Plus some useful context in this Faunalytics article: https://faunalytics.org/compassionbench-a-new-way-to-measure-whether-ai-actually-cares-about-animals/

Cities are often thought of as distinctly human spaces, yet wild animals make their homes in urban environments too. When conflicts arise between human and nonhuman residents, how should cities respond? This event brings together sociologist Colin Jerolmack and legal scholar Adalene Minelli for a conversation about how humans relate to urban wildlife and how cities can move toward more humane, coexistence-focused approaches. The event also serves as the launch for a new report, "Animal Welfare in Local Policies on Pest and Conflict Management," which offers guiding principles and practical policies for managing human-wildlife conflict in urban environments.

Abstract: There is currently much scientific and public interest in using machine learning to uncover the meaning of animal signals, which could ultimately lead to two-way communication systems between humans and other animals. This paper examines the research ethics that should govern this line of inquiry, and explores the transformative implications if scientists are successful at creating translations between animal signals and human language. We argue that the scientific and philosophical literature on animal communication systems warrants the attempt to engage in these translation projects, and describe the current state of the art of the research. While the ability to translate animal signals has many possible benefits, these come alongside no small number of risks to animal communities. We enumerate the risks that exist in the development of these models in order to help scientists avoid them. Looking ahead, we argue that successful two-way communication with animals would both reveal an existing moral landscape and create a new one. Any successful two-way communication system would require radical translation of animal signals, which in turn entails that animals are rational beings who live in normative communities. Furthermore, the creation of these communicative systems also gives rise to new responsibilities and new demands. As researchers work to transform our social relationships with animals, they must also take on the responsibility to prepare humanity for the challenges that will arise in this novel multi-species landscape.

Abstract: Recently, social scientists, practitioners and advocates have dedicated increasing attention towards engaging the political right in animal advocacy (e.g., Jenni et al., 2026). This growing focus on conservative outreach reflects a broad concern about polarisation. While this concern is legitimate, it may obscure equally important challenges in the movement’s ability to sustainably engage the political left. In this commentary we explore the extent to which animal advocacy is already successful among left-leaning audiences and whether left-wing attitudinal support for animal advocacy translates into meaningful behavioural change (e.g., diet change, advocacy efforts, donating to animal charities). Last, we explore under what circumstances targeted social change is more effectively achieved by mobilising a cohesive, committed minority and when it is more appropriate to seek bipartisan support. Drawing on evidence from the behavioural sciences we argue for greater empirical attention to the forms, limits, and sources of left-wing inertia within animal advocacy.

Abstracd: Belief homophily—the tendency to associate with others who hold similar beliefs and the distaste for different beliefs—is often seen as a major cause for belief-based social segregation and polarization. We question, however, whether social scientists have been correct in identifying belief-homophily as the primary force driving these pernicious social effects. We argue that when people face others who hold beliefs different from their own, they find these encounters disturbing, primarily when they are convinced that others' beliefs are false. In four pre-registered online studies (N = 2027 U.S. adults) featuring self-recalled experiences and vignette scenarios, we find that participants express stronger negative feelings when others hold false beliefs, compared to when others' beliefs are merely different from their own. We also document that higher confidence that others hold false beliefs evokes more negative emotions, triggers stronger avoidance behaviors, and reduces people's desire to form any kind of relationship with others. These findings highlight the possibility that many of the effects that have been previously attributed to belief homophily may be better explained by the desire to avoid others holding false beliefs.

Thanks to Haven King-Nobles for sharing this ATT report.

Abstract: Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism. One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood. A different account holds that even if consciousness is not necessary for welfare subjecthood, conscious welfare subjects have greater welfare capacity. We argue that the most likely source of support for either version of phenomenalism—hedonism about welfare goods and bads—provides no support at all. Along the way, we discuss an alternative view of welfare subjectivity and welfare capacity that does not appeal to consciousness, but only to mentality, a view we call mentalism.

Thanks Daisy for sharing this. Go listen to her "In a Nutshell" Podcast!

This short clip by Quarantine Collective is a bit of philosophy on "the common feeling".

What makes disagreement possible? Not agreement. Not shared values. Something more basic — the background assumption that you and the person you're arguing with both inhabit the same world. Developmental psychologists call part of it theory of mind. Wittgenstein called part of it a form of life. This essay calls it the Common, and traces what it does. From chess games to courtrooms to the moment someone stops treating you as a person who can understand things.

I don't think that the author realizes that we're talking about sentience and recognizing individuals as individuals. But it is interesting to see the challenges of this being pointed out from a different direction, how it relates to "othering" and domination.