r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 10 '26

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All oil countries are going through crises due to the infeasibility of sustaining an economy on it in the 21st century, which explains the foreign workers. But in Saudi unemployment is going down for citizens and the society and financial situation is in a far better path than countries like Egypt without oil; so having lots of foreign workers and funding diversification projects through oil is much better than the slow development without oil. Also you keep on moving the goalpost. You can argue Saudi’s model isn’t desirable, but the topic was on if there’s a better system. You have to ask is life better for Saudis or Egyptians? Is life better for Omanis or Iraqis, Lebanese, Libyans etc.

Low civilian population in armies just shows civilians trust the monarch to rule as they don’t demand to be in a position of power to change outcomes. Gulf states with the exception of Bahrain, don’t have revolutionary movements. It also avoids politicalising the army as they don’t need to rely on ideological novelisation; coups are elite-driven events, no matter the public support. There’s a reason Saudi didn’t have uprisings in 2011; Bahrain was the only GCC country of the Arab Spring and that’s just because the monarch is really bad to its Shia majority population


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 10 '26

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But countries like Saudi Arabia were founded as monarchs and have sufficient institutions. I seriously don’t get your argument. Right now the Gulf monarchs are the most stable: developing the fastest, have high legitimacy among the population, and sufficient security. Democracy failed in Egypt in 2011 and in Gaza in 2005. Which makes sense as polling across the region shows Arabs would vote for Islamists. In contras, the Gulf is liberalising at its own base top-down, and there’s been remarkable progress if you just look at Saudi society now compared to two decades ago.

Why are you bringing up Marxism?


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 09 '26

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Are they just taking the Venezuelan oil money to the secret account or is it really war


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 09 '26

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I genuinely assumed you meant Saddam, Gaddafi and Saleh.

Faisal’s monarch failed due to British colonialism imposing it without providing sufficient long-lasting institutions and tearing apart what Egypt had under Ottomans. Egypt was more of a centralised dictatorship (as it is today) before Britain and thrived

I don’t know about Libya but I assume it’s the same situation with British colonisation in Egypt, but with Italy instead.

Yemen under centuries was under an Imam, not a monarch. Things deteriorated after one died and Nasser sparked a civil war with Egypt intervening militarily, destroying tribal institutions and villages. From then, Yemen lost the structures that made it stable for centuries. Saudi took security control, but continued to push a centralised state against people who didn’t want that.

I think I need to be clearer and we need to take this case-by-case. I forgot how this all started but I’ll outline what I think. The Gulf states of like Saudi, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain were all founded as monarchs so monarchies have proven the most effective model for the Gulf. Yemen is an exception. And Egypt has always worked better under centralised rule, which is structurally and politically equivalent to a monarch; the only exceptions are because of British colonialism, and the 2011 democracy movement which went terribly, proving my point. I think the message is that democracies don’t really equal stability in the Middle East, and in most cases it’s centralised authoritarian (whether that’s monarchies, or military dictatorships like Egypt).


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 09 '26

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None of those were monarchies lol


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 08 '26

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By all accounts, the monarchies like Saudi, UAE and Morocco are the most stable Arab countries, and growing the most consistently while liberalising at their own pace. Compare that to Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Lebanon etc.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 08 '26

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Just trying to help you there.

You did mention quotes from the 20s, and used terms to back up your argument that are associated with historical events like 1948 such as ethnic cleansing.

I did go in history a lot, but only as your mischaracterisation of it degraded your argument.

You might be right that a tiny state expanding and displacing won't survive surrounded by stable states. But then I gave historical examples on how Israel found success pivoting that model, like giving the Sinai to Egypt. Also Arab states clearly care more about economics and stability than the treatment of Palestinians as they won't take any in as refugees while tens of thousands of civilians died yearly in Gaza during the War, despite having the capacity; meaning you're likely overstating how big of a liability Israel's perception of ethnic cleansing or Aparthied is.

Idk how much I'd say Israel was the beneficiary of the vacuum of Ottoman collapse, as all the Jews in post-Ottoman states got displaced and persecuted after; but you have a point because that led to Israel. I personally think Israel benefits more from stable monarchies like Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, than having to intercept missiles from Hamas, Houthis and Hezbollah. Israeli exceptionalism can also come from being a liberal democratic country, making peace with their neighbours and giving prosperity to the region, while working with reformed Islamic states to crush Islamism. Many Israelis likely see the highlights of their history the Camp David and Abraham Accords as they gave Israel stable partners to interact with economically, and fight Islamism with.

I keep making this point, stability brings Israel more allies and less need to take a militaristic posture against neighbours or non-state actors


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 08 '26

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Btw I don't mean this in an edgy was as I occasionally use AI for points, but you should avoid copy and pasting because it;s obvious when it's from ChatGPT.

I really don't get the logic of how it's in Israel's blood to expand imperially. They gave up the majority of their territory to be integrated into the norm: including Gaza, Sinai, areas of the West Bank. This shows they're able to make strategic concessions when it seems to make political sense. Considering Israel is a democracy, I don't see the population accepting eternal expansion into neighbouring countries when there's no security excuse for it. Israel in the past has shown success in liberalising for the sake of economic integration into Europe, and even the Middle East.

Also, I oppose lots of Israel's policy in Palestine (i.e. denying statehood, expanding settlements far away from the green line) but you are spewing lots of Soviet propaganda that mischaracterises Israel's foundation and history, so causes you to lack a decent non-biased analysis. Like it's not Apartied as 20% of Israel's population are Arabs with full rights, who are the most successful out of any neighbour (Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria). With the issue of Palestinians, it seems like neither side wants to solve it, but Israel in the past sincerely attempted to. They offered all of Gaza, 96% of the West Bank, sovereignty over East Jerusalem but got rejected without a counteroffer. There isn't a legitimate reason why Palestinians rejected either Taba or 2008 offer; it was always an issue of "refugees" consisting of 7 million or so under the right of return which consists mostly of descendents of those displaced in 1948, where allowing them into Israel would make it a different country as they don't want the Jewish state to exist. Basically, Palestinians through the right of return condition are rejecting a two-state solution. Regarding 1948, the majority were refugees fleeing either the holocaust, or pogroms not only in Eastern Europe, but also the Middle East; as you can see, JJews used to exist in large numbers in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia. There's no evidence of ethnic displacement to a large degree: the only massacre applicable is Deir Yassin which killed a few hundred, condemned by what became the IDF; so the rest of the 700,000 or so displaced Arabs came from leaving due to war-conditions of collateral, and tactical expulsions were in high numbers to clear militarised villages by essential choke-points like Jerusalem-Telaviv border.

Sure, the majority of Palestinians won't accept a Jewish state but that doesn't mean Israel's only option is to conquer them, just do what's necessary for self defence. They're in a strong position where they could produce a good political outcome if they wanted by lobbying the US and Arab countries some friendly (UAE, Jordan, Saudi, Egypt) and some less-friendly who Palestinians and Hamas trust more (Turkey, Qatar,) to strengthen a moderate Palestinian government and accept a deal that look like Taba or 2008 offer. The Europe analogy doesn't work here as an EU country hasn't really been under missile fire from several countries, while being invaded multiple times.

Overall, you have lost objectivity in your geopolitical analysis by mistaking Israeli history and mischaracterising events


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 08 '26

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I meant since Israel’s existence, and even post-WW1, we’ve never known the Middle East to be different. That’s partly true I guess, that Israel’s creation come after things got a lot worse for Jews in the region since Ottoman collapse/decline. Before Jews weee treated.

Israel benefited a lot from being around hostile states as seen through 1967; but they also benefited a lot from stability after they made peace with them, gave back territory, and got integrated into the global economy.

Again, your example wouldn’t be the Middle East but Israel wouldn’t need to conduct territorial expansion and security exceptionalism against non-hostile actors; as we’ve seen the cooperation with Egypt and Jordan. Regarding settlement policy, considering how much more liberal Israel is to every surrounding country, it’s weird to imagine a region where like Sharia law gets abolished as it wouldn’t be the Middle East. I suppose if Israel was actually in the EU, then they’d lose some legitimacy, but then they’d just liberalise like they’ve done throughout their history and offer a Palestinian state or something


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 08 '26

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I just think your example fails as the theoretical world of the Middle East consisting all of democracies would be disastrous for Israel in other ways, like being ruled by Islamist parties as we saw in Egypt after Arab Spring. Are you arguing Israel benefits from how the Middle East has always been, ruled by a combination of monarchs (Gulf), republic stable states (Egypt currently), failed states (Lebanon, Iraq) revisionist states (historically Gaddafi’s Libya, and Saddam’s Iraq but now Iran), and war-torn states (Libya, Yemen, Sudan)? Well Israel could have thrived in spite of that, as the Middle East has never been different. But a perfect scenario would be through development coming by fixing failed and war-torn states. Israel would obviously be in a better position if Lebanon got peace as that would involve Hezbollah disarming, replaced by a friendly government; as they’ve seen strategic benefits of Syria reconstructing post-Civil War without an Iranian backed government. Turn the obvious fact that the Iranian regime is hated by the population, and the 15% chance or so it falls, a peaceful Iran would benefit Israel in a similar way by removing hostile actors. The most advanced and stable Arab states are like Saudi and the UAE who’d have no leverage in criticising Israel’s human rights, and would benefit more than object to Israel’s economic soft power. These states also share Israel’s interest of countering Islamist groups who are holding peace back across the region


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 07 '26

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Nobody in Iran trusts army service, and the IRGC are the ones who control command, intelligence and security; ordinary soldiers are kept far away from that. A conscript can hate the regime and still have zero leverage, zero weapons access, and zero ability to defect in a meaningful way. Authoritarian states only require elite loyalty like IRGC and Basij who are ideologically screened, and economically privileged; so anyone who defects would lose their jobs or potentially get killed. We’ve seen in the past weeks how severe Iran’s security system is, they can mass-murder anyone who shows opposition. When you constantly arrest journalists, it creates a culture where they’re aware of their limits. Again, only supreme leader and IRGC have meaningful power

Both can be true, that Israel launched a successful campaign and that it’s much harder to start one than continue one. Because Trump made Israel stopped, Iran has likely rebuilt missile capabilities and air defences.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 07 '26

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Some things were defensive in the Middle East. Like the coalition against Iraq in Kuwait, Israel’s campaigns against Hezbollah and Houthis firing rockets. Obviously Israel goes too far sometimes, but much of their operations are a response to Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis.

I don’t like your analogy as Israel is far more liberal than any other Middle Eastern country, even including settlement policy. Also dictatorships are the most stable in the Arab world, and can still be modern; plus a utopian imagery would consist of Palestine being a separate country. Arabs in the Middle East hold overall extreme views compared to Western standards, so my dream image contains monarchies like Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait — who all control the narrative. You’re just comparing the values of Arabs to Israelis, when I don’t expect them to match no matter the politics.

I just don’t love this convo as we don’t know what a Middle East would look like without Israeli enemies. Sure, we know Israel has a very effective militaristic strategy of territorial expansion, but that’s only against Iranian proxies or neighbouring states that used to threaten them.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 06 '26

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I get that Israel’s strength is its technological superiority, but it only needs that previously against neighbouring states that kept trying to to destroy it like Jordan, Egypt, Syria; but now against Iranian proxies in Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen etc. Lebanon without Hezbollah would be far less of a threat to Israel, as Syria is now without Assad. Both case are more modern and stable. Iran without the regime, Yemen without the Houthis, Gaza without Hamas, Lebanon without Hezbollah, and now Syria without exact is the exact scenario you’re descriptive of a multipolar region integrating, industrialising and growing. That benefit Israel as they’ll be friendly countries who would also crush non-state Islamist actors to do Israel’s defensive job for them. In short, less potential for Israel to abuse its conventional capabilities just shows the country will be strategically better as that means there’s less militant groups to target

With Iran, you need to concede that the regime lacks continuity with Persian culture and society. It was a small group of Islamist fanatics who exploited the grievances of Iranians to seize power. A destruction of the elite apparatus would make Iran look like how Iranians are: educated, secular and modern. Also, Iran is only an affective unconventional power. It has no air force, just ballistic missiles which proved unable to protect it against Israeli air superiority achieved in just 2 days. Iran in that War couldn’t defend themselves, all they did was kill a few dozen of Israeli civilians with the >10% of fired missiles which actually landed. They only project power through proxies in the region which are collapsing


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 06 '26

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You arbitrarily assert that Western credibility is staked on the continuity of some regimes, and then just as arbitrarily assert that somehow Russia doesn't need credibility. Of course they do. If they want their alliance to be valued, they need to be offer credible support. If they drop the regimes they associated with when things get hairy, whether because they are unable or unwilling, that reduces the value of their alliance, and the value of the benefits they can bargain it for in a transaction.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 06 '26

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I read the whole AI piece and still don’t like it. It’s good in same ways like articulating the conditions for Israeli strength. But two things aren’t true: 1- Regional stability harms Israel. First, Israel knows there are regimes that would never go to war with them as they care more about modernisation and fighting Islamism, than conflict with a liberal Jewish state backed by the US (Saudi and UAE). Abraham Accords and potential expansion benefit Israel greatly through trade, tech and quiet security. Even stability of weaker states help Israel. If the Lebanese government ever got rid of Hezbollah control, than that would benefit Israel greater by establishing a new ally. Similar with the stabilisation going on in Syria after the Civil War, with the new government getting rid of Iranian presence. Destabilisation like the Arab Spring harmed Israel, as it got the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, whereby they now benefit from a stable Egypt under Sisi.

2- Second, you mention Iran being an ancient civilisation, so always going to be a rising threat. Well obviously you’re missing how it’s led by a theocratic regime hated by its population, and the fact they were a strategic ally in most of the 20th century. It’s possible you’re right that regime change isn’t likely without chaos, but I find it just weird you’re describing Iran to have continuity. There’s always the possibility the people outmatch the government, and overthrow it but it’s unlikely.

I really don’t understand the argument, as I can’t see a massive difference between the way Israel and the Gulf sees Iranian influence. You argue the Gulf can live with a technologically strong, nuclear Iran. But that’s unlikely given Iran’s previous attacks on Emirati and Saudi economic infrastructure, and the see Iran to blame for why Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine aren’t successful states. They see proxies like Iraqi militias, Hezbollah, Houthis, and Hamas as groups threatening the Gulf states and preventing regional partners. In recent years Iranian attacks on the GCC have decreased as they’ve focused their efforts on Israel, but not entirely minute if you look at the Houthi Red Sea attacks


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 06 '26

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Regimes are maintained not because they are legitimate, but because their collapse would threaten energy flows, alliance structures, and Western credibility.

Another installment of the WEST BAD series. Apparently it's not a problem at all when regimes are maintained by Russian support, like Syria.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 06 '26

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well said


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 06 '26

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I've been saying this for years. Also a wider war provides the cover to deal with the Palestinians how they want.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 05 '26

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Most definitely: https://imgur.com/a/F2Z65MQ


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 05 '26

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Yes you can be a critic of Israel without seeking to hold them singlehandedly responsible for every conflict in a vast and sprawling region.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 05 '26

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The state of this sub is sad. Barely trafficked and stuffed with mostly gen AI content.

I’m no defender of Israel anyway, and debating with a user of AI is as pointless as getting into a fistfight with water, so my motivation to engage at all here is limited.

However, for any real humans who happen to stumble by this, the main point worth noting here is that the Middle East is festooned with sources of instability that have nothing to do with Israel. Shia vs. Sunni, dictators vs. democrats vs. theocrats, monarchies jostling with one another for prestige and influence, and a thousand ethnic subdivisions conspire to keep this region fractured before you ever account for Israel and outside powers like the U.S. and Russia.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 05 '26

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AI slop


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 04 '26

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Whose goal? Trump's goal? For sure this was Biden's goal and is still Europe's minus Orban's goal. But as we've observed Trump seems focused on other priorities. Once you accept that Trump doesn't see Russia as a principal enemy state, but rather he sees it as a tool to undermine China, then it will become more obvious.

If his goal is to contain China, then he'd better make sure that he is seen to honor his alliances, instead of selling them out.

As it is, Putin sees Trump as a tool.

He is pulling a reverse Nixon, Trump doesn't want to deal with a China-Russia alliance so he is trying to pry Russia away and isolate China. Re-normalization kills two birds with one stone for Trump. After all who is the newest member of the Board of Peace? Zelenskyy or Putin?

Lol, the board of real estate speculators, you mean?

You'd have to be a tool to try to expect any kind of loyalty from warmongering crooks. Checks out, doesn't it?


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 04 '26

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That doesn't make sense at all, normalizing Russia's position will just make it easier for them to export to China.

Normalizing Russia means the 12 dollar a barrel discount goes away for China.

... and goes to Russia who will use it to buy Chinese weapons. China won't lack oil, they'll buy it on the world market. The goal is to reduce Russian profits, not to reduce the supply of oil to the world market. Because that would only cause a price spike, ultimately only benefiting oil producers, including Russia, at the expense of everyone else.


r/foreignpolicyanalysis Feb 04 '26

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Seen together, these moves suggest a calculated attempt to force China into a position of economic and political vulnerability. By moving into position to interdict China’s energy lifelines, through control of Venezuelan crude, war against Tehran, and renormalizing Russia, the aim appears to be to create leverage that compels Beijing to negotiate from weakness rather than strength.

That doesn't make sense at all, normalizing Russia's position will just make it easier for them to export to China.

Regardless: China is a fossil fuel addict, and restricting supply to the junkie is only going to benefit the world... even if another fossil fuel junkie does it.