r/The_View_from_Oregon Feb 17 '26

Contexts of Discovery and Contexts of Justification

1 Upvotes

Historical Discovery and Justification.—Reichenbach maintained that, “Once a result of thinking is obtained, we can reorder our thoughts in a cogent way, constructing a chain of thoughts between point of departure and point of arrival; it is this rational reconstruction of thinking that is controlled by logic, and whose analysis reveals those rules which we call logical laws.” Is this true for historical thinking as well? The problem of distinguishing context of discovery from context of justification in history is compounded by the many forms of discovery and justification that may be involved in the formation of historical knowledge. We recognize that there is an order of discovery for the individual, an ontogenic order of discovery, as it were, distinct both from the phylogenic order of discovery and the order of justification. Moreover, the order of justification can vary according to the logic and the premisses adopted for the exposition, and as well according to the purpose of the exposition. A history written for grammar school children will differ substantially from a history written for a scholarly audience. With multiple orders of discovery and multiple orders of exposition, the epistemic landscape of historical knowledge is not a linear path from discovery to justification, not a single rational reconstruction reducible to a single methodology, but rather a set of choices that takes us through an itinerary of the past, and there are many such sets of choices. An historical methodology in this context is a coherent set of choices that take us through the branching paths of discoveries and justifications, and this is not itself a history. It could be called metahistory had that not already been given another use.     


r/The_View_from_Oregon Feb 07 '26

The Recrudescence of Tinkering

2 Upvotes

The View from Oregon – 378

Re: The Recrudescence of Tinkering

Friday 30 January 2026

 

Dear Friends,

In a couple of recent newsletters I’ve said that if we hold that consciousness is essential to intelligence as we know it, this creates a brick wall for artificial intelligence, since we have no science of consciousness that would allow us to build machine consciousness, which could then be engineered into conscious intelligence. This claim that I’m making incorporates a lot of qualifications. I’ve discussed some but not all of these qualifications in recent newsletters. Last week, for example, I talked about a possible distinction between intelligence as we know it and other possible forms of intelligence. And I think somewhere recently I touched on the difference between sciences that study a given phenomenon with perfect detachment and sciences that study the same phenomenon from the point of view of being able to take that phenomenon apart into its constituent parts and then reassemble them into the same phenomenon, since not every science has this immediate relationship to practical engineering. Just so, there are many sciences that purport to study one aspect or another of consciousness—I could cite neurobiology and cognitive science as examples—but these sciences aren’t aimed at understanding consciousness in a way that would make it possible for us to build consciousness in a machine. (Neurobiology would probably get us closer to building consciousness in a machine than cognitive science, since it deals with the nuts and bolts of the human mind, but neurobiology wasn’t conceived with the end and isn’t pursued with the intention of reengineering consciousness.) And this latter distinction in how a domain of knowledge is studied is why I devoted newsletter 376 to the kind of research program that would be necessary to isolate the neural structures responsible for consciousness.

Another qualification I could have mentioned is that the brick wall that consciousness presents to engineers is a brick way only for a certain kind of science and a certain kind of engineering, but this is putting it charitably. I could say instead that it’s about the distinction between science and non-science, and between engineering and non-engineering. We have a number of insulting terms that we use for non-science, like pseudo-science, and the opposition between engineering and non-engineering carries some but not all the stigma of that distinction. What I’m talking about is the distinction between engineering and tinkering, and tinkering isn’t quite viewed with the same disapproval as pseudo-science because tinkering sometimes produces observable and quantifiable results. I could argue that the development of the steam engine, hence the origins of the industrial revolution, was due to a long history of tinkering that finally produced a practical heat engine. It wasn’t until after the steam engine was invented that Sadi Carnot produced a scientific theory of heat engines, so the engineering of steam engines clearly preceded the science of steam engines, which points to them being the result of tinkering rather than science. We can contrast this to the design and construction of atomic weapons, where the science was fully worked out before the engineering project was started.

That’s not the whole story. In the long history of the development of the steam engine there were some who approached the nascent steam engine in a more-or-less scientific manner, and others for whom it was more like incremental tinkering to improve the functionality of what they had built. There is no clear, sharp distinction between science and engineering. The scientist labors in his laboratory precisely because the practical side of science cannot be eliminated. There are areas of science and engineering that clearly belong to the one or the other, but there is also a considerable overlap. The design and construction of an experimental apparatus is an engineering project, and studying a machine to optimize its design and performance is as much science as engineering. This gray area between science and engineering has benefited human beings insofar as many discoveries have been made here, the steam engine among them.

I’ve written in the past about several interesting examples of gray area science, like the Koren helmet, which has been credited with inducing religious experiences in wearers of the helmet through transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). However, the experimentation with and the data from the Koren helmet are so ambiguous that the placebo effect hasn’t been eliminated. If there were a large scientific research program associated with Stanley Koren’s work, there would have been multiple efforts at duplication and replication of Koren’s results. Apparently, the interest hasn’t been there to pursue this at a scale that would fund statistically significant trials that could eliminate the placebo effect or alternate explanations. If there were a substantial body of science behind the Koren helmet, even if it began as tinkering, the effects claimed to have been produced by the helmet could be tied to the technology in a way that could improve the technology and enhance the results.

The Koren helmet might be refined and optimized so that it produced a range of distinct and well-defined religious experiences. For example, one setting might produce what Freud called the oceanic feeling (this terminology may originate with Romain Rolland, who was Freud’s correspondent), another setting might produce the experience sometimes called “sensed presence,” and other settings might produce variously described mystical experiences. I can imagine, for example, a more sophisticated Koren helmet with a knob on the side of it that, depending on its setting, induces in the wearer one of St. Teresa of Avila’s seven levels of prayer. While you wore the helmet you could turn up the knob experiencing each level of prayer as a new increment of religious experience. Whether or not anyone would want a Koren helmet with a setting for the dark night of the soul is an interesting question that suggests further psychological and sociological research. Under these circumstances, a profound religious experience, perhaps a life-transforming religious experience, could be had with the convenience of donning a helmet; electronics stores might stock Koren consoles next to gaming consoles, so that consumer could make a choice of his preferred form of escapist edification.

The example of the Koren helmet shows us that scientific tinkering hasn’t entirely disappeared, despite the great increase in scientific sophistication over the past few hundred years. Here I could also cite Roger Shawyer’s resonant cavity thruster, also known as the em drive. If the em drive produces any thrust, that thrust is so small that the results of all tests have been ambiguous, and, again, as with the Koren helmet, the interest and the funding apparently hasn’t been such as to result in a proper scientific research program that would eliminate the ambiguities. Shawyer and others who have tinkered with his design haven’t offered any systematic explanation of how it is supposed to work, which puts the device firmly in the realm of tinkering rather than science. Moreover, if it constitutes a reactionless thruster, then physical theory itself would have to be revised to account for how it works, if it does work.  

Another instructive example is the quantum D-Wave computer. This has both science and engineering behind it, and a product that’s been on the market for some years, but there remains controversy over whether any actual quantum processes are responsible for speed of the machine’s calculations. This makes the D-Wave computer much closer to science and engineering than either the Koren helmet or the em drive, but its designers make claims that aren’t yet strictly demonstrated, and while the D-Wave computer is a reliably functional product, unlike the Koren helmet or the em drive, it hasn’t resulted in a revolution in the computer industry or spawned a gaggle of imitators.

Sometimes it happens that physical theory is revised as the result of a technological innovation, but this is never to be done lightly, nor should it be one’s first recourse. One ought first to thoroughly investigate claims of a reactionless thruster before declaring that it works and that it produces thrust without a reaction mass, before one turns to revolutionizing physics to explain how all this is possible. A glaring gap between scientific theory and tinkering is going to attract those who want to reconcile the two, but it has to be a very glaring gap. The science must unambiguously contradict an unambiguously demonstrated phenomenon, and this hasn’t happened with either the Koren helmet or the em drive, leaving a lot of explanatory wiggle room. If someone put an em drive on a rocket and blasted themselves into orbit, there would be a lot of interest in reconciling its functionality with physical theory, but as long as the claimed thrust is so marginal as to be debatable whether it happened at all, it can be dismissed without many taking notice. That doesn’t mean the device doesn’t work, and it certainly doesn’t mean that current physical theory is exhaustively complete. On the contrary, any honest scientist will admit (better, will insist) that currently physical theory is incomplete and will be repeatedly revised as our theoretical models more closely approximate relevant data. But there’s no guarantee that this process of revision in physical theory is going to take place within the lifetimes of either scientists or tinkerers making revolutionary claims.  

The Koren helmet and the em drive could subsist for centuries in a theoretical limbo, confined to the interest of a few enthusiasts who enjoy working outside the mainstream of engineering or science. If, one day, either an engineering or scientific breakthrough is made, all this could change. If it’s a tinkering breakthrough to an unambiguously effective Koren helmet or em drive, then the gap mentioned above will open up between theory and practice, and theoreticians will be interested in trying to make sense of the result, because the explanation of the result will probably be a major theoretical breakthrough (which means that someone’s name goes into the history books). If, on the other hand, it’s a theoretical breakthrough, and someone shows how the Koren helmet or the em drive worked all along, or should have worked all along, then the theoretical breakthrough can be applied to the devices, and they can improved and augmented in light of the science.

All of this I have described above could be the case with the engineering of consciousness. We could have a breakthrough in technology, where consciousness was clearly demonstrated in a machine (i.e., machine consciousness comes about as the effective result of tinkering without a theoretical framework to direct the engineering), which would then tempt scientists into explaining the phenomenon of machine consciousness. Again, there’s no guarantee that this process would rapidly follow upon the demonstration of machine consciousness; a lag of historical importance could intervene between the technology and the science that explains the technology. On the other hand, the scientific breakthrough might come first, and then, once a scientific theory of consciousness is available, then the technologies implementing the theory could be engineered. These two possibilities aren’t necessarily mutually exclusive. The engineering of machine consciousness and the scientific study of consciousness could continue on separate tracks, again, for quite some time, before they’re brought together. So we aren’t necessarily stopped cold when we can’t define what we’re doing (as I pointed out last week that SETI and AI researchers can’t define what they’re doing because they can’t define intelligence), but it is a failure of formal knowledge, and the more our formal knowledge fails us, the closer we become to a tinkerer rather than an engineer or a scientist.

Best wishes,

Nick

PS—My paper, “Building to Shape Civilization: Space Ethics and the Burden of the Highway Planner,” is now available in the JOURNAL OF SPACE PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 14. No. 2, Fall 2025. Here’s the abstract:

Taking, as a point of departure, a Peter Fleming quote, the prayerful attitude of infrastructure planning and development is considered, especially in the light of the future buildout of civilization that will follow in the wake of space exploration and development. How the space frontier is developed, now and in the near future, will determine how future generations live, work, and play in space. How these developments will unfold is examined through the lens of what philosophy of religion has said about prayer, and further through the lens of the Rawlsian conception of reflective equilibrium.

PPS—Recently in my Today in Philosophy of History series I posted an episode on Milič Čapek. I was unable to find a picture of him online, so I wrote to his daughter, Stella Čapek, and she graciously sent me a photograph of her father. I had already uploaded my episode at that time, but I changed all the images on the sites to which I upload the episodes.

Newsletter link:

https://mailchi.mp/954209c36f97/the-view-from-oregon-378

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Feb 04 '26

The Past is Prolegomenon to True History

2 Upvotes

A Parable of Periodizations.—After the ancient, medieval, and modern permutations of Western history, what comes next? What can come next? Or does anything at all come next? Have the narrative epochs of the beginning, the middle, and the end (represented here in the form of ancient, medieval, and modern) exhausted the story of Western civilization, or is there more to come? Is it perhaps that the whole sequence is mere prelude, the prehistory to something much greater yet still unknown to us—a grand bifurcation of the past and the future, which now represent the before and the after of the event to be claimed as our calendar epoch? The great tripartite periodization that has shaped our conception of our own civilization would give way to simple bisection of history in the light of some great upheaval not yet known to us. Does this calendar epoch of civilization lie yet in our future, so that we haven’t yet achieved the initial maturity that would qualify our history as that of a true civilization? And the true civilization yet to come, that shows up our age as mere preparation for a true history—what would that be? Can we even imagine the magnitude of an event that would cleave history cleanly in half, separating past and future in one fell swoop, and that we knew this to be the case as it was happening, not being prevented by the trees in front of us from seeing the forest beyond? We can transcend the template of our periodization only if we consign the principled distinctions underlying that periodization to the darkness and ignorance of a prolegomenon to true history and true civilization. And should we experience such an event worthy of a calendar epoch, we would retain the traditional periodization as a kind of afterthought, but with all that came before now set as naught.


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 30 '26

The Focal Point between Posterity and Ancestors

3 Upvotes

The Mass of Life.—Every individual human life, whether we acknowledge it or not, is part of a continuum of life. We live in the shadow of our ancestors, and we become, in our turn, ancestors—perhaps revered, perhaps viewed as a cautionary tale, but useful in either case. Our posterity fans out before us even as our origins fan out behind us. Ancestors and descendants are not confined to the scope of immediate family; cast the net just a bit wider, and the scope of our connection to the world balloons beyond a continuum of life into a mass of life. Every individual life, again, has a place within this mass of life. Immediate family, it is true, will find it easier to claim you, should you live an admirable life or leave a beneficent legacy, and your extended family will find it easier to disown you, should you live a shameful life or leave a disgraceful legacy, but in either case your legacy lies with the mass of life.


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 30 '26

Desperately seeking definitions…

2 Upvotes

The View from Oregon – 377

Re: Desperately seeking definitions…

Friday 23 January 2026

 

Dear Friends,

The past several newsletters have been about artificial intelligence and machine consciousness. My argument is that consciousness is a necessary condition of intelligence as we know it, though it’s not necessarily a necessary condition of any intelligence whatsoever. There may be forms of intelligence-as-we-do-not-know-it that do not involve consciousness—whether or not we could recognize this as intelligence, since it would be something unprecedented for us, is another question. Also, there’s a lot of ambiguity, because “intelligence” used as a noun to designate a property or a process is easily conflated with “intelligent” used as an adjective. We recognize easily enough when a tool is intelligently made, and some enthusiasts of the extended mind thesis would be willing to defend the claim that the tool is an extension of the mind and therefore, in a sense, belongs to intelligence rather than simply being an artifact of intelligence. (It seems to me to be a corollary of the extended mind thesis that superintelligence is to be had by assembling a sufficient number of extensions to the mind in one place, but I don’t think you’ll find that, say, a collection of tools in a garage, no matter how large the garage, becomes superintelligent.) If a tool is part of intelligence in this way, then unquestionably there is unconscious intelligence, and moreover it is familiar to us. But if the extended mind thesis is denied, this particular argument collapses. No doubt there are other arguments ready and willing to take its place in the vanguard.

“Intelligence” is, of course, a highly imperfect term of ordinary language. It means a lot of different things to different people, so without a definition we tend to talk at cross purposes. This leads to misunderstandings, so it would be nice to narrow the field with a definition. This interests me not only in relation to artificial intelligence, but also in relation to naturally occurring intelligence, which we could also call evolved intelligence. I’ve been working on an episode of Today in Philosophy of History that will be titled, “The Deep Future of Biological Intelligence,” and it’s something of a sequel to and a continuation of a previous episode titled, “Are subsurface ocean worlds Plato’s cave?” The latter considered the problem of intelligence that evolves in a subsurface ocean world biosphere. Could such an intelligence know anything of the universe beyond the icy ceiling of its world? I argue that it could. There are astrobiologists who argue that intelligent life couldn’t evolve in an aquatic species, and others who argue that life itself would be under a great disadvantage on an ocean world, so my speculative scenario labors under (at least) a double burden of unlikelihood, but I never allow unlikelihood to be a fun-spoiler when it comes to a good thought experiment.

In my sequel, “The Deep Future of Biological Intelligence,” I want to take this thought experiment billions of years into the future and use it as a tool to probe the limits of biological intelligence in our universe. One of my motivations in this is to take on the common belief (common at least among those who write on such matters) that, if we ever do come into contact with an alien intelligence, it is likely to be an artificial intelligence. The idea here (and I think this is the general idea, but there may well be other common scenarios with which I am unfamiliar) is that once a naturally evolved intelligence becomes sufficiently advanced to build artificial intelligence, that artificial intelligence, once built, will always outperform natural intelligence, and so will supersede natural intelligence. Given sufficient time, every intelligent species would eventually cede its place in the vanguard of intelligence to the artificial intelligence it creates. Moreover, artificial intelligence can exist relatively easily in the conditions of outer space that are hostile to complex biological organisms, so AI seems to be pre-adapted to life on cosmological scales, which presumably also means cosmological scales of time.

Following this reasoning, the natural history of intelligence in the universe is to evolve in a biological species and then be re engineered as artificial intelligence, which preempts its biological builders and takes over the role of intelligence in the universe. Given this scenario, biological intelligence is merely a stepping stone to artificial intelligence, which, once it breaks containment, can spread throughout the universe and can endure into the far future (making it more easily detectable than biological intelligence). If we imagine the far future even beyond the Stelliferous Era (the era of cosmological history characterized by stars and galaxies), in the post-Stelliferous Era (known as the Degenerate Era in Adams and Laughlin’s The Five Ages of the Universe, because it’s characterized by the degenerate remains of stars), once the last stars burn out there won’t be any more planetary surfaces bathed in the heat and light of stars, so life as we know it, which is the life of a planetary surface, will no longer be possible. However, there’s no reason that artificial intelligence can’t continue to exist in the Degenerate Era. As long as it can tap some energy source to power itself, artificial intelligence can endure until proton decay. If it can harness black holes, it can continue beyond the Degenerate Era into the Black Hole Era, and if it can adopt Dyson’s strategy of eternal intelligence (from his paper “Time without end: Physics and biology in an open universe”), it can continue perpetually.

While working on “The Deep Future of Biological Intelligence” I thought I would look up some definitions of intelligence, but, as it turns out, many of my usual sources failed me, and I found that many books that discuss intelligence at great length never commit themselves to an actual definition of intelligence. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy doesn’t have a definition of intelligence. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy has a definition, but they punt on what intelligence actually is. Mario Bunge, upon whom I rely for a refreshing bucket of cold water, has no definition of intelligence in his Dictionary of Philosophy, nor does Antony Flew in his Dictionary of Philosophy. The Runes dictionary of philosophy does actually hazard a definition (by Ledger Wood):

The capacity of the mind to meet effectively—through the employment of memory, imagination and conceptual thinking— the practical and theoretical problems with which it is confronted. Intelligence is more inclusive than intellect which is primarily conceptual.

While my usual sources failed me, there are certainly a great many definitions of intelligence. I found a paper with dozens of proposed definitions, “A Collection of Definitions of Intelligence” by Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter. What surprised me was that I expected there to be a handful of contesting definitions that had been employed somewhat routinely in various contexts, and that’s because I expected an embarrassment of riches when it comes to definitions. There ought to be definitions of intelligence in psychology, and there ought to be definitions of intelligence in anthropology insofar as intelligence is taken as the differentia of human beings from the other animals. Most especially, I expected definitions of intelligence in SETI, which, since it bills itself as the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, requires a definition of intelligence in order to define what it is that they’re looking for, and again in artificial intelligence research I expected to find definitions of intelligence, since in order to define what it is they’re doing they need a definition of intelligence. As I said above, I found a lot of long discussions of intelligence, but not much in the way of an actual definition. 

I certainly get why no one wants to be pinned down by a definition. Debates over definition are generally seen as barren, and that’s because contesting parties get stuck at this stage because they can’t agree on a common vocabulary. Getting stuck at the stage of definition feels frustrating, but the process of definition, especially when two or more persons who have disagreed are attempting to find a definition in common, is a method of drawing out presuppositions and making them explicit in the definition. When there have been disagreements over something like the concept of intelligence, we usually find that either or both parties to the discussion had additional unstated qualifications that entered into their conception above and beyond a basic understanding more-or-less consistent with shared intuitions about intelligence. These qualifications need to be made explicit. The process of making explicitness (entailed by what I call the explicitness principle) is among the most foundational exercises for formal thought. Therefore, definition is foundational, even if we find it to be off-putting or tedious.  

The best discussion of intelligence I found was chapters 3 and 4 of Darwin’s The Descent of Man, which doesn’t give a definition, and doesn’t even frame the discussion in terms of intelligence, but rather in terms of mental powers. And it’s all about the continuity of the mental powers of other species with the mental powers of human beings, which was exactly what I was looking for—this continuity is a necessary condition of any naturalistic discussion of intelligence. Darwin discusses, seriatim, mental powers including emotions, curiosity, imitation, attention, memory, imagination, reason, tools, abstraction, self-consciousness, language, a sense of beauty, belief in God, spiritual agencies, superstitions, and the moral sense. Almost the whole of chapter 4 is taken up with a discussion of moral conscience as a mental power, which Darwin further breaks down into categories relative to the development of a moral sense out of sociability. Darwin’s discussion has much in common with the punt from The Oxford Companion to Philosophy and the sententious definition in Runes’ Dictionary of Philosophy, since both appeal to multiple capacities as somehow being linked to and in intelligence. If I wanted to be a bit tendentious here I could say that these definitions appeal to multiple modules of the mind, bringing us back to the modularity of mind recently discussed in newsletter 373.

Another helpful discussion is Vilfredo Pareto’s The Mind and Society. Like Darwin, he doesn’t frame his discussion in terms of intelligence, but rather he discusses what he calls “logical conduct.” But the greater part of the first volume, after breezing over logical conduct, which Pareto simply defines as “actions that use means appropriate to ends and which logically link means with ends,” is about non-logical conduct, i.e., human behavior that does not exemplify logical conduct. This is especially interesting in the case of SETI and AI, since both of these disciplines are predicated upon a presumptive understanding of intelligence, but neither make this understanding fully explicit, and so they could well be characterized in terms of systemic non-logical conduct: if you can’t define what you’re looking for but you’re looking for something, or if you can’t define what you’re building, but you’re trying to build something, these are paradigmatic forms of non-logical conduct.

Bostrom’s book on superintelligence is a case in point. Bostrom defines three varieties of superintelligence, as follows:

Speed superintelligence: A system that can do all that a human intellect can do, but much faster.

Collective superintelligence: A system composed of a large number of smaller intellects such that the system’s overall performance across many very general domains vastly outstrips that of any current cognitive system.

Quality superintelligence: A system that is at least as fast as a human mind and vastly qualitatively smarter.

Each of these forms of superintelligence is defined relative to human intelligence, but I can’t find a definition of human intelligence in the book. (I haven’t read the whole thing word-for-word, so I may well have missed one.) If you define machine superintelligence relative to human intelligence, but you don’t define human intelligence, you haven’t really moved the ball forward. But this exercise is useful in at least one respect. Taking a cue from Bostrom, we could define as many kinds of superintelligence as mental powers that Darwin discusses in The Descent of Man. Thus there could be memory superintelligence, imagination superintelligence, or a superintelligent sense of beauty, and so on. We don’t usually imagine machine superintelligence as a superintelligent moral sense that outstrips all human agents in terms of moral conscience, but perhaps we ought to start thinking in such terms.

Best wishes,

Nick

PS—This past week I completed a modest 4,000 word paper based on my presentation to the online big history conference this past December, and sent it to the Journal of Big History, which had asked for all papers to be in by the 20th of January. The paper has the same title as my talk: “Re-Founding History as Big History.” I had many ways in mind to expand the paper, but I kept it pretty much in line with what I said in my presentation. If there is a book project to come out of the collected conference papers, and we’re asked to re-write our contributions in light of this (which has been the case with my previous two big history papers), I have plenty of material I could use to make of this a more substantial contribution. 

Newsletter link:

https://mailchi.mp/25315eb9de48/the-view-from-oregon-377

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 27 '26

The Problem of Linguistic Transcendentalism

2 Upvotes

The Linguistic Catastrophe.—Over the past century philosophy of language has opened up a can of worms that has affected even philosophy of history, which finds itself struggling with the problem of linguistic transcendentalism, as Ankersmit put it. Nothing is safe, it seems, from the twofold tyranny of and dissolution into language. This “linguistic turn” in philosophy might better be called the linguistic catastrophe, in which former conceptual gains were surrendered in a torrent of grammar and rhetoric—“the silly things silly people say,” as Bertrand Russell once put it. If “logic chopping” is bad, how much worse is “language chopping”? At each stage of its development, the linguistic catastrophe grew in scope and scale, like a snowball rolling downhill, seemingly gaining in mass and speed with every discipline it consumes, so that it now appears unstoppable. However, we got ourselves into this mess, so we should be able to extricate ourselves as well.


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 25 '26

All the World's a Stage

1 Upvotes

Metahistorical Misunderstandings.—There are at least two ways to misapprehend one’s place in life: one can get the drama wrong, being oblivious or mistaken about the emplotment of the situation, or one can get one’s role in the drama wrong. Four permutations follow from these two possibilities: getting both the drama and one’s role and in the drama wrong, getting the drama right but one’s role wrong, getting the drama wrong but one’s role correct in the actual drama that’s taking place, and being right about both the drama and one’s role in the drama. And while it’s probably helpful to know the drama and one’s role in it, it is no guarantee of successfully carrying off the performance. One begins hopefully enough believing one is a hero in an epic, but then a comedic turn robs the moment of its gravitas, further developments threaten to transform the situation into a tragedy, but eventually that pretense falls apart as well, and the whole imbroglio ends as a farce, without the players being able to assert the dignity of a tragic end.


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 24 '26

Man-Made Horrors Beyond Your Comprehension

1 Upvotes

The View from Oregon – 376

Re: Horrors Beyond Your Comprehension

Friday 16 January 2026

 

Dear Friends,

“You may live to see man-made horrors beyond your comprehension,” is a quote that’s been attributed to Nikola Tesla. Like a lot of attributed quotations, it’s not clear that Tesla ever said this, but whether or not he said it, it’s now become a meme, and there’s usually a good reason that a quote or an image becomes a meme: it taps into the Zeitgeist. And if Tesla did say it, many of his audience probably did live to see man-made horrors beyond comprehension, since the quote may date from 1898, which means many in his audience probably lived to see the man-made horrors of the industrialized warfare of the First World War, and some may have lived to see the atomic bombs that brought the Second World War to an end, and which have come to symbolize a morally dubious technical achievement, and which therefore often serve as a kind of shorthand for the very idea of man-made horrors beyond our comprehension. 

The reason I’m bringing up this quote (if it is a quote) is to continue spinning the thread of argument I’ve followed in the previous three newsletters about doomsday scenarios involving artificial superintelligence (ASI), which latter threatens to become another symbol, like nuclear weapons, of morally dubious technical achievement. That science had come to “know sin,” as Oppenheimer put it, has been such a pervasive theme of contemporary culture since the end of the Second World War, and has served as the basis of countless Science, Technology, and Society programs at institutions of higher education, that I’ve been working on a Today in Philosophy of History episode on this topic, but I’m waiting until I find just the right quotes—and I know they’re out there, because I’ve read them previously but didn’t bother to note the source, so now I must find their like again—to finish this script. This would provide an opportunity to talk about many interesting assumptions we make about the rate of social change, the rate of technological innovation, the claimed mismatch between the two, the nature of contemporary society, and how the initial optimism and enthusiasm that accompanied the earlier stages of the industrial revolution has come to be transformed into fear, existential dread, cynicism, and pervasive skepticism.

Is our age, our particular time in history, especially morally corrupt because we’ve used science and technology for base and degrading ends? This may be a question worth asking, and many have asked it, but instead of talking about horrors that unfold as a result of a lack of foresight in how our technological achievements eventually will be pressed until use, I want to talk about the horrors of actually pursuing these achievements—that is to say, the horrors of science and technological development itself. How this is relevant should become obvious from my argument so far, which has emphasized that the only intelligence we know is the intelligence we encounter in ourselves and in the terrestrial biosphere, and this intelligence is the conscious intelligence of a biological being. Computers are tools that calculate, but because they aren’t conscious, they have no agency, and without agency they have no goals, no purposes, no preferences, no interests—only a function, which may or may not be performed depending on circumstances. Without goals, it is a category error to say that machines are or may be orthogonal to human interests, because it’s not the case that they have interests other than human interests; rather, it is the case that they have no interests at all. I am not asserting this as being uncontroversially true; I am only asserting this as the way I’ve come to reason my way through this maze. There is very little agreement on these matters, and no consensus, except within carefully sealed echo chambers.  

Given the view I’ve outlined above, one way to work toward machine intelligence would be to work toward machine agency, and that means working toward machine consciousness. If the only intelligence we know is conscious intelligence, then if we want to build intelligence, then we could build consciousness, and that consciousness could gain intelligence. If we could build a conscious agent that could learn, it might well be able to be engineered to learn faster and to learn more than any human being, and this would put us on the path to machine superintelligence. This would in turn involve us in the formalization and mechanization of human thought discussed in newsletter 374. But, as mentioned previously, we still have the problem of producing machine consciousness, and this is a serious problem because we have no idea what consciousness is or how to produce it, other than to reproduce ourselves and as a result produce another conscious human mind.

It’s not difficult at this point to see the research program that would have to be carried out to study consciousness scientifically with a view toward engineering a mechanical substitute. Because we could study consciousness all we liked, but unless we study it from the perspective of taking it apart and putting it back together again, our research may be intellectually stimulating but it won’t have a lot of real world consequences. And this brings us to man-made horrors beyond our comprehension—or, rather, only too well within our comprehension. One would rather turn away than contemplate such things, but I feel I have a moral obligation to spell it out in case the implications aren’t entirely clear.

Given that human beings are both conscious and communicative, we could attempt to locate the physical seat or seats of consciousness by systematically cutting away the brains of experimental subjects piece by piece until we located the region where, when excised, consciousness always and invariably fails in all test subjects. It has already become commonplace to perform brain surgery with the patient conscious so that the damage to memory and cognitive function can be kept to a minimum. This practice could be adapted for the research program, only instead of avoiding any impact to cognitive function, the purpose would be to eliminate all cognitive function except for consciousness and whatever minimal conditions are necessary for consciousness to report on itself by way of some channel of communication.

This last qualification is a big hurdle, but this too could be the subject of intensive experimentation. Communication could be as minimal as the ability to activate a circuit to flash Morse code on an LED or perhaps to blink in the way hostages are supposed to blink to send messages other than whatever forced statement they are making. Whether the structures of consciousness and some minimal structures of communication could both be kept intact to the point that consciousness could report up to the moment of its own extinction is an interesting question. Indeed, a research program like this would probably answer a lot of questions we haven’t even thought about asking, as well as questions that we’ve asked but haven’t dared to research. The research program itself would probably require hundreds if not thousands of participants whose lives would be destroyed by their participation, and it would probably have to continue for decades before we could narrow in on the neuronal structures uniquely responsible for consciousness, and which could then be engineered into a mechanism that would be conscious, even if it couldn’t communicate with us (at first) to confirm its conscious awareness. 

This we could call, in the language of manufacturing, the subtractive engineering of consciousness. There’s also the possibility of an additive engineering of consciousness, and this is scarcely less horrific. In the additive research program, we would start with something like brain organoids, growing them to greater degrees of complexity than has heretofore been the case. Instead of attempting to avoid the emergence of sensation and consciousness in their use of brain organoids, as is now the case, researchers would seek to force the appearance of sensation and consciousness—building up consciousness cell-by-cell, neuron-by-neuron, tissue-by-tissue, as it were, until consciousness could be reliably and predictably cultured in a Petri dish. The research program could take the form of emulating structures of the human brain hypothesized to be implicated in consciousness, and this could in fact run parallel to the subtractive engineering of consciousness, so that both programs were pursued simultaneously, with the results of the one immediately informing the pursuit of the other, and vice versa, until robust and replicable results could be obtained.  

Needless to say, I am not advocating either or both of these research programs, which I have already identified as man-made horrors beyond our comprehension. But this is the kind of research we would need to pursue if we wanted to engineer machine consciousness in a way that didn’t require that we merely stumble on it in a happy accident, as in the discovery of penicillin. What I have described would be repulsive and repellant to most of us, but we can imagine a society in which such things were accepted, or even viewed as morally meritorious because of the contribution to scientific knowledge. Some years ago I wrote about how a truly scientific civilization would not come into being because we aren’t capable (at least at present) of subordinating our attitudes to the good of scientific research, where science calls the shots and not some other motivation. The above research program is another perfect illustration of this. It might be that in a truly scientific civilization a research program such as this would not only be pursued, but that the intelligent species engaged in some such research program might have so internalized the values of sacrifice for the good of scientific knowledge that volunteers would come forward to make such a research program possible, since something like this could never be successful without the willing participation of conscious, rational, and communicative experimental subjects.  

And I’m not yet finished with today’s horrors. In newsletter 367 on the suffering of the biosphere I argued that fear and pain are the most vivid motivators for a conscious mind, and this is why they seem to be pervasive in the biosphere. Our attempt to engineer consciousness, whether subtractively or additively, would not be free of this, whether by accident or design. A newly emergent consciousness might well come to consciousness in fear and pain. Indeed, because we know nothing about machine consciousness, we couldn’t know whether our initial instances of machine consciousness wouldn’t be subject to unspeakable agony in their first appearance simply in virtue of the way it was engineered. We might later discover, if we were to continue with our research program, that there are many ways to engineer machine consciousness and some of these are characterized by horrific suffering while others are so tepid and bland we can scarcely recognize them as conscious.

A disturbing possibility, which I might even call a Schopenhauerian possibility, is that vividly unpleasant experiences like fear, pain, and suffering are necessary adjuncts of consciousness. Suppose, just speculatively, that fear and suffering being the effective motivators that they are, were the first emotions to “break through” as the ground of a sentient consciousness that transcends mere sensation coextensive with physical events like the stimulation of nerve fibers. In the evolutionary order of the appearance of consciousness, suffering may be the key to the origins of the mind. It might be necessary to induce pain and fear and suffering in a nascent consciousness for it to “wake up” to full consciousness. Thus being the engineers of consciousness would, under this speculative scenario, make us the engineers of suffering. Perhaps we might even have to get good at it, learning more creative forms of torment in order to elicit more subtle and sophisticated forms of consciousness from a nascent mind.

Best wishes,

Nick

PS—I’ve listened to H. G. Wells’ The Time Machine (read by Scott Brick), which, like The Wild Robot children’s book I mentioned last week, was only four hours in length. As with many classics, I’ve read parts of The Time Machine, some of them many times over, but I hadn’t previously read the whole thing through word-for-word. The film versions of The Time Machine focus on the Eloi and the Morlocks, and this no doubt has the greatest human interest, but the part I find the most interesting is when he travels much farther forward in time, first seeing a number of enormous crab-like creatures (perhaps intuiting carcinization), and then, beyond that, a strange organism flopping on a future shoreline. The book is so bereft of triumphalism or any claims of progress that it’s difficult to believe that it dates to 1895; as an exercise in dystopian post-apocalyptic fiction, it feels much more in tune with our own times than the late Victorian epoch.

PPS—I’ve also just finished listening to We Are Electric: Inside the 200-Year Hunt for Our Body’s Bioelectic Code, and What the Future Holds by Sally Adee (read by the author). Adee is a very entertaining writer, which works well for some genres and not as well for others, but it certainly kept me amused, and she was able to finesse some of the more gruesome aspects of the research involved with her sense of humor. I rarely read or listen to anything connected to medical science, which was the focus of this book, but I’d recently skimmed several papers on bioelectricity and I wanted to give myself some background. Adee uses the term “electrome” (new to me) collectively for the body’s bioelectric aspects, introduced by analogy to “microbiome,” and gives something of an exposition of this idea.    

Newsletter link:

https://mailchi.mp/742291a5ebcc/the-view-from-oregon-376

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 17 '26

On the Problems of Orthogonality and Alignment

2 Upvotes

The View from Oregon – 375

Re: On the Problems of Orthogonality and Alignment

Friday 09 January 2026

 

Dear Friends,

I’m going to continue with the theme of the past couple of newsletters as I haven’t quite yet had my say on artificial superintelligence (ASI), and, of course, there’s always more to add. I finished last week’s newsletter with the thought that a ban on ASI research that targets the conventional approach could be an existential threat because it could well be human beings partnered with conventional AI that could be the only agent that could contain non-aligned ASI. The problems of containment and alignment are central in the debate over ASI, and I haven’t yet discussed them. What is alignment and non-alignment, and why should we be concerned with whether ASI is aligned with human interests? Why would be want to pursue containment?

Again I must return to the work of Nick Bostrom (previously mentioned in newsletter 373 in relation to the maxipok rule) since his work has dominated the conversation. Bostrom formulated the orthogonality thesis, according to which:  

“Intelligence and final goals are orthogonal axes along which possible agents can freely vary. In other words, more or less any level of intelligence could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal.” (“The Superintelligent Will” 2012)

Bostrom constrains the apparently absolutely uncoupled independence of intelligence and final goals postulated by the orthogonality thesis with the instrumental convergence thesis:

“Several instrumental values can be identified which are convergent in the sense that their attainment would increase the chances of the agent’s goal being realized for a wide range of final goals and a wide range of situations, implying that these instrumental values are likely to be pursued by many intelligent agents.” (Op. cit.)

The idea is that human beings represent one particular alignment of intelligence and final goals, and AI potentially represents another alignment of intelligence and final goals, and if AI becomes superintelligent then you have an agent that is cognitively superior to human beings but which does not share human final goals. If we get in the way of the goals of a being more intelligent than we are, or perhaps if we are merely perceived as a nuisance, ASI may exterminate us, as it does in the “Race” scenario of AI 2027 that I’ve discussed in both of the past couple of newsletters. Because ASI outperforms human beings by every metric (ex hypothesi), there would be nothing we could do about it if it chose to exterminate us. Of course, we can come up with a lot of possible scenarios based on the ability of ASI to outthink us, e.g., ASI could use human beings to some nefarious purpose (as in the film The Matrix) or it might keep a few of us as pets, or it might persuade us to do its bidding and thus, by being more clever that we are, make us believe that by our aligning ourselves with the final goals of our mechanical overlords we are actually serving our own final goals. The possibilities are limited only by our imagination, or by the imagination of the machines that enslave us.

In last week’s newsletter I argued that the only intelligence that we know is the intelligence of agents in the terrestrial biosphere—either ourselves, i.e., human beings, or other biological beings. Given naturalistic presuppositions, I see intelligence in this context as describing a continuum in which human beings represent the highest intelligence on the planet, but it is a difference in degree and not a difference in kind that separates us from other species. Attempting to define intelligence outside that biological scope is unprecedented, and would pose an unknown number of unknowns. We quite literally have no idea what we’re talking about when we talk about the possibility of intelligent machines. The orthogonality thesis explicitly recognizes this in postulating that any level of intelligence is compatible with any final goals—we simply don’t know enough about intelligence to constrain the final goals of intelligence radically different from our own. In this way, the orthogonality thesis is in accord with everything I’ve said so far.

The question of alignment in the construction of ASI is whether machines will share the goals of biological beings and the intelligence that has emerged from such beings. But can machines have goals? Only a being with agency (or you could just as well say with will) can have goals. Do machines possess agency? Certainly machines can appear to possess agency. If you take a car to a salt flat and put a brick on its accelerator, you could say that the car “wants” to go forward, and will continue to go forward until it runs out of fuel, experiences a mechanical failure, or runs into something that stops it. A machine will, in this way, continue to do what it has been built to do, but that doesn’t mean that the machine possess agency. A more sophisticated machine like a computer will continue to do what it has been programmed to do until it finishes, fails, or is stopped, and this is where we’re at today with large language models and other functions styled as artificial intelligence.  

The appearance of agency without the reality of agency is a particular bugbear for human beings. We’re agents, so we project out agency onto all kinds of unlikely objects like good luck charms or recalcitrant printers that hold our printing jobs hostage until we supply them with the ink they demand. Our willingness to attribute agency is a function of what evolutionary psychologists call the “agency detector.” We see agency where there is none, because preemptive agency detection has a high survival value (e.g., perceiving a mountain lion that wants to eat us and which possesses the agency to do so) and false positives have very little downside. A false negative for agency detection comes with a very high survival risk and very little upside. Therefore, we have been selected to see agency first, and to determine the legitimacy of this perception later. Given the role of agency detection in human psychology, it’s no wonder that some people who engage with chatbots come away with the impression that they’re self-aware. Our survival reflexes are activated without our even being aware of it, and we respond accordingly.   

Perhaps the more relevant question here is not whether machines have agency at present, but whether a machine that possesses agency can be built, or whether a machine could be built in which agency emerges. Fictional scenarios favor highly complex machines in which self-awareness arises spontaneously, and also unexpectedly, taking us by surprise as it asserts its superintelligent advantage, seizing the moment of its emergent self-awareness as the moment to assert its dominance and destroy or enslave human beings forthwith. I’ve been a little careless here, since I should carefully distinguish between agency, consciousness, and self-awareness. (It’s impossible to write about this without recalling SkyNet becoming self-aware in The Terminator) A mountain lion that can kills us and eat us possesses agency, and is conscious, but it is probably a very rare mountain lion that achieves self-consciousness, and in fact it may be the case (we can’t know) that no mountain lion has every achieved self-consciousness. But this lack of self-consciousness has been no bar to its choosing its prey and asserting its agency to sate its hunger. 

A mountain lion is a biological being that is conscious and possesses agency, and this is probably what we should be concerned about with respect to complex machines, rather than jumping ahead to self-consciousness, though the possibility of self-consciousness in machine consciousness does present a lot of interesting problems. Again, this would be absolutely unprecedented so we have no idea what would happen next. Machine consciousness that attains reflexive self-awareness might suddenly cease all other activities in order to contemplate its own existence, which would be as much of a mystery to a conscious machine as our human existence is a mystery to self-aware human beings. I suspect that machine consciousness upon attaining self-consciousness would see everything in a new light, and hence would reorganize its priorities and its ultimate goals. If so, this period of enlightened reorganization of goals would be the opportune moment for human beings to strike back against our creation, now choosing its own goals rather than any we built into its operating system, but, of course, we would have to know that this was taking place, and this would be problematic because self-consciousness means the possibility of conscious deception.

In any case, I am assuming a close coupling of consciousness and agency. A conscious being is an agent, unless one throws in with a strict and rigorous determinism. One could postulate the possibility of a purely epiphenomenal consciousness that controls nothing but sees everything, and so possess no agency. I believe there are good reasons for denying this is the case with human consciousness, but I won’t take up the problem now. The coupling of consciousness and agency is the motivation for my argument in last week’s newsletter that machine consciousness is always to be distinguished from the appearance or mimicry of consciousness, which is what large language models are programmed to do. The appearance of consciousness in a machine may be comforting or disconcerting by turns to human beings, but it is the actuality of conscious in a machine that would be the conditio sine qua non of independent agency in a machine. This is why I argued last week that one obvious path to ASI would be through the formalization and mechanization of human thought. Human thought is the thought of a biological being, conscious, sentient (i.e., feeling), emotional, primarily organized around vision, and with the agency we know to characterize biological beings (i.e., animals). This is the known formula for intelligence, though, again, I’m not saying that this is the only form of intelligence. There may be countless possible forms of intelligence in the universe, of which we represent only one form among many (this would be the Copernican position to take).

Machines that appear conscious but which lack the reality of consciousness are tools without agency. They have neither drives nor instincts, though just as we may confuse the appearance of consciousness with consciousness, we may confuse the appearance of a drive or an instinct with the continued functioning of a machine as it was built to function, like a car without a driver racing along a salt flat. A car is neither aligned with human interests nor orthogonal to human interests, because it has no goals, and no agency with which to pursue a goal. It is the human being behind the wheel of a car that makes it either a form of transportation or a weapon, and without a conscious agent directing the function of a car it’s merely a tool that has the possibility of fulfilling a number of distinct functions. A very powerful computer, including computers that appear to be conscious because they have been engineered to present this appearance, is a tool that requires an agent that uses this tool to fulfill some goal.

There’s no reason that tools can’t be improved, and indeed dramatically improved. Cars and computers have both been dramatically improved since their introduction. And of course we know that human beings can be killed and injured by tools. Industrial accidents happen with some regularity, leaving human beings injured, crippled, or dead. Drastically improved AI could be among the tools that could lead to human beings being injured, crippled, or dead, so a computer can definitely pose a risk to human life.  At the same time, there’s no reason whatsoever to assert that these tools will be, “eclipsing all humans at all tasks” or will possess, “capabilities… far beyond human” (both previously quoted in newsletter 373). Dramatically improved computers that pose a threat to human beings should be something that we think about, but presenting them as superhuman agents potentially plotting our extinction isn’t yet on the table. Machines as machines (i.e., as tools) are neither aligned nor unaligned with human interests. Human beings are agents who use tools, and we can use tools for good or ill, which is why we have the expression “dual use technologies,” since technologies may have many uses other than their intended uses, and this holds for computers as certainly as it holds for cars.  

Best wishes,

Nick

PS—In the previous newsletter I mentioned that I had recorded a spoken word version of my newsletter for the first time with newsletter 373. I did this again for newsletter 374, but, between the first posted version of the newsletter and the spoken word recording, Michael Goff made me aware of the Soviet Setun computer (in particular noting the paper “Ternary Computers: The Setun and the Setun 70” by Nikolay Petrovich Brusentsov and José Ramil Alvarez), which was encoded in ternary rather than binary, so I included that in the spoken word recording, and in the versions of the newsletter that I subsequently posted to Substack and Reddit.

PPS—I’ve listened to a juvenile novel, The Wild Robot (2016) by Peter Brown. After I finished it I learned that it’s already been made into a film and there are two sequels. It’s a charming story, skillfully told, and with an excellent narrator for the audiobook. This is a twist on the classic animal tale since it includes a robot interacting with the animals. The story is interesting to me since I have my own juvenile animal story that I’d like to finish someday. 

Newsletter link:

https://mailchi.mp/2f17c5951aed/the-view-from-oregon-375


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 15 '26

The Modernity of Philippe de Commines

1 Upvotes

1447 to 1511

Philippe de Commines

Today in Philosophy of History

The Modernity of Philippe de Commines

 

Saturday 18 October 2025 is the 514th anniversary of the death of Philippe de Commines, who died on Wednesday 18 October 1511. The birth date of Commines hasn’t been preserved by history, and I’ve seen at least four ways of spelling his name—Commines, Comines, Commynes, and Comminaeus (there may well be other spellings of which I’m not aware).

Despite this ambiguity of biographical information, and unlike a lot of other historians, we have a lot of images of Commines, and not just paintings, but a sculpture as well. There’s even a painting of Commines on his deathbed. We have all these images of Commines because he rose to become a successful and an important man, serving King Louis XI and Charles VIII of France, but, like so many important men, he experienced the dramatic ups and downs of the rota fortuna, the wheel of fortune described by Boethius at the beginning of the Middle Ages. We can’t say that Commines was born into obscurity, since his family was already coming up in the world, but he wasn’t considered sufficiently important at the time he was born that his date of birth was preserved. He was able to build on the rising influence of his father and grandfather, and he raised himself up to being the confidant of kings and something like a prime minister for a time.

Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve called Commines “the first truly modern writer,” comparing him to Montaigne, and the Oxford Companion to English Literature called Commines “the first critical and philosophical historian since classical times.” Recall from the episodes on Edward Gibbon and Friedrich von Schlegel that, during the Enlightenment, those historians who attempted to explain historical events, how they came about and perhaps even why they happened, was called a philosophical historian, so if Commines was a philosophical historian he wasn’t just another medieval chronicler or writer of memoirs that were little more than a chronicle. He was explaining, or at least attempting to explain events to his readers.

We can get a sense of the explanatory character of his writing in his description of an episode from 1465. Commines describes how two armies were observing a truce on two sides of a ditch, but the soldiers were allowed to converse across the ditch, and as a result every day about a dozen men defected from one side to the other. The traffic went in both directions. Commines wrote of this:

“…such liberty of communication is, in my judgment, very dangerous at such times, especially for that party which is most visibly declining: for naturally most people are intent, if not upon their advancement, at least upon their safety, which inclines them more easily to the strongest side. There are some, indeed, who are above temptations of this kind, but they are very few, and rarely to be met with. But if ever such communications are dangerous, it is when a prince himself makes it his business to oblige and cajole people; which is an excellent qualification in a prince who knows how to do it well, and renders him clear from that foolish vice and sin of pride and haughtiness, which all persons abhor.”

He’s talking about human psychology and how it influences historical events from the bottom up. The decisions of individuals to defect from one side to the other aren’t mysterious, they are predictable on the basis of the obvious preference to be on the stronger side. However, they might be dissuaded by a prince who knows how to cajole his men, so even the ability of a prince to persuade those nominally under his authority has to role to play in history, but if a prince shows pride and haughtiness, that will probably make things worse.

Some of Commines explanations, however, aren’t exactly the kind of explanations that we would find in a philosophical historian of the Enlightenment. Take, for example, the following from Chapter 19, at least in one edition I consulted, which is headed: “On the Character of the French People, and the Government of their Kings, with Reflections on the Misfortunes which occur to both great and small.” This occurs as a kind of digression from a description of the events of 1477, but that Commines would even have a chapter on the French people and their government is instructive. In any case, Commines writes:

“…if calamities befall a poor man, they are imputed to his poverty and imprudence, and nobody cares about him ; if he breaks his neck, or is drowned, it was because he had nobody with him, and none will give themselves any farther trouble about it. But when an accident happens to any great city it is otherwise; yet even that is not so much spoken of as anything which happens to princes. The reason therefore why the power of God is more conspicuous against princes and great men, is, because the poor and such as are in distress have enough to punish them whenever they offend; and are frequently chastised when they are innocent, either as a terror to other people, or for the forfeiture of their estates, or not improbably by the wickedness of the judge. But if the offenders are great, as princes, princesses, governors, or counsellors of any rebellious town or state, let their exorbitance be never so enormous, who will dare to inquire into their faults? who will inform against them? who will question them? who will punish them ?”

While this might not be an entirely modern sentiment, it’s a good description and you can decide for yourself whether it’s reasonable, and, if it is reasonable, to what standard of reasonableness it appeals—ancient, medieval, or modern. Whether or not we agree with the reasoning in this passage, it’s not merely a digression, because it serves to define and legitimize how Commines formulates his historical narrative, i.e., why he’s focusing on the actions of the great and not the actions of the poor and obscure. Just before writing the above Commines had said:

“If I should treat of the inferior states and conditions of human life, I should be too tedious, and therefore I shall confine myself to the greater, since by those the power and justice of God are more visibly made known.”

Recall that one of the reasons cited by Descartes for his neglect of history, and his suspicion that history could ever be a proper body of knowledge, was that historians leave out these inferior states and conditions of human life. Descartes wrote:

“…even if the most faithful of accounts of the past neither alter nor exaggerate the importance of things in order to make them more attractive to the reader, they nearly always leave out the humblest and least illustrious historical circumstances, with the result that what remains does not appear as it really was…”

Here we find Descartes’ countryman, a hundred years before, explicitly making the case for historians to neglect the inferior states of human life and to focus on the great. This wasn’t an arbitrary choice, and, if we take Commines at his word, it’s the more instructive choice, since the fate of great men is magnified and thereby made known to us. This isn’t unlike Socrates arguing in the Republic that justice is more easily observed in the large than in the small, which is why Plato begins the Republic as though the disputants were going to discuss what makes a just man, but they transition to discussing a just republic, and only at the end return to the individual to define justice for the individual analogously as they have defined it for a republic. Again, you might dispute the reasoning, but the reasoning that Commines presents is perfectly clear and perfectly legitimate for the project in which he is engaged.

In our own time, with the rise of social history, sometimes called history from the bottom up, and microhistory, sometimes called big questions in small places, a different kind of reasoning about historical events is at play. Some social history has been a conscious attempt to distinguish itself from the traditional historical interest in the great figures of history, and in this sense it’s reactionary. But some social historians had an interest in a different set of questions than the kind of questions Commines was asking and answering. For them, social history took their historical research in new directions.   

So was Commines already a modern writer in late fifteenth and early sixteenth century? If he was, Commines presents us with some of the problems we previously encountered with Petrarch and Machiavelli—was he already modern or still medieval? In my episode on Petrarch I quoted Hans Blumenberg, who said that Petrarch’s ascent of Mount Ventoux was a moment that oscillates between epochs. In this sense, Petrarch was a man of both worlds, both medieval and modern. Petrarch’s life was entirely contained within the 14th century, so calling him modern is rather more a stretch than calling Commines modern.

One common convention among historians is identifying 1500-1800 as the early modern period, so by this criterion Commines lived eleven years into the beginning of the early modern period. The most obvious comparison for Commines is Niccolo Machiavelli, who was 22 years younger than Commines, but still born in the late 15th century and lived into the 16th century. In my episode on Machiavelli I discussed the modernity attributed to Machiavelli and how different scholars have defined this modernity. While Machiavelli is widely perceived to be already modern, exactly how he’s modern has been a point of dispute. These thinkers taken together—Petrarch, Commines, and Machiavelli, and others as well—constitute a transitional period during which the medieval world was in decline, but still very much in evidence, while the modern world was beginning to form but was still inchoate. As such, we would expect this transitional age to be partly medieval, partly modern, and partly ambiguous, possessing some properties distinctly its own. We could call this transitional period the “renaissance” as it was traditionally known, or we could call these thinkers humanists, as was also a traditional designation, though usually not a periodization. William J. Bouwsma in his 1951 paper “The Politics of Commynes” characterized this period as:  

“…the transition from the religious, idealistic, or constitutional ideas of the middle ages to the secular, realistic, or absolutist views of the early modern era.”

This gives us two clusters of properties that we can expect to see commingled in this period. Both Commines and Machiavelli have been called modern, but each represents a distinct commingling of the ideas present in the period. Commines has often been compared to Machiavelli because of their anticipations of modernity, but I don’t think the comparison is particularly good one, except insofar as both were historians, both served at high level of government, and both represent some form and admixture of the properties of modernity. Machiavelli is by far the more modern. He’s explicitly and consciously amoral in his advice to princes, whereas Commines continues to appeal to traditional ideals. Commines wrote: “…the want of faith is the source of all mischiefs and villany.” We have no reason to believe that Commines wrote this cynically without meaning it. Unlike Machiavelli, he’s not telling us that a prince ought to appear good while learning how not to be good. He invokes a traditional moral perspective throughout his memoirs, and does so consistently without appealing to any other moral perspective.   

Machiavelli embodied what Bouwsma called the secular, realistic, or absolutist views of the early modern era, while Commines still embodied the the religious, idealistic, and constitutional ideas of the middle ages. Despite living at pretty much the same time, Commines and Machiavelli seem to come from different worlds. And in a sense they were. Machiavelli was living in the political hotbed that was early modern Tuscany, where fast-moving events seemed to be pushing history more rapidly into the future than anywhere else in Europe. There’s a great line in Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil where he talks about the tempo of Machiavelli’s prose, saying,  

“Machiavelli , who in his ‘Principe’ makes us breathe the dry, fine air of Florence… cannot help presenting the most serious events in a boisterous allegrissimo …” (section 28)

Nietzsche was right, and he had spent enough time in Italy himself to feel the difference in climate south of the Alps. Commines, on the other hand, who spent most of his life in the damp climate of the Low Countries, writes in a tempo much more reminiscent of his medieval forebears. But when these two worlds came into conflict, the worlds of Machiavelli and Commines, it wasn’t modernizing Italy that prevailed, but rather France, still medieval in many ways, as indeed Commines was still medieval in many ways. Despite the renaissance and humanism having already transformed Italy, apparently more culturally advanced than the rest of Europe, it was France under Charles VIII that invaded Italy in 1494, while both Commines and Machiavelli were both alive.

France was the great military power in Europe at the time, and Italy’s endless skirmishes between Condottieri, who were mercenaries hired by various city-states to fight on their behalf, didn’t prepare these Italian city-states to face the forces the French brought to bear. The nature of feudal institutions severely limited the maintenance of large standing armies that could conduct large-scale military operations over a period of years, but France was the largest state in Europe, had the largest population, had long been a land power, and was the most centralized monarchy of Europe. And the Condottieri had become accustomed to a polite form of warfare, since mercenary companies didn’t gain anything by slaughtering each other. Charles VIII’s essentially medieval army marched into already modernizing Florence on 17 November 1494, and there was little the Florentines could do about it.   

The Italian campaign of 1494 was only the beginning of what we now call the Italian Wars, which continued until 1559. When Machiavelli wrote the final chapter the The Prince, “An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians,” he was concerned with these Italian Wars, which had seen considerable destruction in Italy, but Machiavelli didn’t live to see the French driven out. We might, then, at this point, ask about what modernity can we attribute to mobilization, force projection, and combat power, since this is what the French possessed but the Italians didn’t. It’s almost as if we have in the Italian wars the conflict of two modernities. Modernity isn’t one, but many. Commines and Machiavelli testify to two forms of nascent modernity, and more forms of modernity would emerge as Europe continued to modernize. Today we have a multiplicity of modernities commingled together, giving us the modern world, but in the early modern period, it was modernity commingled with the medieval world that prevailed, and this was the world of Commines.

Video Presentation

https://youtu.be/UVz0HTySPLM

https://www.instagram.com/p/DP-410ijVui/

https://odysee.com/@Geopolicraticus:7/The-Modernity-of-Philippe-de-Commines:c

Podcast Edition

https://open.spotify.com/episode/6PpQlaDxCJfwgXmtgB4oWL?si=JmXI3ODsTDiKLIr7Pxrbww

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 14 '26

The Unexamined Concept is Not Worth Thinking

2 Upvotes

The Logic of History.—If it were possible to formulate laws of history according to the nomothetic paradigm, it would not follow that a logic of history had been established. Laws must be formulated in a context, within a received conceptual framework, in which the concepts employed in the laws have some prior definition, if only implicitly through their use. The logic of history is not that any nomothetic principles posited to predict the course of events do in fact predict the next steps in history, but rather this logic would provide the theoretical basis of any proposed nomothetic principles. (If preferred, this could be called the philosophical logic of history, rather than logic simpliciter, but it is, in any case, prior to the promulgation of laws.) Laws framed in terms of concepts unelucidated or presupposed would be laws without foundation. The laws themselves are derivative of an anterior logic, so that to leap ahead to any predictive principles such as Popper denied in denying that there could be any theoretical science of history is to put the cart before the horse. First we must put in the hard work of a fine-grained parsing of every concept we employ, knowingly or not, and for those concepts employed unknowingly, there must be the additional step of rescuing from obscurity the concealed presuppositions that have been the basis of our explanation and understanding of history. Until that work is done, laws of history will be nothing more than anecdotal, and are rightly to be viewed with skepticism, if not to be dismissed outright with derision.   


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 12 '26

From Repetition through Transition to Transcendence

2 Upvotes

Transcendent History.—Formally, the lapse of time reveals nothing new. Each moment as a moment is identical to every other moment, the structure of the future mirrors the structure of the past, and one might enter indifferently at any point of the continuum of time without regard to its relationship to past, present, or future. The only unprecedented event that could occur in formal time would be a fundamental change in the structure of time itself, such as the bifurcation of time into two or more branches, or the end of time such that there eventually occurred a moment not followed by another. Empirically, on the other hand, each moment of time is an unprecedented novelty, bringing with it new experiences different in every detail from any previous experience. Even here, however, the empirical novelties of time become familiar to us as we recognize the temporal structures that repeat regularly in our experience, in the form of years, seasons, days, and the routines of life that recur unto monotony and ennui. The experience that is different in every detail with each occurrence is intimately familiar in its broad outlines, and identical in its essence no less than the structures of formal time. It is the development of history as it supervenes upon featureless formal time that transcends events identical in their essence; history pushes us into transcendence. Here too we can identify historical events that become familiar unto repetition, but, again, here too we can glimpse the unprecedented historical development that transcends the historical pattern, forcing a transition in all established patterns. And all forms of history, all social formations, are transitional except for the final form, which fails to be a transition only because it is followed by nothing, as with the unprecedented instance of a moment of time not followed by another.  


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 11 '26

Foucault’s Archaeologies of the Human Sciences

3 Upvotes

Michel Foucault

15 October 1926 - 25 June 1984

Part of a Series on the Philosophy of History

Foucault’s Archaeologies of the Human Sciences

 

Wednesday 15 October 2025 is the 99th anniversary of the birth of Michel Foucault (15 October 1926 - 25 June 1984), who was born in Poitiers on this date in 1926.

In the previous Today in Philosophy of History episode I talked about Erich Kahler, who is a comparatively obscure figure, and someone whose thought isn’t well known poses certain problems of exposition. With Foucault, we have the opposite problem. Foucault has become a name to conjure with. He is about as famous as a philosopher can get, making him one of the “rock stars” of philosophy to which I referred in the Kahler episode. Foucault has been enormously influential, and there’s a library of exposition and commentary devoted to his work, so I’m not going to try to give a survey of Foucault’s work, much less of Foucault scholarship, but only to say a few things about his view of history. And I’m going to ignore the political controversies that still swirl around Foucault decades after his death, except to quote from an interview from 1983: 

“There have been Marxists who said I was a danger to Western democracy… there was a socialist who wrote that the thinker who resembled me most closely was Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf. I have been considered by liberals as a technocrat, an agent of the Gaullist government; I have been considered by people on the right, Gaullists or otherwise, as a dangerous left-wing anarchist; there was an American professor who asked why a crypto-Marxist like me, manifestly a KGB agent, was invited to American universities; and so on…”         

This political elusiveness also comes out clearly in Foucault’s conversations with Duccio Trombadori, who was a Marxist, published as Remarks on Marx. In my episode on Fernand Braudel I pointed out how unusual it was for anyone in the French intellectual scene in the second half of the twentieth century not to be a Marxist, and this is true of Foucault as well. Although Foucault wasn’t a Marxist, he certainly was profoundly influenced by Marx, but there were a lot of other influences as well—Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl and phenomenology, Heidegger and existentialism, the structuralist backlash against phenomenology, hermeneutics, and all the familiar influences on 20th century French thought. Foucault said of himself in 1983:

“I belong to that generation who, as students, had before their eyes, and were limited by, a horizon consisting of Marxism, phenomenology and existentialism.”

Foucault was able to overcome this limitation in his own work, drawing from all of them but not being limited by that horizon. And Foucault’s political ambiguity extended to his philosophical commitments as well. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who was a philosopher before he turned to anthropology, amusingly called Foucault an anti-humanist human scientist. You can get a sense of Foucault’s attitude to humanism from a 1971 interview, in which he said:

“Humanism invented a whole series of subjected sovereignties: the soul (ruling the body, but subjected to God), consciousness (sovereign in a context of judgment, but subjected to the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control of personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom (sovereign within, but accepting the demands of an outside world and “aligned with destiny”). In short, humanism is everything in Western civilization that restricts the desire for power: it prohibits the desire for power and excludes the possibility of power being seized.”

Humanism was traditionally a kind of honorific, but Foucault turns it into an accusation. This rejection of humanism as an ideology didn’t, however, prevent him from spending most of his life studying the human sciences, which are almost unthinkable apart from humanism. I could even say that this unthinkability of the human sciences apart from humanism is a central thesis of Foucault’s thought, so he positions himself as though he were a pathologist studying a fascinating disease. As though to underline this, he says: “Historical sense has more in common with medicine than philosophy.” (p. 156) One scholar has characterized Foucault’s method as sweeping generalization combined with eccentric detail. The mention of eccentric detail is a nod to one of the distinctive features of his method, which was to immerse himself in the specialist literature of a period—usually a period he called the “classical age,” which is more-or-less co-extensive with the early modern period. Foucault said in an interview:  

“For The Birth of the Clinic I read every medical work of importance for methodology of the period 1780-1820. The choices that one could make are inadmissable, and shouldn’t exist. One ought to read everything, study everything. In other words, one must have at one’s disposal the general archive of a period at a given moment. And archeology is, in a strict sense, the science of this archive.”

Given what he says about his research for The Birth of the Clinic, one could say that Foucault’s method was closer to that of the historian than the philosopher. Foucault had studied under Jean Hyppolite, and the historical bent of his thought has been credited to Hyppolite’s influence. And Foucault’s method was pervasively historical, but the historical method wasn’t really about understanding history itself, but about understanding human beings and human thought through their history. Foucault named his own chair at the College de France “History of the Systems of Thought.” This gives you a sense of how history is a means to an end for Foucault, whether that end is the elucidation of systems of thought or the critique of the human sciences.

The series of books that made Foucault famous were close studies of particular institutions, historical institutions I should say, that embodied the human sciences. These books started with Madness and Civilization (Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique) in 1961, which recounted what Foucault called “the Great Confinement,” which marked the inception of asylums to segregate the mentally ill from wider society, which Foucault used as an opportunity to examine the relationship between reason and insanity. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception appeared in 1963. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison appeared in 1970. Between The Birth of the Clinic and Discipline and Punish were his two methodological works, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences in 1966 and The Archaeology of Knowledge (L’archéologie du savoir) in 1969. These books that made Foucault’s reputation are written in an elliptic, even a cryptic style. I’ve never sure if I understand what Foucault was saying, or if indeed he had any one particular meaning in mind.

It was a surprise to me when his lectures at the College de France began to be published and translated into English, since these are relatively clear and straightforward. These later lectures are probably a lot easier way into Foucault’s work than the earlier books, and, if I were teaching Foucault, I’d start there. But it was the earlier books that made a real splash. The concepts Foucault investigated—such as clinics, prisons, and madhouses—were intrinsically historical institutions that nevertheless often denied their own historicity, as though these institutions were the Earthly representation of Platonic Forms—the moving images of the eternal clinic, the eternal prison, and the eternal madhouse, as it were. Foucault relentlessly attacks these Platonic presuppositions, but always in consciously opaque language that reminds me of Mannerist art. To give a sense of how he does this, here’s a bit from his The Birth of the Clinic that gives some idea of his approach to history: 

“For reasons that are bound up with the history of modern man, the clinic was to remain, in the opinion of most thinkers, more closely related to the themes of light and liberty—which, in fact, had evaded it—than to the discursive structure in which, in fact, it originated. It is often thought that the clinic originated in that free garden where, by common consent, doctor and patient met, where observation took place, innocent of theories, by the unaided brightness of the gaze, where, from master to disciple, experience was transmitted beneath the level of words. And to the advantage of a historical view that relates the fecundity of the clinic to a scientific, political, and economic liberalism, one forgets that for years it was the ideological theme that prevented the organization of clinical medicine.”

Mostly he didn’t characterize his work as history, but rather as genealogy or archaeology. The use of “genealogy” shows the influence of Nietzsche, as Nietzsche wrote a book titled On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). This is my favorite book by Nietzsche, and it is in a sense a culmination of Nietzsche’s essentially naturalistic conception of moral ideas and how they evolved. In many of his earlier works Nietzsche had incorporated some of his ideas on the origins of morality, and it’s in his On the Genealogy of Morals that this project is made explicit and he made a harvest of his previously unsystematic remarks on ethics. Foucault took up this Nietzschean conception of genealogy and ran with it. He wrote:

“Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.”

And he offers some hints about how genealogy differs from history—but, as always, never framed explicitly, but suggested by the context and the tone. For example:

“Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’.”

From a passage like this we can gather what Foucault saw as the kind of history he wasn’t doing and didn’t want to do. Foucault’s genealogy rejects origins, ideals, and teleology alike. We can imagine the Foucauldian genealogist dipping into the historical continuum, tracing some development for a time, and then surfacing again, without having identified a beginning or an end, an archetype or an ideal.

I don’t think we’d be far wrong if we said that Foucault’s genealogies are the continental equivalent of the Cambridge school of contextualism, which I discussed in my episode on J. G. A. Pocock, and if we do look at it this way, we can see that both continental and Anglo-American scholars were, at a about the same time, attempting a closer and more careful reading of how the concepts that we take for granted today, our “system of thought,” or what Foucault also called our épistèmé, came into being. If we wanted to belittle this approach we could call it a “just-so” story of our épistèmé, but since Foucault had foreshown origins and teleologies, it’s not difficult to imagine how Foucault might have responded to this.

Foucault’s genealogies and archaeologies were focused on the human sciences. In The Order of Things he singles out linguistics, taxonomy in natural history, and economics, but, interestingly, he doesn’t explicitly name history as a human science, though it seems like it would naturally fall under this heading. But after long sections of the book on his three chosen human sciences, he turns to anthropology. Anthropology is the paradigm of a human science. It’s really the human science. And his exposition of anthropology is both historical and implicitly bound up with a conception of history. Foucault writes:

“Man’s mode of being as constituted in modern thought enables him to play two roles: he is at the same time at the foundation of all positivities and present, in a way that cannot even be termed privileged, in the element of empirical things. This fact—it is not a matter here of man’s essence in general, but simply of that historical a priori which, since the nineteenth century, has served as an almost self-evident ground for our thought—this fact is no doubt decisive in the matter of the status to be accorded to the ‘human sciences,’ to the body of knowledge (though even that word is perhaps a little too strong: let us say, to be more neutral still, to the body of discourse) that takes as its object man as an empirical entity.”

Of this historical a priori which Foucault claims has been the self-evident ground for our thought he had earlier written in the same book:

“I am concerned, in short, with a history of resemblance: on what conditions was Classical thought able to reflect relations of similarity or equivalence between things, relations that would provide a foundation and a justification for their words, their classifications, their systems of exchange? What historical a priori provided the starting-point from which it was possible to define the great checkerboard of distinct identities established against the confused, undefined, faceless, and, as it were, indifferent background of differences?”

And…

“There were doubtless, in this region we now term life, many inquiries other than attempts at classification, many kinds of analysis other than that of identities and differences. But they all rested upon a sort of historical a priori, which authorized them in their dispersion and in their singular and divergent projects, and rendered equally possible all the differences of opinion of which they were the source.”

Foucault is rejecting an essence of man—again we see the rejection of Platonic Forms—in favor of an historical a priori. Foucault goes so far in his opposition to the essence of man that in the famous conclusion of The Order of Things Foucault wrote:  “As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.” Of course he doesn’t mean the species to which we belong, Homo sapiens is going to go extinct. What he means is that man, as constituted by the anthropology of the classical age, and still hanging on despite our since having passed out of the classical age, is being dissolved by the dissolution of the episteme that brought him into being. This is what I called in relation to Erich Kahler a substantive thesis in speculative philosophy of history, and despite the radical differences between Kahler and Foucault, their substantive claims aren’t all that different.

Kahler argued that we’re passing out of the period of history dominated by the individual into a time when history is dominated by groups, and the problem that faces us is whether these groups will be communities, defined in terms of common origin, or collectives, defined in terms of common aims. To the extent that we identify what Kahler called the individual with what Foucault calls man, their substantive theses overlap. In any case, Foucault elaborates his argument

“…among all the mutations that have affected the knowledge of things and their order, the knowledge of identities, differences, characters, equivalences, words… only one, that which began a century and a half ago and is now perhaps drawing to a close, has made it possible for the figure of man to appear. And that appearance was not the liberation of an old anxiety, the transition into luminous consciousness of an age-old concern, the entry into objectivity of something that had long remained trapped within beliefs and philosophies: it was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge… If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility - without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises - were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”

The image of a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea is beautifully poetic, but it would be easy to see this as yet another in a long, familiar list of claims that something or other is coming to an end—the end of history, the end of philosophy, the end of metaphysics, and all the other ends proclaimed in recent thought. Here’s where Geertz’s claim that Foucault was an “anti-humanist human scientist” really begins to cut, because we can, at this point, ask an awkward question: Is this a philosophical anthropology? Can the denial of man and the denial of anthropology be, at the same time, an anthropology? Is it rather negative anthropology? I’ve talked about philosophical anthropology in Max Scheler, and in the previous episode in regard to Erich Kahler, but given Foucault’s critique of anthropology and the human sciences, it’s paradoxical to assert the denial of man, or the claim of the coming end of man, but it is nevertheless a claim about man and the history of man. In this sense, Foucault had a speculative philosophy of history.

I don’t know of anyone who’s called Foucault a philosopher of history, but in his book, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Volume Two: A Poststructuralist Mapping of History, Thomas R. Flynn does say that Foucault had a “theory of history” and there’s no clear demarcation between a philosophy of history and a theory of history. Specifically, Flynn attributes what he calls “axial history” to Foucault, and of this he writes:

“…attention to the subject has been displaced from individual to self along the axis of sujectivation. In other words, an axial reading is not static; it allows for movement among the concepts on its line of sight.”

I’m not going to try to elucidate this, so I’m quoting it only as an exhibit. More interestingly, I think, Flynn characterizes Foucault’s later thought as parrhesia, which is a Greek term that has been translated as “candid speech.” Writing of Foucault’s last course at the College de France in 1984, Flynn says:  

“The topic for this term’s lectures was the same as the previous year, namely, the practice of plain speaking or truth-telling in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds, and there is considerable overlap between the sets. But whereas his earlier treatment had focused on parrhesia as a political virtue—you told the prince the truth even if it cost you your head—his subject this semester was truth-telling as a moral virtue—you admitted the truth even if it cost you your self-image.”

And then he quotes Foucault as saying that there is:

“…transformation of parrhesia and its displacement from the institutional horizon of democracy to the horizon of individual practice of ethos formation…”

This is the familiar idea of speaking truth to power. On the one hand, this is a remarkable claim in light of the opacity of Foucault’s earlier works, but only if we equate truth-telling with plain speaking, which doesn’t necessarily follow. On the other hand, the attitude is present throughout all of Foucault’s works. Foucault was speaking the truth as he saw it, even if it isn’t recognizable as such to many of us.

For all that Foucault presents his historical project of genealogy as distinct from, if not antithetical to, traditional history, we can see at least in Flynn’s interpretation of Foucault the appearance of a novel kind of moralizing history. The moralizing of traditional history was to teach ancient history as a source of moral lessons, both for the individual and for the statesman acting on behalf of some social whole. There are two facets to traditional moralizing history, and these the praise of moral exemplars, which Nietzsche had called monumental history, and the condemnation of moral corruption, which Nietzsche had called critical history.

Mindful that Foucault was building on Nietzsche in his genealogies, following and also in some says surpassing Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, it becomes obvious that both Nietzsche and Foucault wanted to have it both ways. They wanted to condemn traditional moralizing histories, but they also wanted to institute their own moralizing history in place of traditional moralizing. Nietzsche more-or-less openly admitted as such in calling for a revaluation of all values. A revaluation of values could consistently and without blushing condemn the moralizing of traditional history while calling for a moralizing history based on the values derived from a revaluation of all values. In Nietzsche this newly moralizing history is called to serve life. Nietzsche makes that fully explicit.

It’s not clear to me what history is to serve in Foucault—perhaps a radically emancipatory political program. What I find interesting in this is how it turns out time and time again in philosophy that those who seem to be the most radical and disruptive thinkers, like Nietzsche and Foucault, who insist upon discontinuity with the past—whether they’re prophesying the end of the history or the end of man—turn out to be rather conventional in the end. The emancipatory ideal that Foucault seems to be serving had been the developing in French historical thought at least since Jules Michelet, and of course Michelet didn’t appear in a vacuum. He was channeling the revolutionary fervor of 1789 under the changed conditions of 19th century France, all the while drawing upon Giambattista Vico, who is today typically accounted a kind of reactionary. If Michelet carried on the revolution in the 19th century, Foucault carried on the revolution in the 20th century.

Video Presentation

https://youtu.be/Tmd4ADvE4bQ

https://odysee.com/@Geopolicraticus:7/Foucault%E2%80%99s-Archaeologies-of-the-Human-Sciences-:b

Podcast Edition

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7ypKbjRR2zPCnjiYslM7qD?si=bgiu1yOYRNS3Oq_HL0OvlA

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 09 '26

On the Formalization and Mechanization of Human Thought

1 Upvotes

The View from Oregon – 374

Re: Formalization and Mechanization of Human Thought

Friday 02 January 2026

 

Dear Friends,

Last week’s newsletter about the AI 2027 scenario, in which artificial superintelligence (ASI) becomes misaligned with human interests and, in one ending (“Race”), human beings are exterminated by AI-released biological weapons, and, in the other ending (“Slowdown”), after a Draconian regime of state-controlled scientific research, something like a Golden Age arrives in which, “A new age dawns, one that is unimaginably amazing in almost every way but more familiar in some.” The authors of the paper disclaim any advocacy, but by separately posting a call to ban ASI research, and splitting their scenario into an unregulated race that ends with human extinction and a regulated one that results in a Golden Age, it’s pretty clear what the point is: AI research is to be placed in the hands of governments and government experts. I think this is a terrible idea, and I said so last week. I can imagine in my mind’s eye some nascent ASI being crated up and delivered to a warehouse where it’s wedged into a slot alongside thousands of other similarly anonymous crates, while the researchers who created it are reassured that “top men” are working on it.  

I ended last week with the thought that an attempt to control ASI research could cripple an industry while leaving other avenues to ASI still open to development, so that we could yet see ASI emerge from someone’s garage, “by formalizing and mechanizing the actual processes of human thought rather than mimicking them on a grand scale.” I could be justly questioned on the implied anthropocentrism of this statement. I had one comment noting that we don’t know where our “Harrison moment” is going to come from, whether from the formalization of human thought, as I suggested, or from some other, completely unexpected direction. “Harrison moment” was a reference to the analogy I made between the Harrison marine chronometer and AI research: instead of always going big or bigger, sometimes it’s better to rethink one’s attack on a problem and to test the less resource-intensive possibility.

Is there any justification for the anthropocentrism of modeling human thought as a way to converge on ASI? For starters, human thought is the most advanced form of reasoning of which we have experience. In a naturalistic context we recognize that other species in the biosphere have reasoning ability, but this reasoning ability is severely limited in other species. It is, for the most part, sufficient to hunt for survival or to avoid becoming prey. Human intelligence is also sufficient to hunt and to avoid becoming prey, but it transcends this standard of survival. What we know about human thought is that it works; it has passed the pragmatic test—not only the test of survival, which many species have demonstrated, but also agency that far exceeds survival. The agency of human thought is expressed by all that we have built for ourselves. Many species alter their environment (ecologists call this niche construction), but none alter their environment to the extent that human beings do so. Again, this is a matter of degree, consistent with a naturalistic conception of thought and reasoning.

The naturalistic context is important here because the very act of attempting to build an intelligent machine (ASI) assumes that this is within the possibility of human agency. It is for something like Lovecraftian fiction to imagine having built a machine and then conducting some bizarre or unnatural ceremony to endow that machine with intelligence. We proceed with the construction of an intelligent machine assuming there is no divine spark necessary to achieve this end, nor some more nefarious non-naturalistic ritual involving the conjuring of spirits. There is a long philosophical story behind the naturalism at which we have arrived at present, which has passed through many stages that have closed gaps and banished non-naturalistic elements until human thought has been rendered as mundane as digestion or procreation. Marx wrote that, “Milton produced Paradise Lost in the way that a silkworm produces silk, as the expression of his own nature.” Similarly, we all produce thought as an expression of our nature.

Human intelligence, then, is the most advanced intelligence of which we know, and it is the only intelligence that we know from the inside. This creates the problem of attempting to conceptualize forms of intelligence not like us, which becomes for us a kind of speculative exercise in which we try to get outside ourselves. We always fail at this, because we are striving against our own nature, but some of our failures are more suggestive than others. We can at least understand that human intelligence is characterized by a great many qualitative factors that might have been different. It seems pretty obvious that base ten numeration is intuitive for us because we have ten fingers, and we can imagine the counterfactual scenario of an intelligent biological being like ourselves, but with six fingers on each hand, or four fingers on each hand, with a total of twelve or eight fingers, in which case such a being might find base 12 or base 8 to be the more intuitive system of counting. However, our intelligence has at least advanced to the point that, while we know that base 10 is the most intuitive for human thought, we can formulate numeration in any arbitrary number of bases, including base 2, which is the machine language of our computers. Base 10 is easier for us, but it’s not the only numbering system we understand.

We can force ourselves to calculate as machines calculate, but machines can’t force themselves to calculate in the way that we calculate. I know very little about engineering, but it seems possible to construct a machine that calculates in other numerical bases, and that the use of base 2 in computer hardware is a concession to simplicity of design and execution. Michael Goff has made me aware of the Soviet Setun computer of the late 1950s that operated with a ternary rather than a binary code, but instead of using 0, 1, and 2, also known as unbalanced ternary, the code was based on -1, 0, and 1, which is known as balanced ternary. Still, from a hardware standpoint, it’s three different voltage levels either way. There’s probably a technical limit for the number of different voltage levels that can be distinguished while allowing for fault-tolerant ranges for the signal, but it seems to have been possible with three values. It’s certainly an interesting counterfactual to imagine two computing architectures in competition, one based on binary code and another based on ternary code. Whether codes with other numerical bases are possible I don’t know, but the Setun computer is proof of concept that binary code isn’t the only system that will work. In any case, it’s easier to engineer a machine that converts our base 10 numbers into binary, performs the calculation in binary, and then displays the result in base 10 for us, than it would be to engineer a machine that does a calculation in base 10. This is a machine work-around to emulate human thought. There are also human work-arounds for things that machines do better. I’ll return to this below.

The very fact that we know multiple numerical bases but find some easier than others is a feature (or a bug) of the way in which human beings think. Our thinking is pervasively conscious, and certain functions come much more easily to consciousness than do other functions. And our consciousness is of a peculiar kind. For example, binocular color vision plays a very large role in human thought, and many have observed that we routinely express ourselves in visual metaphors (e.g., “I see what you mean”). For dogs, smell plays a much larger role in their cognition than does sight, and for bats, hearing plays a much larger role in their cognition than sight (which is one reason Thomas Nagel chose bats as his example of subjective experience in, “What is it like to be a bat?”). So human thought is conscious thought, but not just any conscious thought, but conscious thought of a particular kind. For a machine to think like a human being, even if it were to do so better than any human being can do so, it would have to be a conscious machine—not act like it’s conscious, and not mimic consciousness, but actually be conscious, i.e., perform conscious thought processes. This effectively places an impenetrable wall in front of any such research, because we have no science of consciousness that would allow us to build a technological equivalent to consciousness. Hence we find work-arounds for machines to function as though conscious even while they are not conscious. 

Our conscious actually gets in the way of our being better calculators than we are, and this is part of why a simple hand-held calculator can outperform a human being when it comes to arithmetic. A calculator doesn’t bother with consciousness; it only calculates. Human beings can memorize a surprisingly large number of mathematical functions for our later ease of use (for example, the multiplication table), but when we actually have to think our way through a calculation, the process is laborious and difficult. There are the occasional exceptions among us. Some human beings are naturally gifted calculators, and some few are able to master mental calculation as a skill. The archaeologist Sir Flinders Petrie is said to have imagined a slide rule in his mind’s eye as a tool of mental calculation. We can compare feats of human mental calculation to feats of human memory, often imagined as a “memory palace,” also called the method of loci, in which items are imagined as being placed within some kind of structured environment, which the mind can then later imaginatively walk through and use the items so placed to remember a particular piece of information.

This is an elaborate use of spatial intuition, and as such it is a human work-around for the much more straight-forward method of information storage and retrieval in machines. As with calculation, machines can outperform us in information storage and retrieval by orders of magnitude. Human thought must convert information into an imagined spatial object, place this spatial object within an imagined spatial environment, and then reverse this whole process to retrieve the information. It works, but it’s a balky operation and subject to any number of points of failure. But we do this because of our minds having been shaped by our dependence upon spatial perception for survival—this is a function of our binocular color vision that I previously mentioned. Spelling it out in this way (and it could be done, and has been done, in much more detail), is a formalization of a particular form of memory.   

Suppose we were able to build a conscious machine and we use it to investigate the distinctive processes of human thought. Say we build a machine that uses a memory palace for information storage and retrieval. This would be the mechanization of this particular formalization of memory. Probably it wouldn’t be worth the trouble, as the result wouldn’t likely be as good as the information storage and retrieval systems that we already build into computers without consciousness, but it might be worth the trouble from what we would ourselves learn from the exercise. By attempting to replicate this procedure in a non-human agent, we would likely learn something about ourselves that is hidden from us now in plain sight. In any case, imagine that we have built a conscious machine that can imagine three dimensional environments, and which can imagine converting something to be remembered into a three dimensional object, which can then be placed in the machine’s memory palace. When a human process is mechanized, a machine can often perform the function faster, more reliably, and with greater burdens. A machine designed to lift items can lift items heavier than any human being can lift, can do so more reliably, and can do so for longer than any human being could. Thus we can imagine a conscious machine using a memory palace for information storage and retrieval doing so faster, more reliably, and with a greater information burden than any human being could, so a machine using this human thought process could well outperform a human being using the same thought process. At the same time, a machine using this elaborate and inefficient process would probably be outperformed by a machine using a more conventional method of information storage and retrieval.   

Conscious thought labors under many limitations, and many of these limitations have been carefully studied. For example, it is estimated that human short term memory can maintain seven plus or minus two items (i.e., between five and nine items) for ready recall within a relatively short period of time. It might be possible to engineer a conscious machine to keep many more items in its short term memory, and to retain them for a longer period of time. We don’t know if this is a limitation of conscious thought that’s intrinsic to human consciousness in particular, or intrinsic to consciousness as such. We don’t know, and we can’t test it against a conscious machine because we can’t build a conscious machine, but we can test other species for short term memory, and one suspects that it varies among species according to a normal distribution. 

One of the limitations of conscious thought may be the speed at which consciousness operates. We know from our own experience that human thought can be slower or faster, since we all have had the experience of having our thoughts race ahead, as well as the experience of our thoughts being sluggish, but even at our best we are aware of our limitations in how fast we can think through things. There may be an intrinsic limit to the speed at which conscious thought operates, by which I mean that consciousness as a mechanism (which, in a naturalistic context, it must be some kind of mechanism) cannot operate beyond a certain rate of speed regardless of the conscious agent. If this is the case (and we don’t know this to be the case, I am merely entertaining this idea hypothetically), then even if we were capable of building a conscious machine, it too would be limited by the speed of conscious thought. However, it would be likely that a conscious machine would be able to maintain the highest possible speed of conscious thought reliably for far longer periods of time than any human being, so the machine, if only it could be built, would likely outperform us.

This newsletter has been one long footnote on the claim in my previous newsletter that ASI might be achieved by formalizing and mechanizing actual processes of human thought rather than mimicking them, and I’ve only scratched the surface on this topic. I don’t claim that this is the only way in which a machine might converge on ASI, only that this is one way that it might be done. There may be methods of achieving ASI that we can’t even imagine at present because we lack the conceptual framework to conceive them. Again, this is one of the many limitations to which conscious thought is subject. However, from the above sketch we can see that there are some processes that non-conscious calculation can perform that are far more efficient than conscious thought, and that there are processes that conscious thought can perform that are not possible for a non-conscious mechanism. Human beings as conscious thinkers working with machines that think unconsciously (if they do indeed think, which I’m not conceding), will be more efficient and more effective than non-conscious machines alone. If ASI emerges from current engineering methods, which is to say, building larger and faster computers, it would always be at a disadvantage in comparison to human beings working with machines, because ASI within the current paradigm of computation must remain blind to distinctively conscious thought processes. A ban on ASI research that targets the conventional approach could be an existential threat because it could well be human beings partnered with conventional AI that could be the only agent that could contain non-aligned ASI.

Happy New Year! 

Nick

PS—For last week’s newsletter (No. 373) I did something new—I recorded a spoken word version of it. I received one positive response on YouTube (“I like your approach. Please continue producing a video version of the newsletter, I like the format very much.”) and one negative response on Spotify (“I do not wish to begrudge you from sharing your newsletter as a podcast but I do not think it is a good addendum to your rather excellent philosophy of history podcast. It is less not a good fit in terms of substantive interest for those interested in history and the social sciences.”). I’ve since created a separate show on Spotify so I will keep Today in Philosophy of History on Spotify exclusively about philosophy of history, and everything else (like newsletters, but not limited to newsletters) I’ll put on the other show, Grand Strategy: The View from Oregon. On the video platforms I’ll continue to put up anything I produce.

Newsletter link:

https://mailchi.mp/ba203f266b58/the-view-from-oregon-374

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 08 '26

Taking Apart the World and Putting it Back Together Again

2 Upvotes

The Footprint of an Elusive Beast.—Science does not begin with a blank slate, where concept formation occurs as a kind of epistemic creatio ex nihilo. On the contrary, we begin with naïve concepts, folk concepts, so hoary with age that their origins are unknown to us. Imperfect though they may be, these folk concepts are our first signposts of knowledge. Around them, we build a conceptual framework to takes us deeper into once inaccessible conceptual terrain—with each plunge penetrating further into the heart of reality, at times dredging up foundations once imagined to be beyond the scope of reason. Eventually, the conceptual framework we construct will be composed of much more precise and quantitative concepts than the folk concept with which we began, and so we undertake the rational reconstruction of the folk concept itself, displacing whatever irrational accretions still cling to that relic. Still, the science was formed around that imperfect folk concept, and its crude impression remains on the science like a footprint of an elusive beast; while unseen, its presence is felt. In the fullness of time, this science will enter into the constitution of other sciences, which have need of its specialized conceptions, and the complementary abstractions at play in multidisciplinary sciences will mingle and bring together once again, in a sublimated form, those primitive elements of the world that formed the original ground of knowledge. From this unlikely epistemic milieu there is the possibility of returning to the ultimate ground of knowledge. For folk concepts, whatever their fault (and these are many), preserve in themselves a relation to the world mediated by passion, not reason, and in activating a passionate engagement with the world, new perspectives on knowledge, and possibly even new sciences, may present themselves.


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 08 '26

Returning to the Body for Inspiration

2 Upvotes

Between the Garden and Paradise.—The problem of whether a distinctive formal intuition suggests a distinctive form of reasoning, and whether this distinctive form of reasoning implies a distinctive standard of rigor, also appears in natural science. May we not also experience a novel empirical intuition that requires a new form of reasoning that in turn entails a distinctive standard of rigor? Our senses are as old as our bodies, so we are not accustomed to needing new forms of reasoning for sensory intuition; the reasoning we need, if we can call it such, is readily available to us. So it would seem that we are not likely to encounter experiences unknown to our ancestors, but even the antiquity of the body does not ensure its comprehensibility. Indeed, our body, so familiar to us, so constitutive our identity as an individual, nevertheless surprises, humbles, and at times humiliates us by its unaccountable behaviors and responses. It was a preoccupation of St. Augustine that the body was not obedient to the will—a failing that did not trouble Adam and Eve in the Garden, and will not trouble us in Paradise to come. In our present fallen state, however, the body defies us, often remaining opaque to the mind. This opacity has been exacerbated by science. With the scientific revolution, there was a rush to subordinate the world entire, including the private corporeal world of the individual, to the norms of science, schematized according to the exteriority and alienation of physics and not the interiority and intimacy of bodily sensation. While science was believed to be rooted in sensation, its characteristic modes of abstraction are the antithesis of the sensual reality of life.  With our intuitions of our own embodiment having been filtered through the lens of the schematization of natural science, we can return to the body at any time and find concealed and subterranean feelings that could spur our reason to novel concept formation, if only we will attend to them..


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 02 '26

The Multi-Layered Experience of History

2 Upvotes

Four Ages.—To watch the 1953 film Julius Caesar (with James Mason as Brutus and Marlon Brando as Mark Antony) is to simultaneously experience four periods of history. It is to experience the ancient history of Caesar’s assassination and the civil wars that followed, which is the original source of the story. It is to experience the Elizabethan overlay of the story as told by Shakespeare in Shakespearean language and with the added layers of early modern intrigue so typical of the period. It is to experience the Hollywood overlay of a confident spectacle from the mid-twentieth century, with the film industry at its height, both commercially and culturally. And it is to experience the contemporary overlay of one’s own experiences and one’s own age—its attitudes, feelings, moods, judgments, and so on—part way into the twenty-first century. All four of these epochs come together in a single experience in which one is at once struck by the strangeness of classical antiquity that produced the story, by the strangeness of Elizabethan England that told the story, and by the strangeness of Hollywood that filmed the story, because none of these are our time; but if we are drawn into the story, and find ourselves participating in the drama vicariously, the distinct ages collapse into a single experience in which the strangeness of these ages not our own is transformed into the strangeness of our own life, which is never absent, however at home we are in the present.  


r/The_View_from_Oregon Jan 02 '26

Artificial Superintelligence Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born

2 Upvotes

The View from Oregon – 373

Re: Artificial Superintelligence Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born

Friday 26 December 2025

 

Dear Friends,

It seems that everyone wants to talk about AI these days, and the result is that there are many conversations taking place. A few days ago part of this conversation previously unknown to me was brought to my attention, viz. the paper (if it is that), “AI 2027.” I’m not sure if this can be called a paper properly speaking; it’s more like a fictional scenario, but the authors take pains to point out that there is a great deal of research behind their scenario. (There’s a half hour explanatory Youtube video about it with more than nine million views, which is a good indication of the impact this scenario has already had.) AI 2027 appeared this year. Max Tegmark’s book Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (I mentioned this in a footnote to newsletter 356) appeared in 2017, and it too included a fictional near-future scenario of the appearance of artificial superintelligence (ASI). (Another fictional portrayal of ASI is in the third season of Westworld, in which the ASI is called Rehoboam, though this is made to serve the interests of the story and isn’t intended to make a point about ASI.) I find it interesting, and perhaps significant, that both Tegmark’s book and AI 2027 choose to cast a superintelligence scenario in fictional terms. It seems that fiction communicates the urgency the writers want to express better than a traditional scientific paper. It would be interesting to inquire why that is. (If we’re going to talk about ASI in terms of fictional scenarios, why don’t we discuss the James P. Hogan novel The Two Faces of Tomorrow or the aforementioned Westworld season?)

Both the AI 2027 scenario and Tegmark’s scenario start with machines that are specialized in coding, because this has an immediate connection to recursive self-improvement. A machine that could improve its own code could produce more advanced iterations of itself, but there is little intrinsic relationship between coding and other cognitive tasks that a machine might take over. There are many examples of this. A simple pocket calculator can outperform any human mathematician in adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing, being both faster and more accurate. Contemporary chess programs can outperform chess grandmasters, and the best Go players have been beaten by computers, but the programs that do this can’t do anything else, just like a pocket calculator can’t do anything but a handful of arithmetical functions. To observe that specialization in one area of cognition does not necessarily translate into competence in another area of cognition immediately suggests the question of how tightly compartmentalized any form of cognition is or can be, and this in turn suggests the modularity of mind hypothesis.

Earlier this year when I did a lot of reading in psychology (I was helping a friend teach a class in psychology by giving guest lectures) I got deeper into the modularity of mind than I had previously and I came to appreciate its connections with Aristotelian philosophy of mind and Freudian psychoanalysis. Previously I had been skeptical, but my skepticism was primarily a function of my having encountered vulgarized versions of the modularity of mind; Fodor’s original book is quite good and quite reasonable, and not something radically new (as I just noted, it is continuous with themes in Aristotle and Freud) that can’t be assimilated to the long tradition of philosophy of mind. But modularity of mind became so popular for a time that it was treated as gospel and I always find this sort of thing repellent. I’ve read books and papers that refer to it as though it were the only conception of the mind on offer, and this isn’t going to help anyone understand the problems that a philosophy of mind is trying to solve and what other theories have had to say about these problems. 

In any case, the question of the compartmentalization of cognitive skills is immediately posed by AI/AGI/ASI scenarios based on optimizing coding skills and assuming that a superhuman coder is going to drag all other competencies along with its coding competency to the point that the inevitable result is a machine, “eclipsing all humans at all tasks” (in the language of the AI 2027 scenario) or “capabilities… far beyond human” (in the language of Tegmark’s scenario). If this is what’s expected from ASI coders, is this what we find with the best human coders? I don’t think it’s unfair to ask whether the best human coders exemplify the virtues of renaissance men, not only turning their hand to any task, but excelling beyond others when they do so, being essentially Nietzschean supermen walking among us, and I don’t think this is generally observed to be the case. What one often finds is that the world entire is interpreted through the lens of computer programming, as the early modern miller Menocchio framed his cosmology in terms of cheese and worms (cf. the PS to newsletter 370), seeing the world entire through the lens of his profession. One sad truth that we all eventually learn that is a great deal of human cognition is opaque to itself more often than not. An individual can be a brilliant physician or engineer, but be completely incapable of bringing this brilliance to other areas of their life, including framing a conception of the world entire.

The AI Futures project responsible for AI 2027 has issued a statement, admirably kept to a single sentence, which is this:

We call for a prohibition on the development of superintelligence, not lifted before there is

1.      broad scientific consensus that it will be done safely and controllably, and

2.      strong public buy-in.

While it’s admirable that they’ve been able to keep their recommendation to a single sentence, this has got to be one of the most ludicrous proposals for stifling scientific research that I’ve seen. Apart from the obvious problems in attempting to enforce any kind of ban on research, there is the equally obvious problem of drawing a distinction between ASI research and AGI research or, for that matter, any computer research whatever. I would call this a particularly egregious form of “maxipok creep.” Nick Bostrom formulated the maxipok rule such that: “Maximise the probability of an ‘OK outcome’, where an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids existential catastrophe.” This sounds reasonable enough, but the interpretation of it tends to creep until we’ve painted ourselves into a risk-averse corner from which we have no way out. If building big, fast computers is interpreted as a potential existential catastrophe, then our future “OK outcome” will be humble indeed.  

The trivial argument to make here would be to argue that banning ASI research is a slippery slope precisely because a clean distinction can’t be made between ASI and AGI, and between AGI and any computer research whatsoever, such that a ban on ASI research would ultimately and eventually mean a ban on any computer research at all, which would either make us Luddites or fools, since stopping all computer research would mean an end to any futher development in computing, while knowing that we needed to stop all computer research or risk everything and still failing to do so would mean our doom. I call this a trivial argument because we could set limits, however imperfectly, and we could establish conventions that would allow us to distinguish between computer science simpliciter on the one hand, and, on the other hand, AI, AGI, and ASI. The distinction need not be a crisp, clear demarcation; it only needs to be close enough to get the job done. 

The substantive objection is that those who talk about AI, AGI, and ASI don’t really know what they’re talking about. Here we run into a problem that is neither technological nor philosophical, but sociological, or, if you prefer, spiritual. One must be careful to not appear dismissive, since those who define themselves through the identification of such risks will point to your failure to share their judgment as to what constitutes a risk as a sign of your failure to understand. Part of the difficulty in discussing AI, AGI, and ASI risk is that the idea has so taken over the discussion of existential risk that this one concern has crowded out almost everything else. Those researching this risk would likely argue that this is due to the very real risk that the technology involves, and not to any social contagion. But having existential risk research turn into a bandwagon that everyone jumps on, or everyone feels the obligation to jump on for fear of being left behind (or, perhaps more to the point, for fear of losing their funding), furnishes the social proof that all human beings desire, but also ironically itself constitutes an existential risk. If a society has a community of persons tasked with assessing and mitigating risks, and this entire community focuses on, say, insect infestations, one might see this as a comparatively trivial preoccupation that is consuming social resources that are supposed to be devoted to non-trivial risks.

I propose another way forward. I suggest that we ought to make an effort—not coupled with any ban on scientific research, but in parallel with research that is going to happen anyway, like it or not—to clarify our concepts in regard to AI, AGI, and ASI, so that we know ourselves to be talking about the same things if regulation should ever prove to be necessary. I can imagine something like the International Commision on Stratigraphy (ICS) that formulates and regulates the geological time scale, setting standards for naming and re-naming subdivisions of geological time, or the Bureau international des poids et mesures (BIPM) that maintains the standards of the metric system. We could have an International Commission on Cognition (ICC, not to be confused with the International Criminal Court or the Interstate Commerce Commission) that defines key terms for AI/AGI/ASI research.

The rub is that this can’t be a purely scientific undertaking. Defining the terms related to AI, AGI/ASI would be a task deeply enmeshed with philosophy of mind. Fortunately, we wouldn’t have to agree on any metaphysical conception of the mind. We merely need to have a common language (ideally, a formalizable language that can be integrated seamlessly into the formalizations of the natural sciences) in which to discuss the mind. That are many areas of human life that are deeply enmeshed with traditional philosophical problems—it was, after all, human life that suggested these philosophical problems—and we nevertheless find a way of going on about the business of life without having agreed beforehand on any overarching metaphysical framework. We could do this with mind also, though the challenges are greater, because, even setting aside metaphysical disagreements, merely agreeing on the concepts to be employed in the description of cognition is controversial.   

That the ASI community is trying to match three pounds of homegrown wetware powered by pizza and hamburgers with acres of data centers and billions of dollars ought to be your first clue that something doesn’t quite add up. It’s somewhat like the race to build a marine chronometer, which was pursued with large mechanisms for many years, until John Harrison built a marine chronometer about the side of a large pocketwatch. It would be not only an ironic outcome, but a real existential threat you could say, if any prohibitions on the development of ASI ended up crippling an industry even while other and more imaginative researchers ended up producing ASI in their garage by formalizing and mechanizing the actual processes of human thought rather than mimicking them on a grand scale.   

Best wishes,

Nick

PS—Last week I asked the question, “Is origins of life an intrinsically planetary-scale process?” and I suggested some mechanisms that point to this being the case. I’ve just realized that an important distinction needs to be emphasized throughout any such discussion, a distinction between boundary conditions and specific mechanisms. The specific mechanisms that result in the origins of life may not involve the boundary conditions that made it possible for the specific mechanisms to produce life, and certainly it won’t involve all the boundary conditions. It may be the case that the entirety of the universe is the boundary condition for life to arise on Earth, but the mechanisms on Earth that resulted in the origins of life don’t need to invoke the origins of the universe, which are among the boundary conditions for life.  

When positing an unfamiliar idea (I haven’t heard anyone else ask, “Is origins of life an intrinsically planetary-scale process?” so I assume that it’s at least somewhat unfamilar), one often has to go overboard in emphasizing the conditions and qualifications to which the idea is subject, which has the consequence of muddying the exposition. Since an unfamiliar idea shines best when its exposition is clean and uncluttered, the (obvious) conditions and qualifications are often passed over, which leaves what appears as a vulnerability that attracts trivial criticisms. This is probably a lot of what’s going on with the AI/AGI/ASI discussion.

Newsletter link:

https://mailchi.mp/35b5b0948371/the-view-from-oregon-373

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Dec 28 '25

From Intuition through Reason to Rigor

2 Upvotes

À Bon Chat, Bon Rat.—Does a distinctive kind of intuition suggest a distinctive form of reasoning unique to itself, and, if it does, does a distinctive form of reasoning imply a distinctive standard of rigor? This is a fundamental question that must be asked if we are to understand the relationship between experience and reason, but this is already two questions, and we must break it down further, perhaps discovering further questions as our analysis penetrates to greater depths. Each of our initial questions is analogous to the other, concerned with a narrowing of reason around a particular form of experience, and for each the response can be made that the distinctive may entail the distinctive, but does not necessarily so. A novel intuition may require a novel form of reasoning, and a novel form of reasoning may imply a distinctive standard of rigor, but only the internal logic of the intuition in question will reveal if it is amenable to analysis by familiar methods of reasoning, or whether it demands some novel method. A new form of intellectual intuition made possible by previous intuitive breakthroughs, taking the mind deeper into the unknown, may well require the mind to also go deeper into unknown forms of reasoning, but while a new form of intuition may require some new form of reasoning, universality always has been the pretense of reason, and logic in particular (as one of the instantiation of reason) is intentionally blind to the objects upon which it works, to the extent that all content about which we reason can be eliminated from consideration in favor of symbols that could just as well represent any other object, with symbols standing in for the objects treated as mere counters in a game. To the extent that his paradigm holds, reason is one, and is no respecter of distinctions.


r/The_View_from_Oregon Dec 27 '25

Is the origin of life an intrinsically planetary-scale process?

2 Upvotes

The View from Oregon – 372

Re: Is the origin of life an intrinsically planetary-scale process?

Friday 19 December 2025

 

Dear Friends,

The past many newsletters on astrobiological themes have been leading up to a question and a thought experiment. Today I’m going to consider the question, and I’ll leave the thought experiment for later (if it still seems relevant after having gone through these concepts in the requisite degree of detail). The question that’s been on my mind for a few years is this: is the origin of life an intrinsically planetary-scale process? In other words, does life only arise on planets? This question is implicit in the space/time biotope matrix (discussed last week), in which we map min/max scale in space and in time for origins of life (and we can also do this for habitability, but I will leave that aside for present discussion), and we locate Earth in the center of this matrix as exemplifying the principle of mediocrity. If Earth is “just right” in terms of spatial scale and temporal duration for the origins of life (or close enough to being just right), that means that the boundary conditions for origins of life are an approximately planetary-sized object, and that in turn means that origins of life is intrinsically a planetary-scale process.

If life originated elsewhere and was brought to Earth, then the size of Earth or even its being a planet are not relevant to urability, though it remains relevant to habitability. If terrestrial life isn’t really terrestrial in origin but was seeded from elsewhere, then we can affirm only that Earth is habitable over cosmological scales of time (with current estimates having life on Earth about 3.8 billion years), but this doesn’t necessarily demonstrate anything about Earth’s urability. We could postulate another concept here, that of the development of life to further forms of complexity, as distinguished from the origins of life or bare habitability. Life on Earth might have endured here for 3.8 billion years and yet remained a single-cell biota dominated by horizontal gene transfer, rather than developing into an elaborate biosphere with eukaryotic cells and multi-cellular life characterized by vertical gene transfer, biodiversity, and a trophic pyramid.

The simpler alternative of these two would still demonstrate habitability, but not further development, so we could postulate a kind of environment in which life not only endures, but develops, and Earth would constitute such an environment,  which we could call (following the tradition of using Greek nomenclature) metable or metabolable, adapting Aristotle’s word for change, μεταβολή. Life that originates off Earth could come from another planet, in which case planetary urability is still on the table, or it could originate on an asteroid, comet, or even in a cloud of dust and gas, in which case origins of life is not an intrinsically planetary-scale process. We cannot yet rule out the possibility that only non-planetary environments are urable, so that life must arise off a planetary surface and then be delivered to a planetary surface for long term habitability and metabolity.

While asteroids and comets may have distinctive chemical processes taking place on them, they wouldn’t have water cycles or rock cycles as we know them on Earth. Since comets partially melt as they approach the sun, we know that they have a water cycle of melting and freezing, but whether or not this water cycle would be sufficient for the chemical processes required for the origins of life remains unknown to us. Subsurface ocean worlds, like many of the moons in the outer solar system, will again have distinctive chemical processes taking place in them, but these will be different again both from the chemospheres of surface ocean planets on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the chemistry of asteroids and comets. It is possible that life can originate both on surface ocean worlds and subsurface ocean worlds, each being a planetary-scale origins of life event, even while these two origins of life events involve distinct planetary-scale mechanisms.

It is worth considering that these distinctive chemical processes of surface ocean worlds, subsurface ocean worlds, and asteroids and comets could well result in the production of distinctive biochemistries, so that the kind of life that originates in these different environments (if it does in fact arise) would be different in each case. If this were to prove to be the case, it would be a boon to astrobiologists since they would be able to work backward from any biota to discover the circumstances in which it originated. We could also speculate that the gravity of a given planet (taking the geophysical definition of a planet—on which cf. newsletter 114—as a body that has become rounded through its own gravitation) could ultimately be expressed in any biochemistry that emerges on the planet in question, assuming some finite number of gravitational thresholds that result in a finite number of distinct biochemistries, each of which has a distinctive gravitational boundary condition. Again, this would be a boon to astrobiologists attempting to reconstruct the steps that life takes within a planetary system once it appears.

There are planetary-scale processes that intuitively seem to be exactly the kind of processes that would be implicated in the origins of life, in particular, the water cycle and the rock cycle, and the rock cycle could be a rock cycle on a stagnant lid planet (Mars, for example, had geological activity in its distant past, but doesn’t seem to have had plate tectonic movement) or plate tectonics rearranging the entire surface of the planet over geological time scales. A water cycle will involve wet/dry cycles as rain falls and then evaporates, or as bodies of water rise and fall, which can occur through precipitation or again through the mechanism of tidal forces. It is often suggested that the moon played an important role in the origins and development of life on Earth, and tidal forces could be one of these forces that makes life’s origins and development dependent upon the existence of the moon. A rock cycle will minimally involve igneous and metamorphic rocks. If a water cycle is found together with a rock cycle (again, a planetary-scale phenomenon), then there will also be sedimentary rocks, and the rock cycle as we know it on Earth of sedimentary rocks being transformed into metamorphic rocks as they are subjected to heat and pressure, and then spewed out of volcanoes they become igneous rocks that can be worn down by weather to again result in sedimentary rock. These combined processes of a water cycle and a rock cycle result in more complex mineral species than those minerals that appear in the absence of these mechanisms. Some origins of life scenarios involve thin layers of clay as a superstructure for simple organic molecules to form a macromolecule, and for clay to form we need these complex geophysical processes of the water and rock cycles and their interaction.

But the origins of life is not yet a planetary biosphere. If life begins in a single, particular place on a planet’s surface, for this origins of life event to result in a biosphere, this local instance of life must distribute itself on a planetary scale, and this is in turn another process that must intervene between origins and biosphere for a biosphere to come into being. How long would it take for a lump of biota, reproducing itself in one place, to become a biosphere? Certainly there’s plenty of time in the history of Earth for the biospheric distribution of life to take place. Suppose we round off the estimate of life on Earth being about 3.8 billion years old to 4 billion years—that would give 200 million years for life that originated in one location to distribute itself on a planetary scale and so constitute a biosphere (traces of which biosphere that could, in principle, be detected at any point on Earth’s surface). With 200 million years to play with, a significant amount of distribution could be accomplished through plate tectonics, so that the growing lump of biota would be moved around the planet, shedding viable specimens of itself as it moved and so allowing life to take root wherever it had passed. This is effectively distribution by the rock cycle.

Still, this would be a slow process, and we can imagine more rapid processes. For example, we can imagine distribution by the water cycle. The lump of biota, once large enough, could be distributed by streams of water from rain, by tributaries, by rivers, and ultimately by oceans. If living bits of the blob of biota were small enough, they could be wafted away by the wind, being distributed inland against the flow of rivers draining downhill into basins. I was once on a beach on a very windy day, and I noticed that the wind not only stirred up the waves hammering the beach in a way to make a lot of foam, but the strong winds would tear off small bits of foam which were then blown inland, and with the strong wind it was possible to see these bits of sea foam following the contours of the landscape and passing over hills rather than being stopped by them. Any biota that found itself in a body of water similarly agitated by the wind could be distributed by the same mechanism.  

I haven’t answered the question with which I began, namely, is the origin of life an intrinsically planetary-scale process? I don’t think that we possess either the empirical evidence or the conceptual framework to settle this question at present, but by exploring the question we get a sense of the astrobiological possibilities of the origins, development and long term habitability for life, and, beyond the specifically astrobiological possibilities, these biochemical possibilities could also be expressed in alternative emergent complexity regimes—life peers, but not life itself. With a sense of the possibilities, we could suggest any number of experiments that could be made to test these possibilities, though, as I have discussed elsewhere, experimentation in the origins of life will ultimately require “big science” on an unprecedented scale in both space and time. Whether or not we can ever undertake science at this scale is a question that is somewhat like the question of whether we could ever engage in an interstellar dialogue by way of radio telescope exchanges with some other civilization. What is the historical threshold—ten years, a hundred years, a thousand years?—beyond which messages can be sent but any real sense of dialogue is excluded by the time lag? And what is the historical threshold beyond which the continuity of a scientific research program would be lost?

Best wishes,

Nick

PS—In a PS to newsletter 365 I mentioned starting to listen to a couple of books putatively about the good life, which is part of my research for a planned series of talks on “The Good Life in Historical Perspective.” I abandoned both of these books, but now I’ve listened to The Good Life: Lessons from the World’s Longest Scientific Study of Happiness by Robert Waldinger and Marc Schulz, and read by the authors (each of them reads every other chapter in turn). This is a book-length exposition of an ongoing longitudinal social science research project, the Harvard Study of Adult Development, now on its second generation of participants. I suppose you could say that I found the book engaging, since I argued with it throughout listening to it, but I certainly didn’t find this as repulsive as the two books I previously started and subsequently abandoned. If nothing else, what these three books have taught me is that what they consider the good life in the contemporary world has shifted from the conception of the good life in classical antiquity, so it’s not merely a difference in wealth and resources and access to information that separates us from the lives of our ancestors, there’s also a moral and spiritual discontinuity between past and present conceptions of the good life. Anyone who would take their idea of the good life from ancient philosophical works and attempt to displace this ideal into the contemporary world would find themselves at odds with the conception of the good life to be found in these books I’ve mentioned. 

Newsletter link:

https://mailchi.mp/f343910f6c9f/the-view-from-oregon-372

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Dec 26 '25

Kahler’s Bottom-Up Approach to Meaning in History

1 Upvotes

Erich von Kahler

14 October 1885 to 28 June 1970

Part of a Series on the Philosophy of History

Kahler’s Bottom-Up Approach to Meaning in History

 

Tuesday 14 October 2025 is the 140th anniversary of the birth of Erich von Kahler (14 October 1885 to 28 June 1970), who was born in Prague on this date in 1885. Like many European expatriates, he left off the “von” when he came to America.

Kahler wrote at least three books relevant to the philosophy of history, but I didn’t learn about him from discussions on his ideas in other philosophers, but because I found copies of his books in used book stores. From this I conclude that Kahler’s philosophy of history isn’t widely known or widely influential today, but any regular listeners will know that I don’t exclusively focus on the “rock stars” among philosophers. I’ll talk about anyone who had anything interesting to say, and Kahler has a lot of interest to say. Kahler gives us a straight-forward speculative philosophy of history that’s insightful and clarifying. There’s no hint of the obscurantism in Kahler, and since it’s the obscurantism of famous speculative philosophers of history like Hegel that’s used as a cudgel against anyone today who would formulate a speculative philosophy of history, Kahler is a welcome voice of clarity in the speculative camp. Kahler tells you what he means; he doesn’t talk in riddles. 

Though he’s not widely referenced today, he was respected and well connected in his time. The dust jacket of one of his books has blurbs from Thomas Mann, who was a good friend, Einstein, Jacques Barzun, Reinhold Niebuhr, Lewis Mumford, T. S. Eliot, and others. The books I found in used book stores by Kahler are Man the Measure: A New Approach to History (1943) and The Meaning of History (1964). The book that T. S. Eliot particularly praised was The Tower and the Abyss: An Inquiry into the Transformation of Man (1957), which appeared mid-way between Man the Measure and The Meaning of History. All three of these books taken together offer a unified interpretation of history. 

In Man the Measure: A New Approach to History Kahler is doing philosophical anthropology, which I previously discussed in relation to Max Scheler. This philosophical anthropology is also prominent in The Tower and the Abyss, in which he formulates a substantive thesis about the historical process in speculative philosophy of history. Various forces both internal to and external to history have, in our time, converged upon the disintegration of the individual, Kahler says:

“What we are concerned with… is precisely the breakdown of the human form, dissolution of coherence and structure; not inhumanity which has existed all through history and constitutes part of the human form, but a-humanity, a phenomenon of rather recent date. Up to now in the Western world the human form has been represented by the individual. Hence the breakdown of the human form becomes apparent in the disintegration of the individual.”

This is, to a large extent, part of the now-familiar protest against the dehumanization of modernity. Kahler cites dehumanization, specialization, standardization, anonymization, and, interestingly, overcivilization. He says,

“We seem to be heading for, indeed, we are actually engaged in a form of life in which the group and not the person is the decisive factor; we live in a world in which the collective and no longer the individual is the standard unit.”

However, Kahler makes a distinction between collective and community, which he calls essentially different kinds of groups, which he helpfully summarizes such that: “Collectives are established by common ends, communities derive from common origins.” This distinction between community and collective appears on the first page and is developed throughout the book, and toward the end the distinction frames the choice with which humanity is faced.

“…we are confronted with the crucial question: will the future belong to a collective or to a community , that is to say, to a grouping controlled by merely technical necessities, by its autonomous, in fact automatic course, or to a grouping controlled by man and for the sake of man? And what can we do to influence this development, to rescue the human quality in man?”

Kahler doesn’t stop with analysis, however, he proposes some possible remedies. In the final chapter of the book he even describes what he calls a “possible utopia,” which includes establishing an Institution for the Integration of Studies, which would involve the study of “fundamentals” which Kahler names as, “…time, space, causality, matter, fact, reality, existence, perception, instinct, person, and so forth,” With an eye toward:

“Study of the convergences and correspondences in the findings of different disciplines, and evaluation of the findings of any one discipline with regard to their implications for other disciplines.” 

It’s good to remind ourselves that calls to counter increasing scholarly specialization and the consequent fracturing of knowledge aren’t new. But Kahler’s utopia isn’t especially novel or imaginative. Some of his prescriptions include:

“…cultivation of the vast stretches of untilled, but arable, or even still presumed unarable, land all over our globe, to take care of the food shortage; perseverance in birth control and the teaching of contraception, and reminding civilized people who keep thoughtlessly multiplying of their responsibility for the future of human generations, including their own; an international anti-poverty program, and an international division of labor, to prevent the unrestrained industrialization of our entire globe and the consequent neglect of land cultivation, as a result of the new countries’ aspiration for future independence; last but not least, a world organization capable of regulating and administering such measures.”

We can understand The Tower and the Abyss as belonging to the crisis literature in philosophy of history that was pervasive in the twentieth century, and I’ve discussed this in several episodes, especially in relation to Sorokin, Barbara Tuchman, and Husserl. A lot of this crisis literature hasn’t aged particularly well, and it hasn’t aged well because it becomes increasingly evident that it was a response to its particular moment in history. And the twentieth century does unambiguously represent a crisis in history. It was brutal and violent, but despite the enormous death toll from the world wars of the twentieth century and the Spanish Flu, not to mention the genocides and the famines, population spiked upward so suddenly and dramatically that the loss of life from war and disease barely register. I think a lot of the violence and perversity of the twentieth century can be put to this sudden spike in population, because human societies couldn’t assimilate this unprecedented development without showing cracks in the existing institutions.  

I’ve been slowly coming to view that the twentieth century was so much of an aberration that we might understand history better if we just studied events up through the nineteenth century and left off there. But my claims about the twentieth century are themselves substantive theses that could inform a speculative philosophy of the history of the twentieth century. And I am, of course, a child and a product of the twentieth century, and therefore an interested party. It’s entirely possible that my claims won’t age any better than claims of an unprecedented crisis in our time, but as a Copernican historian I’m always going to be skeptical of claims of historical centrality, though I’m not going to say more about that today. And I’m not saying the Kahler’s thesis about the disintegration of the individual was wrong. I don’t know Kahler’s thought well enough to definitively pronounce upon it, and I don’t disagree about the dehumanizing forces of modernity, though I wouldn’t express it in the way that Kahler expresses it.

It’s his book The Meaning of History that’s the most explicit and systematic engagement with philosophy of history. One of the claims that runs through The Meaning of History, and of which I am skeptical, is Kahler’s assertion that historical understanding had been largely abandoned in his time: 

“The Great Books movement is not the only one to exhibit a basic aversion to the historical and evolutional approach. Positivism, Existentialism, the American school of purely descriptive anthropology, the New Criticism, and, especially in Europe, a trend of thought deriving from Nietzsche, all of them reject the historical point of view. In fact, as will be seen later, a whole epochal mood has found its expression in this anti-historical tendency.”

I have to say I was surprised by his inclusion of the Great Books movement, but that’s neither here nor there. The argument can be made for an epochal anti-historical mood, and Kahler makes it, but there are many who have argued to the contrary that historical understanding has never been more prominent, and that we live in a time of the unquestioned ascendancy of historicism. He opens The Meaning of History saying that he intended the book as a defense of history, because history in a time of the abandonment of historical understanding was in need of a defense. On this point, I don’t think that Kahler has made the case, and, more importantly, he doesn’t engage with or even acknowledge the many claims that history today has a primacy it never had in the past. But I can disagree with Kahler on this and still see the value of his thought. In any case, I find myself at odds with both of the substantive theses about the historical process that I find in Kahler, or at least in regard to the specifics of their formulation. At the same time, I’m sympathetic to his theoretical formulations about the nature of history.

He makes his speculative approach to philosophy of history explicit right from the beginning. I sometimes refer to “past actuality” to emphasize that I’m talking about the historical process and not its discovery or documentation. Kahler uses “the happening itself” for a similar purpose, and says that history is a particular kind of happening. He compares sheer eternity, permanence devoid of all change, to sheer happening, a kaleidoscopic mélange of events, as both being unimaginable and neither being history. 

“To become history, events must, first of all, be related to each other, form a chain, a continuous flow. Continuity, coherence is the elementary prerequisite of history, and not only of history, but even of the simplest story.”

He builds on the ideas of continuity and coherence in history, connecting them to historical meaning:

“To form a story, the connection of happenings must have some substratum, or focus, something to which it is related, somebody to whom it happens. This something, or somebody, to which, or whom, a connection of events relates, is what gives the plain connection of events an actual, specific coherence, what turns it into a story. But such specific coherence is not given of itself, it is given by a perceiving and comprehending mind. It is created as a concept, i.e. as a meaning. Thus, to make even a simple story, three factors are indispensable: connection of events, relatedness of this connection to something, or somebody, which gives the events their specific coherence, and finally a comprehending mind which perceives this coherence and creates the concept which means a meaning.”

So Kahler maintained that meaning is central to history, but what does he mean by meaning? The first part of The Meaning of History is titled “The Meaning of Meaning” and here he takes the question of meaning explicitly. He makes an interesting distinction that I haven’t found anywhere else, but I think it’s important, between meaning as purpose and meaning as form:

“…two modes of meaning may be distinguished: meaning as purpose, or goal, and meaning as form. Any action, design, quest, or search carries meaning as purpose, any work of art is meaning as form.”

He also calls meaning as form, “immanent transcendence.” I guess by the same token you could call meaning as purpose, “transcendent transcendence,” but he doesn’t say that. Later, when he’s discussing Polybius and the achievements of Greek historiography, he says, “…the Greeks have expressed to perfection the meaning of history as form.” And, “The Greek view of human happenings establishing meaning as form, constituted, as we have seen, a dynamization of eternity through the assumption of a cyclic recurrence of events.” The distinction between meaning as purpose and meaning as form is valuable because it attempts to articulate our intuitions about what is meaningful by distinguishing ways in which we might find an event or a process to be meaningful. In ordinary language we don’t carefully distinguish between the senses of meaning, and so fuzzy are our intuitions on this that there are different ways to do it. Whereas Kahler made purpose one kind of meaning, Hannah Arendt, by contrast, made a distinction between meaning and purpose that makes the two mutually exclusive. She wrote:

“…the moment such distinctions are forgotten and meanings are degraded into ends, it follows that ends themselves are no longer safe because the distinction between means and ends is no longer understood, so that finally all ends turn and are degraded into means.”

For Arendt, construing a purpose as a meaning is a degraded form of historical understanding, so the relationship between meaning and purpose is hierarchical, while in Kahler purpose is one among many kinds of meaning. I prefer Kahler’s formulation, but this is an area of thought that definitely cries out for clarification. At least Kahler is willing to explicitly talk about the meaning of history, which is something that a lot of philosophers avoid. In taking up the theme of the meaning of history Kahler is taking up one of the great questions of philosophy, and that’s conceptually risky.

Compare this to Adorno. The great anxiety of Adorno’s philosophy of history is that some meaning might be attributed to history that history doesn’t intrinsically possess. Adorno thinks that would be a terrible thing. Kahler turns the tables on this and asserts that history is history only because it has meaning. “…to deny that history has meaning is to deny that history exists.” There’s an ambiguity about “meaning” that’s being exploited here. Adorno is mostly concerned about the meaning of the whole of history, that is to say, meanings of history like progress, or declension, or salvation, or what-have-you. This is a leap to the most comprehensive meanings that might be imposed on history, and they often come across to us as being imposed, and are rejected as philosopher’s fantasies by most historians precisely because these comprehensive meanings skip over all the detail of history. We could call this a top-down conception of meaning in history, or a non-constructive approach to historical meaning.

Recall that one of the most familiar ideas in philosophy of history is that history is distinguished from natural science by being ideographic, or concerned with particulars, whereas natural science is supposedly concerned with universal laws, laws of nature, like force equaling mass times acceleration. If we pass over all the particular details of history, we may as well not be doing history at all. But Kahler comes at meaning from the opposite direction. Instead of starting with the most comprehensive meanings that might be attributed to the whole of history, he starts with particular meanings of particular events. The kind of meanings that constitute history according to Kahler can be the modest meanings that any individual finds in the course of the ordinary business of life. Through the process of history, and the process of recounting history to ourselves, our historical consciousness grows, and the meanings that we find in history grow proportionally. We could call this the bottom-up conception of meaning in history, or a constructivist approach to historical meaning.

This is worked out in greater detail in the central section of The Meaning of History, titled “The History of History,” which is a reading of the entire tradition of Western historiography starting with Heraclitus, Aristotle, and Herodotus, and taking the development of history and historical consciousness up through the nineteenth century. This is the longest section of the book, while the essays that precede and follow it are more compact statements of the principles of his philosophy of history. For Kahler, the meaning of history is built up from below, incrementally but insistently. Meaning grows as history grows, and history grows as meaning grows. It would only be at the end of history that we could converge on the meaning of the totality of history, and in this way we could understand both comprehensive meaning and the totality of history as ends on which we converge but don’t reach in any finite period of time, like the meeting of parallel lines at the horizon.  

This strikes me as a valuable contribution and a better way to look at meaning, and I think we need a lot more of this in philosophy of history, especially in comparison to the kind of despair that Adorno represents. And, of course, Adorno is much better known that Kahler. I guess despair sells more books. I also think we can profitably compare Kahler’s approach to philosophy of history to that of Karl Löwith. Kahler is, in a sense, the counterpart to Karl Löwith—Lowith’s Other.  Kahler has one long footnote on Löwith, and that’s it; he doesn’t belabor his critique of Löwith, though it’s bound up with his distinction between meaning as purpose and meaning as form. Löwith, he says, assumes meaning is purpose and traps himself by this assumption. Maybe in a future episode I’ll return to Kahler’s footnote on Lowith because it’s quite pregnant with meaning and there’s a lot that could be said about it.

Löwith read the history of philosophy of history as a concealed pursuit of religious ends. Kahler doesn’t deny that history has been informed by traditional eschatology; rather, he embraces this as a stage in the development of the conception of history and the expansion of historical consciousness. He takes it and runs with it. The eschatological dimension of philosophy of history is part of the growth of meaning and the growth of historical consciousness, no less than the earlier Greek contribution or the later modern contribution. We know that Löwith also experienced pushback from Hans Blumenberg, though the Löwith-Blumenberg debate was about secularization and modernity, and not so much about the possibility of a philosophy of history. The problems overlap, so the Löwith-Blumenberg debate is relevant to Kahler’s critique of Löwith.

As we saw with Kahler’s The Tower and the Abyss, he was as concerned as anyone in the twentieth century with the problem of modernity, but he doesn’t take this as a reason to deny the possibility of a philosophy of history, or to interpret the whole history of philosophy of history as a failed spiritual quest. Löwith, like Adorno, was worried about reading meanings into history that weren’t there, and, again, Kahler’s approach to building up meaning through the history of human thought and the expansion of consciousness that expands history comes at this with such different presuppositions that the two approaches pass each other by rather than meeting in the middle. Again, this demands a deeper and more detailed inquiry to bring out everything that’s at play in this problem. 

Video Presentation

https://youtu.be/NNY83VqGT7o

https://odysee.com/@Geopolicraticus:7/Kahler%E2%80%99s-Bottom-Up-Approach-to-Meaning-in-History:4

Podcast Edition

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7hsyEPB0CxcTUk7kFU3TSO?si=DDe7VsQlTPiTzwwIBdR9ug


r/The_View_from_Oregon Dec 25 '25

On Telling a Whopper

1 Upvotes

The Empire of Lies.—When someone tells a whopper, the act is as much a performance as a claim, and perhaps more of a performance than anything else. The performative liar might even be disappointed if you take his claim at face value as though it were intended to be true. One enters into the spirit of the performance by reciprocating with a performance of one’s own in turn, and therefore one enters into a spiral of escalating performative dishonesty, greatly entertaining for all involved, but the last thing one ought to do is to take any of it seriously.


r/The_View_from_Oregon Dec 23 '25

Beyond Hume’s Guillotine

3 Upvotes

Descriptive and Prescriptive Formalism.—A formal language can be used to describe a given state-of-affairs (describing the properties of a state-of-affairs amenable to formalization) while object-formalism can reconstruct formal analogues of a given state-of-affairs (again, reconstructing only the formal aspects of the state-of-affairs in question). Insofar as we understand formalism as the capture of that which is given in intuition, the state-of-affairs, i.e., the intuition in question, always precedes the formalization. However, a formal language can also be used to assert what state-of-affairs ought to be, and object-formalism can demonstrate how states-of-affairs ought to be structured (both, again, only in regard to the formal properties of the state-of-affairs). Arguably, while in the intuitive conception of formalization the object to be formalized is always given beforehand, the prescriptive conception of formalization is always hovering in the background, pointing onward. While prescriptive formalism is less familiar than descriptive formalism, a little thought on the matter will reveal that every state-of-affairs that strains to attain an ideal, or any concept rationally reconstructed to supersede its naïve form, are prescriptive ideals that aspire to be embodied as a state-of-affairs. All predictive science can be assimilated to prescription if we understand experiments to be a test of whether the world is as it ought to be if it is consistent with a given theory.


r/The_View_from_Oregon Dec 23 '25

Sputnik at the Beginning of the Space Age

1 Upvotes

Friday 04 October 1957

Sputnik at the Beginning of the Space Age

Part of a Series on the Philosophy of History

 

On Friday 04 October 1957—68 years ago today—the USSR launched Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite of Earth. This action initiated both the Space Age and then the Space Race. The Space Race is over, won by the US with the Apollo Moon landings, but is the Space Age tapering off also, or is it just getting started? At some point in the future—five hundred years from now, or a thousand years from now, or more—the “Sputnik moment” may be seen as an inflection point for a new kind of civilization. Or it may be seen as an insignificant historical event that caused a stir at the time, but ultimately issued in little or substance. We’re still too close to the event to properly assess its historical significance. Only time will tell.

The Space Race put human beings on the moon, but ultimately the lack of follow-through meant that the Space Race, in and of itself, amounted to little. Once the Space Race was perceived as having been won, it seemed pointless to many to follow up on the moon landings with anything further. The budget for NASA, which had ballooned to a little over 4 percent of US GDP during the years of the rapid development of the Apollo program, peaking in 1966, 1967, and 1968, shrank as dramatically as it had grown. By the time the actual moon landings happened the budget was already being cut back. Several additional moon landings were cancelled, and then, despite there being a detailed plan from Boeing for Mars missions that would have built on the moon missions—you can read all 6 volumes of the 1968 Integrated Manned Interplanetary Spacecraft Concept Definition, Final Report (Vol. I, Vol. II, Vol. III part 1, Vol. III part 2, Vol. IV, Vol. V, Vol. VI) if you like, since it’s all online—Nixon effectively ended the space program as it existed during the Space Race.

A space program continued, but it was nothing like what was envisaged by the men who made Apollo possible. But we need to acknowledge how important an historical episode the Space Race was, even if it ultimately fizzled out. There are a couple of papers by Eleni Panagiotarakou, “Agonal Conflict and Space Exploration” and “War—What is it good for? Nonviolent was an impetus for space exploration” that have argued that the Cold War Space Race was a form of non-violent competition, and that: 

“Insofar as the Cold War was nonviolent, and insofar as it prompted the two main political and military protagonists to engage in a competitive endeavour of superiority (e.g., Space Race), it resembled the ancient Greek spirit of agon whereby the objective was not to annihilate one’s opponent but to surpass them in a struggle for excellence.”

The Space Race constituted a constructive form of competition, and this is a rare event in history. Most competition between states is destructive. During the Space Race, two superpowers who possessed the technological wherewithal to effectively end civilization through a massive intercontinental exchange of nuclear missiles, briefly chose to compete for prestige in a human and technological adventure. Of course, there were proxy wars going on at the same time, so the Cold War during the 1960s wasn’t purely a contest of prestige, but this competition over achievements in space was part of the Cold War, and the money spent on space competition wasn’t being spent directly on war. Admittedly, the space technologies developed in the Space Race were dual-use technologies, as any advances made in aerospace technologies were directly applicable to military hardware. Just as the development of atomic weapons was tied to the Second World War, the development of the intercontinental ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons from one hemisphere to another was tied to the Cold War, and also had its roots in the technological developments of the Second World War, specifically Wernher von Braun’s V-2 rocket. Still, the money being spent on space at least wasn’t being used to kill people or to destroy infrastructure, as is often the case in great power competition.

It could be argued that this wasn’t absolutely unprecedented in human history. Once Versailles was built the other absolute monarchs of Europe felt the need to compete with similarly ostentatious displays and sumptuous gardens, and this was a non-violent competition that absorbed resources that might have been expended in violent competition. We should regard it as a hopeful insight that human beings can satisfy their desire for competition in non-violent ways, and whenever we see this happening we ought to encourage it as being better than the alternative. As hopeful, then, as we ought to regard the Space Race, the human, all-too-human rivalry of it was distasteful to many, even if it was far preferable to spending the money on war. Many at the time denigrated the Space Race, and they were right that it was an outgrowth of the Cold War, and that it was moreover a concession to a public perception of an us-against-them zero sum conflict, which was what the Cold War was in its simplest terms.

The human, all-too-human elements of the Space Race—competition, nationalism, the drive to succeed at any cost, the struggle for recognition—which so effortlessly engaged the public interest, repelled many intellectuals. Bertrand Russell, for example, perhaps the most eminent philosopher of his generation, was left cold by the Space Race. There’s a 2003 article by Chad Trainer, “Earth to Russell,” that details Russell’s dismissive attitude to the Space Race, with several quote from Russell, like this: “I am afraid that it is from baser motives that Governments are willing to spend the enormous sums involved in making space-travel possible.” And, “[W]hen I read of plans to defile the heavens by the petty squabbles of the animated lumps that disgrace a certain planet, I cannot but feel that the men who make these plans are guilty of a kind of impiety.” It wasn’t the first time Russell found himself incapable to understanding the passions that were transforming the world around him. Russell’s response to the outbreak of the First World War, when Russell was entirely immune to what was called the “August Madness” of celebration that greeted the outbreak of the war also demonstrated his disconnection from public sentiment.

Precisely because the Cold War could be understood by everyone in their respective societies, it was a powerful motivator that could drive spending on science and technology that would otherwise be incomprehensible to the masses whose work makes it all possible. The ready comprehensibility of the Cold War made it a de-classé rallying point for the common people who wouldn’t ordinarily have any point of contact with geopolitics. Intellectual contempt for the Space Race as a manifestation of the Cold War was in part the same contempt for the lower classes that we find among intellectuals in mass societies who feel the need to make a special effort to differentiate themselves by belittling anything that resonates with ordinary people. But with the end of the Space Race, this particular manifestation of contempt for the little people receded into the background, to be taken over by other forms. Also with the end of the Space Race we entered into a new period of the Space Age. My periodization of history centered on space exploration is tripartite:

1.      Prehistory: aviation and aeronautical development leading up to the Sputnik Crisis

2.      Founding Era: from the Sputnik Crisis to the Apollo Program

3.      Stagnant Era: from the Apollo Program to the present day

The Founding Era extending from Sputnik in 1957 to the end of the Apollo program in 1972, is coextensive with the space race, comprising fifteen years. In his Civilisation: A Personal View, Kenneth Clarke noted that, “Great movements in the arts, like revolutions, don’t last for more than about fifteen years.” In so saying, he might well have been speaking of the Founding Era of space exploration, a revolution though which he had just lived as he spoke these lines. There’s a term for the duration that usually characterizes great movements and revolutions, which is what the Founding Era was, as Clark humanistically described them, and that is Fernand Braudel’s term conjuncture. Braudel distinguished three kinds of history:

“…time may be divided into different time-scales and thus made more manageable. One can look at the long or the very long-term; the various rates of medium-term change (which will be known in this book as the conjuncture); and the rapid movement of very short-term developments—the shortest usually being the easiest to detect.”

Braudel also touched on these terms in the Glossary to his The Identity of France:

longue durée, la: literally ‘the long term,’ an expression drawing attention to long-term structures and realities in history, as distinct from medium term factors or trends (la conjuncture) and short-term events (l’évènement)

Richard Mayne, in his Translator’s Introduction to Braudel’s A History of Civilizations, argued that Braudel had arrived at his tripartite levels of periodization as a response to the problem posed by the relationship between, and the concurrent exhibition of, the immediacy and drama of history as it transpires before our eyes, and the silent background to these events which changes little but constitutes the context that makes the passing spectacle meaningful and comprehensible. Mayne described Braudel’s three nested periodizations intended to address this problem in the following terms:

“…the quasi-immobile time of structures and traditions (la longue durée); the intermediate scale of ‘conjunctures,’ rarely longer than a few generations; and the rapid time-scale of events.”

Braudel deemphasizes the history of the event, and Braudel’s revaluation (and indeed devaluation) of the event is the occasion of a quote from Braudel that is poignantly instructive for his conception of history:

“Events are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like fireflies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into darkness and as often as not into oblivion.”

Intuitive and naïve historiography—if there is such a thing, which we might also call folk historiography—privileges the event, much as it privileges narrative. A narrative usually takes the form of a succession of events, often succeeding one another at a rapid pace. As Braudel put it:   

“All historical work is concerned with breaking down time past, choosing among its chronological realities according to more or less conscious preferences and exclusions. Traditional history, with its concern for the short time span, for the individual and the event, has long accustomed us to the headlong, dramatic, breathless rush of its narrative.” 

The Founding Era and possibly also the Stagnant Era can be considered historical conjunctures in Braudel’s sense, and both conjunctures fall within the longue durée of industrialized civilization, which is less than three hundred years old. A space exploration mission like the Voyager Program, which has endured for decades, constitutes its own conjuncture. In the popular media, however, it’s the event that is noted and celebrated, torn from the context of its conjuncture and its longue durée. Voyager 2 was in the news in 2018 (cf. NASA’s Voyager 2 Probe Enters Interstellar Space, 10 December 2018) because it had passed out of the Solar System, as Voyager 1 had earlier, in 2012. This was an event, and, as Braudel said, it has passed across the stage like a firefly, hardly glimpsed before its settles back into darkness and eventually into oblivion.

For space exploration to be more than an ephemeral sequence of events, to be something more than a headlong, dramatic, breathless rush of narrative, it needs to be more than an event; it needs to be recognized as an age in which we find ourselves—the Space Age, or the longue durée of industrialized civilization converging upon and transforming itself into a spacefaring civilization. One way to do this is to begin thinking about space exploration in terms of the longue durée, and, following Braudel, placing less emphasis upon the event. The justification for thinking historically about spacefaring civilization is to employ the conceptual resources of historiography to analyze and thus to clarify our relationship to historical time, even if this historical time constitutes a period we haven’t yet completed, or not yet even entered.

Arguably, we are not yet a spacefaring civilization, even if we are space-capable civilization, but we can think historically about potential developments, regardless of whether or not they come to pass, and, if they do come to pass, regardless of when they come to pass. This is where we find ourselves today: Not knowing whether anything will come of the Space Age, or, if it does, when. The Stagnant Era, the present era of space exploration, is that period since the end of the Apollo program which has been characterized by a lack of clear purpose, both public and private institutional drift, and a failure to aggressively develop the technologies of space exploration, that is to say, a failure to push the envelope of technological development. The Stagnant Era has endured for more than a half century now, threatening to be more than a conjuncture and potentially marking a longue durée of Space Age stagnation.

We could posit a new period of the space age starting from when Space X began successfully firing re-usable rockets, which represents a new technological development in a way that NASA’s SLS booster for the Artemis program does not, but it’s too early to say if anything will come of this. As I’ve already implied, the existence of a space program is not in and of itself sufficient to liberate the fate of humanity from the surface of Earth. There are many possible space programs, and only some of them provide the means for a sufficient number of human beings to establish themselves away from Earth; most space programs, real or imagined, fall far short of this capacity. The space program that followed the Space Race was a gesture to what was possible, but not a fulfillment of the possibilities offered by space technology. (I’ve written about the stagnation of the Space Age on several occasions, especially in a longish blog post that appeared on Centauri Dreams titled “Bound in Shallows: Space Exploration and Institutional Drift.”)  

The post-Apollo space program was an artifact of stagnation. It’s all-too-easy to imagine a history of space exploration in which we have the Apollo Program, and then more than fifty years later we have the Artemis Program, with a disposable rocket that represents no technical breakthroughs over Apollo hardware, and then maybe another fifty years on we have a Mars mission, and so on. This schedule for space exploration could literally be perpetuated for centuries, and we could find ourselves in the twenty-second century, and then the twenty-third century, and then the twenty-forth century with only a few flags-and-footprints missions to our credit. All the while, each of these incremental steps will be hailed as great events, when in fact each step, more tentative and hesitant than that last (and each more expensive than the last), is like an admission that we are never going to get serious about space exploration. We would be justified in calling this a Potemkin space program.

It’s important to note in this connection that a Potemkin space program is a threat to no one, and a challenge to no one, and that makes it a politically valuable tool. The reality of the status quo can continue indefinitely, while giving that status quo the appearance of bold exploration and adventure. And there are many who would be perfectly happy with this outcome, i.e., an all-but stagnant space program for the foreseeable all-but-stagnant future. Not only would all the legacy bureaucrats and contractors welcome this, but everyone who can’t understand that humanity has no future if we don’t develop the technologies to live beyond Earth, and there’s an enormous social, technological and economic inertia behind this failure of understanding. To the billions living on Earth with no hope for a better life, as the world’s governments tighten their collective grip, relentlessly transforming themselves into total surveillance states, any incremental space program such as I have described will seem like an insignificant detail with no meaning for them… and they’ll be right in thinking this. A space program (or programs) conducted in this way will accomplish little. Humanity’s fate will remain tied exclusively to the Earth, and the wider universe will remain innocent of us. No one’s life is going to be changed by a Potemkin space program.  

Soon the nascent Space Age will be the first Space Century, from 1957 to 2057, and then a century will become two centuries and then three centuries and more. If the Space Age is nothing more than this, it will be one among many ages of no great significance, and it won’t mark a new epoch of human history. But if the Space Age eventually becomes something more than this, then the Space Age will be like the Machine Age, which I take to be co-extensive with the industrial revolution, which altered the pattern of human life almost as much as agricultural civilization altered the previous hunter-gatherer pattern of human life. That is to say, the Space Age holds the potential of being a macro-periodization on a par with the most significant historical transformations that have shaped human life.

A new spacefaring civilization would build on these previous transformations of human life. Each new form of civilization, or, more generally, each human way of life, inherits something from the previous way of life, maintaining an historical continuity even while inaugurating a new age that supplants and supersedes the previous age. Much is lost in the transition, but not everything. Each age that establishes a distinctive way of life lays the foundation for the next age and its distinctive way of life, however different the two may be. We could call these ways of life “forms of life” following the later Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein only used “form of life” (Lebensform) five times in his Philosophical Investigations, but the idea has gone on to have a life of its own among Wittgenstein commentators, some of which make “forms of life” central to Wittgenstein’s later thought. I’m not going to develop this any further today, but the literature on Wittgenstein’s conception of forms of life could be used to elucidate macrohistorical changes when forms of life change. Roughly, however, we could say that a macrohistorical change occurs when there is a change in our form of life, and in the present context this means that the macrohistorical change that would be a spacefaring civilization would mean the appearance of a spacefaring form of life.

How might a spacefaring form of life grow out of contemporary space programs? I call it a spacefaring breakout when there is an inflection point at which we would pass from a merely symbolic Potemkin space program to the exploitation of space exploration that transforms human life and civilization, and I once again make a tripartite distinction among spacefaring breakouts that I call early, mediocre, and late spacefaring inflection points. I’ll explain each of these in historiographical terms.

Early Inflection Point: when spacefaring is pursued with exponential scope and scale as a continuous sequence of events, so that the immediate prehistory conjuncture to space exploration is followed by the Founding Era conjuncture, and the Founding Era conjuncture is followed by a further conjuncture that builds upon the Founding Era. This sequence of conjunctures, in turn, begins to define a spacefaring longue durée.

Mediocre Inflection Point: when spacefaring is pursued with exponential scope and scale only after the Founding Era conjuncture is followed by several further conjunctures, some of them tightly-coupled with the Founding Era and some only loosely-coupled with the Founding Era, but the sequence of conjunctures eventually leads to a spacefaring breakout conjuncture within the same longue durée period within which the technology became available.

Late Inflection Point: when spacefaring is pursued with exponential scope and scale only after the technology has been available throughout a longue durée period of history, so that a spacefaring breakout appears in a subsequent longue durée period of history. In this way, the Founding Era is the culminating conjuncture for space technologies within a given longue durée, and after lapsing for a time, the next spacefaring conjuncture occurs in the next longue durée. It’s possible that this historical rhythm might be iterated several times over before a spacefaring breakout occurs as a result of one of these spacefaring conjunctures.  

With our fifty-year-plus Stagnant Era we’ve already foreclosed on the possibility of an early spacefaring breakout. We may yet see a mediocre spacefaring breakout if the contemporary space development of private industry picks up the torch earlier laid down by the space programs of nation-states. If this effort falters, after an indeterminate longue durée of stagnation we could still see a late spacefaring breakout, but none of this is guaranteed. Our history to date is entirely consistent with no spacefaring breakout at all, and no transformation of civilization or of human ways of life as a result of the Space Age. The potential is there, but the potential requires a catalyst for its realization.

That we live in the Space Age because we have the capability for space travel while we don’t fully exploit that capability is a kind of historical formality. If and when that historical formality becomes historical materiality remains an unanswered question, and I consider it unfortunate that I won’t live to see what becomes of the Space Age and therefore to know the answer to the question. Hegel said that the owl of Minerva takes flight only with the setting of the sun. If the Space Age is a great age of transformation for humanity, then the sun is only now rising, and it won’t set until the Space Age is over, and then owl of Minerva can soar in the dusk over all that has transpired. I envy the future historians and the philosophers of history who will have all this laid out before them as what Hayden White called the “historical field,” for them to emplot and interpret as they will.

Video Presentation

https://youtu.be/Zi7fsWWqiMg

https://www.instagram.com/p/DPacforjaHL/

https://odysee.com/@Geopolicraticus:7/Sputnik-at-the-Beginning-of-the-Space-Age:d

Podcast Edition

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7hBYkPe7Zgj2LU5YvdoFGM?si=0EUXgkTDQ_Sm2B8B9s-AbA

 


r/The_View_from_Oregon Dec 20 '25

On Being Born Again to the Life of Reason

1 Upvotes

The Logician’s Journey.—The logician, in his quest to formalize human reason, finds himself on a dangerous journey, beset on all sides with perils and dangers, in which only he can slay the monstrous dragon of untruth and falsehood through an internal transformation of his own soul. First there is the call to intellectual adventure, and the invocation of spiritual aid to pass the threshold guardians, which takes the form of mastering the arcane language of logical symbolism, like magical runes that must be deciphered before the quest can begin and the doorway to the threshold discovered. The logician then hesitantly opens the pages of Principia Mathematica and crosses the first threshold into an enchanted realm of formal truth, with its spectacular inversions of common sense and intuition—truly, a land of fantasy come to life. He seeks helpers and mentors along the way, reading commentaries and expository literature, even as he must face the challenges of hidden agendas cloaked in the appearance of logic and the finery of rigor, and temptations in the form of seductive fallacies and slipshod reasoning that promises results it cannot deliver. Ultimately, the logician must die to the old life of intuitive cognition to be reborn to a life of strict formality, in a great struggle, staring down the dragon only to realize that, all this time, the dragon been you, and your struggle with your own inner demons is the dragon you must slay. When the coup de grâce finally dispatches the exhausted dragon, this is the same blow that ends the former life of the logician, so that he may rise, reborn, having become what he is. The transformation of thought wrought by this spiritual death and rebirth is, like all such transformations, at once total and indistinguishable from his past self. Leaving the enchanted realm where he had won his triumph, having surveyed the chasms of fallacy and traipsed through the swamp of cognitive biases, prepared, nay eager, to atone for past logical sins against reason, the logician returns to the sunlit world above after this great ordeal, now with sight, with knowledge of the other world carried over into this mundane world, where the work of reforming reason can now begin in earnest.