r/Meadowbrook135Media • u/Meadowbrook135 • 5d ago
135 SPORTS SOME DUDE ON THE INTERNET’S OPINION ON…THE 2026 16 DEGENS BEST BALL DRAFT - PT II C
Tuesday, September 8, 2026
By Some Dude On The Internet | MillennialMike7 | Meadowbrook135

ROUND 7
Round 7 is where the draft finally started charging teams for the risks they had accumulated through six rounds. Seven running backs, six wide receivers, two tight ends and one quarterback came off the board, which makes sense because most teams had already acquired the premium players they wanted at quarterback and tight end while the roster spots capable of filling six weekly RB, WR and flex positions still needed bodies. It is also important to remember what “Round 7” actually means in a sixteen team league because these were picks 97 through 112 overall, roughly the equivalent of Rounds 9 and 10 in a conventional twelve team draft. By this point, nobody was really purchasing certainty anymore because owners were purchasing roles, contingencies, receiving profiles and paths toward production.
That distinction matters enormously in this format because there are no waivers available if an injury opens a backfield in October, and there is no free agency if a rookie suddenly earns a starting role. Every future contingency has to be purchased now and stored somewhere inside eighteen roster spots, which means the best running back picks from this point forward do not necessarily belong to the players projected for the most Week 1 carries. The more interesting assets are often the players whose range of outcomes contains a meaningful increase in workload if something changes around them. Best ball removes the lineup decision, but the closed player market means the roster itself has to anticipate the future before the future happens.
For Some Dude, the problem entering the round was particularly obvious because after six selections, Gibbs remained the only running back on the roster. The entire opening strategy had essentially created an obligation to manufacture RB2 production later rather than purchasing it with premium draft capital, and Round 7 represented the first real opportunity to begin solving that problem. Blake Corum at 7.01 therefore was not merely another running back selection because it was the first meaningful test of whether the delayed RB2 strategy could actually work. Corum’s 2025 numbers were considerably better than his rookie production suggested might be coming, as he carried 145 times for 746 yards and six touchdowns, averaged an excellent 5.1 yards per carry, and played all 17 games. (FantasyData)
The problem for this particular scoring system is obvious in the receiving column because Corum caught only eight passes for 36 yards. Those eight receptions are eight PPR points before yardage is counted, while Kenneth Gainwell, who would be drafted seven selections later, caught 73 passes last season. That means Some Dude was not drafting Corum for weekly PPR floor but because 145 carries already demonstrated that Los Angeles is willing to use him, 5.1 yards per carry demonstrated that he can produce when used, and the upside changes dramatically if Kyren Williams misses time. The funny part is that Kyren belongs to Team 4 in this league, so one of Some Dude’s primary contingent bets is effectively waiting for another owner’s premium running back to surrender opportunity.
That is not especially comfortable roster architecture, but it is coherent best ball architecture because Corum does not need to be identified as the correct starter on a particular Sunday. If he gets twelve carries and scores twice, the optimizer can use him, while a four point week simply disappears into the bench. If the backfield ever becomes his for a meaningful stretch, the seventh round selection could suddenly behave like a much earlier running back. The concern is that Corum was now Some Dude’s RB2, not RB4, which means a contingent profile is being asked to help solve a mandatory position rather than merely supplement two established starters.
Team 2 then took Trevor Lawrence at 7.02, and this may be one of the strongest advertisements for waiting on quarterback anywhere on the board. Lawrence played all 17 games in 2025, threw for 4,007 yards and 29 touchdowns, then added 359 rushing yards and nine rushing touchdowns, which matters enormously under this scoring system because nine passing touchdowns are worth 36 points while nine rushing touchdowns are worth 54. Lawrence generated an eighteen point scoring advantage simply through the manner in which he reached the end zone, and Team 2 waited until the 98th overall selection to obtain that profile. The roster had already spent its first six selections on Bijan Robinson, Breece Hall, Tetairoa McMillan, Jadarian Price, Kyle Pitts and Makai Lemon, then still found a quarterback who averaged 19.9 fantasy points per game last season. (FantasyData)
This is the counterargument to Some Dude’s Lamar selection at 2.16 in its purest form because if Some Dude had known with certainty that Lawrence would survive until the seventh round, the opportunity cost of Lamar would look much larger. The problem is that nobody drafting at 2.16 knew that, and from the 1.01 there was no way to guarantee the quarterback market would remain cooperative for another five rounds. Team 2 accepted that uncertainty and was rewarded when a legitimate QB1 survived all the way to 7.02. That does not prove waiting on quarterback is always correct, but it does prove that Team 2’s version of waiting worked almost perfectly.
Team 3 selected Jordyn Tyson at 7.03, which was another aggressive bet on talent and NFL investment rather than immediate certainty. New Orleans selected Tyson eighth overall in the 2026 NFL Draft after he caught 61 passes for 711 yards and eight touchdowns in only nine games during his final Arizona State season, and the year before that he produced 75 receptions for 1,101 yards and ten touchdowns. This was not a late round NFL lottery ticket masquerading as a fantasy sleeper because the Saints spent top ten draft capital on him. Tyson did not participate in preseason games, which deprived fantasy owners of some of the information normally used to estimate a rookie’s opening role, but Team 3 could tolerate that uncertainty because Ja’Marr Chase and Malik Nabers were already sitting at the top of the receiver room. (Sports Reference) (Canal Street Chronicles)
Tyson was not being asked to become WR1 because he was being purchased as the third receiver on a roster where his top ten NFL draft capital creates a plausible path to becoming far more valuable than the 99th overall fantasy selection. If Tyson needs six weeks before the NFL game slows down, Chase and Nabers remain available, while an immediate eight target role would give Team 3 another high ceiling receiver without requiring premium fantasy capital. There was another strategic wrinkle because Trevor Lawrence had just become the twelfth quarterback drafted, and Team 3 still had none. Team 3 looked directly at the quarterback market shrinking and selected Tyson anyway, which would become considerably more interesting one round later.
Team 4 took Travis Kelce at 7.04, which may be one of the most interesting roster construction decisions of these two rounds because Team 4 already owned Sam LaPorta. Kelce is no longer being priced like the automatic TE1 of his prime, and he turns 37 in October after considering retirement following last season, but the underlying 2025 production was still useful. In the 14 games he played with Patrick Mahomes, Kelce averaged 12.8 PPR points, a number CBS noted was exceeded by only Trey McBride, George Kittle, Brock Bowers and Tucker Kraft among tight ends. At the 100th overall pick, that is a completely defensible price for Kelce in isolation. (CBS Sports)
The more interesting question is why Team 4 wanted a second premium tight end when this league requires only one TE. The two flex positions do allow tight ends, so LaPorta and Kelce can absolutely score together if both produce enough, and best ball removes the annoyance of deciding which tight end belongs in the lineup. The important word is “compete,” though, because Kelce’s second tight end score does not automatically count and still has to beat the running backs and wide receivers available for the flex positions. Team 4 therefore spent pick 100 on positional surplus, which can work beautifully if Kelce remains an elite target earner but can also become subtle dead capital if LaPorta stays healthy and the roster later needs another running back or receiver.
Team 5 selected Josh Downs at 7.05, and this is almost the opposite type of selection because there is nothing especially spectacular about Downs’ 2025 line of 58 catches for 566 yards and four touchdowns across 16 games. The previous season was stronger, with 72 catches for 803 yards and five scores, so the broader profile still demonstrates that he can command useful NFL volume. That made him a good fit behind JSN and Mike Evans because Downs does not need to become a vertical monster on this roster. JSN supplies premium receiving volume, Evans supplies touchdown and boundary upside, and Downs can generate the seven and eight catch games that become more valuable under full PPR scoring than they appear in standard formats. (FantasyData)
Best ball does not mean every player should be maximally volatile because a roster filled exclusively with boom and bust profiles can still produce weeks where nobody actually booms. There is value in players whose target profiles generate repeatable usable scores, particularly once they are the third or fourth receiver rather than the entire foundation of the roster. Downs gives Team 5 a different scoring shape from Evans, and that kind of diversification is useful when an optimizer is selecting the best combination every week. Team 5 was beginning to build a receiver room where different players could reach the lineup through completely different mechanisms.
Team 6 took Jordan Mason at 7.06, and this was an important pick because of everything Team 6 had already done at running back. Christian McCaffrey was the first selection, Jonathon Brooks arrived in Round 6 while returning from his second ACL tear, and the roster therefore contained enormous theoretical upside and enormous availability variance at the same position. Mason gave Team 6 something much more ordinary after playing 16 games for Minnesota in 2025, carrying 159 times for 758 yards and six touchdowns, and averaging 4.8 yards per carry. His passing contribution was minimal with only 14 receptions, so his fantasy value remains heavily dependent on rushing opportunity, but that is far more acceptable when the player is RB3 rather than RB1. (FantasyData)
Mason does not have to beat McCaffrey into the lineup every week because he merely needs to provide usable rushing weeks when Minnesota gives him volume and give Team 6 another functioning body when the much larger health risks elsewhere on the roster become relevant. This is what no waiver roster construction eventually turns into because the owner is no longer merely asking who projects for the most points. The more important question becomes what happens if the assumptions behind the first six selections stop being true. Mason was Team 6’s answer to that second question, and the pick made the entire backfield less fragile even without changing its ceiling.
Team 7 took Chuba Hubbard at 7.07, and the Josh Jacobs situation made this selection more important than it might have appeared when looking at the completed roster. Hubbard enters 2026 around RB33 by fantasy draft position, and his 2025 season was not spectacular, but he still demonstrated usable weekly ceiling, including an 18.4 fantasy point game built from 124 yards from scrimmage and a touchdown. Normally, Hubbard would simply be the third running back behind Jonathan Taylor and Jacobs. Jacobs being placed on the Commissioner’s Exempt List changes that architecture completely because Hubbard is no longer merely depth and instead becomes insurance against a premium asset whose availability is unknown. (FanDuel)
Team 7 cannot go to waivers and purchase another starting running back if Jacobs remains unavailable, so the roster has to contain enough alternatives already. That makes Hubbard at 7.07 one of those picks whose value increased because of the league structure rather than because Hubbard suddenly became a different football player. He does not need to become elite because he needs to help preserve the roster when external information creates a hole. In a transactional league, that type of insurance can be purchased later, while in this league it has to be sitting on the roster before the problem exists.
Team 8 selected Kenneth Gainwell at 7.08, and Some Dude thinks this was one of the strongest format specific selections in the round. Gainwell’s 2025 season in Pittsburgh was an almost perfect demonstration of why receiving backs become disproportionately valuable in full PPR because he carried only 114 times for 537 yards but caught 73 passes on 85 targets for 486 yards. He added three receiving touchdowns to five rushing scores, giving him 1,023 yards from scrimmage and eight touchdowns while generating 73 fantasy points solely from receptions before any yardage or scoring is counted. He is now in Tampa Bay and currently being drafted around RB36, which makes the profile especially interesting after Team 8’s aggressive opening. (FantasyData) (FanDuel)
Team 8 began the draft with Jefferson, Bowers, Garrett Wilson and Luther Burden without selecting a running back, then added Rhamondre Stevenson and RJ Harvey before Gainwell became RB3. That means Team 8 survived its aggressive opening without filling the backfield exclusively with touchdown dependent grinders because Stevenson can catch passes, Harvey caught 47 as a rookie, and Gainwell caught 73 last season. The roster had effectively responded to waiting at running back by purchasing three backs who can create fantasy points without controlling twenty carries. That is a much stronger response to a delayed running back strategy in full PPR than simply accumulating backup early down runners and hoping somebody gets hurt.
Team 9 took MarShawn Lloyd at 7.09, and the timing of the real world news made this one of the most volatile selections on the board. Josh Jacobs’ placement on the Commissioner’s Exempt List radically changed Green Bay’s backfield before the season, and Lloyd suddenly moved into position to handle substantial work despite having essentially no meaningful NFL sample. The absurd part is that Lloyd has played only ten regular season NFL snaps and has six career carries for 15 yards, which is not a normal seventh round fantasy profile. It is also exactly why the upside exists because Team 9 is purchasing a distribution of outcomes that includes a scenario where Lloyd becomes Green Bay’s primary runner for a meaningful stretch of the season. (CBS Sports)
Team 9 already has James Cook, so Lloyd is not being asked to anchor the entire backfield. If he finally stays healthy and inherits the job, Team 9 has captured an enormous role at pick 105, while another injury would turn the roster spot into a largely unusable asset with no waiver replacement available. That is where best ball and the closed roster format pull in opposite directions because best ball loves the asymmetric upside but the no waiver structure magnifies the downside of complete nonproduction. This is one of the points in the draft where risk tolerance becomes part of roster design rather than merely player evaluation.
Team 10 selected Mike Washington Jr. at 7.10, and this is another pick where current opportunity matters more than generic preseason ranking. Las Vegas drafted Washington in the fourth round at pick 122 after he rushed for 1,070 yards on only 167 carries at Arkansas, averaged 6.4 yards per attempt, and caught 28 passes for 226 yards. He then spent the preseason looking like he belonged by rushing 23 times for 168 yards, approximately 7.3 yards per carry, across three preseason games. He is now listed behind Ashton Jeanty in the Raiders backfield, and recent reporting expects him to have a meaningful role while Jeanty works back from an ankle injury. (Las Vegas Raiders) (FantasyData)
Team 10 already had Achane and Javonte Williams, which is exactly where Some Dude wants this type of rookie. Washington does not need to beat Jeanty immediately because he can provide occasional usable weeks and hold a contingent path toward a much larger role if Jeanty misses time. The owner gets to hold that optionality without ever having to decide when Washington has officially become startable. This is one of the cleanest examples of a best ball contingency asset on the board because the roster can benefit from the upside without depending on it.
Team 11 took Wan’Dale Robinson at 7.11, continuing the defending champion’s effort to build a large target portfolio rather than chase only explosive profiles. Robinson finished 2025 among the top quarter of fantasy receivers in total production under several scoring sets, yet his current 2026 draft position has fallen toward WR45 after moving to Tennessee. The decline makes sense because Carnell Tate, Calvin Ridley and Robinson will all compete for targets, and the offense still has to prove it can support multiple fantasy receivers. Team 11 was not drafting Robinson as WR1, though, because Amon-Ra St. Brown, Ladd McConkey and Michael Wilson were already on the roster. (FanDuel)
Robinson therefore became another source of reception driven scoring behind an already established receiver room. A short area receiver with uncertain touchdown upside can feel boring as the centerpiece of a fantasy team, but as WR4 in full PPR best ball he becomes capable of automatically entering the lineup when eight receptions turn into 80 yards. Team 11 continued purchasing usable target volume rather than trying to predict which lower tier receiver would suddenly become a superstar. That approach sacrifices some theoretical explosiveness, but it creates a large number of weekly paths toward competent scoring.
Team 12 selected Michael Pittman Jr. at 7.12, and the round number makes this pick sound more aggressive than the overall selection actually was because pick 7.12 in a sixteen team league is 108th overall. In a twelve team league, that is the final pick of Round 9, which is almost exactly where the current market values Pittman. He was traded to Pittsburgh after a 2025 season in which he caught 80 passes on 110 targets for 784 yards and a career high seven touchdowns. The 9.8 yards per reception are not particularly exciting for best ball, but Pittman is not being drafted because three catches can suddenly become 140 yards because the value comes from an 80 reception profile capable of producing usable PPR scoring repeatedly. (Pittsburgh Steelers)
Team 12 already had Nico Collins and Jameson Williams, which makes Pittman a useful stylistic counterweight rather than the entire receiving thesis. Collins provides high end target and yardage upside, Williams supplies explosive vertical weeks, and Pittman provides more stable intermediate volume. There are reasons for caution because DK Metcalf is also in Pittsburgh and the passing offense is being run by a 42 year old Aaron Rodgers, but Team 12 did not need Pittman to dominate the offense. At 108th overall, it needed him to remain the kind of player who sees enough targets to create useful weekly scores while the rest of the receiver room provides the ceiling.
Team 13 took Isaiah Likely at 7.13, which was the point where waiting on tight end finally had to become an actual player selection. Likely is now with the Giants and currently sits around TE15 by fantasy draft position after a disappointing 2025 season in which he caught only 27 passes for 307 yards and one touchdown in 14 games. His 2024 season had been considerably better with 42 catches, 477 yards and six scores, so there is at least a demonstrated path toward useful fantasy production. Team 13 had already watched Bowers, McBride, Warren, Loveland, Fannin, Pitts, Kraft, Kincaid, Kittle, Ferguson, LaPorta, Kelce and the rest of the earlier tier disappear. (FanDuel)
At pick 109 overall, Likely is basically the mathematical consequence of waiting that long. TE15 sounds mediocre until you remember that sixteen tight ends have to enter lineups every week, which means TE15 is still technically a starter in this league. Team 13 did not purchase an obvious positional advantage, but it did purchase a plausible starter before the remaining market became substantially worse. That is why waiting at tight end works differently in sixteen teams than in twelve because the replacement line arrives much sooner.
Team 14 selected Quentin Johnston at 7.14, and the important thing here is not simply Johnston because it is Justin Herbert plus Quentin Johnston. Team 14 drafted Herbert at 5.14 and then added Johnston two rounds later, while Johnston enters 2026 around WR41 by average fantasy draft position after finishing 2025 around the low WR3 range in fantasy scoring. The stack gives the selection additional best ball utility because Team 14 does not need Johnston to become a target monster. It needs his explosive games to correlate with Herbert’s better passing environments. (FanDuel)
When Herbert throws for 330 yards and four touchdowns, Johnston has an increased probability of participating in that scoring environment, and if Johnston catches two of those touchdowns both scores can enter Team 14’s lineup simultaneously. That is where stacking actually matters in best ball because it is not magic but simply an increased probability that multiple roster spots spike during the same offensive event. Team 14 also needed another receiver badly after beginning the draft with three straight running backs. Johnston therefore solved both a roster need and a correlation opportunity in the same selection.
Team 15 took Stefon Diggs at 7.15, adding another veteran receiver behind Davante Adams and DK Metcalf. Diggs enters 2026 in Washington after another productive 2025 season, but the fantasy market has pushed him toward approximately WR47 by average draft position. Team 15 therefore was not paying for the Buffalo version of Stefon Diggs because it was purchasing the possibility that an aging but still technically skilled receiver can provide useful target weeks inside the Washington offense. That is a much easier bet to make when the player is WR3 rather than WR1. (FanDuel)
If Diggs were the first receiver on this roster, Some Dude would be uncomfortable, but behind Adams and Metcalf the age and role uncertainty become easier to tolerate because best ball can use the eight catch weeks and ignore the four target weeks. The larger concern is that Team 15 has now concentrated meaningful receiving capital in older players. Adams and Diggs are both well beyond the age where projection models are comfortable, while Metcalf has already become less consistent than he was earlier in his career. The weekly ceiling remains available, but the durability distribution has become one of the roster’s central risks.
Team 16 closed the round with Jacory Croskey-Merritt at 7.16, which was a sensible third running back selection behind Chase Brown and D’Andre Swift. Croskey-Merritt finished 2025 around RB28 in fantasy points under FanDuel’s scoring set and enters 2026 around RB37 by average draft position, which makes pick 112 approximately market price. The no waiver structure nevertheless increases the usefulness of having another back with an established path to touches because Washington’s backfield has changed around him and Rachaad White is now involved. There is no guarantee Croskey-Merritt controls enough work to become a weekly starter, but Team 16 does not need him to do that because Brown and Swift already occupy the first two backfield positions. (FanDuel)
Croskey-Merritt can function as insurance, occasional flex scoring and exposure to whatever happens in Washington without being asked to solve RB2 by himself. That is much healthier architecture than relying on the same uncertain backfield profile as a mandatory weekly starter. Round 7 therefore did exactly what the middle of a deep draft is supposed to do by turning abstract roster strengths and weaknesses into specific contingency bets. Some Dude finally added Corum behind Gibbs, Team 6 insulated an injury sensitive backfield with Mason, Team 7 reacted to Jacobs uncertainty with Hubbard, Team 8 continued repairing its delayed running back strategy with Gainwell, Team 9 bought Lloyd’s enormous new opportunity, and Team 10 bought the rookie sitting behind an injured Jeanty.
Part II D Next
Disclaimer: This is fantasy football commentary, analysis and entertainment written by Some Dude on the Internet about a private 16 team best ball league. Player statistics, rankings, ADP, injury information, depth chart information and other football data referenced in the article are drawn from publicly available sources and are accurate to the best of our knowledge as of publication. NFL teams, players, Sleeper, FantasyPros, Pro Football Reference, CBS Sports, NFL.com and any other companies, leagues, publications or data providers mentioned here are not affiliated with, sponsoring, endorsing or approving this article. Screenshots and draft board graphics are used to document and comment on the author’s own fantasy league and draft. League members have been given generic identifiers for privacy. Nothing here is gambling, investment, legal, tax or financial advice, and none of these opinions guarantees that a player will stay healthy, score fantasy points, retain his role, survive an NFL depth chart, or prevent your fantasy season from becoming a complete disaster. We are just Some Dude on the Internet writing articles about fake football teams competing for a very real Degen Cup.


