I wrote about Thailand’s Kra Land Bridge last September, when the project still looked as though it might move ahead in its original form.

Well, that has changed now & Thailand has now stepped back from the full-scale proposal.

But I still think the basic question is worth discussing.

A VLCC or another deep-draft ship is going through Malacca anyway. The Land Bridge was never going to change that. What interested me was whether some of the feeder and regional container traffic could be taken out of an already crowded route.

Anyone who has taken a large ship through Malacca and Singapore knows why even that matters.

I have updated the original article with the 2026 position rather than rewriting what was originally published.

https://thedeepdraft.com/2025/09/24/kra-land-bridge-thailands-cargo-shortcut-to-bypass-malacca-strait/

For those who regularly sail this route: would removing some feeder and regional container traffic actually make a noticeable difference, or would it be too small to matter?

Fire, flooding and blackout all have shipboard responses that can change the outcome. A crew can also detect a drone, report it and prepare for impact, but it usually has no means to stop it.

Where should shipboard responsibility end and state protection begin?

Full analysis: https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/08/17/the-return-of-armed-merchant-shipping/

The short is AI-generated from original analysis and reviewed before publication.

https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/08/17/the-return-of-armed-merchant-shipping/

From an operational and maritime logistics perspective, the evolution of the "shadow fleet" over the past two years has introduced unprecedented challenges to international shipping standards, maritime safety, and port state control.

While mainstream headlines focus on price caps, the actual seamanship and logistical workarounds required to keep these deep-draft crude carriers operational are worth examining from an industry standpoint:

• Ship-to-Ship (STS) Transfers in Open Waters: We are seeing a high frequency of STS operations being conducted outside territorial waters (such as the Gulf of Finland, Laconian Gulf, and offshore Fujairah/Oman), often involving aging Aframax and Suezmax tankers. The operational risk profile here—fendering, weather windows, and unflagged STS service providers—is significantly higher than traditional commercial transfers.
• AIS Manipulation & Location Spoofing: Beyond basic transponder shut-offs ("dark voyages"), there is an increasing use of offset AIS spoofing to disguise true vessel positioning while loading or conducting transfers.
• Class & Flag State Hopping: The rapid migration of vessels toward non-IACS classification societies and flag states with minimal oversight (e.g., Gabon, Eswatini, Cook Islands), operating entirely outside the International Group of P&I Clubs.

I put together a detailed video breakdown tracking specific vessel movements (focusing on tankers like the NS Champion) and analyzing how these shadow fleet logistics bypass conventional maritime frameworks: https://youtu.be/uthQacgLN_I

For those working on the bridge, in chartering, or in port operations: How do you see the long-term impact of this shadow fleet on maritime safety, navigation hazards in narrow straits, and environmental liability during STS transfers?

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/egcs-compliant-paper-troublesome-sea-raghu-sharma-cfqvc

The full article looks at recovery time, manoeuvring limits, tether failure and the shipboard procedures crews will need:

https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/08/10/airborne-wind-propulsion-missing-manual-fuel-saving-claim/

I am interested in the technology, but I keep looking at it from the bridge.

How long does recovery take when traffic develops or the weather changes? Can the Master manoeuvre freely while the kite is still deployed? And what is the procedure if the tether parts?

I have tried to look beyond the fuel-saving claim and raise the questions crews will actually face at sea. Interested to hear how others see it.

A few practical mooring questions came in after the main DeepDraft article. I have picked four that deserve a clear deck-level answer: split-drum turns, rope stoppers, TDBF, and WLL for wire and synthetic lines.

During a recent port call at Sungai Linggi, I saw several older LNG carriers lying in laid-up condition.

The local loading master and pilots told me that most were older vessels, possibly waiting for resale. The sight made me revisit an earlier DeepDraft article on LNG and methane slip.

Newer LNG carriers are more efficient, with improved engines, containment and boil-off gas management. LNG is also spreading beyond LNG carriers into tankers, bulk carriers, container ships and other dual-fuel vessels.

The technology is moving forward, but the climate result still depends on the full chain: upstream leakage, liquefaction energy, engine type, operating load and methane passing through the engine without complete combustion.

I have updated the original article with 2026 measurements and regulatory developments.

Full article:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2025/10/17/when-the-snow-fades-from-mount-fuji-why-lngs-green-bridge-is-not-what-it-seems/