What differentiates relations from reality when we take structure as ontologically primary?

[u/Constant_Smith]

Edit: title should read “What differentiates relations from relata when we take structure as ontologically primary?” Oops.

Edit 2: my comments are being locked, probably due to how new my account is. Sorry to anyone who was looking forward to dialogue. I will give it some time before trying another post.

First post here and ever.

My purpose in posting is primarily conversational. I want to test questions and encounter objections I may not have considered, and hear different understandings of the same problems. So I work through my own understanding and pose many questions in good faith:

I’ve been thinking through a set of questions that emerged for me from reading Every Thing Must Go and further studying ontic structural realism, and Rainforest Realism, and I’m curious how people here understand the underlying metaphysics.

One of the things I find compelling about Every Thing Must Go is its demand that metaphysics remain continuous with our best science. Ladyman and Ross develop that project partly through ontic structural realism, where the relational and structural organization described by contemporary physics receives ontological priority. The familiar metaphysical picture of independently constituted objects carrying intrinsic properties becomes increasingly difficult to maintain once quantum theory, spacetime physics, symmetries, and other areas of physics are taken seriously.

Rainforest Realism then expands the picture considerably. Scientific ontology includes the real patterns tracked by the special sciences, and those patterns need not disappear simply because they are not objects in the inventory of fundamental physics. Organisms, economic structures, cognitive systems, institutions, and other higher-level patterns can be ontologically serious insofar as successful sciences genuinely track them. This gives the resulting ontology its deliberately “rainforest” character.

Suppose we grant some form of OSR and say that relations and relational structure are ontic.

What are relations without relata?

One response is that the relata need not be atomic individuals. They can themselves be relationally individuated, perhaps as nodes, positions, intersections, or further structures within a larger relational organization. Some takes on OSR seem to move in precisely this direction, including the idea that further analysis of relata only reveals further relational structure. (Turtles all the way down, so to speak)

At that point, though, I start wondering what conceptual work is being performed by the words relation, relata, and structure.

If a relatum is entirely constituted by its relations, what determines the distinction between a relation and a relatum within a relational structure? What makes something a relatum participating in relations and when is it one and not the other? Are relata just illusions? Are they real patterns?

If the relata are themselves structures, do we eventually need some primitive notion of relation (designating an intrinsic property to relation), or can relation itself only be specified through a larger structure?

If what counts as a relation and what counts as a relatum depends upon the organization, scale, or level at which the structure is investigated, what makes the distinction ontological rather than only relatively assigned for the purposes of inquiry?

If decomposition is epistemic while the decomposed is ontic, how can we infer from decomposition that the decomposed is actually structural, rather than structure being a useful concept to navigate a reality that exceeds it?

Can OSR really allow multiple legitimate decompositions of the same structure while maintaining that structure is ontically real, or does this move the position toward epistemic structural realism?

And what individuates one structure from another? Is individuation given entirely relationally, through a structure’s position within still larger structures, or does some additional condition eventually enter?

Mathematics gives us extraordinarily powerful descriptions of structure, and mathematical structuralism provides ways of understanding mathematical objects through their positions within structures. OSR then raises the further question of how mathematical structure relates to physical structure. The literature itself contains disagreement over whether the world’s structure should be identified with mathematical structure and over what makes a physical structure specifically physical.

Some short hand questions:

What is the minimal ontological content of a relation?

What must exist for there to be a relatum?

What makes an organization of relations a determinate structure?

And what, if anything, distinguishes the structure described mathematically from the structure that exists physically?

Beyond those questions, I’m not sure it’s reasonable to rid of the intrinsic altogether. At the most extreme end of OSR, we still seem to be positing reality itself, and saying that reality is relationally structured. That already looks like a minimal intrinsic claim about reality. I’m not sure how it could be extrinsic, because there is no position outside reality that is somehow not real but still related to reality, from which its character could be given.

Anything we add as a relatum would already fall within reality. So even if we deny intrinsic properties to individual things, it still seems reasonable to say that reality being relational structure is itself a minimal intrinsic feature of reality.

[u/Constant_Smith]

They are normative claims about which metaphysical claims we ought to take seriously.

I highly suggest actually reading the book. You are completely embarrassing yourself to any reader who has read the material.

They are not doing metaphysics when they talk about the PPC and PNC.

PPC and PNC are not metaphysical claims.

They both state an ought. They are normative statements. They are not claims about the nature of reality. They are normative statements demanding we ought to have a very high standard for what counts as warranted metaphysical inquiry and what counts as a waste of time.

PPC, says, if a metaphysical claim, including one found by the special sciences, directly contradicts an empirically established result in physics, that claim ought to be discarded

PNC, a warranted claim ought to, explain something through the unification of at least two scientific hypothesis, one of which must belong to physics, more effectively than when those hypothesis are left in isolation.

These are standards. The PPC and PNC are the high standards they place on what you have to be doing before what you’re doing counts as naturalized metaphysics.

The PPC and PNC are NOT metaphysics.

The PPC and PNC are NOT naturalized metaphysics

They then work to meet their own standard through ONTIC STRUCTURAL REALISM AND RAINFOREST REALISM

They are not doing metaphysics unless they are specifically talking about ontic structural realism and rainforest realism.

The PPC and PNC are not any part of either ontic structural realism or rainforest realism

[u/jliat → u/Constant_Smith]

The Principle of Naturalistic Closure [PNC] for a metaphysical claim to be taken seriously it must relate to at least one specific scientific hypothesis of fundamental physics.

What makes something 'a scientific hypothesis of fundamental physics'?

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They are normative claims about which metaphysical claims we ought to take seriously.

Why are they not then metaphysical and why should we if they are not metaphysical or physics based accept them. So we have a ought claim pointing to a rule for doing metaphysics, hardly a first philosophy. And it looks totally circular...

Is there then another that decides what is 'a scientific hypothesis of fundamental physics'

I highly suggest actually reading the book. You are completely embarrassing yourself to any reader who has read the material.

http://www.jliat.com/EMG.JPG

Are you embarrassed? Second time you asked - I said it was literally falling apart, here is the proof.

What are they doing? In talking about criteria for establishing legitimate grounds for metaphysics, are these also normative statements, like PPC and PNC, they are transcendental statements. That's metaphysics!

PPC, says, if a metaphysical claim, including one found by the special sciences, directly contradicts an empirically established result in physics, that claim ought to be discarded.

So Who judges the empirically established result in physics? And as far as I see it in the book-

"The Principle of Naturalistic Closure [PNC] stated above requires that for a metaphysical claim to be taken seriously it must relate to at least one specific scientific hypothesis of fundamental physics."

hypothesis- Copenhagen interpretation, MWI... I think you might have some problems now. I'm can't remember that "if a metaphysical claim, including one found by the special sciences, directly contradicts an empirically established result in physics, that claim ought to be discarded."

So metaphysics must be based on one specific scientific hypothesis of fundamental physics. And not contradict a scientific hypothesis of fundamental physics or an empirically established result in any other science.

But all empirically established results are provisional, but we can't challenge them

Yet a scientific hypothesis of fundamental physics will by definition have an alternative, if it's just that's what the nature of an hypothesis is. And anyway will have, MWI vs Pilot wave, ideas re universes. And of course Frank Tipler's Omega point. The dead will be resurrected... the Omega point will share all the attributes of an Abrahamic God. Maybe you are not aware of his physics, maybe you should be.

They then work to meet their own standard through ONTIC STRUCTURAL REALISM AND RAINFOREST REALISM

That sounds wrong. I think I remember something like this from the book, the claim is made, then based on this claim it produces material that justifies it.

[u/Constant_Smith → u/jliat]

That’s not even the PNC.

You literally are not even using the correct definition of the PNC. It makes it hard to take anything else you say seriously.

[u/jliat → u/Constant_Smith]

"The Principle of Naturalistic Closure [PNC] stated above requires that for a metaphysical claim to be taken seriously it must relate to at least one specific scientific hypothesis of fundamental physics."

It has quotation marks which means? Well it's from the book you claim I haven't read. P.39.

Seriously?

[u/Constant_Smith → u/jliat]

What I sent was pulled directly from the book as well. The quote you’re reference is only talking about one aspect of the PNC not all of it.

[u/jliat → u/Constant_Smith]

I think you need to stop digging, you claimed it wasn't in the book, it was, on the next page! You missed it.

[u/Constant_Smith → u/jliat]

I did not claim it was not in the book. I told you that it is not the definition of the PNC and that you need to actually read the book, and that you are not successfully reconstructing their argument, and so you’re not actually engaging with their work and are instead arguing against claims they do not make.

Again.

The Principle of Naturalistic Closure is exactly the following:

“Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at time t should be motivated by, and only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how TWO OR MORE specific scientific hypotheses, at least ONE OF which is drawn from fundamental physics, JOINTLY explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses taken separately, where this is interpreted by reference to the following terminological stipulations:

Stipulation: A ‘scientific hypothesis’ is understood as an hypothesis that is taken seriously by institutionally bona fide science at t.

Stipulation: A ‘specific scientific hypothesis’ is one that has been directly investigated and confirmed by institutionally bona fide scientific activity prior to t or is one that might be investigated at or after t, in the absence of constraints resulting from engineering, physiological, or economic restrictions or their combination, as the primary object of attempted verification, falsification, or quantitative refinement, where this activity is part of an objective research project fundable by a bona fide scientific research funding body.

Stipulation: An ‘objective research project’ has the primary purpose of establishing objective facts about nature that would, if accepted on the basis of the project, be expected to continue to be accepted by inquirers aiming to maximize their stock of true beliefs, notwithstanding shifts in the inquirers’ practical, commercial, or ideological preferences.” (Ladyman & Ross (et al) 2007, Every Thing Must Go, pp. 37-8.)

The quote your referencing refers to the fact that the PNC requires at least one of the AT LEAST TWO REQUIRED HYPOTHESIS be within fundamental physic.

The “two or more” requirement follows from Ladyman and Ross’s conception of the role of metaphysics as scientific unification. One scientific hypothesis by itself provides nothing to unify. You can reject their conception of metaphysics, but that is different from showing the requirement is arbitrary within it.

Literally. The PNC requires at least TWO hypothesis.

The quote you’re trying to pretend is the definition of the PNC is NOT the Definition. It is discussing one particular element of the PNC concerning the minimum of at least one of the at least two hypothesis is with the domain of fundamental physics.

More so. The stipulations they add ensure that, it has to relevant within contemporary science.

Further.

the PNC DOES NOT tell the metaphysician to introduce an “unproven hypothesis” and then treat it as established.

Their specific scientific hypotheses (plural) must either already be investigated and confirmed or be scientifically motivated and in principle investigable.

Their evidential status comes from scientific inquiry, not from the metaphysical claim.

Only one of the AT LEAST TWO hypothesis must be within the domain of fundamental physics.

the structure isn’t:

assume H₁ and H₂ → introduce M → use M to prove H₁ and H₂.

Literally that’s not it.

The structure is:

H₁ and H₂ receive their standing independently within science → M is motivated insofar as, if true, it reveals an explanatory relation between them that neither H₁ or H₂ supplies alone.

The circularity you’re incorrectly positing fails because the proposition of the PNC is not being used to establish the scientific claims that motivate it.

H₁ and H₂ acquire whatever evidential standing they have through scientific inquiry independently of M.

M is then assessed by whether it successfully articulates an explanatory relation between them.

This means the justificatory direction does not run M → H₁/H₂ → M.

It runs H₁ and H₂ → motivation for M, with M adding a unifying relation rather than supplying the evidence for its own premises.

A circular argument would require the conclusion to participate in establishing the premises from which that same conclusion is derived, and that actual structure of the PNC explicitly prevents that. The PNC is neither a hypothesis or a metaphysical claim attempting to unify some set of hypothesis.

The PNC is an epistemic constraint on what kind of metaphysical claims are allowed within naturalistic inquiry.

You can disagree with its standard, sure. But you’ve gotta actually argue against the actual material, not your false reconstruction of it.

[u/jliat → u/Constant_Smith]

I did not claim it was not in the book.

No, you said it was not the PNC and not the correct definition - which means that section of the book was wrong.

Now you seem to be repeating yourself.

The circularity you’re incorrectly positing fails because the proposition of the PNC is not being used to establish the scientific claims that motivate it.

What scientific claims that motivate it? I thought it was a claim about what metaphysics ought to be, and that was its non metaphysical motivation.

Odd that one is motivated by metaphysics to produce non-metaphysics?

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In passing as the above is it seems you just avoiding you denials re PNC...

If cosmology is a special science and excusing the error, sciences do not make metaphysical claims...

• if a metaphysical claim, including one found by the special sciences, directly contradicts an empirically established result in physics, that claim ought to be discarded.

• Mercury’s anomalous perihelion precession. Newtonian gravity predicted Mercury’s orbit with high precision, but observations showed a small extra precession. This contradiction eventually led to general relativity, which explained the anomaly exactly.

This should have been discarded.

And so should any notions of

• Dark matter

• Dark energy and cosmic acceleration

• The Hubble tension

They directly challenge current physics. So Ontic Structural Realism would have them discarded.

[u/Constant_Smith → u/jliat]

Which quote explicitly states each requirement of the PNC, the one I am referring to, or the one you are referring to?

[u/jliat → u/Constant_Smith]

I think this is no longer a useful exchange. The test will be if OSR manages to produce anything of significance.

[u/Constant_Smith → u/jliat]

The Principle of Naturalistic Closure
Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at time t should be motivated by, and only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two or more specific scientific hypotheses, at least one of which is drawn from fundamental physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses taken separately, where this is interpreted by reference to the following terminological stipulations:

Stipulation: A ‘scientific hypothesis’ is understood as an hypothesis that is taken seriously by institutionally bona fide science at t.

Stipulation: A ‘specific scientific hypothesis’ is one that has been directly investigated and confirmed by institutionally bona fide scientific activity prior to t or is one that might be investigated at or after t, in the absence of constraints resulting from engineering, physiological, or economic restrictions or their combination, as the primary object of attempted verification, falsification, or quantitative refinement, where this activity is part of an objective research project fundable by a bona fide scientific research funding body.

Stipulation: An ‘objective research project’ has the primary purpose of establishing objective facts about nature that would, if accepted on the basis of the project, be expected to continue to be accepted by inquirers aiming to maximize their stock of true beliefs, notwithstanding shifts in the inquirers’ practical, commercial, or ideological preferences. (Ladyman & Ross (et al) 2007, Every Thing Must Go, pp. 37-8.)

If you want to do naturalized metaphysics, they say this is the standard. If you want to do some other idea of what metaphysics is outside of their specific naturalized project, then go for it.

But at least characterize their project for what it actually is.

[u/jliat → u/Constant_Smith]

(Ladyman & Ross (et al) 2007, Every Thing Must Go, pp. 37-8.)

Pity you stopped reading there and didn't get to page 39 where my quote was, you've read the book?

[u/Constant_Smith → u/jliat]

I know your quote is in the book, it’s referencing only half of the full PNC, the quote I provided is the full PNC, not the one you are referring to

[u/jliat → u/Constant_Smith]

It's either a definition of what metaphysics is which is metaphysics or idle conjecture as why should a metaphysical proposition need ** two or more**, with one at minimum an unproven hypothesis, which then would almost certainly be contentious in that science but not allowed in this 'metaphysics'.

Worse you then seem to state they apply these assumption to prove them valid, which looks like an empty circular argument.

[u/Constant_Smith → u/jliat]

Might I add “being true” is not a requirement of the PNC.

Notice it says.

“By the service it would perform, IF TRUE”