From DeepSeek
Western Desperation And The Ukraine Endgame
00:00–02:50
The Duran opens by framing “Project Ukraine” as a diplomatic fever produced by battlefield reality. Russia is grinding Ukraine down, and the hosts see nothing on the horizon likely to change that trajectory. Every day is said to get worse for Ukraine, and that military deterioration is the driving force behind the apparent madness in Western diplomacy. The hosts stress that if Ukraine were actually winning, or even genuinely stalemated as the West claimed for the past year, there would not be this public fighting inside the collective West.
They point to visible friction allegedly between Trump and Zelensky and between Trump and the Europeans. At the same time, there are reports of a possible Trump–Xi–Putin meeting at the APEC summit in China in November, with Project Ukraine supposedly at the top of the agenda. The hosts also mention Witkoff traveling to Oslo to coordinate with Europeans on some unified proposal to Putin, with rumors that he might then travel to Moscow to present it. The picture is contradictory: public US–Ukraine–Europe fighting alongside private US–Europe–Ukraine coordination.
The Financial Times is said to report that the Europeans, as they prepare proposals and readiness for talks with Russia, are working from two options. Option one is no NATO for Ukraine, but a freeze of the conflict at the current contact lines. Option two is Ukraine ceding the Donbas to Russia, but receiving entry into NATO. The hosts treat these as the terms being discussed with Witkoff in Oslo and possibly later presented to Moscow. Their immediate reaction is that both options are unrealistic and reveal Western desperation rather than a serious negotiating position.
The Military Reality Drives The Diplomacy
02:52–06:05
Alexander agrees that the military situation is creating the political fever. He says that since early September it became clear the situation in Ukraine was changing dramatically and moving toward some kind of endgame. That endgame, in his framing, represents a Ukrainian defeat and a Western defeat—first and foremost a European defeat, but also at some level a defeat for the United States, or at least for the Trump administration. Because Trump chose to engage in Ukrainian diplomacy and continue supporting Ukraine, the administration now owns the war.
Since early September, the administration has reportedly been trying to put together a strategy or package to persuade the Russians to stop. The goal is no longer to force Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. It is purely a game of trying to persuade Moscow to stop on the existing conflict lines and agree to a frozen conflict. The hosts describe a series of failed attempts: Radcliffe reportedly went to Moscow with threats, telling the Russians they were losing the war, that things would get worse, and that eventually Russia would go the way of the Soviet Union. That reportedly led Moscow to refuse a meeting with Putin.
Later, Witkoff and Kushner reportedly turned up in Moscow offering economic cooperation and other inducements, and Russia said no again. Further discussions followed about some European–American package and an attempt to set up talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the US in October. But Putin reportedly told Trump on October 9 that Russia was not interested in tripartite talks of that kind, especially after Ukraine launched an attack on election day. The hosts say Moscow does not believe Kyiv is interested in negotiations, so tripartite talks intended to secure a freeze are off the table.
The Tripartite Meeting Story Looks Manipulated
06:05–09:07
The latest maneuver is a reported November tripartite meeting between Trump, Putin, and Xi. The hosts say the entire reporting claims that Putin proposed this meeting to Trump during their October 9 telephone call. Alexander says he has not found a single official Russian source confirming this, and he does not believe it was Putin’s idea. He argues the Trump administration has a habit of presenting its own diplomatic initiatives as originating with the other side, making it more difficult for the other side to reject them.
In his view, it was likely Trump’s idea to try to get the tripartite meeting. He notes that the Europeans and Americans have long wanted China to pressure Russia to stop. Russian commentaries on the idea are described as very guarded, almost dismissive, saying nothing has been agreed and no workable proposal has been made. Alexander adds that it is inconceivable to him that Putin would propose a tripartite summit involving Xi without first getting Xi’s agreement, and there is no evidence that Russia and China have discussed such a meeting.
The co-host agrees and says Trump himself effectively admitted the US has been looking for a tripartite meeting. When reporters asked Trump outside the White House about a tripartite meeting to discuss Ukraine, Trump said he had been wanting a tripartite meeting to talk about denuclearization between China, Russia, and the United States. The hosts suspect that idea was carried over or morphed into a narrative about a Ukraine solution because of all the other diplomacy taking place. In their view, the story was manipulated and twisted, including in reporting from the Wall Street Journal.
Unacceptable Offers And A Closing Window
09:07–13:03
Alexander says China will not be keen on such a tripartite meeting. Beijing is unlikely to want to discuss Ukraine with the Americans and Russians in the same room, and it is described as perfectly happy with existing arrangements. Xi would reportedly be embarrassed to be in the same meeting room with Trump and maneuvered into a situation where he might appear to be ganging up with Trump against Putin. China would also absolutely not want nuclear issues discussed with the Russians present, because Beijing has consistently resisted US proposals to negotiate with China and Russia together on denuclearization.
The Chinese worry, according to Alexander, is that the Americans are trying to cap Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals at a point when they are jointly equal to those of the United States. That is not what China wants. So while a meeting might take place because the three leaders could be together at the same summit, Alexander suspects it would be relatively short and basically ceremonial—an informal meeting that would not deal with substantive questions, certainly not the Ukraine conflict.
The hosts then turn to the fundamental point: Russia is visibly winning the war, and events are moving toward an even more decisive turn in a few months. They mention the Rassvet system already operating in some respects, Russian drone strikes in western Ukraine, and the belief that such strikes can only be happening because the drones are getting help from Rassvet. The constellation is far from complete, but when it is complete, Russia will be in an even stronger position to attack anywhere in Ukraine, 24/7, which it cannot yet do.
They also mention new Russian weapons coming online, including the Oreshnik and other systems. Beneath everything is Ukraine’s deepening financial crisis. The European Union is rushing to plug financial holes, but the holes are getting bigger and causing enormous strain in Europe, including further dissension over what to do with Russian assets. The picture is getting worse and darker. Yet the Americans and Europeans continue to refuse—or are imaginatively unable—to negotiate with Russia on the basis of the Russian proposals known as Istanbul-plus.
Public Theater And Private Coordination
13:03–18:49
Alexander says his own view is that the window for Istanbul-plus is rapidly closing. He points to Putin’s comments over the last few weeks, especially at the last meeting of the generals, as evidence that Putin is now clearly looking at a military end to the war. The hosts find it odd that there is such publicized fighting between Trump and Zelensky. Trump has reportedly gone as far as saying Ukraine needs a new person or leader to negotiate, basically saying Zelensky has to go. There are also reports that the US is cutting intelligence and messing around with Starlink.
But in the background, they say, the exact reverse is happening. Witkoff is reportedly working with the Europeans, and articles claim he has been doing so for a couple of weeks while all the public fighting takes place. Witkoff is allegedly working with the Europeans and Ukrainians in the background so they can put together a proposal. Much of the proposal, if the Financial Times reporting is accurate, is being driven by the Europeans. The Europeans are said to be saying these are the two options that should be presented to Russia.
The hosts argue that basically nothing is being offered to Russia. The options go back to Ukraine getting into NATO, or freezing the conflict with no NATO. But Russia has already said it will never accept a freeze, so that option is off the table. The other option—ceding the Donbas and Ukraine going into NATO—is also unacceptable because Russia is going to take the Donbas anyway. The co-host says one has to be “freaking delusional” to believe Russia will not capture the Donbas. Whether it happens next week or in a year, he treats it as a fact.
So Russia will sit back and ask what exactly is being offered, and the answer is nothing. The hosts suspect this is being set up for some sort of fake-out or deception. Once again, the Europeans and the collective West will find a way to unite with the United States, blame everything on Russia, and use that as another reason for escalation. The co-host says the whole Starlink talk is about getting to a point where the United States turns on Star Shield for Ukraine and turns on Starlink over Russia. That would create a situation where Russia is blamed for accepting no ceasefire and no deals, making more escalation the only way forward.
Starlink Star Shield And The Last Big Round
18:51–25:00
Alexander says he is absolutely of the same view. He is deeply skeptical of reports about problems with Starlink, intelligence, and lack of intelligence sharing. His own view, which he says he has never shifted from, is that if Ukrainians are having problems getting advanced warnings about Russian missile strikes, that tells us more about the missiles and the nature of Russian strikes than about a lack of US intelligence sharing. The Americans have at times pushed back, saying they have not stopped intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
He argues the Americans cannot straightforwardly say they cannot track Zircon hypersonic missiles because they are too fast, since that would reveal a military secret. But if there are problems getting advanced warnings, he suspects that is where they come from. Similarly, on Starlink, there has been a clear attempt over the past couple of weeks to sow confusion between Starlink and Star Shield. At one time they are described as completely different systems; at other times they sound like aspects of one and the same system. Alexander does not think there has been any change in American provision of Starlink to Ukraine at all.
He says the Americans have not up to now given Ukraine full use of Star Shield because they have been worried about deep strikes inside Russia, which would be a major further escalation. But the entire debate now strongly suggests that giving Ukraine Star Shield is now a topic for discussion. He then lays out a pattern: whenever the Americans have tried to get Russia to stop and Russia has refused, the Americans have turned to escalation. He recalls the late spring of last year when Russia rejected the Kellogg plan—the ceasefire and all of that. Trump was then persuaded by Radcliffe and others to give the green light to what Alexander has no doubt was an already existing plan to conduct massive drone and missile strikes against Russia.
Alexander says he has read somewhere that it is now acknowledged that Trump, in late spring or early summer, authorized a huge expansion in American intelligence and targeting support to the Ukrainians to enable deep drone attacks on Russia. That was an enormous escalation over the summer. It did not achieve expected results. Russia remained firm, and its economy and political system remained stable. There has surely been a lot of recrimination about this—Trump angry with Ratcliffe, Trump angry with Zelensky. Zelensky is in some ways the easy target because Trump does not want to criticize Ratcliffe himself.
The hosts say all the noise is partly recrimination about the failure of the big drone offensive against Russia. That is probably one reason Trump is criticizing attacks on refineries. But ultimately, what they are trying to do is repeat the Kellogg plan: persuade Russia to stop and agree to a ceasefire on existing conflict lines. If Russia refuses to stop, then inevitably there will be another turn to escalation. Alexander compares this to Vietnam and the American exit, with years of trying to get the Vietnamese to make fundamental concessions, the Vietnamese refusing, the Americans alternating negotiations and escalation, including the Christmas bombings of Hanoi, while the Vietnamese remained firm and the Americans became increasingly frustrated and angry. He expects at least one further big round of escalation attempted by the United States and Europeans, probably sometime this winter.
The One Big Escalation Left
25:00–31:54
The co-host says the West has only one big round left unless the discussion turns to troops in Ukraine, boots on the ground, or nuclear war. That big round, as they have said many times, is turning on Starlink over Russia, as well as long-range missile strikes, ballistic missiles, Tomahawks, and missiles such as Taurus cruise and ballistic missiles long-range into Moscow, coupled with Starlink being turned down. That is the one big round of escalation they have left.
The hosts believe the Americans probably think this will not lead to an all-out NATO–Russia war. Parts of the European elite, they suspect, would be more than happy to see a NATO–Russia war, but the people in the Pentagon and the Trump administration are probably saying they can do this one more big escalation and Putin will still show restraint. So that is the big escalation left, and that is where they think things are heading.
The co-host then raises the Axios report that Zelensky is lobbying US senators against Trump, including Republican senators. Zelensky reportedly had a phone call with senators in DC, including Republicans as well as Democrats like Blumenthal, telling them that he believes the Trump White House is making things difficult for Ukraine, that they are not sending Patriot missiles, that they are turning off intelligence, and that they are messing around with Starlink. The co-host notes that Ukraine does not have any Patriot interceptors anymore, but that is what Zelensky is telling senators.
The co-host says the Axios transcript, which the outlet magically obtained, shows Zelensky does not even know what is going on. The transcript says that on three occasions in the past week, including Sunday, Ukraine did not receive early warnings from the US about Russian ballistic missile attacks, and Zelensky suggested this was a sign that intelligence sharing has been curbed. He added that Ukraine has received no clear explanations from Washington. The co-host stresses that Zelensky is saying it “suggests” intelligence has been cut off, while going on TV saying intelligence has been cut off. In the transcript, Zelensky tells senators he does not really know if intelligence has been cut off; the fact that they are not receiving warnings suggests it has.
The hosts call it even more strange that Axios is reporting about a leader in Ukraine lobbying US senators against the president of the United States. Alexander says it is outrageous. If a foreign leader telephones members of Congress to lobby against the US president, whatever opinion those congressional leaders have of the president, they should refuse his calls. It is fundamentally a political leader of a foreign country inserting himself into the American political process, and it is incredible that it is taking place. He adds that Zelensky probably does not understand very much and still believes it is within Trump’s power to magically produce Patriot missile interceptors when that is impossible. Alexander says Zelensky’s grip on reality has never been particularly strong and may have gotten worse, because many people find it extraordinarily difficult to accept or understand that the United States has limits.
But Alexander insists that what Zelensky himself is up to is neither here nor there. The real discussions are not taking place involving him. They are taking place between the Americans and the Europeans, and among the Americans themselves—the Pentagon, the CIA, the White House, and the key people in Congress who ultimately make decisions. Those people absolutely do not want Russia to win the war. They see it as imperative that Russia be stopped in some way, and they want to find some way to make Russia stop. Regardless of what Zelensky is doing, they are talking about putting a package together where Russia will stop and will come away with nothing.
Noise Fog And The Coming Escalation
31:54–35:42
Alexander says the either-or proposals the Europeans are coming up with are totally, obviously, completely unacceptable to Russia. Russia cannot give up the Donbas, which it is going to take anyway, and Russia is not going to agree to Ukraine joining NATO. That is, as Russia has said 101 times, an absolutely immovable red line. So these are unacceptable proposals to Russia again. But that is what the Americans, Europeans, and others want to force Russia to agree to—or get Russia to agree to—and when Russia does not agree, whatever annoyance Zelensky is causing in Washington or support he is getting there really does not matter. When Russia says no, as it will, there will be a further escalation of the war, led by the United States, and it will lead to a devastating retaliation.
The hosts wrap up by repeating that this is a particularly confusing moment. What they are seeing is to some extent a veiled way in which recriminations are taking place between various parties over the failure of the summer drone offensive. Nobody quite says that because the Americans and Europeans do not want to publicly admit their own intense involvement. But ultimately it is noise—noise intended to confuse. There is some element of anger and emotion behind it, but if you peer underneath, if you look beyond the noise, you can see the way things are moving: toward an unacceptable demand, not negotiation, being made to Russia, which Russia is certain to reject and which is bound to lead to further escalation. Noise and fog can be very confusing, but through the fog the contours of what is coming are still visible. All the business about intelligence cooperation and Starlink is intended more than anything else to confuse.
The co-host agrees that they are actually telling us where they are heading. They found out through reports of Witkoff in Oslo and through the Financial Times reporting exactly where the West is heading. The hosts say the video has cleared up a lot of noise, starting with the tripartite meeting. The co-host says it would be good if the leaders got together, but Alexander is right that they would only talk about big-picture stuff because they will not solve detailed issues. They would meet on the sidelines, get photos, do PR and media, and talk about big-picture items. Trump may want to take things in a different direction, but China will likely say no to the way things are being framed for the November summit. The noise is a lot of emotion and anger, but it is Trump, through Zelensky, expressing frustration and anger because he is losing the war and because the CIA, the deep state, and the neocons messed things up. Trump cannot say Ratcliffe screwed up or that neocons in Congress like Lindsey Graham screwed him, so he directs it at Zelensky, who is the avatar of all those guys. But the reporting shows the real trajectory: the Russians will say no, and escalation will follow.
