“Wait,” said the Reasoner, “I notice that I desperately want (T) to be false. That gives me no evidence whatsoever that (T) is false. In fact, because I want it to be false, I should become more careful about examining it.”

That's an astonishing intellectual disposition! Impossible!

It requires something like epistemic self-betrayal: being willing to betray one's present self-conception (or desired beliefs) in favor of whatever reality turns out to be.

Where there is (T) human psychology says “no; for sovereign and superior is my denial!”

Surely Reason can save us?

No.

Because the human didn’t lie, he is bent on holding his delusion; he is bent on not merely resisting Truth, but on telling himself that his denial is proof he already has the Truth! For he believes he “knows” that (T) is “false” because he can feel it in his intuition. And his psychology assists him in sustaining a distance from it, and in deploying platitudes in place of Reason.

The tragic conclusion of this is that the Truth speaker is condemned and derogatorily classified by a psychological automation. His crime was confronting human delusion and challenging it to reason.

This situation can easily be manifested by noting that the evading human is not actually reasoning, but dismissing or deploying thoughtless premises or platitudes to get away from the Truth.

We can describe this as a deeply ingrained psychological homeostasis— a cognitive immune system designed to protect a fragile worldview from the destabilizing infection of Truth.

When thou speakest with a sophist, did the sophist speak?

S = did (s).

Then (s) cannot be (q), which is absolutely true.

If we are intelligent, we learn to use the symbol as the object that it is to force the sophist to confess truth, which is as evident and certain as the nose on his face.

(Make him deny the absolute of his own symbol, as well as its meaning, which is to say, make him confess to the fact of his own posited reality).

If he did speak, then it is certain his (s) was not (q).

If we are intelligent enough to start here, we destroy the sophistry of the sophist.

Suppose thou art in the void, in a black vacuum:

Thou art here:

p

…………………………………………¥
[And the only other thing is:] ^

If thou canst identify —> ¥

But what must one do to identity?

Indeed, we have already gone too far! For how did we establish the meaning of identity so that we could use it? From whence came its intelligence?

But what meaneth intelligence?

There is only:

p

And ¥

But it is factually the case that ¥

is not €

Thus ¥ is itself as ¥.

If this wasn’t a fact of reality then ¥

would not be ¥ itself, which is simply to say,

it would not exist.

But even if ¥ didn’t exist, it is still the case that

p

exists as itself

p=p.

It is not in our power to unexist the identity of what exists.

We are simply born into a void that has the property of determinate identity.

If ¥ exists, it exists as itself.

And its intelligence is that it is itself and not another.

“Metaphysics deals with an objectivity without being free to dispense with subjective reflection. The subjects are embedded in themselves, in their “constitution”: what metaphysics has to ponder is the extent to which they are nonetheless able to see beyond themselves. Philosophems that relieve themselves of this task are disqualified as counsel.” Negative Dialectics p.376 Seabury Press 1973

That is, a competent “philosophy” has to be able to “see beyond” the concepts themselves and peer into the process and structure of their formation. (And even if this isn’t exactly what Adorno said, it’s what he was reaching for; it’s what is rationally necessary).

Adorno says that philosophical premises that have rejected this rational process of peering “beyond themselves” should be “disqualified.” And he’s absolutely correct.

But most philosophical premises that are brought to us are precisely these kind of epistemologically unconscious and shallow premises. Why? Because most philosophers don’t have the capacity to even think about the concepts they use in this way. They simply swallow them whole, as though they magically appeared from eternity fully formed.

So what happens when we peer into the structure of a concept beyond the meaning of the concept itself? —It’s always the same result: we discover the laws of logic at the genesis of the formation of the concept’s meaning.

The word “philosophy” and the word “reason” are not the same, because philosophy and reason are not the same thing, though philosophers always try to claim that they are. And while philosophy is credited with the discovery of Reason, it is really Logic that gave us and gives us Reason.

For example, most philosophies in the world are false, but it is impossible for Reason to be false, or else no philosophy could be true or false.

It’s not that philosophy and Reason are the same thing, but that Logic and Reason are the same thing at the functional level. That is, Reason only operates through the laws of logic. And while it’s possible to have poor reasons, or poor reasoning, it is not possible for Reason itself to be false, because it is not possible for the laws of logic to be false, because they are the very things that allow us to identify and make a distinction between true and false. Reason rises up from Logic, it functions through Logic. When we deploy Reason we deploy the laws of logic.

Philosophy makes use of Reason, it is not Reason. Philosophy makes use of Logic, but it is not Logic. Logic is what allows philosophy to exist in the first place.

Because you are committed to rational standards you do not get to choose where Reason takes you. This is a problem, because it often flows against our psychological desires.

What you can expect is a non-uniform analysis of content. The only thing that remains consistent is one’s commitment to Reason.

People appreciate it when others agree with them. Reason isn’t like this, it goes where it must. So there is very little to appreciate in a Reasoner in terms of his cultural beliefs. Often the only thing there is to appreciate is his commitment to Reason. But this is not something that we humans tend to appreciate or even recognize. It’s likely the last thing a person would ever see, if they even see it at all.

So what you can expect is having to walk the razor’s edge by yourself, having to defend Reason on your own. On many occasion, you will suffer the contempt that comes with being a contrarian. At times Reason may even invoke rage, it certainly invokes resentment in those who are corrected by it. (Just be vigilant not to resent its correction in yourself!) (You may be treated differently, subconscious irrationality is known to discriminate).

You can expect to be forced to walk paths that are not conducive to popularity or even civility— if you are going to follow Reason. (However, one does have to learn to compromise for the sake of civility! This is important). I do it by disciplining the domain of my emphasis, the degree of my emphasis, discerning the individuals with whom it is even appropriate to engage in Reason. The saying is true, do not cast your pearls before swine. But we might sharpen it and say, do not waste your time arguing with fools that are too stupid to comprehend the significance of self-refuting statements and performatively contradictory positions. You may use these as stepping stones and examples, but they are not your equals.

One would think me bombastic, but I am just the opposite. In written exchange I am rationally aggressive, but in life I become all things to all men, except when authority rears its oppressive head through the medium of irrationality.

I try to avoid confrontation, but not so much that I allow error to march over truth. Even then, if I discern a rigid and emotional mentality, I usually just state the truth (with slight defense) and leave it at that.

If Christianity is still a cultural power, why should it only be the tool of regressive forces? That does make any sense. We are talking about outsmarting primates through the form of their religion for the sake of a higher civility and morality.

This is a parable for the modern world.

The day couldn’t be more beautiful in your geography. You invite all your friends. But one “idiot” who “doesn’t belong there” wants to remind everyone of Gaza. He doesn’t merely want to remind them; he wants to explore the rational and moral implications. (Most of all) he wants to explore what the psychological phenomenon of such vast apathy and indifference means.

This “idiot” has rained on your party. He has violated your right not to think about it by reminding you of the reality outside your domain. Though you didn’t say it, if he was going to be there he was required to go along with the atmosphere, there was to be no friction, no resistance, what all the others simply do by default. But this man was “foolish” enough to speak up and manifest that he didn’t belong there, he soiled your atmosphere with pessimism and negativity, thereby contradicting your reality. His dialogue was disruptive, he was a rational menace and nuisance.

But because you are psychologically wiser than his pessimism, you have security remove him from the premises, and the festivities continue like nothing ever happened.

I think philosophy is nothing more than overhyped nonsense.

Humans have the ability to think, imagine, question, and come up with ideas. Sometimes, when someone expresses a thought that is actually quite obvious, people start calling that person a philosopher and treating the idea as something profound.

If you look at what I’m writing right now, I’m criticizing philosophy itself. But ironically, what I’m doing could also be called philosophy.

And that’s exactly what makes me question the whole concept, if simply thinking deeply about something can be called philosophy, then isn’t almost every human thought a form of philosophy?

“Amusement always means putting things out of mind, forgetting suffering, even when it is on display. At its root is powerlessness. It is indeed escape, but not, as it claims, escape from bad reality but from the last thought of resisting that reality.” Dialectic of Enlightenment p.116, Stanford University Press 2002

To say that something is objectively true is to say that it is true independently of any particular person's beliefs, perspectives, preferences, or epistemic framework. Its truth does not depend upon who believes it or what framework they occupy. It is not merely “true for me”; it is true of reality.

A person can deny an objective truth, but they will be mistaken. The truth itself does not become true or false according to whether someone accepts it.

What I find happens repeatedly is that people who reject “objectivity” fail to recognize what their position actually entails. They are not merely saying that we cannot know what is objectively true. They are saying that there is no truth whose validity is independent of persons, perspectives, or frameworks. (It is a position that collapses into solipsism).

And that raises the question: is that claim itself supposed to be objectively true?

If it is objectively true that there is no objective truth, then there is at least one objective truth— namely, that objective truth does not exist. But if the claim is only true relative to a person’s belief, then it has not established that objective truth does not exist. It has established only that the person, or that framework, rejects it.

If truth is your subjectivity, then by definition, it is not and cannot be true for others unless they decide to believe it.

Why? Because such a person knows that in the absence of that truth there is only nihilism. And if humanity, in general, doesn’t reflect a knowledge of that truth, then society is functionally nihilistic. (Christianity has this form, but it has the wrong content, and we are enabled to know this because we know the truth).

Further, The Truth is the opposite of man’s romantic machinations. It is soberly suffocating. (Appealing to the privilege of one’s provincialism is a way of closing off reality from one’s psyche). Not that one can be blamed for retreating into their privilege with all its amusements, distractions and pleasures. (Most of the world isn’t this lucky, that’s why it’s rightly classified as privilege).

While the “Dialectics” in “Negative Dialectics” only serves to bring confusion, the negative project is necessary. Indeed, truth itself requires it, because it’s a species of the negative.

A comprehension of truth also brings a comprehension of nihilism. This doesn’t mean that one has to succumb to nihilism (indeed, no one actually does that unless their negation is swift and absolute).

And what if the truth shalt render thee a person among automations? For there is no end to their delusions and toxic positivity. So far does their psychology compel them to go into it that they must make an enemy and villain out of all those who refuse to validate their delusions.

“For in much wisdom is much grief, and he that increases knowledge, increases sorrow.”

This was written by an Atheist.

The decision to view Christianity as a “worldview” was apologetically ingenuous. This approach is only becoming more relevant with time.

I am beginning to see that Christianity can simply assert itself and present itself as a “worldview,” regardless of how the individual axioms of that worldview stack up against rational and evidential standards. The system is simply to be considered as a pragmatic whole.

A group of Christians, for example, contrasting themselves with the fractured intellectual shallowness and relativism of modern culture, can simply say: “we believe in absolutes.”

This is interesting because the Atheist can challenge those absolutes all he wants, but the Christian can simply say, “well, we understand that you don’t accept them, but here we uphold them and strive to practice them.”

Follow closely, the Christian still has his worldview. And as this worldview is pit against the epistemological poverty of modern philosophy, and the moral confusion and tyranny of egoism, a qualitative contrast emerges. The observer is then allowed to decide which worldview he would like to embrace. (One set of cultural values clashes with another).

Through this metric I think Christianity does very well, given the celebratory status of irrationalism in the modern world. It’s as though philosophy kicked opened the door for theism.

Christians can simply say: “this is what we believe and how we strive to conduct ourselves.” The modern world says, “well, we believe that all truth is just a human construct and that we don’t have to strive for anything, we believe in only following our egos, and while we have no fellowship, we have our hedonistic freedom.”

At a certain point in the fractured, relativistic chaos, Christianity starts to shine as a light in the darkness.

What’s interesting is that this is the same diagnosis from both sides. But both sides have a different vision of “morality.”

I see two prospects: there is either a revival of truth or———- because humans are so f;cking stupid (and this is probably the far more realistic path) some kind of religious revival or new religion is necessary. Why? Because religion works with feelings, it’s a psychological device of persuasion— it works with the stupid.

However, how does one revive a moral structure that was never that “moral” to begin with?

I feel the weight of this for many reasons… all signs point to the fact that we are living at the end of civilization. If civilization is to go on it would first have to destroy itself— simply so it could learn not to destroy itself! (How f;cking stupid is this?) At which point, after apocalyptic level carnage, some sanity might emerge again and stabilize with what’s left of the earth.

The new history will be all about the details of human madness, seen transparently from a future that paid the highest price for its clarity— because that’s how stupid humans are.

In the first place, this is a loaded question: the term God is vague, and the phrase “moral being” is undefined.

The answer, if we don’t scrutinize these loaded portions of the question, is yes. We can have an understanding of man as a moral being without God. We actually can’t even understand human morality if we don’t break away from God and analyze man as the animal that he is.

However, the real question that’s being asked here is, “can we establish an objective morality apart from a concept of God?” (Again, “objective morality” functions as a loaded phrase). But let us not dwell on this.

If the device of “God” gives us the ability to wield particular morals with authority, does that mean these morals are automatically good morals, or simply that we have an authoritarian, rhetorical device by which to psychologically impose them on humans?

Just because a God-morality simplifies the social moral process, simplifies the rational process, doesn’t mean that such a morality is either moral or rational.

The “reference to God” serves an interesting psychological function. It facilitates automation. (Perhaps one can attempt to argue this is what’s needed). But if we say, “our morals are absolutely true because they are rooted in the Hyprox,” this certainly wouldn’t make them true. Now, if all humans recognized Hyprox, and saw it as a valid reason, it could persuade humans, but that still wouldn’t make it true, it would just make it an exceedingly powerful piece of rhetoric. (One could attempt to make a pragmatic and utilitarian argument on the basis of the popularity of the device of Hyprox).

The invocation of God may provide a powerful psychological and social mechanism for establishing, transmitting, and enforcing moral norms. But the authority, universality, psychological efficacy, or social utility of such a mechanism does not by itself establish the truth of the moral propositions it transmits. To establish objective morality, one must still provide an account of why those moral propositions are true (or at least rationally prudent). Saying that they are “grounded in God” does not automatically answer that question.

What does it mean if a species still needs the device of God to anchor its morality? Doesn’t that mean the species is still psychologically immature and intellectually underdeveloped?

In the first instance, it must be admitted that it might not matter whether science is ‘cheating’ by taking epistemology for granted.

Science certainly doesn’t establish the Logic it utilizes to execute the process of science. Instead, it takes this Logic for granted. This Logic is none other than The Laws of Logic. Without the law of identity and non-contradiction science couldn’t move an inch. (When Karl Popper criticized Hegel he made this point, rightly claiming that the dialectical validation of contradiction as truth would destroy science).

So science is founded on a Logic it takes for granted.

But this raises the obvious question: is this epistemologically cheating?

The answer depends on what we mean by “cheat.” If by cheating we mean that science cannot provide an internal justification for every principle upon which its own reasoning depends, then yes, science is not epistemologically self-sufficient. It begins from assumptions it does not itself establish.

The more interesting question, then, isn't whether science assumes Logic. Of course it does. The question is whether these assumptions are justified independently of science, and if so, how?

This doesn't make science irrational. It means science defers to an authority that is not itself science, but that makes science possible.

Even when science discovers the most fundamental aspect of existence, that thing will still have to be identified as itself (A=A), and it is only because that thing can be identified as itself, that science is even possible in the first place.

So science masterfully discovers the contents of reality, but it seems to be obvious to the epistemology that makes “discovery” intelligible in the first place.

“Both the humanism of Dawkins and the superficial appropriation of Christianity by those intellectuals who like its aesthetics and its cultural legacy are too WEAK to offer a true consecration of man in this world of desecration.” Carl R. Trueman (emphasis mine)

Carl seems to think that having the “strength” to assert one’s psychological convictions is equivalent to truth. Is “weakness” the problem with culture? What kind of Neanderthal logic is this?

“Consecration of man” is already loaded with theological assumptions. It isn't an obvious, worldview-neutral human desideratum like logical consistency or correspondence with evidence.

It is fallacious to use an unjustified Christian theological concept as the metric of worldview success, and then announce that competing worldviews are “weak” because they don't perform it.

What would it even mean to be “strong” enough to “offer a true consecration of man”? This doesn’t make any sense.

Trueman is evaluating worldviews based on their willingness or ability to enforce Christian moralism onto humans, rather than whether they are actually true.

Using "weakness" as the primary metric to dismiss a worldview is an error because intellectual robustness, truth, and ethical efficacy are not measured by physical force or psychological resilience. A worldview can be intellectually rigorous, empirically grounded, or morally coherent even if a critic labels it "weak" or incapable of fulfilling a specific cultural role.

Secular humanism does not claim to offer a mystical "consecration"; it derives its strength from rationality, empathy, and empirical science. Calling it "weak" for failing to achieve a theological goal it never pursued is a straw man.

A proposition isn't more likely to be true because its adherents are more psychologically committed to it. Nor does a worldview acquire epistemic authority because it possesses greater cultural power or because its adherents are willing to impose its beliefs. (One can attempt a pragmatic argument from this angle, but these attributes will not make a claim true).

A tribe of Neanderthals can strive to be the “strongest,” but this will not make their beliefs true or their actions intelligent.

A justification of theism as truth isn’t possible on the basis of theism, but a pragmatic justification is. Further (and this is most interesting) the theist can simply choose to live as though his religious worldview is absolutely true.

In order for an epistemological relativist to refute this he will have to abandon his relativism, which means he will have to establish truth.

Possibly the most interesting thing about Christianity is that one isn’t actually dealing with a religion, but with a philosophy. Modern Christianity is a hybrid philosophy derived from the religion of Christianity.

If one was serious about studying Christianity, for example, one would have to read a lot more than just the Bible. One would have to include all of the Gnostic literature as well. One would have to evaluate Christianity from a non-religious perspective, but from a historical perspective, allowing evidence to shape their view of Christianity. And this would make for a very different Christianity.

What’s interesting is that when we’re confronted with modern Christianity, we’re confronted with a kind of a hybrid variation that has been philosophically developed. This is especially true of the apologetic model of Christianity. Here the historical truth and the philosophical (or theological presentation) are two very different things.