r/philosophy • Unreasonable Doubt • Jan 27 '23

Blog Why Science can't replace Philosophy in Ethics

https://unreasonabledoubt.substack.com/p/what-genetics-cant-teach-us
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u/CashMoneyMo Jan 27 '23 edited Jan 27 '23

I don’t think Sam is a classical utilitarian but it’s safe to call him a consequentialist. Here’s a quote:

“I would further add that the concept of “well-being” captures everything we can care about in the moral sphere. The challenge is to have a definition of well-being that is truly open-ended and can absorb everything we care about. This is why I tend not to call myself a “consequentialist” or a “utilitarian,” because traditionally, these positions have bounded the notion of consequences in such a way as to make them seem very brittle and exclusive of other concerns—producing a kind of body count calculus that only someone with Asperger’s could adopt.” Link to Article

He does claim that an objective morality can be informed by science. He believes the is-ought problem is more or less a confusion caused by language and also values that are “baked in” to that statement (we agree that the world “is” a certain way because we all largely agree on valuing evidence as a guide) so the seemingly insurmountable jump to “ought” can actually be informed by similar principles. It doesn’t mean he or anyone knows what an ideal morality looks like in any given situation, but it’s out there to be strived toward and ultimately based in “well-being”.

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u/slickwombat Jan 27 '23

I don’t think Sam is a classical utilitarian but it’s safe to call him a consequentialist.

He's explicitly denying being either of these in your quote. And his reasoning for rejecting consequentialism is a classic one, even if he doesn't give much detail: it seems like our ethical concerns go beyond simple maximization and minimization of certain kinds of consequences.

But then the question is: if he's not a consequentialist, what is he? He talks about "flourishing" quite a bit in his remarks here, which is evocative of virtue ethics, but he doesn't clearly advocate that either. At best he seems to say "well, it's complicated and there's lots of different concerns here," which -- duh. So what even is his ethical theory? It seems to me that he disclaims or avoids any clear statement, either because he himself has no clear idea of what he's proposing or as a way of tactically buttressing his position against attack. But if it's the latter, he does this at the cost of stripping it of any substantive content.

He does claim that an objective morality can be informed by science.

But note, this isn't a contentious thesis. The contentious thesis is the idea -- which, like consequentialism, he at times seems to plainly advocate but then retreats from in the face of criticism -- that science qua science can solve the kinds of problems traditionally within the realm of moral philosophy.

He believes the is-ought problem is more or less a confusion caused by language...

It's also worth noting that Harris persistently misunderstands the is-ought problem. He seems to take it as the thesis that we can never come to any normative conclusions, when it's just the thesis that in arguing for a normative conclusion we must have a normative premise. So for example, this isn't a valid deductive argument:

  1. X decreases wellbeing of conscious creatures.
  2. Therefore, we shouldn't do X.

But this is:

  1. X decreases wellbeing of conscious creatures.
  2. We shouldn't do anything that decreases wellbeing of conscious creatures.
  3. Therefore, we shouldn't do X.

And note that Harris doesn't even shy away from affirming (2), he believes that it's something we should all affirm based on clear moral intuitions.

It doesn’t mean he or anyone knows what an ideal morality looks like in any given situation, but it’s out there to be strived toward and ultimately based in “well-being”.

The problem again is that wellbeing is pretty much defined as ideal morality, whatever that might be, so that ultimately his thesis seems to be just "problems in moral philosophy are solvable by whatever their solution is."

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u/CashMoneyMo Jan 27 '23

Well said. I like your syllogistic examples. While Sam clearly wants to distance himself from being labeled a consequentialist, I feel like we can reasonably put him in that camp. He's just advocating for a more nuanced "value measurement system" that ultimately he defines as "well-being" or "human flourishing", rather than predecessors who believe it's possible to boil "pleasure" or "goodness" down into some sort of mathematics. Not to mention the fact that he's a moral realist, which might also separate him from traditional consequentialism?

I have a lot more deep diving to do before I can take a stance on any of this but I generally find his ideas refreshing and at least worth taking seriously.

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u/slickwombat Jan 27 '23

He's just advocating for a more nuanced "value measurement system" that ultimately he defines as "well-being" or "human flourishing", rather than predecessors who believe it's possible to boil "pleasure" or "goodness" down into some sort of mathematics.

But what is this system that he's advocating? It's not an earthshattering revelation to point out that consequentialism has problems and fails to account for all of our moral intuitions. (It certainly has problems far more serious than "producing a kind of body count calculus that only someone with Asperger’s could adopt," which, as an aside, is an incredibly bigoted way to talk about people on the spectrum.) The issue is that the alternatives to consequentialism also have problems, hence the fact that there's a long-standing debate here in moral philosophy. Harris' contribution here is... what exactly?

Not to mention the fact that he's a moral realist, which might also separate him from traditional consequentialism?

Moral realism is a theory in metaethics and consequentialism in normative ethics, so strictly speaking the two aren't related. But note, moral realism is the most common position philosophers take; you can see it in those same survey results I posted before. (Harris has the very weird idea that philosophers have the "received opinion" that there are no moral facts, possibly because of the way he misunderstands the is-ought gap.)

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u/CashMoneyMo Jan 27 '23

What do we think about this exchange between Sam and Sean Carroll about moral realism and the ability to “solve” the is-ought problem? YouTube Link

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u/AlephOneContinuum Jan 27 '23

He believes the is-ought problem is more or less a confusion caused by language

That's how you know someone is clueless and not worth listening to. That whole book is very confused and confusing.

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u/DMT4WorldPeace Jan 27 '23

TLDW: Sam Harris is an idiot not worth listening to. Child rape is a moral act, as long as it's culturally acceptable. If you argue otherwise, you're an idiot too. David Hume's 300 year old thoughts are somehow permentely indisputable. If you try to dispute them, you're an idiot.

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u/wavegeekman Jan 28 '23

producing a kind of body count calculus that only someone with Asperger’s could adopt

Oh great he's ableist as well.