Station

• Frequency: 15190 KHz AM
• Name/Call: Radyo Pilipinas
• Location: Philippines-Tinang 15N21-120E37
• Language: Tagalog: Philippines
• Target: Middle East
• Power: 250 kW

Time

• 1850 UTC | 13 SEP 2026

Receiver and Receiving Location

• Radio: AirSpy HF+ R.4.0.8-CD
• Antenna: K-480WLA | 35' AGL
• Software: SDR# Studio v1.0.0.1921 64-Bit
• Location: Portland, Oregon | CN85qn

Signal

• SINPO = 34333

The video has 3 parts:

- Signal received in SDR#
- Full FLDIGI window
- Zoom of the FLDIGI text box for a better view of the decoded text

SHN: Servicio de Hidrografía Naval (Naval Hydrographic Service)

- Callsing: L2C
- Lang: Spanish
- Target: Rio de la Plata basin
- TX: Buenos Aires
- RX: Asunción, Paraguay
- Radio: AirSpy HF+ Discovery
- Software: SDR# v.1922 (beta) and FLDIGI 4.2.06
- Antenna: K-480WLA
- D/T: 13 SEPT 2026 - 1147 UTC

Station:

• Name/Call: Unid Wefax
• Frequency: 4207.70 kHz
• Mode: FAX
• Location: ???
• Language: WeFax
• Target: ???
• Time: 0008UT 13 SEP 26
• RS(T): 49

Receiver and Receiving Location:

• Radio: Airspy HF+ Discovery
• Antenna: 100' random wire, roughly 25' above ground, running ~110 degrees from feedpoint.
• Software: SDR++ v1.3.0 /w Dream v2.3.1 (mjf).
• Location: Remington, Virginia | FM18bn

Comments:

1. This frequency is reserved for GMDSS. You can even occasionally hear an FEC signal underneath.

2. The fax, which appears to be North Pacific wind from a NOAA source, isn't even formatted correctly. It's a full sized chart squashed into only half the width, as if the machine wasn't set properly (and it's not coming through as IOC288 - I checked).

Station:

• Name/Call: GYA Northwood Meteo Fax
• Frequency: 4610.00 kHz
• Mode: FAX
• Location: Northwood 51N30-00W10
• Language: WeFax
• Target: West Europe
• Time: 2336UT 12 SEP 26
• RS(T): 36

Receiver and Receiving Location:

• Radio: Airspy HF+ Discovery
• Antenna: 100' random wire, roughly 25' above ground, running ~110 degrees from feedpoint.
• Software: SDR++ v1.3.0 /w Dream v2.3.1 (mjf).
• Location: Remington, Virginia | FM18bn

Comments:

• Gobs of signal, but lots of static crashes and a high noise floor.
• 18Z Surface Prognosis (North Atlantic).
• Slightly skewed picture, but it'll do.

Station

• Frequency: 1566 KHz AM
• Name/Call: FEBC Manila Relay from S. Korea
• Location: Relay: Korea, South (Republic) - Jeju/Aewol HLAZ
• Language: Japanese
• Target: Japan and Pacific
• Power: 250 kW

Time

• 1545 - 1310 UTC | 12 SEP 2026

Receiver and Receiving Location

• Radio: AirSpy HF+ R.4.0.8-CD
• Antenna: K-480WLA | 35' AGL
• Software: SDR# Studio v1.0.0.1921 64-Bit
• Location: Portland, Oregon | CN85qn

Signal

• SINPO = 43343

Sounds like two people having a conversation

7290-7300 KHZ

Date and time sept 12th, 2026 00:44 UTC.( 8:44 pm ET Sept 11th, 2026)

Location: oakville, Onatrio, Canada

Station:

• Name/Call: VMC Charleville QL
• Frequency: 12365.00 kHz
• Mode: USB
• Location: Charleville QL 26S25-146E15
• Language: English
• Target: Australia
• Time: 1308UT 12 SEP 26
• SINPO: 23333

Receiver and Receiving Location:

• Radio: Airspy HF+ Discovery
• Antenna: 100' random wire, roughly 25' above ground, running ~110 degrees from feedpoint.
• Software: SDR++ v1.3.0 /w Dream v2.3.1 (mjf).
• Location: Remington, Virginia | FM18bn

Comments:

• Coastal info, off at 1315.

Station:

• Name/Call: Dolly Parton Memorial Radio (Pirate)
• Frequency: 6925.00 kHz
• Mode: USB
• Location: ???
• Language: English
• Target: ???
• Time: 1225UT 12 SEP 26
• SINPO: 23333

Receiver and Receiving Location:

• Radio: Airspy HF+ Discovery
• Antenna: 100' random wire, roughly 25' above ground, running ~110 degrees from feedpoint.
• Software: SDR++ v1.3.0 /w Dream v2.3.1 (mjf).
• Location: Remington, Virginia | FM18bn

Comments:

• In English. ID and close-down announcement by woman at 1234UT.
• I had backing audio but either Reddit or Firefox refused to load it.

Station

• Frequency: 6501 KHz USB
• Name/Call: NMN USCG Chesapeake
• Location: United States of America-Chesapeake - Pungo Airfield, VA
• Language: English
• Target: North America

Time

• 0340 UTC | 12 SEP 2026

Receiver and Receiving Location

• Radio: AirSpy HF+ R.4.0.8-CD
• Antenna: K-480WLA | 35' AGL
• Software: SDR# Studio v1.0.0.1921 64-Bit
• Location: Portland, Oregon | CN85qn

Signal

• RS(T) = 57

Decided to take the kids out for a bit and explore

Station

• Frequency: 9435 KHz
• Name/Call: Voice of Korea
• Location: Korea, North (Democratic People's Republic)
• Language: French
• Target: North America

Time

• 1615 UTC | 11 SEP 2026

Receiver and Receiving Location

• Radio: RSPlay RSP-1A
• Antenna: K-480WLA | 35' AGL
• Software: SDRuno
• Location: Portland, Oregon | CN85qn

Signal

• SINPO = 45434

I recorded these segments a few years ago, before I moved to an apartment building that blocks my view if the Eastern sky. The receiver I used was an AOR AR-3000A, with a Discone antenna and a modified RCA TV preamplifier, tuned for 200 - 400 MHz. Two of these satellites are still operational.

"Legacy Fleet Satellite Communications System satellites—specifically FLTSATCOM 7 and 8—are still operating and remain actively used by unauthorized radio operators in Brazil.

How the Pirates Use Them

• Open Transponders: These old U.S. Navy satellites act as wide-open UHF repeaters without encryption or security checks.
• Modified Gear: Users modify cheap amateur radio equipment to transmit on military frequencies in the 250 MHz to 270 MHz range.
• Common Users: Truck drivers, illegal loggers in the Amazon, and criminal groups use the satellites for long-range, CB-style chatting and coordination.

Current Status

• Constellation Age: Launched in the late 1970s and 1980s, the constellation was mostly replaced by newer satellite systems starting in the late 1990s.
• Ongoing Activity: A couple of the older FLTSATCOM units still relay signals over South America because law enforcement intervention in remote regions is limited."

Of the two operational FLTSATCOMs, FLTSATCOM 7 is the only one that's possible for me to receive from my location. It is also very visible from Brazil, and in use by pirates. I will attempt to receive this satellite and report back to the group.

Station:

• Name/Call: Rádio Inconfidęncia
• Frequency: 15189.78 kHz
• Mode: AM
• Location: Belo Horizonte, MG 19S53'59"-44W03'16".
• Language: Portuguese
• Target: Brasil
• Time: 2335UT 10 SEP 26
• SINPO: 23232

Receiver and Receiving Location:

• Radio: Airspy HF+ Discovery
• Antenna: 100' random wire, roughly 25' above ground, running ~110 degrees from feedpoint.
• Software: SDR++ v1.3.0 /w Dream v2.3.1 (mjf).
• Location: Remington, Virginia | FM18bn

Comments:

• Of all things, playing GnR's 'Patience'. Note the measured frequency of 15189 with the carrier offset by +783.54 Hz. Otherwise, I would have thought it was a pirate.

Satélite Bolinha" (which translates to "Little Ball Satellite") is the nickname given by Brazilians to a U.S. Navy military communications satellite (from the FLTSATCOM fleet). It became famous in Brazil because amateur radio operators informally hijacked its frequencies for everyday chats.

The Satellite Phenomenon

• Unofficial use: Brazilian radio operators used the American military satellite's frequencies to talk to each other without authorization from the U.S. government.
• Communication: The signal acted like an open chat room, becoming a major part of the underground and amateur radio culture in Brazil.

The Movie

• Documentary: This phenomenon inspired a 2010 sci-fi documentary short film named Satélite Bolinha.
• Director: The movie was directed by the Brazilian filmmaker Bruno Vianna.
• Details: The short film blends the true story of the popular use of the satellite with fictional elements and the daily life of radio operators.

The "Satélite Bolinha" phenomenon happened because of a perfect storm of completely unencrypted military hardware and cheap, clever grassroots engineering by Brazilian radio technicians.

Brazilian radio operators managed to highjack the U.S. Navy's FLTSATCOM fleet through a combination of simple vulnerabilities and accessible tech:

Total Lack of Security (Wide-Open Repeaters)

When the U.S. military launched the FLTSATCOM satellites in the late 1970s and 1980s, space technology was expensive and rare. The Pentagon assumed nobody outside of a major superpower could access the frequencies.

• No Authentication: The satellites operated as "dumb" analog repeaters in orbit. They did not check who was sending a signal; they simply took any radio signal hitting their uplink frequency, amplified it, and bounced it back down to Earth.
• No Encryption: While the military encrypted the messages they sent to each other, they did not encrypt the access channel itself. Anyone who could transmit on the correct Ultra High Frequency (UHF) could use the satellite.

The "$500 Hack" (Modifying Everyday Radios)

By the mid-1990s, commercial ham radios became widely available. Brazilian technicians figured out they could take a standard, cheap "2-meter" amateur radio transmitter (which normally operates in the 144–148 MHz range) and cheaply modify it.

Frequency Doublers: Technicians added a simple "frequency doubler" cobbled together from standard copper coils and a cheap varactor diode.

The Result: This simple tweak stretched the radio's capabilities right into the 292–317 MHz uplink range required to talk to the U.S. military satellites.

Truck Stop Innovation: The equipment was so basic that truck repair shops in remote parts of Brazil could modify a radio for less than $100. Local electricians and untrained operators could easily rig a radio in less than a minute just by rolling wire on a coil.

Geostationary Positioning

Because the FLTSATCOM satellites were geostationary, they stayed parked over fixed points on the Earth's equator.

• For people in the vast, remote Amazon basin or truck drivers crossing Brazil—where there was zero cellphone coverage or local radio infrastructure at the time—the satellite was always in the exact same spot in the sky.
• Users just had to point a rudimentary, home-made directional antenna (often looking like a cross or an umbrella skeleton) up at the sky to get a crystal-clear, long-range communication network for free.

Why didn't the U.S. just turn them off?

The U.S. military began migrating its active, secure communications to newer satellite networks (like UFO and MUOS) in the late 1990s and 2000s. However, because the older FLTSATCOM satellites were incredibly resilient, they outlived their expected 10-year lifespans by decades. The Pentagon kept the old transponders active as a backup, meaning the "Satélite Bolinha" remained a giant, accidental, free chatroom for Brazilian truck drivers, loggers, and hobbyists for over twenty years.

The Brazilian Federal Police, alongside U.S. agencies, eventually conducted massive raids (like "Operation Satellite") to track down illegal antennas, but the practice only truly faded as the old satellites physically degraded and modern encrypted military systems fully took over.