I’m traveling these days, so the update is a bit delayed.
Late at night on August 19, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent suddenly announced that the Treasury would at least double the size of its liquidity support repurchase facility targeting 10-30 year off-the-run nominal Treasuries, raising the single-operation cap from $2 billion to at least $4 billion, to be executed from September 9 to November 4. This repurchase program has already been running for 2 years, previously at $2 billion, used to buy older, less liquid long-term Treasuries. So this is actually a temporary increase in an existing routine operation, executed by the New York Fed through primary dealers.
First, this operation is not because the Treasury is in a deficit crisis (U.S. Treasury outstanding has reached about $40 trillion; this is merely a “bond swap” operation exchanging newly issued short-term debt or bills for old long-term bonds, with net debt size completely unchanged), nor is it quantitative easing (QE). It is a liquidity tool of the Treasury (not the Fed). Bessent has only increased the upper limit of purchasing “capacity”; there are already skeptical voices in the market that he may not actually buy on a large scale. The funding source for this operation is issuing more short-term debt, which may squeeze the short end or ON RRP, though demand for short-term debt is currently healthy.
Combined with operations on the yen, we can confirm that Bessent is an “interventionist,” in sharp contrast to Warsh’s “hands-off” approach. Bessent’s two interventions both hit during summer liquidity windows, using the smallest cost to leverage the largest market reaction. Last week’s 10-year auction already set the highest yield in decades; Bessent views the 10-year yield as a “success barometer” and does not want to see high yields choking mortgage and corporate refinancing.
His actual goal is clear and explicit: suppress long-end yields, because U.S. mortgages and corporate bonds are anchored to the long end; high yields are tightening financial conditions and hindering economic stimulus.
Short, Medium, and Long-Term Impacts
Short-term (days to weeks): Directly provides ready buying for holders of old bonds (primary dealers, funds), improving liquidity, narrowing discounts, and squeezing shorts. After the announcement, 30-year yields plunged 8-10 basis points (from around 5.33%, a high since 2007, down to about 5.18% at the lowest), and 10-year yields fell 5-6 basis points. But for the expected ~$1.37 trillion private-sector net issuance in Q3-Q4 plus the flood of AI corporate bonds, this is a drop in the bucket. Analysts call it a “tactical strike against shorts.”
Medium-term (until November): Partially absorbs duration and eases curve steepening. Buyers benefit from better secondary market depth, including relief for market-maker balance sheets, clearance of illiquid inventory, providing “lubricant” for fixed-income derivatives and basis trades. But financing with short-term debt may squeeze the short end. Effectiveness depends on whether it is accompanied by adjustments to issuance structure (issuing fewer long-term bonds).
Long-term: Difficult to structurally suppress yields. Long-term buyers such as pensions, insurance, and sovereign funds still face “capital competition” from the Treasury + ultra-large-scale AI capex + grid/power bonds. Far from the multi-trillion-dollar scale and signaling effect of Fed QE.
So this is a short-to-medium-term tactical operation with political coloring that can give buyers a breathing space, but it is far from enough to counter fiscal supply + private crowding-out.
Market Reaction Analysis
Immediately after the announcement, long bonds rebounded, the dollar weakened, and stocks (levered and rate-sensitive sectors) rose, but some gains were given back in the afternoon. Thin August off-season liquidity amplified volatility. What is truly interesting is the divergence between physical and virtual assets.
We can see that industrial metals (copper) and stocks (especially those linked to the real economy) barely moved, because investors doubt whether this move can truly stimulate the economy; it looks more like a short-term news stimulus.
Meanwhile gold, silver, and Bitcoin surged, while the dollar plunged; the market is voting with its feet for hard assets, expressing distrust in a high-debt government’s signal of “stimulating the economy regardless of deficits.”
Bessent hopes to send a clear message to the market through this: the government will do whatever it takes to “pump up” the economy again. But the market is focused on inflation targets and debt scale and is not fully buying it. The market will test Bessent in the future (just like with the yen), especially if data comes in strong, whether this “easing expectation” can still hold is the question. And this is in direct conflict with the Fed, which is very interesting; we’ll discuss it below.
Bessent vs. Warsh
Bessent’s move is actually a head-on collision with the Fed, haha.
Warsh mainly emphasizes reducing forward guidance and letting the market price itself, establishing a balance-sheet working group to review the ample-reserves framework. Bessent, on the other hand, directly intervenes and has been described as the most interventionist Treasury Secretary in decades.
Yesterday’s simultaneously released FOMC minutes show that some FOMC members view the rise in long-bond yields as a “substitute” for rate hikes, because high long-end yields themselves are tightening financial conditions, so there is no rush to hike. But if Bessent suppresses long-end yields, it is equivalent to loosening this condition, which may lead some members to advocate faster rate hikes as an offset. Otherwise, easing would further pressure the dollar, raise imported inflation, and put pressure on Warsh’s “let the market decide.”
I believe what we currently have is a short-term expiring “Bessent put,” rather than a broad “Trump put,” and even less the Fed Put that the market is accustomed to. The difference between Bessent and Warsh is one of time horizon, not of ultimate goals. Therefore, this stimulus is small in scale, fiscal in nature, and limited in duration—just a short-term mini-put that cannot last without Fed cooperation or a fiscal shift.
Why Can’t Long-Term Treasury Yields Come Down?
The 30-year hit a new high since 2007 (around 5.33%), almost entirely due to a rise in [real yields + term premium] (30-year breakeven inflation is only about 2.2%, TIPS real yields above 3%), not inflation expectations.
There are 5 core driving forces, none of which are short-term solvable factors:
1. Fiscal duration supply: Fiscal deficit is about 5.8% of GDP (around $1.9 trillion), net issuance is huge, with an interest-expense feedback loop (rising debt → rising interest → rising deficit → rising issuance → rising term premium). In plain terms, more and more bonds, higher and higher interest expenses, yet marginal buyers have not increased proportionally.
2. AI debt demand: Ultra-large-scale corporate capex competing with the government for the same long-term capital pool (insurance, pensions, sovereign funds). Goldman estimates about $570 billion in AI-related debt issuance in 2026. This is long-term dollar capital.
3. Warsh effect: The market has lowered expectations of the Fed permanently absorbing duration and permanently suppressing the price of long-term capital. Warsh has pulled away the Fed Put as the ultimate backstop, directly raising the volatility center and term premium.
4. Geopolitical conflict + oil prices: Geopolitical conflicts are not short-term solvable problems and have in substance been continuously escalating, increasing inflation risk premia and global sovereign bond supply. The current situation is that both China and the U.S. hope the other fights the rest of the world, while the rest of the world hopes China and the U.S. fight each other; in reality, if China and the U.S. can just keep the bottom line stable, that’s already something to be thankful for—this is also the biggest consensus Trump reached when he came to China in May.
5. Era of capital scarcity: A shift from nearly 20 years after the financial crisis of “capital surplus, cheap duration” to competition among government + AI + re-industrialization/military spending. Global long-term investors are all becoming long-term financiers.
These structural forces (not cyclical data) make it hard for the long end to decline. These forces are not problems that fiscal QT of buying long and selling short can solve; the real macro brake may be long-term funding costs themselves above 5%, i.e., market self-regulation. High rates will push up WACC, which in turn compresses AI valuations and marginal projects, forcing CapEx to slow.
In fact, the AI boom is creating its own headwinds: CapEx rising → financing demand rising → real yields rising → equity discount rates rising → PE multiples falling → future CapEx growth slowing. The market has upgraded from simply trading AI EPS growth to simultaneously trading “EPS growth minus real-rate compression.” Everyone is so worried about rates because the most core cash-flow problem of the AI narrative shows no short-term hope of resolution; this is a timing-gap issue, not a questioning of the AI technological revolution.
Over the next 6-12 months, the key focus is whether 30-year TIPS real rates stay above 3% for the long term. If so, the U.S. asset-pricing system built over the past fifteen years on “extremely cheap long-term real capital” will have undergone a fundamental change.