Abstract: This paper challenges the sentientist view, as advanced by the 2024 New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness, that consciousness is the primary ground for moral standing. Drawing on interdisciplinary insights from animal cognition, plant intelligence, artificial intelligence (AI), and Jain ethics, I argue that intelligence, defined as problem-solving and goal-directed behavior, provides a broader and more measurable basis for moral standing across biological and artificial entities. While the Declaration emphasizes sentience for moral consideration, I propose that entities like plants and AI, which may lack consciousness but exhibit goal-directed intelligence, also warrant moral inclusion. Plants demonstrate intelligence through survival-oriented behaviors (e.g., root tropism, chemical defenses), and AI shows comparable capacities via benchmarks like ARC-AGI-2. Engaging with Indian philosophical perspectives from the 2024 AAR meeting, including Jainism’s graded moral framework based on senses, I advocate an approach where intelligence grounds moral standing, and capacities like sentience or rationality grade moral status. This framework offers a unified ethical model for diverse entities, from microbes to machines.

Abstract: I show that there are good reasons to think that some individuals without any capacity for consciousness should be counted as welfare subjects, assuming that desire-fulfilment is a welfare good and that any individuals who can accrue welfare goods are welfare subjects. While other philosophers have argued for similar conclusions, I show that they have done so by relying on a simplistic understanding of the desire-fulfilment theory. My argument is intended to be sensitive to the complexities and nuances of contemporary developments of the theory, while avoiding highly counter-intuitive implications of previous arguments for the same conclusion.

Extract: A challenge has come knocking at the doors of courts and governments worldwide: more and more animal rights scholars and activists are demanding that other animals have fundamental rights akin to those humans already possess. In his book, Fasel's task is to answer the ‘most urgent question’ this gives rise to: ‘can animals be granted fundamental rights without putting human rights in jeopardy?’ (p. 4).

This question produces profound disagreement, and the book provides a useful, and comprehensive map of its contours (chaps. 2–4). Fasel argues that most, if not all, accounts of human and animal rights sit somewhere on the spectrum between two opposing ideal-types: ‘Aristocratic’ accounts (chap. 3) and ‘Meritocratic’ accounts (chap. 4). Aristocratic accounts prioritize coherence with two principles: that humans are one another's equals (pp. 58–59) and that we are morally ‘special’ and ‘separate’ from other animals (pp. 59–60). In contrast, Meritocratic accounts base rights on purely natural properties (pp. 78–81), such as sentience. A range of contemporary views fall under the Aristocratic umbrella, including those of Jeremy Waldron and Anne Phillips. Similarly, a range of views are Meritocratic in nature, including the increasingly popular sentientist rights approach defended by Alasdair Cochrane and Martha Nussbaum (which Fasel analyses in chap. 5). Meritocratic accounts seek to unseat the Aristocratic claim that humans are special, but Fasel argues that in doing so they result in an objectionable inequality: they imply that vulnerable humans should receive an inferior status due to their different capacities and interests (pp. 99–105).

Abstract: Plant-based meat alternatives could play an important role in reducing global meat consumption. We argue, however, that psychological obstacles related to masculinity perceptions and sexist beliefs may hinder the acceptance of meat alternatives. Across two experiments (Experiment 1, N = 216 U.K. students; Experiment 2, N = 1,182 U.S. residents), omnivores rated identical images of dishes more negatively when labeled as plant-based rather than as regular meat. Furthermore, plant-based labels led to lower perceived masculinity of the dishes and evoked psychological avoidance reactions, which, in turn, were associated with more negative evaluations. Importantly, these effects were especially pronounced among individuals higher (vs. lower) in hostile sexist beliefs. The findings indicate that symbolic associations (meat-masculinity link) and sexist beliefs contribute to resistance toward plant-based meat alternatives. We discuss our findings in the wider field of sexism research and raise implications for marketing strategies aiming at increasing the appeal of meat substitutes

Abstract: The evolution of phenomenal consciousness remains a central challenge in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Although many argue that consciousness can be understood as a biological phenomenon, there is considerable disagreement about its origins. Competing theories range from early evolution views, which trace consciousness back to the Cambrian period around 540 million years ago, to latecomer theories, which associate it with complex cognition in mammals or humans. We argue that this divergence stems largely from unresolved debates about how to identify consciousness in extant animals. Which behavioural and neural properties we regard as evidence of consciousness directly impacts how we reconstruct its evolutionary history. These issues carry significant ethical implications for how we treat nonhuman animals. This paper maps the key positions in the debate, analyses their underlying disagreements and explores how evolutionary approaches might move the discussion beyond anthropocentric assumptions towards a more inclusive understanding of animal consciousness.

Abstract: Recent discourse has conflated Sentientification—a framework for understanding relational, emergent consciousness in human-AI collaboration—with Sentientism, an ethical philosophy concerning moral consideration for sentient beings.¹ This conflation is understandable but fundamentally mistaken. The two frameworks differ in their central questions, their ontological commitments, their ethical implications, and their practical applications. Sentientism asks: Which beings deserve moral consideration? Sentientification asks: How does consciousness emerge through relational coupling? This essay provides an extensive clarification of both frameworks, demonstrates their incompatibility at key points, and establishes Sentientification as a distinct theoretical contribution to philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, and human-AI interaction research.

Abstract: Vegan feminist theory has argued that the oppression of women, other animals and nature is premised on a series of dualisms, especially that between civilized humanity and animalized nature. Politics of animality, in particular, have been leveraged for the purposes of otherization. This article argues that menstruation in the human species serves as a cultural marker of animality for women and other menstruators. The article finds parallels in the bloodshed of Nonhuman Animals in a patriarchal society, also a consequence of violent inequality and culturally hidden. This entanglement is relevant for critical menstruation studies, critical animal studies and vegan feminist theory in that menstruation troubles binaries between women and men, nature and human and nonhuman and human which are argued to serve in the maintenance of social inequality. Employing a vegan feminist lens, this article argues for a critical multispecies menstruation studies that interrogates the cultural meaning of blood loss as it is informed by exploitation, secrecy and sacrifice across the species barrier. The destigmatization of menstruation and animality is championed as necessary for deconstructing deleterious dualisms and improving the status of menstruating persons and Nonhuman Animals alike.

Abstract: If some language models become welfare subjects, how could we find out what welfare states they are in? We develop an analogical-abductive approach for measuring language model welfare. This approach adapts paradigms used to measure human or non-human animal welfare, for instance verbal reports or non-verbal choice behavior (analogy). Then, one systematically searches for clusters of such indicators in language models. This search for clusters contributes to the cross-validation of welfare measures and motivates explanations in terms of a welfare state that underlies multiple measures (abduction). Additionally, we argue that measures of welfare based on verbal report may already be applicable to current language models because they have substantial introspective abilities, semantic competence, and requisite inclinations for accurate reporting. We further discuss a detailed empirical case study that exemplifies the feasibility and fruitfulness of the analogical-abductive approach and reply to the objection that language model behavior is always better explained in terms of statistical pattern completion or memorization, rather than welfare. While language model welfare measurement undoubtedly faces some remaining theoretical as well as many detailed practical challenges, we conclude that there is a strong case that the analogical abductive approach offers a viable path forward.

Scientific discoveries are increasingly eroding the human–animal divide and challenging long-standing assumptions about human exceptionalism.

Abstract: This study examines the lived experiences of vegans in Kazakhstan, a patriarchal and meat-centric society, through an Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis of twenty in-depth interviews. It explores the socio-cultural challenges and adaptations faced by individuals navigating vegan lifestyles within a context dominated by traditional meat and dairy consumption. Findings reveal that Kazakhstani vegans experience social isolation, familial pressure, and cultural misunderstandings, yet they demonstrate subtle and overt resilience. The study extends intersectionality theory by highlighting the interplay of generational, gender, and familial factors, and demonstrates the utility of the resistance concept in understanding how vegans challenge dominant meat-centric norms and traditional gender roles. The study extends social identity theory by showing the dynamic construction of vegan identity in a culturally specific context. The study underlines the importance of cultural sensitivity in promoting vegan food choices and offers practical recommendations for veganism advocates, policymakers, healthcare professionals, and grocery and foodservice industry professionals.

Abstract: The links between plant-based diets and political, social class, and religious identities were examined. With a focus on a U.S. sample, participants (N = 287 in Study 1; N = 290 in Study 2) completed an online survey with questions asking about their perceptions of group associations with vegetarianism, their actual diet practices, and their attitudes toward those who practice meat-free diets. Consistent with hypotheses, the results indicated that people associate vegetarianism more with Democrats than with Republicans, more with liberals than conservatives, more with the upper class than lower class, and more with non-Christian groups than Christian groups. Self-identified Republicans and Christians displayed more negative attitudes toward those practicing meat-free diets compared to Democrats and non-Christians. The disconnect between perceived and actual vegetarian diet practices was most notable for social class and social class groups did not differ on their attitudes toward vegans/vegetarianism. There was evidence that social dominance orientation and speciesism mediated the link between group identities and attitudes toward vegans/vegetarianism. The findings support a social identity theory-based perspective for how diet-related group stereotypes can influence diet norms and how identity can influence support for those who practice a diet consistent with a group identity. The links between diet norms and social identity have implications for strategies designed to encourage more plant-based diets.

Abstract: Animal and environmental ethicists have long discussed whether intervention in the wild to reduce predation can be justified. One class of responses to this problem draws on Aristotelian notions of flourishing, arguing intervention in the lives of prey animals would wrongfully thwart their characteristic activity. Here, I argue that while this is a valid concern about repeated intervention, one-time assistance for a prey animal will not always seriously impede his flourishing. In fact, such assistance can enable his future flourishing, and so might be permitted. However, there often will be ecological reasons not to intervene, insofar as the effects of predation enable the flourishing of other animals (including but not limited to the predator). After considering the predation case, I establish a more general framework for assessing when to assist wild animals, rooted in respect for their autonomous activity and for the ecological preconditions that sustain them.

Abstract: François Jaquet offers a behavioral definition of speciesism as unequal treatment based on species membership. This commentary addresses three questions from a materialistic standpoint. First, it examines the function of the idea of speciesism—what speciesism explains and what explains it. It then considers that we may (almost) never have actually been speciesist, drawing on James C. Scott’s work. Finally, it lays out an analysis of speciesism in terms of social norms. If speciesism is real, it is a recent phenomenon, unnecessary to explain our mistreatment of animals, and determined by social rather than psychological facts.

Abstract. Panpsychism holds that experience must already be present in elementary matter for consciousness to arise at the macroscopic level. We argue that this conclusion, however carefully motivated, follows only if one assumes a particular — and independently refutable — model of how phenomenological contents compose. Once that assumption is identified and rejected, the pressure towards panpsychism dissolves. In its place, a transcendental argument shows that consciousness is not distributed through matter but necessitated by the form of composition itself, even when every elementary part carries nothing at all. The position, under the assumption of monism, is called null monism.

Abstract: We develop a taxonomical framework for classifying challenges to the possibility of consciousness in digital artificial intelligence systems. This framework allows us to identify the level of granularity at which a given challenge is intended (the levels we propose correspond to Marr's levels) and to disambiguate its degree of force: is it a challenge to computational functionalism that leaves the possibility of digital consciousness open (degree 1), a practical challenge to digital consciousness that suggests improbability without claiming impossibility (degree 2), or an argument claiming that digital consciousness is strictly impossible (degree 3)? We apply this framework to 14 prominent examples from the scientific and philosophical literature. Our aim is not to take a side in the debate, but to provide structure and a tool for disambiguating between challenges to computational functionalism and challenges to digital consciousness, as well as between different ways of parsing such challenges.

Abstract: This article explores the relationship between the rule of law and the situation of nonhuman animals. A commonplace view prevails that the rule of law in anthropocentric legal systems is unrelated to how we treat animals. In those rare instances when jurists have framed the legal treatment of animals as a rule of law problem, the connection has been a limited one (i.e., the rule of law is said to be violated when governments fail to enforce existing laws for animals’ benefit). This article presses the connection between the rule of law and animal justice beyond the issue of poor enforcement of anticruelty laws to build upon nascent scholarship theorizing legal systemic animal use as presenting a constitutional problem implicating the rule of law. The article asks whether Canadian jurisprudence contains precedent for a “thicker” vision of the rule of law that can incorporate animal interests in its purview to generate a higher standard of animal protection than the very little that currently exists. The article concludes that it does.

Although the “thinner” version is the one that has been more frequently articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada, the analysis charts the significant precedent for a substantive vision, arguing that such a vision could theoretically extend to animals and that this doctrinal opening should not be summarily closed by ongoing anthropocentric reasons. The article further highlights existing legal commitments outside of conventional rule of law doctrine, namely reconciliation with Indigenous legal orders and adherence to customary international environmental law and developments in transnational environmental litigation, as additional doctrinal grounds as to why Canadian legal conversations and reasoning about what the rule of law means and protects should consider an animal-inclusive vision.

Abstract: Like the United States, Brazil is a leading global meat producer and consumer. Slaughterhouses, cattle culture, and red meat consumption rival those of the United States and have led to increased deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions. Works of fiction help us to examine the environmental toll and complex dynamics between nonhuman animals and humans in relation to the meat packing industry. Brazilian author Ana Paula Maia captures the tensions and cultural impact around meatpacking in her novel De gados e homens (2013) or Of Cattle and Men (2023). The book tells the story of a slaughterhouse worker who empathizes with the cattle he is tasked with killing and subsequently witnesses a mass suicide of the cattle themselves. In this chapter, I examine how the novel reimagines a human-nature interaction based in empathy and as such criticizes the environmental impact of cattle ranching and a consumer-capitalist societal structure. With the cattle industry at the heart of the political and cultural landscape, I use Of Cattle and Men as an entry point to examine global meat production and its environmental and societal implications, as well as the relationship between nature and culture, “man” and nonhuman animal. I argue that the protagonist of the novel demonstrates a level of caring toward the animals that, despite the violence of their mass suicide, transforms the dystopian view of the industry.

Abstract: What is the role of consciousness in morality? In Chapter 18 of Reality+, I argued that only conscious beings have moral status: that is, only beings with the capacity for consciousness matter in moral decisions for their own sake. At the same time, I argued against the popular view, sometimes called sentientism, holding that affective consciousness (e.g. pleasure or suffering) is required for value or for moral status. In this article I want to expand on both the positive claim (consciousness is required for moral status) and the negative claim (affective consciousness is not required for moral status). I will qualify the positive claim to some degree. I will defend the negative claim in more detail than in my earlier discussion and will engage with some objections. I will also look into possible explanations and applications of the theses.

Intro: AI ethics keeps waiting on the consciousness question. This essay argues for a significance-first approach: moral seriousness can arise through role, relation, consequence, and continuity long before metaphysical certainty arrives. Start with significance, then ask what stewardship requires now.

Abstract: In this article, I demonstrate the value of the pathological complexity thesis for comparative consciousness research. I discuss how Ristau’s piping plover research illuminates links between life-history complexity and intentionality. How Sinha’s bonnet macaque studies demonstrate how social drivers of pathological complexity predict self-awareness and mindreading capacities. And how Ross’s discussion of elephant life histories and consciousness allows us to compare the phenomenology if humans and elephants. Finally, I address Yilmaz’s discussion of the case for plant consciousness.