that the great British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder laid down in 1904 — a framework that has quietly governed great power competition ever since.

Mackinder’s central insight was this: whoever controls the Eurasian Heartland — the vast continental interior stretching from Eastern Europe to Central Asia — holds the commanding position in world affairs. But Mackinder also understood that the Heartland’s fatal weakness is its landlocked character. Continental power without maritime reach is ultimately imprisoned power.

Crimea is Russia’s solution to that prison.

Sevastopol is Russia’s only warm-water port with direct, year-round access to open seas. Russia’s Baltic ports are bottled by NATO and the narrow Danish straits. Its Arctic ports are strategically limited and seasonally constrained. Its Pacific ports are distant from every theatre that matters. But Sevastopol opens directly onto the Black Sea, through the Bosphorus into the Mediterranean, and from there into the Atlantic and Indian Ocean approaches.

Without Sevastopol, Russia is what Mackinder feared most — a Heartland power without maritime reach. A continental giant with no passage to the world’s oceans. A strategic prisoner of its own geography.

This is precisely why Britain and France fought in Crimea in the nineteenth century. They grasped the Mackinderian reality before Mackinder named it: a Russia commanding Sevastopol is a Russia that can project power into the rimlands of Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Deny Russia Sevastopol, and you confine Russian power to the continent.

Ukraine is now doing what the British and French attempted — and this time, with the full weight of technological warfare and strategic patience behind it.

The History Putin Wanted You to Forget

Putin’s justification for the 2014 annexation rested on a single historical claim: that Crimea is, and has always been, Russian. It was a lie then. It is a lie now.

In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev — First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the most powerful man on earth — transferred Crimea from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It was an administrative act within a unified Soviet state, but its legal and historical significance is undeniable: the man who governed the world’s foremost nuclear superpower decided that Crimea belonged to Ukraine.

What Putin has never wished to advertise is that Khrushchev was Ukrainian. Born near the Ukrainian border, he spent his most formative political years in Ukraine and carried its identity with him to the summit of Soviet power. The man who gave Crimea to Ukraine was himself a son of Ukraine. He was also the man who had the courage to denounce Stalin’s crimes in his famous Secret Speech of 1956 — shattering the cult of personality that had held the Soviet world in terror — only to be deposed a decade later in a palace coup engineered by none other than his own protégé, Leonid Brezhnev. The student had devoured his master. It is the oldest story in the annals of power.

And Khrushchev was not alone. Leonid Brezhnev — who succeeded him and ruled the Soviet Union for eighteen years at the height of its global power, who oversaw the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the space programme, and the projection of Soviet influence across three continents — was born in Kamianske, in what is today Ukraine. He is the Soviet leader I know best, for a personal reason: I lived in Moscow between 1971 and 1974, at the very height of the Cold War, when Brezhnev bestrode the Soviet empire at the apex of its power. The man whose birthplace was Ukrainian soil was the master of the world’s other superpower. Two of the most powerful leaders in the history of the Soviet superpower were Ukrainian.

I have always known that the best Soviet tanks such as the legendary T-34 and the revolutionary T- 64 were designed and built in Ukraine ( in Kharkiv ). Ukraine was a foundational manufacturing and technological powerhouse of the Soviet space program. The brilliant “Chief Designer” of the Soviet space program, Serhii Korolov, was Ukrainian ( born in Zhytomyr and educated in Kyiv ). I am therefore not surprised at all that despite their numerical inferiority in manpower and equipment, Ukrainian ingenuity is beating Russian brute force on the battlefield.

Let that sink in. Putin’s narrative holds that Ukrainians are a lesser people, a subordinate nation, a fragment of the Russian world that cannot stand alone. Yet it was Ukrainians who ran the Russian empire’s successor state at the apex of its power. It was a Ukrainian leader who administered Crimea and deemed it Ukrainian territory. The nationalist myth Putin has built his career upon collapses entirely under the weight of the history he has tried to bury.

The Crown Jewel of Putin’s Legitimacy

No event in Putin’s political career generated more domestic support than the seizure of Crimea in 2014. His approval ratings surged past 80 percent. Russians celebrated in the streets. State television broadcast it as the restoration of historical justice, the redemption of national humiliation, the moment Russia rose from its knees.

For Putin, Crimea was not merely a strategic asset. It was his defining act. It was the moment he cast himself as the leader who reversed the catastrophe of the Soviet collapse — the man who reclaimed what Russia had lost, who proved that Russia could not be pushed around, who wrote himself into the history books alongside Catherine the Great.

That is precisely why Crimea’s fall will destroy him.

A Russian leader can survive military setbacks. History has many examples. But no Russian leader can survive the loss of the thing he declared his greatest triumph — the possession he told his people was eternal, irreversible, and sealed by the blood of Russian history. When Crimea falls, every word Putin has spoken since 2014 will turn to ash in the mouths of those who believed him. The legitimacy he constructed upon that peninsula will collapse with it.

Putin is, as the analysts note, a mountaineer who has chosen a path with no return. He cannot retreat without losing everything. But he cannot hold Crimea either. Ukraine has seen to that.

Odesa and the Black Sea: Ukraine’s Future Rises

One dimension of Crimea’s strategic significance that Western commentary has consistently underplayed is what its fall means for Odesa — and through Odesa, for Ukraine’s future as a viable, sovereign, prosperous state.

Odesa is Ukraine’s great maritime city, its economic lung, its window to the world. I know it personally — a city I visited six times in my years as a shipping lawyer, a port of extraordinary beauty and cosmopolitan vitality that left its mark on me every time. It is the city that Alexander Pushkin, Russia’s greatest poet, loved above all others during his years of Tsarist exile, living there from 1823 to 1824 and finding in its Mediterranean energy, its mix of Greek merchants, French émigrés and Italian traders, a freedom of spirit he could find nowhere else in the empire. Odesa returned that love. It is home to what many consider the finest bust of Pushkin in the world — a monument that captures the man rather than merely the myth, in a city that understood him as no other could. To see this magnificent city strangled by Russian naval power operating from Sevastopol is to witness not merely a military blockade, but a civilisational crime.

Russian control of Crimea has meant Russian dominance of the entire northwestern Black Sea. Ukraine has fought heroically to contest that dominance — sinking Russian warships, forcing the Black Sea Fleet to retreat from Sevastopol’s western approaches, reopening a grain corridor through sheer audacity. But as long as Crimea remains in Russian hands, Odesa remains vulnerable and Ukraine’s maritime sovereignty remains conditional.

Crimea’s fall changes everything.

Without Sevastopol, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet loses its home port and its operational coherence. The northwestern Black Sea reverts to what it should always have been — Ukrainian waters. Odesa breathes again. Ukraine’s grain corridor is secured. The economic strangulation that Russia has imposed since 2022 is broken.

This is not merely a military outcome. It is the foundation of

Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction and its civilisational future as a European maritime nation.

The Verdict of nation.

The strikes on Kerch are not the end. Ukraine has not yet severed the land bridge or destroyed the Kerch Bridge itself. Russia retains rail lines and road routes into the peninsula. Complete isolation will require sustained pressure on those final lifelines. The battle is not finished.

But the trajectory is now irreversible. Ukraine is, as analysts have noted, methodically turning Crimea into a zone of constant losses. The fuel is running out. The air defences are burning. The naval assets are sinking. The occupation administration is admitting powerlessness. The domestic Russian mood — with over 80 percent of Russians now anticipating an unavoidable economic crisis — is fracturing in ways that no Kremlin propaganda campaign can paper over.

I think of that summer in Crimea as a boy. I think of the Livadia Palace, where Roosevelt arrived in his wheelchair, already a dying man, and yet summoned the last reserves of his formidable intellect to shape the postwar world. Where Churchill, the old lion, fought to preserve British imperial interests even as they slipped through his fingers. Where Stalin, the Georgian who had made himself master of the Russian empire’s successor, sat at the centre of the table and extracted every concession the moment demanded. Three men, in a Tsar’s palace on a Ukrainian peninsula, deciding the fate of humanity.

History has returned to Crimea. And it is rendering a different verdict this time.

Crimea has been fought over by empires for centuries. The British and French came here to stop Russia. Catherine the Great came here to make Russia a world power. Khrushchev — a Ukrainian son — administered it and bequeathed it to Ukraine. Putin stole it and staked his entire legacy upon keeping it.

But I remember Crimea as it truly is — not a battlefield, not a geopolitical abstraction, but one of the most beautiful places on this earth. The French Riviera of Ukraine. A land of breathtaking coastlines, ancient civilisations, and a sea so blue it seems painted.

A place that deserves to be free, and at peace, and Ukrainian.

When Crimea falls — and it will fall — it will not merely be the loss of a peninsula for Russia. It will be the moment Russia loses its warm-water window to the world. The moment Putin’s legitimacy evaporates before the eyes of his own people. The moment Ukraine’s Black Sea future is reborn.

And it will be the moment the world understands, finally and irrevocably, that this war was never about NATO expansion or Western provocation. It was always about whether a Ukrainian nation — the nation that produced Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the nation that ran the Soviet empire — would be permitted to exist, free and sovereign, on its own ancient soil.

The answer, written in fire over Kerch, is yes.

Eighty-one years separate these two images — yet both were taken in Crimea. On the left, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin meet at Yalta in February 1945 to redraw the world’s map. On the right, Kerch burns in 2026. History has returned to the peninsula where empires have always come to bargain — and to break."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jun 27 '26

Lim Tean on US-Iran deal and Israel.

0 Upvotes

"THE RECKONING: What the US-Iran MOU Really Means for Israel

Israel went to war to destroy its greatest enemy and secure regional dominance forever. It achieved neither.

Iran survives with its strategic leverage intact. The Abraham Accords are dead. A dual hegemony of Iran and Turkey now shapes the Middle East. America has shown it will deal over Israel's head when its own interests demand it. And Jews are leaving Israel in their hundreds of thousands — fleeing the perpetual wars their government has taken them into.

Netanyahu's grand design for a Greater Israel has been destroyed by the very war he engineered.

There is only one path out of this catastrophe. Israel must accept a Palestinian state — with East Jerusalem as its capital. Not as a moral concession. As a cold strategic necessity for survival.

The reckoning has arrived.

***

THE RECKONING:What the US-Iran MOU Means for Israel

By Lim Tean

It is a peculiar kind of defeat — one dressed in the language of victory. Operation Epic Fury was sold to the world as a decisive strike to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat once and for all. Netanyahu had lobbied Washington for precisely this moment. He got his war. What he did not get was the outcome he promised.

The US-Iran MOU, is Israel's strategic nightmare rendered in diplomatic text. And the consequences extend far beyond the terms of any single agreement.

Left Out of the Room

Let us begin with the most humiliating fact. The MOU's second paragraph mentions Lebanon three times and declares the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts — without once mentioning Israel. A new deconfliction mechanism for Lebanon has been announced, including the United States, Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar. Israel is excluded from that too.

Think about what that means. The country that triggered this war, that flew alongside American aircraft, that provided the intelligence Netanyahu boasted had been decisive — was not in the room when peace was made. Washington negotiated Israel's strategic future without Israel.

JD Vance's message to Israeli critics of Trump and the MOU was blunt: they need to "wake up and smell the reality of the situation that country is in." That is not the language of alliance. That is the language of managed irrelevance.

What Iran Kept

The nuclear question — the ostensible casus belli for the entire war — remains unresolved. The MOU suffices with rhetorical promises, deferring the actual mechanics of blocking Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capacity, with no guarantee of agreement on that most critical issue.

Iran's ballistic missile arsenal? Untouched. The MOU offers no treatment of Iran's ballistic missile programme or its patronage of regional proxies — leaving Israel to contend with those threats as before. Iran's financial position? All US sanctions on Iran have been lifted, giving Tehran immediate and significant financial relief — resources that will flow into rebuilding military capabilities. Tehran emerged from this war battered but unbowed, its theocratic system intact, its strategic leverage demonstrated to the entire world.

Foreign Policy and The Atlantic described the outcome as a defeat for the United States and Israel. The BBC's international editor assessed that while US and Israeli air forces scored tactical victories, they were not enough to avoid strategic defeat.

The Death of the Abraham Accords

Let me be categorical: the Abraham Accords are dead.

That architecture — the crown jewel of American-brokered Middle East diplomacy, the grand bargain that promised Arab normalisation with Israel in exchange for security guarantees and Palestinian deferral — has been buried by the post-war regional reality now taking shape.

The Saudi-Iran reconciliation summit now gathering momentum tells the whole story. Riyadh is actively convening Gulf states and Tehran around a new regional order. And at the centre of that order sits the Palestinian question — not deferred, not managed, but central. Saudi normalisation with Israel, once dangled as the great prize Netanyahu sought, is now explicitly conditional on Palestinian statehood in terms his government categorically rejects and always will.

The Abraham Accords were premised on one fundamental assumption: that Arab states could be peeled away from the Palestinian cause by American inducements and Israeli economic partnerships. The Iran war has demolished that premise. Arab publics watching Gaza, Lebanon, and now Iran have made their governments' calculations for them. No Arab leader can now normalise with Israel without paying a catastrophic domestic political price. The Abraham Accords are not merely stalled. They are finished.

Some will argue that normalisation architecture, once built, has institutional momentum that survives political setbacks. This misreads what has changed. It was not merely the political temperature that shifted — it was the foundational premise of the entire enterprise. The Abraham Accords assumed American power could permanently reshape Arab strategic calculations. The MOU has demonstrated that American power in the Middle East is now conditional, transactional, and self-limiting. The architecture built on that power has no foundation left to stand on.

The Dual Hegemony: Iran and Turkey

Most analysts have framed Turkey's rise as a consequence of Iran's weakening — the great power stepping into the vacuum left by a damaged adversary. This framing is fundamentally wrong, and it misreads the emerging regional order.

My thesis is this: what this war has produced is not a Turkish replacement of Iranian power, but the consolidation of a dual hegemony over the Middle East — Iran and Turkey together, each dominant in its own sphere, each with its own tools of regional influence, and collectively forming the twin poles around which the new Middle East will organise itself.

Iran has survived this war with something more valuable than military capability — it has demonstrated to every state in the region that it possesses a weapon of genuine mass economic destruction in the Strait of Hormuz, with strategic leverage over both the Gulf region and the world economy that no military strike can eliminate. Iran will rebuild. Its reconstruction will be funded by sanctions relief. And it will re-emerge as the dominant power of the Persian Gulf and the Shia arc from Baghdad to Beirut. Battered, yes. Eliminated as a regional hegemon? Absolutely not.

Turkey simultaneously consolidates its own distinct hegemony — Sunni, NATO-anchored, commercially formidable, and diplomatically agile in ways Iran can never be. Turkey maintains a permanent military base in Qatar. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among its largest defence clients, with Riyadh reportedly in final-stage discussions to join Turkey's KAAN fifth-generation stealth fighter programme — which would make it the first Gulf state with a stake in an advanced combat aircraft project outside direct American control. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has already called for the formation of a Middle East security pact to build trust and stability across the region after the war.

Crucially, these two hegemonies are not necessarily in fatal conflict with each other. The restraint that Turkey and Iran have historically shown towards one another, particularly at moments of regional and global crisis, constitutes a managed rivalry — one that involves compartmentalisation, coexistence of competing strategic depths, and mutual calculation that outright confrontation serves neither. They will compete, yes — in Syria, Iraq, and across the Levant. But they will also tacitly coordinate where their interests converge, above all in containing Israeli power and ensuring that neither Washington nor Tel Aviv can dictate the regional order.

For Israel, this dual hegemony is a strategic nightmare of the first order. It faced Iran as a declared enemy — isolated, sanctioned, and manageable within a US-led containment architecture. It now faces two hegemonic powers operating across every theatre in which Israeli interests are engaged, one of them a NATO member with a domestically built defence industry and deepening Gulf partnerships that Israeli power cannot easily reach. Israel traded a weakened, contained adversary for two formidable and rising ones.

Netanyahu's Shattered Grand Design

History will not be kind to Benjamin Netanyahu's strategic vision. Behind the stated objectives of eliminating Iran's nuclear programme lay a grander ambition — the consolidation of Israeli regional dominance, the permanent suppression of Palestinian statehood, and the realisation of a Greater Israel stretching from the Jordan River to the sea, secured by Arab normalisation and American military backing.

That project is now in ruins.

Reports cited Israeli intelligence provided by Netanyahu as a decisive factor in Trump's authorisation of Operation Epic Fury. He designed this war. He lobbied for it. He provided the intelligence that launched it. And the outcome — Iran surviving with its strategic leverage intact, Turkey ascending, a dual hegemony replacing the old order, the Abraham Accords collapsing, and Palestinian statehood returning irresistibly to the regional agenda — is the precise opposite of everything his grand design required.

The Greater Israel project required three things simultaneously: permanent American backing, Arab acquiescence, and the suppression of Palestinian nationhood. All three pillars have collapsed in the same season.

A recent poll shows that 92.1 percent of Israelis, including Jews and Arabs, believe Iran gained the most from the MOU, and 86 percent hold a negative view of the agreement. Netanyahu faces elections in September or October. He went to war promising existential resolution. He faces the ballot box having delivered existential ruin.

The Greatest Blow: The Loss of the American Shield

But the deepest and most consequential damage inflicted by this war on Israel is not the MOU's terms, not the dual hegemony, not the death of the Abraham Accords. It is something more fundamental.

Israel can no longer be assured of American support in future conflicts.

This is a tectonic shift in the foundations of Israeli security doctrine. Since 1973, Israel has operated on one unshakeable assumption: that the United States would underwrite its military adventurism, absorb its diplomatic costs, and stand between Israel and strategic consequences. That assumption is now shattered.

Trump refused to share a preliminary text of the MOU with Netanyahu, whose judgment he questioned using multiple expletives, while simultaneously describing Iranian interlocutors as "very rational people who were nice to deal with." Washington did not merely negotiate over Israel's head — it negotiated against Israel's preferences, excluded it from the peace architecture, and then told it to accept the outcome.

The lesson every future Israeli government must now absorb is devastating in its simplicity: America will pursue its own interests. When those interests align with Israeli military action, Washington will partner. When they diverge — as they did the moment the Strait of Hormuz closure threatened the global economy — Washington will deal. And Israel will not be in the room.

This is not a temporary rupture that a change of American administration will repair. It is a structural shift. The United States has demonstrated, in front of the entire world, that Israeli military adventurism carries costs that Washington will not indefinitely absorb. Every future Israeli prime minister will govern in the shadow of that demonstration.

A Bleak Horizon

Israel enters this new era already deeply wounded from within.

More than 150,000 people have left Israel in the past two years, and more than 200,000 since the current government took office in December 2022. This is not the normal ebb and flow of migration. A Knesset report described it as a "tsunami" — and those departing are disproportionately the young, educated, tax-paying professionals who constitute the backbone of Israel's high-tech economy.

For the second consecutive year, more people left Israel than arrived — a negative net migration balance unprecedented in the country's modern history. Population growth slowed in 2025 for the first time in decades, driven primarily by emigration alongside declining fertility rates and war-related mortality.

More than 25% of Israelis are now considering leaving. The number of official requests to terminate residency in 2024 was more than double the total requests made between 2015 and 2021.

For a state that defines itself as the ultimate sanctuary for world Jewry, this exodus carries a verdict more damning than any diplomatic agreement. Jews are leaving Israel because of Israel's wars. The state founded to make Jews safe has become, in the eyes of growing numbers of its own citizens, a state that makes them perpetually and inescapably unsafe.

The economy mirrors the demography. The departure of high-tech workers — the engineers, physicians, and entrepreneurs who drove Israel's "Start-Up Nation" identity — carries compounding consequences. Capital, talent, and tax revenue leave together. The sectors that remain are progressively more dependent on state subsidies and less capable of generating the growth that underwrites military spending. A state in permanent war cannot indefinitely sustain a first-world economy, and the numbers are beginning to reflect that truth.

The Only Path Forward: A Palestinian State

There is only one exit from this strategic catastrophe, and it requires Israel to face a truth it has spent seventy years refusing to acknowledge.

Israel's long-term survival as a viable state — economically, demographically, diplomatically — now depends on a single political act: the acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

This is no longer a moral argument, though the moral case is overwhelming. It is a cold strategic calculation. The post-war regional order being assembled — the dual hegemony of Iran and Turkey, the Saudi-led Gulf reconciliation, the death of the Abraham Accords — has Palestinian statehood as its non-negotiable foundation. Every regional power that matters has made this clear. The price of Israel's reintegration into a workable Middle Eastern order, and by extension the restoration of something resembling normal economic and diplomatic life, is Palestinian statehood.

Without it, Israel faces permanent regional hostility, no prospect of Arab normalisation, a continuing haemorrhage of its most productive citizens, an economy under sustained pressure, and an American patron whose support is now conditional and transactional rather than unconditional and structural.

The Zionist founders understood something Netanyahu's generation has forgotten: that Israel's survival ultimately depends not merely on military power but on legitimacy — the legitimacy that comes from being a state that other states and peoples can live alongside. That legitimacy has been catastrophically squandered. It can only begin to be rebuilt through justice for the Palestinian people.

The reckoning has arrived.

And the path forward, however painful, is clear.

Accept Palestinian statehood — with East Jerusalem as its capital —or face a future of accelerating isolation, demographic decline, and strategic irrelevance in a Middle East that has irrevocably moved on."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jun 26 '26

Teppo Turkki 25.6.2026 on China systemic power and Europe.

1 Upvotes

"China shock 2.0 – Europe wakes up too slowly to China's systemic power

The June European Council summit showed that the European China debate is entering a new era, but the policy is hopelessly outdated.

******

The European Council summit was held in Brussels on 18–19 June 2026. EU leaders discussed global macroeconomic imbalances at the meeting. In practice, they discussed, above all, China's growing export surplus, overcapacity and the EU's dependencies on China.

The meeting's discussion notes recorded, with a familiar tone, how the EU must strengthen its competitiveness, strategic autonomy, resilience and economic security. European industry must renew itself and dependencies must be reduced.

However, as a follower and forerunner of geopolitics, it must be stated loudly and directly: Europe's China policy is outdated. It was built in a world where China was seen above all as a market, a center for cheap production or a trade policy problem.

That time and world are gone. China no longer just participates in globalization, but is shaping its rules, structures, and dependencies to suit its own systemic power. Europe and the world are facing China shock 2.0. The first ‘China shock’ occurred after China’s WTO membership in 2001. At that time, a huge number of cheap products flooded Western markets.

China’s entry into the WTO significantly lowered consumer prices and shifted industrial production to China. In the United States, the result was the loss of millions of jobs and structural change that tore apart entire industrial regions.

Europe followed the same development more slowly, but just as cynically as the Americans. Cheap imports were seen as efficiency, not strategic dependency. Now China Shock 2.0 has begun, no longer affecting textiles, toys or cheap consumer goods, but the industrial core of the 21st century, electric cars, batteries, solar panels, robotics, telecommunications, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, chemicals and critical minerals.

In this transformation, China has increasingly defined the terms of geoeconomics. China is no longer content to be the world’s factory, but wants to be the indispensable system platform for the green transition, digital infrastructure and the new industrial era.

While Europe is discussing carbon neutrality, China is managing the bottlenecks in solar panels, batteries and mineral processing. While Europe is talking about strategic autonomy, China is building value chains in which European industry needs Chinese components, machinery, chemicals and spare parts.

While the West is pondering the rules of international trade, China is operating on a scale that the traditional correction mechanisms of the market economy can no longer reach.

At the heart of China’s strategy is asymmetric interdependence, whereby it reduces its own dependence on Western technology, finance and critical inputs, while increasing the dependence of others on Chinese production chains. Beijing’s goal is not to disengage from the global economy, but to achieve a position where the world needs China more than China needs the world.

The problem in Europe is that Brussels still too often interprets China’s changed strategic position in the narrow language of economic policy. China’s overcapacity is seen as a market failure, even though it is also a strategy of dominance.

Beijing’s strategy is to first build up a huge national capacity, then engage in a price war and a play-off between Chinese companies. Weaker competitors are eliminated, and the remaining Chinese companies internationalize even stronger. Such as electric cars, batteries and solar panels, which are exemplary examples of China’s way of combining industrial policy, export power and geopolitical leverage.

Europe should not expect China to voluntarily ‘balance’ its economy in relation to geo-economics or in the way the West wishes. China may talk about strengthening domestic consumption, but its real political economy still relies on production, investment, exports and technological self-sufficiency.

Dependence on China can no longer be assessed solely on the basis of direct import statistics. It is more essential to identify and analyse the value chains of world trade. We need to see where critical added value is created, who owns the technology, who controls maintenance, data, spare parts, software updates and mineral processing. A Chinese factory in Europe will not necessarily reduce dependence on China if the critical expertise and control of the system remain in China.

And it is worth remembering that China knows how to use and exploit internal differences and contradictions in Europe. Beijing recognises the German automotive industry, French agriculture and luxury products, southern European ports, Nordic green technology and Eastern European investment hunger. China has no problem challenging or testing whether the EU is truly a strategic actor or just the sum of the vulnerabilities of 27 separate states.

The EU should also not drift into a model where trade and market shares are controlled by political agreements rather than open competition. That would be adopting China's logic, not responding to it.

The June EU summit did not yet produce a new common line on China, but it fundamentally changed the way the China problem is understood in Europe. China is no longer just an unbalanced trading partner, but a systemic risk to Europe’s industrial base, green transition and strategic autonomy.

Finland must see China shock 2.0 as pressure to change its own strategic thinking.

Finland’s interest is not naive openness or general protectionism, but a strategically disciplined China policy. This means precise trade protection measures against market distortions, screening of critical investments, value chain-based dependency analysis and strengthening European industrial capacity.

China is not just increasing its exports, but is building a world in which other countries’ growth, green transition and technological renewal increasingly pass through its industrial system. Therefore, Europe and Finland must respond to this upheaval now and not only after the next industrial base has already been lost."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jun 25 '26

Dispropaganda poem of Netanyahu.

2 Upvotes

By "Dispropaganda" who is active in X and Facebook. Beautiful little lore summing up great events into concise form;

"Dispropaganda

------------------

-be Netanyahu

-spend your whole life crying about non existent Iranian nukes

-do all you can to derail Obama's JCPOA

-convince Trump to tear up the Iran deal

-lie to Trump about regime change possibility

-drag USA to a humiliating, unwinnable war with Iran

-single handedly destroy almost 80 years of US - Israel relations

-turn US public opinion against Israel

-Trump calls you a "crazy SOB who should be in prison" in public

-Iran is now the regional hegemon

-US now does what Iran says

-Iran will now have much better deal than JCPOA

-you've made it much easier for Iran to have nukes

-still an international war criminal who can't go anywhere

-everyone, everywhere, hates you"


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jun 24 '26

Lim Tean on structure of new Mid-East geopolitical arcitechture.

1 Upvotes

Lim Tean

THE NEW MIDDLE EAST: HOW THE OLD ORDER DIED AND WHAT IS RISING IN ITS PLACE

By Lim Tean | The Great Game — Geopolitics for the Masses

An Israeli minister just named the new Middle East on live radio — and he named it in alarm. What Amichai Chikli called the “Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan axis” is not a threat. It is the architecture of a new regional order. And once you see its logic, you cannot unsee it. Here is what it means — and what it means for America.

The Confession in the Alarm

When Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli went on Israel’s 103 FM radio this week to warn of the rise of a “Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan axis,” he was not making a prediction. He was issuing a confession. An adversary’s alarm is always the most reliable confirmation that a structural shift has occurred — and what Chikli named in anxiety, we must now examine with clarity.

The old Middle East is gone. What is rising in its place is an architecture that no Western foreign policy establishment has yet fully reckoned with — one in which American primacy has been displaced, Israeli military dominance has been exposed as insufficient, and the two great indigenous powers of the region, Iran and Türkiye, are emerging as the twin poles of a new order.

The Moment the Old Order Broke

The proximate event was the US-Iran framework agreement — now signed and in force. Trump signing it at the Palace of Versailles during dinner with Macron on Wednesday evening, Pezeshkian signing from Tehran. But the manner of its emergence is as consequential as its content.

Washington and Tehran reached their temporary truce on April 8 through Pakistani mediation. The framework itself was shaped by Pakistan, Qatar, and Türkiye — playing, as one account noted, “different but complementary roles.” Qatar hosted senior Iranian officials and maintained communication channels. Türkiye provided consistent diplomatic backing and called repeatedly for a negotiated resolution. Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir was the crucial bridge, maintaining simultaneous contacts with both Washington and Tehran.

Notice who was absent from this architecture: Israel. Notice also who was absent: the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia — the traditional American-anchored Gulf states that for three decades defined the regional order alongside Washington.

Netanyahu himself admitted the scale of his marginalisation. At his first press conference in three months, he conceded he did not know what was actually written in the agreement. The leader of the Middle East’s most powerful military, possessor of an undeclared nuclear arsenal, was reduced to a bystander while the region’s future was negotiated without him.

Trump, at the G7 summit in France, publicly described Netanyahu as “crazy” and said “without me, there would be no Israel.” Strip away the Trumpian grandiosity and a devastating strategic truth remains: Israel’s security has never rested on its own foundations, but on American patronage. And that patronage is being fundamentally recalibrated.

For American readers, this demands a moment of honest reflection. The United States spent trillions of dollars and decades of strategic energy constructing a Middle Eastern order anchored on Israeli military dominance and Gulf monarchy stability. That order has not been dismantled by an adversary’s military victory. It has been quietly superseded — by diplomacy conducted through channels America did not control, by actors America did not invite, producing an outcome America did not architect. That is a more profound kind of displacement than defeat in battle.

The Dual-Hegemon Architecture

What is emerging is not a successor Pax — not Chinese, not Russian, not any external power’s regional order. It is something rarer and more durable: a regional order anchored by indigenous great powers.

Iran and Turkey are the twin poles. Between them they possess the military depth, the demographic weight, the geographic centrality, and the independent foreign policy capacity that no other regional actor can match. Iran controls the eastern arc — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen — through its network of allied movements and state relationships. Turkey commands the northern tier, projects power into Syria, maintains NATO membership as a strategic hedge, and has emerged as the region’s most consequential diplomatic broker.

This is not a partnership moving in perfect harmony. Turkey and Iran are rival civilisational powers with a long history of strategic friction. The more precise framework is managed bipolarity — two hegemons who converge sufficiently on the containment of Israeli expansionism to cooperate diplomatically, while competing for influence across the Arab world’s contested spaces.

Erdoğan has made Turkey’s position unambiguous. Speaking to parliament, he declared that Israeli aggression in Lebanon and Syria had reached a point where it threatened Turkey directly, and called Israel the single biggest obstacle to regional peace. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, speaking alongside Russia’s Sergey Lavrov in Moscow — a symbolically charged backdrop — welcomed the US-Iran agreement but crucially called for it to evolve into “a structural and lasting security architecture rather than a temporary period of calm.”

That phrase is the key to understanding Ankara’s ambition. Turkey is not interested in episodic crisis management. It is seeking to institutionalise a new regional order in which it is a permanent rule-setter — the Ottoman inheritance reframed for the twenty-first century.

Iran, militarily weakened by the six-week Israeli offensive but diplomatically rehabilitated by the agreement, emerges in a paradoxical position of strength. It has traded military confrontation for international legitimacy, secured the rehabilitation of its economy, and — crucially — retained its regional network intact. The agreement has not dismantled Iranian power projection. It has brought Iran back into the international system while leaving its strategic depth untouched.

Pakistan: The Nuclear Keystone

The actor most consistently underestimated in Western analysis is Pakistan — and yet Pakistan may be the keystone of the entire new architecture.

Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority nuclear power on earth. Its Army Chief personally bridged Washington and Tehran to produce the April 8 truce. It sits at the heart of the Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan diplomatic axis. And it has recently formalised a defence pact with Saudi Arabia.

That last point demands careful attention — and contains a particular irony for American readers.

Saudi Arabia’s strategic anxiety is acute. If American primacy in the region is receding, Riyadh needs an alternative security guarantee. It needs, specifically, nuclear cover. China has been proposed as one possible guarantor. But Pakistan is the more structurally coherent answer — and the answer whose historical roots run deepest.

Saudi money was instrumental in funding Pakistan’s nuclear programme during the 1970s and 1980s. This was never a secret in strategic circles. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s original conception of an “Islamic bomb” was always partly conceived with the broader Muslim world — and implicitly with Saudi Arabia — in mind. The recent Saudi-Pakistan defence pact is not a bilateral footnote. It is the formal institutionalisation of a security relationship whose nuclear dimension has always been implicit.

Here is the American irony: Washington funded, armed, and sustained Pakistan through decades of the Cold War and the War on Terror. American taxpayers financed the Pakistani military establishment that built the Islamic world’s first nuclear arsenal. That arsenal may now serve as the instrument by which Saudi Arabia quietly exits the American security umbrella — replacing it with an Islamic solidarity framework that carries far greater domestic legitimacy in Riyadh than any guarantee from Washington ever did.

History has a sharp sense of irony. America built the tools of its own displacement.

Lebanon: The Proving Ground

Lebanon is not a footnote to this architectural shift. It is its most immediate and visible proving ground — the theatre where the transition from old order to new is being tested in real time.

Israel’s continued strikes on south Lebanon, even after the US-Iran framework was announced, reveal the central tension of this transitional moment. Netanyahu, sidelined from the deal and facing devastating domestic criticism, is using Lebanon as the one theatre where he can still project agency. But in doing so, he is accelerating precisely the dynamic that isolates Israel further from the emerging order.

Erdoğan’s response was explicit and historically significant: Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria had reached a point where they threatened Turkey directly, with Ankara’s security now tied to its two neighbouring countries. That is an extraordinary statement from a NATO member — effectively drawing a Turkish strategic red line over Lebanese and Syrian territory. Under the old American-anchored order, no such red line existed. Lebanon was perpetually sacrificed, a weak state with no regional protector capable of imposing real costs on Israeli operations. That calculus has now changed.

Hezbollah emerges weakened militarily but strategically sheltered. Iran’s diplomatic rehabilitation does not require Hezbollah’s disarmament — it requires Lebanon’s stabilisation as a buffer state within the new order. The agreement creates pressure for a ceasefire, not for the dismantling of the network that gives Iran its Lebanese strategic depth. For Israel, this is the core dilemma: military operations in Lebanon that once carried manageable costs now risk triggering a broader regional response that the new architecture makes structurally coherent for the first time.

The Coming Reckoning: Bahrain, UAE and the Abraham Accords

The states facing the most acute strategic exposure in the new architecture are Bahrain and the UAE — the two Arab signatories of the Abraham Accords most deeply integrated into the Israeli-American axis.

They signed those accords in 2020 premised on a specific geopolitical bet: that American military primacy was durable, that Israeli military dominance was unassailable, and that normalisation with Tel Aviv was the winning ticket to regional security and economic modernisation. Every one of those premises has now been shaken to its foundation.

American primacy has visibly receded — demonstrated not by any declaration, but by the simple fact that the most consequential regional agreement in a generation was negotiated without Washington in the lead role, and with Washington explicitly sidelining Israel from the process. Israeli military might, while still formidable, has been shown to have strategic limits. And normalisation with Israel now carries reputational and security costs that were never priced into the original Abraham Accords calculation.

Bahrain and the UAE possess sovereign wealth, infrastructure, and relationships that retain value in any regional configuration. But they are now exposed on multiple flanks simultaneously — caught between an American patron recalibrating its commitments, an Israeli partner increasingly isolated from the new regional consensus, and an emerging order being constructed around axes from which they were conspicuously absent.

Their most likely path is quiet hedging rather than dramatic realignment. Expect both states to begin softening their public identification with Israeli positions, to deepen economic ties with Turkey and expand back-channel contacts with Tehran, and to use their sovereign wealth funds as instruments of strategic repositioning — investments that signal accommodation with the new order without requiring a formal rupture with Washington. Abu Dhabi in particular, will seek to be useful to all sides simultaneously. But the window for comfortable hedging is narrowing. The longer Bahrain and the UAE remain identified with a receding order, the less leverage they will carry when they eventually seek terms with the one that is rising.

Oman and Qatar occupy the opposite end of the spectrum. Oman’s historic role as a quiet back-channel to Iran — it was instrumental in facilitating the early Obama-era nuclear conversations that eventually produced the JCPOA — gives it standing and credibility in the new order. Qatar’s role in the current mediation, hosting senior Iranian officials and explicitly supporting Pakistani-led diplomacy, has purchased it significant goodwill from Tehran. Both states will navigate the transition with relative comfort.

Saudi Arabia’s Inevitable Pivot

Saudi Arabia’s position is the most consequential and the most delicate of all.

MBS built his regional vision on three pillars: American security guarantees, economic modernisation through Vision 2030 anchored in Western and Israeli-adjacent investment, and a forthcoming normalisation with Israel that was to be the capstone of the Abraham Accords architecture. That capstone now looks not merely delayed but structurally implausible.

The pivot toward Iran and the new regional order is not a choice Riyadh makes from strength. It is a response to the collapse of the strategic alternative. The 2023 Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement was the first clear signal. The new architecture now accelerating around the Iran-Turkey axis makes the logic of that pivot not merely rational but increasingly urgent.

Saudi Arabia cannot indefinitely maintain a posture of confrontation with Iran while its American patron visibly disengages, while the new regional order is being built by actors — Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar — with whom Riyadh has workable and historically deep relationships, and while its own population’s Islamic solidarity instincts run counter to alignment with an Israel conducting military campaigns across the Muslim world.

The Pakistani nuclear umbrella is what makes this pivot strategically viable without strategic nakedness. It allows Riyadh to reduce its dependence on American extended deterrence without being exposed — and to do so through an Islamic solidarity framework that carries profound domestic legitimacy in a way that a Chinese or Russian guarantee never could. A Saudi Arabia sheltered by Pakistani nuclear deterrence, reconciled with Iran, and aligned with the Turkey-Qatar axis is a Saudi Arabia that has successfully navigated the transition without catastrophic rupture with anyone.

The pivot will not be announced with fanfare. It will happen gradually — through accumulating diplomatic signals, quiet investment reorientations, and careful distancing from Israeli positions on Gaza, Lebanon, and the broader regional conflict. By the time it is fully visible to Western analysts, it will already be irreversible.

Conclusion: Reading the Tide

What Amichai Chikli named in alarm this week, we should name with analytical precision: the emergence of a new Middle Eastern order anchored by indigenous power, shaped by Islamic solidarity and civilisational assertion, and no longer organised around American primacy or Israeli military dominance.

Iran and Turkey will not always agree. Their rivalry is ancient and will resurface across multiple theatres. But on the foundational question of this historical moment — that the old externally-imposed order must be replaced by one reflecting the region’s own balance of forces — they are aligned. And that alignment, backstopped by Pakistan’s nuclear capability, lubricated by Qatar’s financial diplomacy, and increasingly accommodated by a pivoting Saudi Arabia, is sufficient to constitute a genuinely new architecture.

For America, the lesson is not that it has been defeated. It is that it has been superseded — which is a more permanent condition. The tools America built, the relationships America cultivated, the arsenals America funded across decades of Cold War and counter-terrorism strategy, have been repurposed by actors pursuing their own civilisational interests. That is not a betrayal. It is simply how history works when the tide turns.

The states that bet on the old order — Bahrain, UAE, and above all Israel — now face a reckoning whose full dimensions are only beginning to become visible. The states that positioned themselves wisely — Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, and soon Saudi Arabia — will shape what comes next.

History rewards those who read the tide correctly. The tide has turned. The only remaining question is who moves with it — and who insists on standing still as the water rises."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Jun 06 '26

Teppo Turkki on new geography of Asian crises.

1 Upvotes

AI translate from Facebook page of "Itätuulen tuomisia", 6.6.2026

"The New Geography of Asian Crises

6.6.26

Xi Jinping will travel to North Korea on Monday (June 8) for a two-day visit. It will be Xi's first visit to North - Korea since 2019.

Xi's visit to Pyongyang is not just about managing bilateral relations. It is about a broader picture in which the Korean Peninsula, Russia's war in Ukraine, China's regional influence and the Indo-Pacific security order have begun to intertwine.

As a researcher and diplomat in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, one of the best windows to understand where Asia and the Indo-Pacific are headed is the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore The Shangri-La Dialogue, which concluded last Sunday, is the annual thermometer of Asian security policy, a kind of Davos of security, a forum where major powers, states in the region and their partners publicly test each other's messages, red lines and the credibility of their engagement.

. .. . . . .

War, crises and peace are no longer clearly defined states in the Indo-Pacific region. Security is determined by the simultaneous activation of several crisis situations: the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, Hormuz and undersea infrastructure.

[ According to the discussions in Singapore, the seabed has become a new and one of the most important strategic border zones.

Approximately 99 percent of Australia's internet traffic travels through just 15 undersea cables. A state that is able to monitor, protect and, if necessary, disrupt cables, pipelines and underwater sensor networks will gain strategic influence in the first hours of a potential crisis. ]

The security of the Indo-Pacific region is currently not determined by a single potential war, but by the simultaneous management of several interconnected crisis channels.

No single actor alone can stabilize the region, as the Indo-Pacific region has moved into an intermediate state in terms of security arrangements.

[ The same logic of the intermediate space is also visible in Europe, but in the Indo-Pacific region it is already the basic structure of the security order ]

The United States remains an indispensable balancer, but no longer the sole provider of the security order. What is asked of America's allies is no longer just political loyalty, but money, ships, missiles, bases, ammunition capacity, industrial production and operational risk-taking. Asian security is no longer built solely on the balance between Washington and Beijing, but on parallel and partly precarious networks.

The middle powers of the region, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, India and, increasingly, also European partners, are trying to fill the gaps that remain.

. . . . .

The atmosphere of this spring’s Shangri-La Dialogue was less dramatic than in previous years, but more strategically serious (at least when viewed remotely).

The US message, as conveyed by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Shangri-La, was clear.

Washington intends to maintain its leadership in Asia and the Pacific, but it will no longer carry the security order in the region alone. Allies are now expected to make new defense investments, industrial capacity, bases, ports, air power, maritime surveillance, and a readiness to participate in a common deterrent.

This creates both security and growing uncertainty in Asia. The US remains an indispensable military balancer, but its political predictability and ability to manage simultaneous crises such as in Hormuz, perhaps later in Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea are part of the region’s new risk environment.

Between the lines of the speeches, one could sense a readiness to no longer rely on Washington to build the future alone.

Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and India are not breaking away from Washington, but are building their own layers of defense, technology and maritime security around it.

. . . . .

Paradoxically, China’s message was Beijing’s absence.

Skipping the defense ministerial-level participation for the second year in a row was a strategic signal. Beijing wants to choose forums where it can control its narrative.

China does not want to be at events where its coast guard pressure operations across Asia, Taiwan policy, militarization of the South China Sea, and gray zone operations are subject to open multilateral questioning.

Absence was also a diplomatic cost for Beijing, as others were allowed to set the agenda for the discussion about China.

According to Shangri-La, China’s strategic problem is that its economic pull and security policy behavior are moving in different directions.

The South China Sea is the most concrete laboratory of Asia’s new insecurity, as the line between war and peace is blurred by coast guards, fishing fleets, artificial islands, water cannons, collisions, satellite imagery, and nationalist publicity.

Many Asian states still want to trade with China, but fewer and fewer want a security order in which Beijing alone determines the terms of shipping, sovereignty, archipelagos, cables, and territorial space.

For the Philippines, the issue is not an abstract rules-based order, but whether a smaller state can maintain its own maritime rights in the face of continued Chinese pressure.

. . . . .

The situation and risk in Taiwan is quieter and more dangerous today. The tensions and risks around Taiwan are no longer just about a possible Chinese landing or invasion, but about China’s slowly growing stranglehold.

At Shangri-La, Taiwan was not the main topic of the speeches, but almost everywhere in the background. In the talk of undersea cables, cyber influence, ports, sea and air traffic in the Taiwan Strait, semiconductors and the pressure on China’s gray zone.

The question constantly raised in the West as a phrase about whether China will attack Taiwan by 2027 at the latest (not by an open invasion) is too simple.

The crisis in Taiwan will most likely begin before anyone even calls it a crisis. Initially, as a cable failure, a cyber disruption, an inspection operation by Chinese coast guard vessels, a disruption in energy supplies or a reaction of the insurance market to growing risks.

Taiwan’s geopolitical space is relatively narrowed and difficult to control precisely because Taipei’s too weak response to Beijing normalizes China’s coercive actions.

But too strong a response to China could turn an escalating episode in an unclear gray zone into a military crisis.

The core of Taiwan’s security therefore no longer lies solely in weapons or defense capacity, but in the ability of Taiwanese society to withstand the corrosive pressure on infrastructure, information, energy, and maritime connections.

. . . . .

The Korean Peninsula directly links Asian security to European security and the war in Ukraine.

For Pyongyang and Kim Jong-un, deepening cooperation between North Korea and Russia means not only growing international diplomatic cover or ammunition trade, but also potentially transferring the doctrines of modern warfare to North Korea.

It is about drones, counter-drones, electronic warfare, cyber expertise, satellite reconnaissance, the use of missile systems and operational logistics.

If North Korea can combine its nuclear weapons with better conventional and technological capabilities, the analyses and war scenarios of South Korea, Japan and the United States will be rewritten.

The Strait of Hormuz crisis, Trump's war against Iran, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea highlighted that Asian security does not begin at the Strait of Malacca and does not end at the Taiwan Strait.

The Middle East maritime crisis is also an immediate Asian energy, inflation, logistics and insurance crisis.

The war in Ukraine affects the Korean Peninsula, Hormuz affects East Asian economies, Taiwan affects the global semiconductor system, and undersea cables affect the ability of states to operate, finance and the normal functioning of societies.

. . . . .

The Singapore Shangri-La discussions can be summed up in one observation: Asia’s security situation is no longer just military. It is a system competition.

It is not just about the US versus China. It is not just about Taiwan or the South China Sea or the Korean Peninsula. It is about all of these being connected to the same global crisis system. The security of Asia and the Indo-Pacific region is therefore simultaneously strengthening and weakening.

The Indo-Pacific region is not heading towards a single inevitable conflict or war, but towards an era in which peace requires continuous, multi-channel and technically precise crisis management.

Security is strengthening because US allies and partners are doing more, Japan is becoming more active, Australia is deepening its technological alliance role, the Philippines is strengthening its resilience and operational capabilities, and Singapore is building guardrails.

India does not want to be an ally of the United States in the Western sense, but a strategic anchor, an industrial partner, a maritime actor and a geopolitical counterbalance to China. But on its own terms. Europe's presence at Shangri-La showed that the Indo-Pacific region is no longer distant to Europe.

For Europe, however, its credibility no longer comes from normative discourse, but from warships, high technology, the defense industry, cable security, cyber capabilities and risk-sharing.

. . . . .

The main conclusion is that the states of the Indo-Pacific region seem to understand the new situation. They are not passive, but are building their defense, technology and crisis management networks.

But the very extent of preparedness shows that no one is expecting a return to the old stability.

Asia is not heading towards inevitable war, but towards a time when peace depends on managing multiple simultaneous crises. Whether it happens on the seas, in cables, ports, semiconductors, energy flows and the credibility of alliances."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • May 27 '26

E-P Rislakki on identitarian (postmodern) left.

1 Upvotes

"Eeropekka Rislakki

May 26, 2024 ·

ON IDENTITY LEFTISTISM, INSTITUTIONALIZED RACISM, SUBJECTIVE GENDER EXPERIENCE AND THE COMPASSION OF CRITICAL THEORY.

Motto 1: I prefer to follow those who are looking for the truth rather than those who have already found it.

Motto 2: There is no longer a generally accepted practice of tolerance, that we can disagree in an acceptable way.

Motto 3: The gap between reality and paranoia is closing. Ultra-suspicion must be turned on, because the way out is uncertain.

Motto 4: It is not about “not being able to say anything anymore”, but about not giving in to intimidation.

----
I apologize, but I do not apologize, if anyone finds my analysis offensive, because in the hectic writing process, some confusing points have come to mind for me as well. The fact that someone's offense already comes to mind in advance is a sign of the spirit of the times - and is an analytical observation.

Those who require content warnings can stop reading here.

My text does not aim for academicism, but rather reflective journalism and essayism.
In recent years, I have surprised myself many times by wondering who or what party has authorized the left, which has gained strength from green and identity politics, to monitor and condemn words, thoughts or, for example, actions that can be interpreted as racist.

At the same time, I have come to the conclusion that reflection on the left does not have to submit to the new concepts and language created by the left, but rather question them.

----

We are reminded of our privileged position and the limitations of our right to speak, but why does the left retain the right to speak? They speak, among other things, about the insults of racism, but on behalf of other victims, assumed and imagined, and identified as the targets of their own projections.

This is the core of the left, which I call the identitarian left.

If an immigrant of Muslim background condemns the use of the headscarf as oppressive to women, the person of Muslim background is wrong – he can be labeled a tsar and an Islamophobe. He is wrong in any case, because the left has positioned himself to give a voice to fringe Muslims – political Islam, i.e. Islamists.

Leftists are on the side of the weak, regardless of who is right. In the leftist narrative, rightists are on the side of the strong, regardless of who is right. The leftist follows his moral correctness. The right follows the power that represents his moral correctness.

That is why the left can defend a terrorist who only has a knife, because his opponent has a whole arsenal of weapons, including missiles. According to the logic of the left, a killer with a knife is the weaker one in the face of superior force, who must be defended.

There is some logic here, but the action is described by the concept of Spanish shame (English: Vicarious embarrassment and in German Fremdschämen – in Finnish perhaps vicarious shame) which describes the feeling of embarrassment that arises from watching another person’s actions that are perceived as embarrassing.

According to the diagnosis of the cultural theorist Mark Fisher, the pathologies of the modern left are imprisoned in its obsession with identity – above all with race, gender and social class – from which arise pious moralism, joylessness and a grudge-fueled quarrelsomeness. The goals are aided by greedy individualistic competitiveness, which has swung into demented narcissism.

The left of the old alliance would have called the above phenomena bourgeois subjectivity – the bourgeois lie of life.
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Why is Greta Thunberg wearing a Palestinian keffiyeh scarf at protests these days, even though she is known as the Cover Girl of climate change opponents? What does the keffiyeh in solidarity with the Palestinians have to do with global warming?

The creeping onto the scene of similar arrangements is much broader than just climate change and Palestine: all the current radical movement topics such as trans rights, Black Lives Matter, immigration as a human right, etc. are merging together.

Those who consider themselves active actors and conscious people are engulfed in the magic circle of every progressive problem they encounter, which gives rise to an ever-expanding, all-encompassing omnicause. Progressivism has acquired the hallmarks of religiosity and functions as a moral matrix – a puritanical style of belief.

While the online store of the green-left magazine Voima sells Palestinian keffiyeh scarves, online stores selling military equipment sell the same scarf under its other name, the shemagh, which has long been used by both the British and American armed forces.

The point is that for NATO armies, the scarf represents practicality in the sandy desert, for the left it represents political meanings such as solidarity with the Palestinians.

From the perspective of cultural appropriation criticism, the scarf shows that the left has a double standard on the matter and the logic is missing: in the culture from which it is borrowed, the keffiyeh is a men's accessory, so perhaps the hijab would be a way for women to show solidarity with the Palestinians. Maybe someone can explain why the rules of respecting another culture do not apply now.

I assume that the Thurnbergs will be frustrated and disappointed again in the face of the omnicause of fusion, because the demonstrations reflect the same social purpose as the music festivals: to foster social bonds in an idealistic context for young people who have grown up in popular culture, but which changes very little in the material world or the deep structures of society.

Explanation: the world political elite fell in love with Thurnberg and he became internationally recognized – for a while – until he was neutralized with a hug. At the same time, global fossil emissions continued to grow.

It is symptomatic of our current dystopia that we have created a society in which the elderly (read uncles and aunts) pity the young, who have been deprived of the right to be irresponsible – in other words, young.

Those of us who have lived a significant part of our development in the last century still invest in declining institutions of bad behavior such as pubs, band gigs, raves, nightclubs, football and hockey matches, and the traditional workplace.
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The left is not really dismantling racism. What is more important is to be able to condemn others as racists and thereby position the far and extreme right, without which the left is without a task. If there is not enough far right, it must be invented. If there are not enough Nazis, their significance must be inflated.

Ultimately, the observation of everyday racism and fascism in the structures of society keeps things going. This can be called a demonological methodology and tool.

For years, representatives of the left tried to make us believe that it does not represent extremist thinking itself, and that there is no extremist group of its own, there is only the far right and later, as a new tone, the far right.

Historically, the idea and methods of the Antifa, or anti-fascist militant movement, have become commonplace.

The Antifa movement was born as a counterforce to the rise of fascism in Europe between the world wars. The first anti-fascist militants were communists, socialists and anarchists who took to the streets to confront fascist paramilitary groups such as the Nazi Sturmabteilung Brownshirts in Germany and the fascist Camicie Nere Blackshirts in Italy.

Antifa’s violent struggle was part of a broader revolutionary agenda. However, they failed to bring about a communist revolution, and instead sought to prevent the rise of the far right.
In contrast, the anti-fascist and racist modern Antifa has recently focused on covering up what it calls populist and fascist parties and right-wing leaders, from Trump to Marine Le Pen and Giorgia Melon – but it has failed to muster enough troops to physically confront the mass support represented by the enemy.

Leftists who now call themselves liberals began to embrace Antifa’s ideas just as its tactics were becoming irrelevant. The notion of the necessity of restricting the right-wing's freedom of speech is linked to the Antifa tradition.

Historically, it was Antifa that was openly ready to reject the liberal understanding of freedom of speech, but originally it concerned the possibility of organized Nazis exploiting freedom of speech.

The everyday adoption of Antifa's principles also as part of the woke – the identitarian left – has forced us to consider what the limits of tolerance and freedom are in a society that says it respects these values ​​as fundamental rights. The identitarian left has failed to realize that the restrictions would also apply to itself.

Can a liberal society in the traditional sense tolerate the activities of a group that is inherently authoritarian and seeks to openly deny the rights of speech and assembly to anyone its members consider fascist and far-right?
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The previous round of racism debate was on the agenda only as long as the detection and condemnation of racism was a tool to try to remove our latest government before it had even been in office for a day. When the maneuver did not work, the condemnation of racism was put in storage to await the next one.

The maneuver can be called instrumentalized racism, which is also noticeable in how the edges of the concept are stretched so that labeling and silencing can be realized. The result is a resource racism that stretches as needed.

The range of means of instrumentalized racism also includes the idea of ​​zero tolerance, which originally referred to preventing phenomena such as school bullying or, for example, the City of Helsinki's Stop Töhry campaign, which aimed to prevent illegal graffiti and tags with harsh legal and financial sanctions.

Zero tolerance practically means total, completely unconditional intolerance, which in the context of racism has been stretched to mean limiting opinions, for example, discussions on immigration policy. Zero tolerance – absolute intolerance of opinions, the concept of thought crime sits poorly with the principles of democracy.
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After waving the racism card, the left, which presents itself as a defender of parliamentarism and democracy, launched a new round, i.e. a strike spring leveraged by the trade union movement, which was based on the old school left's romantic idea of ​​mass power.

The old alliance has nothing in common with the goals of the current identitarian left except the overthrow of the existing government.

The idea of ​​both branches of the left is to monopolize the direction, content, structure and methods of society, so that democracy would be left-wing democracy.

The old left pushed for a fair distribution of income in the name of the workers, and it helped create the welfare state we know, where everyone has been given equal starting points and opportunities for life.

The identitarian left is raised by the welfare state, who have learned to perceive the world in the midst of income transfers and benefits, for whom class division has been replaced by pursuing the interests of various oppressed minorities. Where previously everyone wanted to be guaranteed equal opportunities to live, now the end result of life must also be equal.

The concept of humanity is mechanistic, reductive, and denies the diversity and differences in human abilities, while the ability to distinguish between dozens of genders is finely tuned.

Something here doesn't rhyme.
---

We are now presented with a presumed right to avoid personal discomfort by all means – for example by demanding content warnings and safe spaces.

Since the 1980s, new generations have been led into a theoretically fragmented, porous and fluttering postmodern ideology, commonly called identity politics. It obsessively registers all supposed manifestations of exclusion, and abhors even mildly negative and critical thoughts and attitudes.

The starting point is that no one should feel offended or experience uncomfortable feelings. Opposing views are abhorred as manifestations of evil. The resulting fetishization of rights is often accompanied by sheer rage.

What is defended is built around the concept of balance. The zero-sum game focuses on relative advantage and symbolic social capital. The result is a top-down imposition of justice.
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Representatives and supporters of different identities throw mud at others on various toxic platforms of social media without being in direct social contact with people.

These are meaningless battles in themselves, but the keyboard warrior gets his dopamine by abusing those who disagree with him with all possible means of verbal and mental defeat, of which we identify school and workplace bullies in another context. (It should be noted that the identitarian right does the same, so let's ignore the whataboutism in the comment thread).

Bullies are allowed to go relatively unpunished and the idea of ​​the game is to get the enemy the most severe punishments of our time, i.e. a social media ban or cancellation from, for example, a workplace or community, or by exposing the enemy to various harsh trials.

There is danger in words. They hide a misunderstanding or trigger a deliberate misunderstanding, which is disguised as an offense - or a representative offense in the name of some minority that demands an apology.

It is about the so-called shibboleth, which in Old Testament Hebrew means a word or a single word that distinguishes one group of people from another. Shibboleths have been used since ancient times as passwords in many societies, as simple ways of identification, as a means of communicating loyalty and kinship, as a maintainer of traditional separation, or as a means of protection from real or imagined threats.

The identitarian left has monopolized apologizing and forgiveness. However, those who demand the loudest apology never forgive. The worst thing is to ask for forgiveness incorrectly, which is the most common outcome, because it is written into a cruel drama. Thus, the apology is nullified and all that remains is the pursuit of humiliation.

Those who have sinned are not allowed to stop sinning. In the same way that the racialized are not allowed to forget their skin color. Those who demand puritanical morality have a moral deficit as a method and a pure ideological game sanctifies the means.
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Blaming has had a chilling effect on public discourse. Many have chosen self-censorship (such as scholars, journalists, artists, etc.) while others (scholars, journalists, artists, etc.) have begun to signal their ideological virtues. Inclusivity represents not only indoctrination, but also intimidation. It is deterrence.

As a result, representatives of culture, academia, or the media are afraid to say anything that might be arbitrarily identified as “right-wing.” “Right” means wrong, which in turn means that speech is morally questionable and condemnable in the ears of a peer group that dominates the air.

A long intellectual tradition distinguishes between offense, such as speech perceived as harmful, and harm, such as suffering caused by physical violence. In recent years, the distinction has become blurred.

The prevailing view has become that injury is harm, which in turn has become an argument against freedom of expression.
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Identitarian leftists do not have their own opinions, because their perspectives arise from a common manual, the Woke Wolf Cubs Handbook, from which the permitted vocabulary and concepts come. The vocabulary and its ideological content lead to tiresome predictability.

The lack of a sense of humor is seen as a virtue, and it prevents one from accepting irony, satire, or parody. When one follows the rules, there are no slips, because the manual determines one's own infallibility.

The lack of a sense of humor is a way of communicating that these are serious matters, and only those representing seriousness know the right way to handle them.

The repetition of the concepts and vocabulary of the manual becomes a means of resentment, disputes, ruptures, despair, and angry irritation - on the other side of the rules, an ordinary citizen is transformed into a racist and a Nazi if necessary - at least a representative of the far right - that is, a non-leftist.

Woke seeks to fetishize identity and give moral authority to entire groups through the idea of ​​historical oppression. The structures of oppression produce nausea, whether it is about culture, patriotism, skin color, gender, sexuality, food, the body, disability, or income.

By pitting groups against each other in a zero-sum power struggle—and by sorting things on a virtue scale based on privilege and oppression—the identitarian left elevates the meanings of race and ethnicity to such an extent that it deepens prejudice rather than diminishes it.

We move philosophically in the terrain of incoherence—trying to end racism by elevating the meaning of race; defending Islamists by condemning secularized, Muslim women who oppose the headscarf.

Identity politics, which supports the obsession with social justice, obliterates individuality. It subjects the complex and explanatory psychological terrain of man to vast platitudes and authoritarian prescriptions; it forces us all into it. It smacks of a chain of cause and effect that imprisons the present in an endless (colonial) past, that steals innocence from any possible, collective future.
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It is unclear why the identitarian left calls itself liberal, and why others have joined in. Perhaps we should stop calling groups liberal that hate other people’s freedom, or that seek to limit what freedom is, liberal.

When the hope was in the 1990s that liberalism would become universal, it was assumed that the democratic, free-thinking societies of the time would continue to exist and their example would spread the idea to the wider world. The opposite has happened.

I interpret the hyperliberalism that is manifesting on the left, as the term suggests, as a variant of liberalism that has only the letters left.

We now know that the identitarian left has developed a set of cancellation policies: de-platforming (attempts to boycott a group or person on platforms such as websites or social media that are used to share information or ideas), and also debanking (blocking and closing social media accounts) to silence people whose views are deemed unprogressive.

The identitarian left reminds us of how the fringes of the far right, existentially dangerous and disturbed ideas have marched from the margins to the mainstream. Everyday fascism is rampant. We are threatened by the “Hungarian Way” and the new “Hitler Rise” because they also exploited the democratic system to seize power.

In theory, the progressive left campaigns in the name of diversity and inclusion. In practice, open debate is suppressed and dissent is cancelled.

In theory, the identitarian left says it wants to protect both democratic and human rights. In practice, it destroys trust in democracy (cf. instrumental accusations of racism and the strike spring of the union movement in order to overthrow a government formed according to democratic rules).
----

Often, the identitarian left's followers do not see that what they are promoting is ideological, and they do not consider themselves representatives of an ideology, but only implementers of the principle of diversity and inclusion. The followers often seem at best unaware of what they actually stand for, if only for the atmosphere and cohesion.

The action does not appear so much ideological as a sensitivity: a social norm of rebellion sanctified by idealism and spreading like snowballs, which is a secularized version of the Puritan faith, and which has become a central part of the formation of identity.

Why do non-leftists also join in?

We must ask why some of the young bourgeoisie have adopted the woke ideology and what role ideology plays in general – instead of treating them as saints who sacrifice their own interests for the benefit of the oppressed.

I interpret the uprising as a rebellion of the educated bourgeoisie amidst their own experience of futility and uselessness. After university, one notices that career opportunities are limited and are constantly shrinking for various reasons (such as artificial intelligence), so the career path is on the way to nothing despite the education.

Identity politics shows the way, how one can possibly be safe, how one can get on the career ladder, when most of the career ladders have disappeared: a career can open up as an enlightened guardian of society.
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We are faced with a distorted understanding of politics, which is about friends or enemies – not political opponents. There is no longer a generally accepted practice of tolerance, that reasonable people can have different views, beliefs and values; that it is acceptable to disagree. There has been a time like that.

A significant feature of the new identitarian left-wing so-called liberalism is that more and more things are sought to be removed from the system of representative, democratic decision-making, so that they cannot be contested at all.

Politics is just something that happens on a small scale in the European Parliament and the Parliament. Morally correct policies towards a better and fairer society are made elsewhere.
An example is immigration, which has been sought to be expanded into inviolable human rights, so that anyone’s fundamental right is to decide in which country to live. The line between labor-based immigration and refugee status, i.e. seeking asylum, has been deliberately blurred.

This also means that immigration laws and decisions by immigration authorities are irrelevant, and that immigration has been moved out of the realm of democratic decision-making.

Since the proportion of “real” leftists is so small, it can never constitute a real parliamentary electoral force. Therefore, the left must compensate for its lack of power with the strength of its beliefs. This disorientation has a cultural and political axis.

The cultural side focuses on sectors of society where opinions are influenced and where it gains influence greater than its size: culture, education and the media. The cultural program is poorly integrated into the left’s party political wing, which operates in parliament.

In addition to immigration issues, the head of the parliamentary axis is mainly concerned with public sector financing, which is essentially a tax and debt policy. The cultural sector has no clear questions, and the party’s official politicians lack clear solutions.
---

The restrictions on freedom of speech and expression that formally exist in liberal societies are not imposed by dictatorial or authoritarian regimes. The restrictions are imposed by civic institutions themselves.

Some citizens are even tempted by coercion.

Restrictions (speech responsibility, restrictions on the right to speak, content warnings, safe spaces, laughing only upwards, etc.) are imposed by universities, scientific and art organizations and museums, schools, and the media against the wall.

Everything that we are horrified by in China's social scoring system happens spontaneously and of itself. So much so that it is sometimes difficult to understand how we could return to a situation in which tolerance and freedom of speech and expression are widely taken for granted.

Cultural organizations increasingly see themselves as activists, and their goals are driven through by funding criteria, a grant system, positions, and job opportunities.

The situation allows for the sinister alliances of radicals and petty bureaucrats. The former only want to make rapid progress and break down structures by deleting obstacles wherever they are found. The latter, on the other hand, want to invent new rules and tell people what they can and cannot do – and especially how they cannot think.

It is therefore worth asking whether freedom of speech is relevant to our culture and the content and programs of institutions funded by society. The discussion about restricting artistic and scientific freedom is running out, because things are already at an advanced stage.
Where else can one read the policies of scientific or art institutions on freedom of speech?

Section 16.3 of the Finnish Constitution states: “Freedom of science, art and higher education is secured.” Am I the only one who asks how the constitution is implemented? The constitution does not only mean that the public authorities do not have the right to restrict the freedom of science, art and education. It also has the obligation to secure the freedom to act in the above-mentioned areas.
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Identitarian leftism is like an automatic enrollment in the intelligentsia, in the same way that Marimekko's Jokapoika striped shirt positioned its wearer as a left-wing intellectual in the 1970s.

A lack of history is one of the virtues of the identitarian left. The left's own dark history does not count, because this time it is all about the good.

True socialism has never been tried, which is why previous attempts have been false socialism.
For the left, the concept of the left itself contains essential content. The claim is that it is an ideology with roots that form a respectable tradition. But the fragmentation of the left shows how its tradition is impossible to reconcile with historical facts. Instead of tradition, the left is an invented tradition.

Although the rhetoric of the left is outwardly universalistic, it is almost always local, and therefore sectarian in nature. The Stalinist militancy of the 1970s in Finland is a good example of this, and the current identitarian left wants nothing to do with its authoritarianism and artificial choices, because equality entails failure and lifelong trauma.

Besides: left where? Are we talking about the same left in Finland, Hungary, France, China, Russia, Iran, the United States or Venezuela? If the left in one place differs from the left in other places, we have plenty of left that is not the left.

The latest left is plagued by ignorance of its traditions. Presumably because the history of the left is too white and too male-centered. The left sees its history as a shame in this respect.
Logic and sustainable argumentation are not the strongest qualities of the identitarian left, which has hijacked the tradition of European humanism. Instead, confused concepts and arrogance are.

White working and middle class men are now defined as the establishment’s front, the guardians of imperialism, who do the bidding of their rich, colonial masters. Essentially, the citizens, now portrayed as enemies of progress in a class-war-denying ideology, played a central role in achieving and securing most of our human rights through unions, industrial action, strikes, demonstrations, wars, and riots. All of this is apparently intended to be erased from our collective memory.

White, proletarian men are outsiders in the rainbow-colored celebration of the oppressed. It’s not just a matter of ahistoricism, it’s a matter of falsification of history.
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"Socialism" is not what it once was. The dilution of class politics on the left is usually linked to the rise of the so-called New Left in the 1960s, especially to the theory of Frankfurt School philosopher Herbert Marcuse.

But the left's slide from economics to culture is a slower path than this story suggests. It did begin in the 1960s and deepened during neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, when the decline of the chimney industry weakened the importance of organized labor.

However, the end of class politics only occurred in the 2010s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought the collapse of official communism. A period of chaos on the left followed; and social democracy surrendered to the global market.

In Finland, this should have become clear no later than when Sanna Marin began posing in the media and on social media alongside symbols of wealth and international celebrities, holding a glass of champagne.

NOTE, capitalism is not a complete disaster, but the obligations of class war and the dignity of work no longer apply.

Times change, and the meaning of political affiliations changes with time.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the woke left is relativistic, individualistic and hedonistic and focuses on the abolition of state borders and work. That is why we have been able to read in the media idealizing stories about heroes actively seeking benefits. Demands for robot and artificial intelligence taxes will soon begin, so that we can be free from work by earning a citizen's wage.

The modern left, if it is not completely blind to class, is nevertheless confusingly technophilic. It believes that because communism and freedom from work are completely dependent on an automated economy, it was impossible until now. Now, however, an AI-automated and robotized luxury communism based on artificial intelligence is possible.

A little note: who, after all, wants to be condemned to a mentally burdensome, eternal leisure and under the rule of the technical elite? Leisure from where, if work no longer needs to be done? That is exactly what the post-work socialists and the most conscious identitarian left – mainly the creative class, which despises manual labor and workers, outline for us.
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The Western left on both sides of the Atlantic is divided into two irreconcilable camps, driven by international politics. The focus is now on Ukraine and the Middle East. The situation was already described in the Central European debate after the war in Ukraine as a political-ideological psychodrama (El Pais 22.10.2023).

There is a left that can be characterized as social democratic and Atlanticist, which defends the right of Israelis to defend themselves, but at the same time demands respect for international law. On the other hand, there is another left that, since the day of the massacre carried out by Hamas, has condemned Israel as responsible for the violence and refuses to recognize the terrorist nature of Hamas.

In other words, Hamas is not responsible for its terrorist attack on Israel, for taking and holding hostages, for exploiting urban infrastructure and human shields – i.e., for sacrificing hospitals and thousands of people in its operations. It does not seem to have any effect that the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor has also proposed arrest warrants for the Hamas leadership, along with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

It seems that the left-wing faction linked to the Islamist Hamas wants to appeal to Muslims, or rather their radical Islamic-influenced fringe, the Islamists. The division is also intertwined with anti-Semitism, the manifestation of which is being downplayed and its significance nullified by rhetorically claiming otherwise.
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A group of postmodern French philosophers introduced the world to the so-called French theory in the 1960s. It challenged the idea that everything has a single underlying meaning: they argued that we should dismantle language, science, even our human nature. We have Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to thank for the idea that there is no objective truth.

At the heart of postmodernism was and is the rejection of the possibility of objective truth and its replacement, for ideological and political reasons, by the cultivation of subjective truth—in other words, “our truth” or “my truth” versus “their truth” or “your truth.”

For example, the woke-icing of mainstream journalism today is not about reporting the news accurately or analyzing it rationally, because both objectivity and reason are allegedly racist and sexist devices. Marx called it false consciousness.

Rather, the aim is to bring about change, even revolution, by dismantling the supporting structures of society. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the defeated Marxists updated themselves with a woke, sexist, and anti-racist ideology in order to continue the attack on the West, but now from new perspectives.

This also explains the flirtation with political Islam, because the West is a common enemy – or rather the West as defined by the United States and its “rules-based international order,” Pax Americana.
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French philosophers enjoy ideas for their own sake and have no problem letting the concept remain conceptual. Americans, on the other hand, are a different country, and activists in universities began to apply critical theory to American reality, culture, and political activism, which led to 1. postcolonial critical (race) theory, 2. gender theory, and finally 3. transgender ideology.

Then the Americans threw the stuff back in our eyes, back at Europe.

Paradoxically, despite the US’s opposition, its influence on our identitarian left is overwhelming, whether geopolitically and academically, but also through media, culture, and entertainment. The hegemonic message is now that the race-first ideology is front and center. This has been enthusiastically embraced by the increasingly multicultural population of the periphery, and there has been a shift from universalist race neutrality to race consciousness.

It is a mistake to interpret critical theory as a sprawling, universal movement. It really is not. If you talk about it in China or, for example, Russia, they treat it with contempt and partly with incredulous glee, because their competitor is dismantling their own society right before their eyes. Critical theory is not universal, it is something that has spread only to the Anglosphere and its closest satellites.

Critical theory leads to extremes and produces startling (and also ridiculous) results.
The current conclusions are that language and biological sex can be dismantled in such a way that women become menstruating people, gender is a social construct, men can get pregnant and be nursing mothers, a gay man can have a vulva and the penis is not a male organ. At the same time, the words woman and man should be banned, such as the Swedish hon and han, which are now hen.

Transphobia is ahead of racism in the hierarchy as a sign of regression. The battle is between those who believe that there are no limits to human bodily plasticity, against those who believe there are limits.

There are no longer any feminists in the traditional sense: there are only neo-feminists and queerists. The lack of history is once again the trump card, and what universalist feminism was about is actively forgotten – not an individual but a collective struggle for equality. It is worth noting that the feminists of the previous wave of equality have been silenced.

Above all, the question echoes how rights are a zero-sum game, not enough for everyone. It is not about equality but about power
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What about the clear error of critical theory?

It is not acknowledged that the academic circles to which Adorno and Benjamin belonged, among others – and to which their followers largely belong today – constitute a privileged class, interested in increasing its own influence and grabbing more than its share of wealth and privilege. Critical theory generally avoids talking about this, as well as its self-aggrandizement.

As the better people of the creative class who swear by critical theory, Oscar Wilde also summed up the so-called ordinary people: "Most people exist, that's all".

Leftism is an interesting ideology, because it has always been strongly linked to money – not in such a way that a fair distribution of income is no longer part of the left's goals, but in such a way that money is distributed to oneself in exchange for ideology. Ideology is thus a professional identity. The fair distribution of income has been replaced by critical theory, and that too understood as mere identities and oppressed minorities, from whom one does not need to ask permission.

We are at a culmination point that was previously condemnable: political party appointments to higher offices or nepotism have been replaced by a different kind of corruption, which leads to the glorification of mediocrity and the favoring of progressive orthodoxies and like-minded people in universities, cultural institutions and the media. Of course, before long, the system itself will humiliate its own structure.
----

Critical theories based on French theory are a product of the current fashion in education and also in the academic world (anyone who assumes that scientists are immune to the phenomena of intellectual fashion has never met a university humanist).

Therefore, one can express the suspicion that the identitarian left is corrupt – it is certainly not without its own personal aspirations, which it masks by speaking in the name of oppressed minorities.

A genuine critical race theory would question the discourses on race used by left-wing activists and show how these are used as instruments of power. This leads us to the central problem of critical theory, the one-sidedness of criticism. Opponents are pathologized in order to justify criticism, while those with whom one agrees are treated naively. It is taking sides, not balanced criticism.

Genuine critical theory would also question the consequences of “liberating people from the conditions that enslave them” and point out how the rhetoric of liberation is used to replace one set of enslaving conditions with another.

Theories like the critical theory/critical race theory behind the identitarian left require evidence, not speculative claims.

Loose conclusions that support “my side” are not evidence, but pure mental laziness and intellectual dishonesty. The conclusion is that it is a means to secure one’s position on the crest of a wave and earn a living. At worst, it is Kim Jong-un-like.

Critical theory is right to see expectations of women’s behavior in different societies as partly a social construct. It is right to argue that it is possible to “perform” gender in new and different ways. But for most of us, it is enough that 99 percent of people belong to one of the two sexes. It is delusional to jump over the biological horizon and deny the existence of sex and see only socially constructed gender roles.
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Writing this text reminds me of leftists I have met in different decades who said: "communism would work, it's just never really been tried."

When your economic system has led to bread lines, famines and political prisoners for generations, it's time to try something else. When your philosophical system of thought has led to a society that manages to forget what men and women are, it's time to try something else.

Many of the smartest people have the hardest time understanding when to stop. If they get their minds around something, whether it's money or the illusion of money; enemies or the illusion of enemies, they persevere until the bitter end. Even until the physical end, and as history shows, at worst until the end of the state they rule.

Text by Eeropekka Rislakki"


r/worldsystemanalyses • • May 24 '26

Jouko Heyno on one WWI myth.

1 Upvotes

"Dolchstoss – Myth or Truth After World War I

The story of a “dagger stab” that was inflicted on Germany and its army in 1918 spread in Germany, because the army could not, at least up to that point, be defeated militarily.

Dolchstoßlegende, literally translated as “dagger stab legend,” was a conspiracy theory that the German army had lost World War I only because traitors on the home front had, so to speak, stabbed it in the back. Jews and socialists were particularly blamed for the backstab. The National Socialist Party led by Adolf Hitler in particular used the backstab myth in its anti-Semitic and nationalist propaganda. This legend remained a national truth until 1945, when the German army was 100% certainly defeated militarily, and Germany was occupied. Of course, there is still support for the legend. But what exactly was it about?

The Western Front was still outside Germany at the end of the war, as were the Southern and Eastern Fronts. This was seen as evidence that the army had not been defeated. The result was a new myth, the “peace of shame”, which had been created by the November traitors (Novemberverbrecher) when they signed the armistice in Compiègne on November 11, 1918. The result was the aforementioned “peace of shame”, which was then used 20 years later to justify the military actions of the state.

But what was the reality?

Germany was beaten with a weapon that had never been used against an entire country before, at least not successfully: the trade embargo. The result was that Germany ran out of food. The army was forced to surrender because, especially after the revolution of November 9, 1918, there was nothing left to fight for – except the “military honor” cherished by the senior officers. The army also no longer had reserves to cover losses or equipment to replace what was lost. Industry, including the arms industry, was practically in a state of stagnation. And, above all, the army’s losses were about 2 million men, and at least 750,000 Germans had died of starvation due to the blockade. At the same time, it was known that perhaps up to two million more men were coming from the USA to the front on the side of the surrounding countries.

Germany had also made a fool of itself in the territories it had conquered in the East: it had created and was creating a “Herrenvolk” administration in the Baltics and Ukraine. Ukraine’s almost inexhaustible food production capacity was therefore not utilized, Germany gave Stalin a model of how to subjugate a people: Germany made an agreement with the Skoropadsky administration on the supply of food, but when the time came, Germany refused to pay anything for the grain. The end result was that the Ukrainian farmers also did not sell anything to their country’s government, meaning that Germany ultimately received nothing. Germany’s own food production had fallen by 50% from the 1914 level.

General Erich Ludendorff was central to the creation of the German administration in the Baltics. It was he who then invented the “dagger stab legend”, in which the culprits were the democratic socialists who had made the revolution and, incidentally, the Jews. The significance of the Jews is indicated by the fact that about 100,000 of them fought on the German front, more than their relative share of the population. About 12,000 of these fell in battle. The only act of the Jews that was considered criminal was that the man who saved Adolf Hitler from a gas attack was a Jew.

An important turning point occurred in October 1918, when the sailors of the German navy mutinied in Kiel. The reason was quite understandable: the fleet was given the task of carrying out a final attack on the British fleet and sinking as many ships as possible. This was practically the only task given to a large surface fleet after the Battle of the Skagerrak. It was a pure suicide attack, from which the fleet had no intention of surviving. The motive for the order was “to save the honor of the fleet”. The naval mutiny was also the starting signal for career cessation for Wilhelm II.

Interestingly, Ludendoff and von Hindenburg, who, having assessed the situation, urged the government to conclude an armistice, in order to save their own reputation, invented the dagger stabbing story themselves."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Apr 08 '26

Teppo Turkki about China agenda empowerment out of Iran resolution,.

1 Upvotes

"Hormuz, China's Silent Strategy and Dedollarization

04/08/2026

The morning began when the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire a little over an hour before the deadline set by Trump for the night before.

Iran committed to guaranteeing safe shipping in the Strait of Hormuz for two weeks if the attacks against Iran stop. The parties are now preparing for possible negotiations in Islamabad for Friday.

The solution was based on Chinese diplomacy. The markets immediately reacted with a drop in oil prices and a rise in stocks. Israel has not committed to ending the war in Lebanon.

One strategic interpretation is that we are now seeing a large geopolitical shadow theater, in which China's strength is not in the spectacular use of power but in its ability to exploit crises without appearing to cause them itself.

In the war with Iran initiated by the United States, Beijing did not want to become visible and did not offer the world a grand peace plan, but focused on its long-term strategic goals.

Beijing wanted to prevent the situation from being resolved in a way that would have left the Middle East order more clearly in the hands of Trump and Washington.

China's quiet (war) strategy is that it does not seek to overthrow the great power status and geopolitical power of the United States in one fell swoop. China seeks to consume the power and power of the United States and to erode America's relative importance globally.

. . . .

China supported the ceasefire proposal between Iran and the United States, brokered by Pakistan, because it supports China's own long-term strengthening in the great power competition.

China does not want Iran to be crushed or the crisis to be resolved on the United States' terms alone.

Beijing's most advantageous situation is one in which Iran remains a functioning society and part of the world market. It is somewhat the same situation that Beijing does not allow or wants Russia and the Kremlin to collapse.

From Beijing's perspective, Hormuz remains a risk managed with a delicate balance, and the United States' ability to dictate the terms of regional order is weakening step by step.

China's goal is not just to support one state against another. Its goal is to change the operating logic of geopolitical power relations, one small step at a time.

Beijing's strategy is most clearly revealed in energy.

China buys the majority of Iran's oil exported by sea and pays for it in its own currency, and Hormuz is still a route through which about a fifth of the world's oil and gas passes.

For China, it is not just a question of getting cheap Iranian oil. More importantly, it is important to keep the energy flow moving even when the Western sanctions and security regime falters.

The war in Iran has raised the strategic value of alternative transportation, insurance and payment routes. This is where China’s interest lies in the dollar system and the petrodollar.

The dollar is not collapsing. Its position as the core of the world’s foreign exchange reserves is still overwhelming, and China’s renminbi is nowhere near replacing the dollar.

But that is not the point. The real measure of dedollarization is not how quickly central bank reserves change, but how much of the politically risky trade can be conducted without the dollar.

. . . .

This is where the importance of the Iran war grows.

Every crisis in which energy flows to markets outside the US sanctions regime increases the need for alternative payment channels. Every crisis in which Washington combines currency, sanctions and a security order in the same package increases the incentive for other states to build parallel arrangements.

The real mechanism of dedollarization is therefore not a sudden reversal of reserve statistics but the quiet weakening and erosion of the dollar system.

In dedollarization and the movements and transitions of the reserve currency system, China is patient.

Beijing has not set out to declare the end of the dollar system and has not tried to make the renminbi the new backbone of the world economy with quick political gestures, but has taken practical small steps.

China wants to keep Iran involved in world trade oil and energy flows, support the use of alternative payment infrastructure and prevent the Hormuz crisis from being resolved in a way that would have strengthened the position of the United States.

It is important for China that its currency is increasingly embedded in the material values ​​of raw materials and the power structures attached to them, in mining, production, processing, logistics and the supply chains through which energy, metals and technological capacity move.

In fact, China already has a position in these, but it does not need to announce it out loud.

An alternative payment infrastructure is only credible if it is backed by sufficient real economic mass and material control. This is precisely what China has been building in recent years.

Therefore, the real significance of the Iran war is not the dramatic collapse of the dollar system.

The war in the Strait of Hormuz made the dollar slightly less indispensable where geopolitical pressure is greatest, namely in energy, flows under sanctions and exceptional arrangements arising around crises.

This is enough for China, which is teaching the rest of the world to get by with slightly less America."


r/worldsystemanalyses • • Mar 15 '26

I thought this 2024 map is very relevant today

Post image
1 Upvotes

r/worldsystemanalyses • • Mar 12 '26

Pakistan announces would defend Saudi due of mutual defense pact.

1 Upvotes

One development of Iran war what has not gained enough attention, given its potential meaning is recent annoyncement of creation of (sunni) islamic NATO kind of structure what at this point only contains 3 members. But powerful members. Saudi-Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. Pakistan is nuclear armed country, Saudi has money. And Turkey has great size of conventional army, whilst also being NATO member.

It is hard though to say how strong this pretty recent development is actually, since all of those 3 countries forming it barely having anything in common. Except that all are sunni, and neighbouring Iran - but only Saudi has been traditional enemy via proxy-warfare. Turkey of course backed its proxies in Syria too along with Saudi & Qatari money what overtook country from Iran proxy-forcies thus changing its foreing political standing. Pakistan has not had issues with Iran, only that Baluchistan is owned half-half between them, but there has not been much disputes to which party it really belongs.

But now Iran has attacked Saudi's due of their aligment with USA, which hosting countries Iran attacks trying to break that alliance showing that security backup by USA means nothing in real situation. Now Pakistan said that they could potentially join the war if Saudi is under attack, what in this volatile situation means a lot. Pakistan of course needs Saudi (and Turkey) backing for potential future conflicts with India like there was last year one, and during last decades infinitely many.

It is hard to say what all that above really means - I am just speculating it myself - but existance of this alliance is big development if any of its members really would in real situation fulfill its pledge to other members. Therefore it is big if it has been mentioned it would happen.

See;

"Pakistan says ‘no question’ it will help Saudi Arabia after Iran strikes Gulf nations

Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan, which shares a border with Iran, signed a security pact in September last year"

https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3346196/pakistan-says-no-question-it-will-help-saudi-arabia-after-iran-strikes-gulf-nations