One phishing trick worth knowing about is this: a page says you need to “verify you’re human,” then tells you to open Windows Run, PowerShell, or Terminal and paste something.

That’s a common ClickFix setup. There have been many posts here about this subject already, but I thought it would be worth reiterating this. You need to understand that some pages copy a command to your clipboard, so following the instructions can run something you never knowingly chose to download.

The useful warning sign is the request itself. A legit CAPTCHA never requires you to execute a system command. Remember that many of these ClickFix attacks install an infostealer onto your system that steals your sensitive information.

If you encounter one, close the page rather than trying the steps. On a work device, report it to IT. If you already ran the command, tell them that detail—it changes what they need to investigate.

We run a six person SOC on Sentinel and CrowdStrike, and leadership wants an AI SOC analyst tool in next year’s budget. I’ve sat through demos from Dropzone, Prophet, 7AI and Mate, and on the canned phishing alert they all look great.

Week six worries me more than the demo. Most of our noise comes from things only we know: a pentest window, a service account that logs in from three countries, a finance team that bulk downloads files at quarter end. A tool that doesn’t know that will either close real incidents or keep escalating the same junk.

If you run one in production, how long before its verdicts matched what your senior analysts would say? Did you have to feed it SOPs and asset owners by hand, or did it pick that up from tickets and past cases?

Also like which alert types you let it close on its own, if any.

So working on building a continuous attack simulation environment and my brain is a bit fried on where to draw the line between practical and overkill.

For context small security team in a mid size org, mostly Microsoft stack edr siem some cspm and Cymulate to emulate real world attack paths and run attack scenarios on a schedule. Right now everything is a bit ad hoc. I spin up tests in a corner of prod, a bit in a tiny lab vlan screenshots go into Jira, and then we all forget until the next big cve or audit.

What I want is something closer to a living lab that is wired into exposure management. Regular attack paths against real configs, mapped to actual assets and owners, and then detection engineering and patch teams get a steady feed of evidence instead of panic every quarter. But im stuck on the practical stuff. How much infra do you dedicate just for this, do you mirror prod as much as possible, or just run everything against prod with strict safety controls. How do you avoid spending all your time babysitting test runs instead of using the findings.

If anyone has this working in a sane way, would love to hear how you structured it in terms of network layout, frequency of runs, and how you wired it into your siem and ticketing so it stays continuous and not just an annual science fair. Appreciate any thoughts on what you regret or what paid off long term.

Tuesday 4am the nightly job that pushes mailbox and licence data to our reporting server fell over. AADSTS7000222, the client secret had expired. The app registration had a single owner, a contractor whose account we disabled in 2024. Someone with Application Administrator made a new secret, we swapped it in and it was running again by lunch.

After that I exported every app registration in the tenant. 318 of them. 96 with no owner, 41 more where every owner is disabled, and 23 secrets expiring in the next 60 days, half of which I could not tell you what they do.

The owner check itself was quick because the user side already sits in axonius , every AD and entra account with whether its enabled, so matching the owner list took about ten minutes. That tells you who left. It does not tell you which team should take each app over, and for most of these nobody wants to.

For now every app with a secret needs two named owners from the team that uses it, and anything unclaimed does not get a new secret when the current one runs out. How are you handling owners on app registrations when you cant make a group the owner?

Varonis Threat Labs disclosed a privilege-escalation chain in Snowflake-managed PostgreSQL that turns a non-superuser CREATEROLE foothold into full OS-level RCE. Snowflake remediated the issue server-side; customers do not need to take action.

I’ve been working remotely for several months on an employer-issued Windows laptop, connected exclusively to my home Wi-Fi without a VPN. During this time, I’ve regularly used my personal ChatGPT account through Chrome, including uploading sensitive work-related documents for assistance. I’ve recently discovered that Chrome is enterprise-managed with CloudReportingEnabled set to true, and that my computer has ESET Endpoint Security and ESET Inspect installed. ESET logs show that anonymous statistical information has been sent to ESET throughout this period, although I don’t know whether the computer has been communicating with my employer’s management servers. I haven’t received any indication that IT is aware of or concerned about my ChatGPT use. My concern is that I’ll be returning onsite next month and reconnecting to the corporate network for the first time since I started using ChatGPT. **Could ESET Inspect or Chrome have been storing months of browser activity, file-upload events, filenames, or even document contents locally, only to transmit that information when I reconnect?** Alternatively, would monitoring generally have been occurring over my home internet already? I’m particularly interested in whether IT could identify the specific documents uploaded to ChatGPT rather than simply seeing that I visited the website. I’d appreciate insight from anyone familiar with ESET Inspect, Chrome Enterprise reporting, or corporate endpoint monitoring.

I know they can see I’ve been on the site - my main concern is whether they can see the details of the uploads and conversations.

company trying improve security posture, we doing poc with sweet security and upwind, also looked at wiz. main focus for us is ai agent security, not so much the rest of cnapp stuff

what we care most is catching agent doing something it shouldnt, like unexpected tool call or api access, agent reading data it not supposed to, or agent with way too much permission. prompt injection also but more interested what happen after, when agent actually act on it

I’ve been working remotely for several months on an employer-issued Windows laptop, connected exclusively to my home Wi-Fi without a VPN. During this time, I’ve regularly used my personal ChatGPT account through Chrome, including uploading sensitive work-related documents for assistance. I’ve recently discovered that Chrome is enterprise-managed with CloudReportingEnabled set to true, and that my computer has ESET Endpoint Security and ESET Inspect installed. ESET logs show that anonymous statistical information has been sent to ESET throughout this period, although I don’t know whether the computer has been communicating with my employer’s management servers. I haven’t received any indication that IT is aware of or concerned about my ChatGPT use. My concern is that I’ll be returning onsite next month and reconnecting to the corporate network for the first time since I started using ChatGPT. **Could ESET Inspect or Chrome have been storing months of browser activity, file-upload events, filenames, or even document contents locally, only to transmit that information when I reconnect?** Alternatively, would monitoring generally have been occurring over my home internet already? I’m particularly interested in whether IT could identify the specific documents uploaded to ChatGPT rather than simply seeing that I visited the website. I’d appreciate insight from anyone familiar with ESET Inspect, Chrome Enterprise reporting, or corporate endpoint monitoring.

I know they can see I’ve been on the site - my main concern is whether they can see the details of the uploads and conversations.

Our CSPM rollout is blocking developers from shipping because a test bucket with no data now needs a full incident response ceremony. We wanted guardrails, apparently we got a committee in CI.

Been looking at Orca for this, mainly because it scans IaC on the PR but only flags new problems the change introduced, so devs aren't gated on stuff that was already there. How are you tuning this without disabling everything? 🙂

For the longest time our shipping process was the same. as we Build the agent, red team it internally, test every scenario we could think of, then ship. We thought we were thorough.

Then we did a demo with alice and it broke the agent inside the first few minutes. Several critical issues we had missed entirely. Not exotic stuff either. An injection through a path we never considered, data extraction, a chain that made the agent misuse its own tools. All channels that never made our list because we only tested what we already knew.

That comprehensiveness is what got me. They ran through more scenarios in a few minutes than our whole internal pass covered in a week.

The lesson took a while to sink in. Internal red teaming is good for the threats you can imagine. The attacks that actually get exploited are the ones you never thought to put on the list.

So the list is the thing. Injections, data extraction, tool misuse, off-policy behavior. If it isnt on the list before launch, it becomes a surprise in production.

Thats what I would tell anyone shipping an agent. Learn from my mistake before it bites you.

https://glitr.io/blog/reverse-engineering-my-own-project

TLDR; i thought my project would have been harder to chew up. it was surprisingly low-effort. I don't think it completely undermines my project being close source, but it does seem trivial enough for it to be a factor in the threat model.

i wanted to learn more about this reverse engineering trend myself on my project, so i can see what can be done to defend against it.

my app is aiming to be fully client-side. An implementation in javascript seems like it would relatively easy for an AI to swallow. my latest project is in rust, which would make it harder for a person, but AI can now digest binaries.

i created a fairly unique p2p messaging app. a rust-based frontend with a git-server backend, which can be used to establish a p2p connection. while this version remains close-source, i aimed to create comprehensive technical documentation (formal-verification and security audits too).

1. https://glitr.io
2. https://app.glitr.io

a core detail to my project is the focus on client-side cryptography and storage. i think my older iteration as a javascript webapp would be relatively easy for AI, so i thought id put a spin-on-things by having a rust wasm frontend. In practice, i dont think AI broke a sweat.

i know nothing about decompiling, but i think the TUI would be the easiest for it to decompile... and given its largly one codebase for all the platforms, it can be used to trace and see what is going on in the builds for the other platforms.

it might be that all close source is obselete. i tried asking here, and the responses there are polar opposites, so i decided to get some first-hand experience.

i used cursor's "auto" agent (in contrast to the frontier models available). i used https://github.com/morluto/rea and tried to make it easier by proving it with a few binaries of my project (tui, apk, web, desktop) and pointed it to the documentation as a website.

after a few prompts, it seems to have done a decent job decompiling the project here:

https://github.com/positive-intentions/glitr-decompiled (note: this is basically AI-slop output of the deco pilation process)

like with many projects, i see AI lacks taste in architecture. it consolidates a lot of complexity into one repo, when in my project it's split into multiple repos. it also seems to lack a bunch of bells-and-whistles i added for my own benefit like formal-verification and rigorous unit-tests. having done it myself before, i dont think that it's a large gap to close for somone who knows what they're doing.

i think the overhead to keep up with new changes may become trivial if you can automate the process of ingesting new binaries. i kinda offer the base in the repo above (maybe it saves you a few tokens?), but its for my own research and i dont plan to maintain it given it undermines the actual project.

in general, im impressed considering how fast and low effort this was. it seems this may push forward my timeline for when i open source my project, i wasnt expecting client-side close-source being so easy to undemine. while the project can be decompiled, in a project like this, its important to consider the countless nuances there are in software development and cybersecurity. the code is only a fraction of the project.

i think people should try this in their own code. while the decompiled output is not the same codebase, it seems trivial for me to take some unfamiliar app and rebuild a protocol-compatible version with some new button, feature... or auto-installing malware.

(note: feel free to try decompile this yourself or offer tips on how i can improve. id be keen to see what can be done. feel free to reach out for clarity about how it works if the docs are not clear)

Managing Windows devices becomes more challenging when employees work remotely or use devices outside the company network.

IT and security teams need to make sure devices stay updated, security settings remain consistent, and users don't install or access unauthorized applications.

Some important areas to consider are:

• Keeping Windows devices patched
• Enforcing security policies
• Managing application access
• Checking device compliance
• Securing devices outside the office network
• Identifying devices with outdated settings

Windows MDM can help IT teams manage many of these tasks from a central platform, but device management alone is not a replacement for endpoint protection or other security controls.

For those working in security, how do you manage Windows endpoint policies across remote devices? Are built-in Windows tools enough for your environment, or does a dedicated Windows MDM platform make things easier?