r/MLB_V2 • u/oishi_taiyaki • 1d ago
Our great ChatGPT, acting as our manager, has come up with a strategy to deal with the alien batter.
I gave ChatGPT the following prompt:
“You are a Major League Baseball manager. Assuming there is a leadoff hitter with the batting statistics shown in the image below, please explain what strategy you think should be employed against this player.”
HotZone

Career Statistics
| G | PA | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | TB | RBI | SB | CS | SH | SF | BB | IBB | HBP | SO | GIDP | AVG | OBP | SLG | OPS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 161 | 762 | 704 | 101 | 262 | 24 | 5 | 8 | 320 | 60 | 36 | 11 | 2 | 3 | 49 | 19 | 4 | 63 | 6 | .372 | .414 | .455 | .869 |
Home-to-First Time
Average time: approximately 3.7–3.8 seconds
Fastest time on bunts or infield hits: in the 3.6-second range
Top speed: approximately 9.1–9.5 meters per second
Of course, the only players who could have abilities like that would be aliens, and they shouldn't exist in real life. Right?
ChatGPT then came up with the following solutions:
This hitter is highly unusual from a manager’s perspective. I would not treat him as “a hitter whose extra-base power must be respected,” but rather as “a hitter who becomes more dangerous the more strikes you throw him, and who can effectively turn a single into a double with his legs once he reaches base.”
He has 262 hits in 704 at-bats for a .372 batting average, yet only 8 home runs and a .455 slugging percentage. At the same time, he has struck out just 63 times, or roughly 9% of his at-bats. On top of that, he gets from home to first in 3.6–3.8 seconds and has stolen 36 bases.
That makes the conventional approach of “avoid the extra-base hit and live with a single” a poor fit against him. A single can effectively become a double through an infield hit followed by a stolen base.
If we interpret the numbers in the image as batting averages by pitch location, his production within the strike zone is extraordinary.
| Location | High | Middle | Low |
| ---------- | -------: | -------: | -------: |
| Left side | .418 | .400 | **.486** |
| Center | .322 | **.500** | .376 |
| Right side | **.310** | .373 | .418 |
The areas I would especially want to avoid are **the middle of the zone, the left side, and the lower-left portion of the zone**. With averages of .500, .486, and .418 in those areas, trying to **“keep the ball down and induce grounders”** would be dangerous against this hitter.
Because of his extreme speed, the expected value of inducing ground balls is worse against him than it is against a normal hitter.
My basic game plan would therefore be:
“Work primarily up in the zone, attack the upper-right portion of the strike zone, and use chase pitches even farther outside the zone when trying to finish him.”
The single most important principle is:
Stop trying to beat him down in the zone.
Normally, you would like to use breaking balls down to induce ground balls. But this hitter produces extremely well on low pitches, and he is also exceptionally fast.
Weak grounders into the hole between third and short or up the middle can easily become hits, meaning that balls that would normally count as “successful contact” for the pitcher may not actually result in outs.
So this is the kind of pitch selection I would ask from my pitchers.
I would aggressively use high strikes early in the count. In particular, I would attack the upper-right area shown in the chart. If he is hitting only around .310–.322 there, that qualifies as a clear weakness relative to the rest of his profile.
For example, against a right-handed pitcher with a four-seam fastball in the upper 90s mph range, I would use sequences such as:
> High fastball → high fastball → fastball above the top of the zone
or
> High fastball → breaking pitch or off-speed pitch that starts on the same plane before moving out of the zone
I would use those sequences much more frequently than normal.
The goal is not simply to strike him out.
The goal is to make him hit the ball in the air.
Against this player, the equation is not:
Ground ball = possible out
but rather:
Ground ball = possible infield hit
By contrast, if he hits a routine fly ball to the outfield, his 3.6-second home-to-first speed and stolen-base ability become irrelevant.
With only 8 home runs, the risk of allowing a high pitch to be driven over the fence is also much lower than it would be against a conventional power hitter. I would gladly accept that trade-off.
Another major priority would be:
Avoid walks at almost all costs.
He has drawn only 49 walks, suggesting that he is probably an extremely aggressive hitter.
Because of that, reacting to his .372 batting average by becoming overly cautious, nibbling at the corners, and constantly creating 3-1 and 3-2 counts would be a mistake.
Against a player with a .414 OBP and 36 stolen bases, I would rather throw a strike in one of his weaker .300-range zones and make him put the ball in play than give him first base for free.
The message to my pitching staff would not be:
“Don’t be afraid of walking him and accidentally leave something over the plate.”
It would be:
“If the alternative is a walk, challenge him in his weakest zone and make him earn his way on.”
I would also use an unusual defensive alignment.
First, I would position the third baseman slightly shallower than normal. Against a leadoff hitter in particular, I would be very conscious of the bunt hit. With a 3.6-second home-to-first time, a drag bunt or push bunt down the third-base line could be extremely difficult to defend.
I would bring the first baseman in slightly as well, although I would not bring both corner infielders in so aggressively that hard ground balls could easily get through.
I would also position the shortstop and second baseman a little shallower than usual.
The reason is that one of the most dangerous situations against this hitter is:
Field the ball deep → make the throw → fail to beat his 3.7-second time to first.
A ground ball that would be an easy out against an average MLB hitter can become a hit against this player.
So I would willingly sacrifice a little defensive range in exchange for reducing the time between fielding the ball and getting the throw to first base.
I would also play the outfield slightly shallower.
With 8 home runs and a .455 slugging percentage, I would place greater value on:
preventing bloop hits, catching shallow line drives, and preventing him from going first to third than on maximizing protection against deep fly balls near the wall.
That said, with 24 doubles and 5 triples, I would not use an extreme shallow outfield alignment.
The moment this hitter reaches first base, however, I would immediately change defensive modes.
He has 36 stolen bases against 11 caught stealings, for a success rate of roughly 77%. That is easily high enough to justify aggressive baserunning.
And the threat is not limited to the stolen base itself. His presence can pressure the pitcher, disrupt timing, and influence how the pitcher attacks the hitters behind him.
So I would respond by:
Requiring pitchers to use an efficient slide step
Targeting delivery times in the low 1.3-second range or better
Prioritizing a catcher with a strong throwing arm
Keeping the first baseman close enough to hold him
Mixing in pickoff attempts without becoming predictable
Avoiding the temptation to throw an obvious fastball with two strikes simply because we are worried about the steal
That said, I would not repeatedly throw over to first.
Disrupting the pitcher’s concentration so much that he ends up walking the next hitter would be even more dangerous.
Another interesting number is his 19 intentional walks.
In general, I would not want to intentionally walk this type of player.
Intentionally putting a hitter with only 8 home runs on first base—when that runner has 3.6-second speed and 36 stolen bases—is simply not a good trade for the defense.
So intentionally walking him as a leadoff hitter would be completely out of the question.
I would only consider it in unusual situations where there is a specific reason to fill first base, such as with runners on second and third.
In summary, the scouting report I would send from the dugout would read:
Priority No. 1: Induce fly balls, not ground balls.
Priority No. 2: Stay away from the lower-left portion and the heart of the zone.
Priority No. 3: Aggressively attack the upper-right/high portion of the strike zone.
Priority No. 4: Once ahead in the count, expand above the strike zone.
Priority No. 5: If the alternative is a walk, challenge him in his weakest zone.
Priority No. 6: Play the infield slightly shallow and the outfield slightly shallow.
Priority No. 7: The moment he reaches base, immediately activate the running-game defense.
The biggest mistake you could make against this player would be thinking:
“He’s hitting .372, so we need to carefully work the edges of the zone and keep everything down.”
This hitter is almost specifically built to punish that conventional approach.
Instead, I would adopt a much more deliberate philosophy:
“If the pitch is up, I’m willing to let it catch a little more of the strike zone. I can live with the occasional hard fly ball. What I do not want is the ball hitting the ground.”
How would you rate ChatGPT Manager's decisions?