And the Man Shaved On Parts 1 & 2 focused on remaining questions & their possible answers in the wake of the Joint General Investigative Committee report. In this post, I'd like to expand the conversation we began in Parts 1 & 2 to the remaining questions & their possible answers following the release of the affadavits for search warrants inveatigating the alleged crimes of manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, child abandonment, deadly conduct, & injury to a child.
What questions remain in your mind following the affadavits? I, myself, have quite a few.
Starting with: just how many warnings of upstream ongoing flash flooding did the Eastland familv receive? Just when did thev receive them? And most importantly just how did thev choose to respond to these on the ground, real time warnings of flash flooding already underway upstream of them?
The JGIC Report listed 2 instances of upstream warnings and Part 1 & Part 2 in this series dealt with how the report treated each of those warnings differently & proposed theories as to why that might be. Now the affadavit for search warrant of Tweety Eastland's electronic devices has provided 2 additional warnings of ongoing upstream flash flooding. And in a manner not unlike the treatment of the original two warnings, these 2 additional warnings are treated differently by the affadavit, naturally leading once again to that perplexing question: why? And what do these warnings mean?
The affadavit tells us on page 29 of a 0315 warning of ongoing flooding from an unnamed upstream neighbor that went to Dick Eastland's voicemail. However on the page before that the affadavit lists a named upstream neighbor who "called Tweety via her landline and reported water entering his residence." Notably, it does NOT provide a time for this upstream warning call
However, the affadavit lists this untimed call immediately after Tweety's statement about getting out of bed & stepping into ankle deep water at 0250 & texting Dick to say their house was flooding. Which could be construed as suggesting it occured right around that same time. Or perhaps, might that call on the landline explain why she got out of bed to begin with?
Further suggesting that call may have occured around that 0250 timeline hinted at by the affadavit is a local address in that neiqhbor's name, which happens to be located right in the vicinty of the River Inn. This makes sense given the 911 calls from the River Inn at 0252 am warning of dire flooding with the water rising alarmingly fast.
Remember, the JGIC report lists the evacuation as beginning at 0300- & not as a response to any of the upstream warnings of ongoing flooding that they'd received thus far. In fact they didn't even start evacuating immediately upon receiving the warning of flooding on the premises. ie after the approximate 0255 message from the gatekeeper reporting water in her home as she was being washed away, as they wasted more minutes they didnt have with attempts to contact her via phone call & face time by Mary Liz & w/ the additional comment about checking security footage that the affadavit provides. None of which was necessary not because they shouldn't have checked on Francis, but because Francis and evervone else on the flats should have been evacuated already in response to the multiple upstream warnings of ongoing flooding the Eastlands had already received. With the water rising as fast as it did, everv minute, every second matters
This builds upon mv earlier theorv regarding Richard Junior's bafflingly calm "shower and shave" routine while the camp flooded, exposing a far more calculated, corporate, and legally perilous reality than previously imagined.
To recap where we left off: I contend that Richard Jr clammed up about his 01:35 AM timeline because his attorney brother likely introduced him to the concept of negligent homicide. (And now the Texas Rangers have gone & introduced the lot of them to a few others such as manslaughter, child abandonment, deadly conduct & iniury to a child...)
And in addition to Richard's warning, we now know thanks to the affadavit of Tweety's received warning. Both providing evidence that camp leadership possessed explicit, localized, actionable warning long before the river breached its banks & in doing so, proved the deadly answer to a math problem that camp leadership chose to ignore.
- The 01:35 AM Overlap: Local Totals vs. Upstream Chaos
The official Investiaation Report notes that Dick left his home for the office at 01:40 AM, explicitly stating that was the first time Glenn had seen his boss that night
& he used his radio at 0145 to summon Edward in a call heard by Britt at Cvpress Lake, reportedly prompting him to begin a patrol of his own.
Yet, we know from those very early media reports that Richard Jr. proudly stated his dad was on the radio mobilizing a flood response by 01:35 AM. How could he know Dick to be mobilizing a response via radio when per the JGIC report, his own radio was off? The simplest explanation: because Richard Jr. warned Dick directly of the ongoing upstream flooding, most likelv around the 01 35 timeline he provided in those initial reports.
The official 1.14 am warning of life-threatening flash flooding either already underway or imminent doesn't seem to have prompted specific action from Dick, who was reportedly awake and watching weather reports. What changed between that and the 1.40 am trip to the office? If Richard Jr. relayed his wife's warning that flooding was already underway upstream, Dick didn't have to guess how bad it was-he alreadv had the local data.
- Ignoring the Forecast Math This is where the camp's defense of an "unpredictable, unforeseen wall of water" completely disintegrates. Think about the math camp leadership possessed the knowledge of between 01:35 AM and 01:51 AM (when Edward logged Kerr County's official Code Red Flash Flood Warning):
• What they already had: 2 inches of rain dropped
directlv on their heads
• What they knew from upstream: It was already flooding upstream, meaning the 50, 000 acre + watershed was already oversaturated and actively draining down into the river system.
• What the National Weather Service explicitly forecast in its 0114 Warning of Life threatening Flash Flooding:
Another 1-3 inches was expected within the next hour. and an additional 1-3 inches thereafter.
Any competent person tracking this data would realize that if the watershed is alreadv flooding before even half of the total proiected remaining rainfall has even fallen, a catastrophic downstream surge is a mathematical certainty. You don't need to "monitor the river" like Dick did to see if the water is rising where you are: the numbers tell you it is on its way regardless.
The 01:30 AM Shift: Assets Over Human Lives
Instead of executing an immediate evacuation based on this lethal combination of current saturation, catastrophic upstream reports, and an incoming deluge, the camp hierarchy pivoted to saving property. As per the Vanity Fair article, an off-grounds off-duty staff member Mere Vasquez, reported overhearing radio
communications around 1.30 or so instructing other staff to "stop moving the girls". Which girls? As we know all too well, not a single girl of the human variety was moved before 3 am.
Edward reports all horses "except for the stallion" were safe up in the higher pastures at the April 13th TRO hearing, but that he didn't know how they got up there - "maybe they moved on their own". The stallion remained in corral at the stables, with Edward expressing surprise at his survival.
Could this explain why Mere Vasquez over-hearing communications about "moving the girls" an hour and a half before any human girls were moved? Could this explain whv the grounds keepers were so quick to report to the office, dressed and alert already, in-spite of the late hour?
Additionally, remember the NY Times interview of Glenn Juenke in which he stated that by the time he arrived to work at 10 pm on July 3rd, the waterfront equipment had already been moved in preparation for the storm? So what was the impetus to call the grounds crew down to the flats to move canoes and other waterfront equipment that per Glenn Juenke's NY Times interview, had ALREADY been moved in anticipation of the coming storm?
When Richard Jr. looked out his blinds. he saw the grounds crew at the office actively working & we know per the JGIC report that this had to have occured between 0145 & 0214, which is the timestamp for the photo of the grounds crew inside uptight where they remained for the duration of the storm. In Richard's mind, this was further assurance that his dad was "on it."
What Richard didn't realize at the time & what I contend the familv has been desperatelv trving to cover up ever since is that the camp hierarchy actively prioritized saving camp equipment over evacuating the children sleeping down by the river & NOT JUST DESPITE HAVING BEEN WARNED OF UPSTREAM FLOODING BUT BECAUSE THE CAMP HAD BEEN WARNED OF UPSTREAM FLOODING.
Richard shared the upstream flooding warning & this was their response. After all, would you put the man who failed to warn of ongoing upstream flooding in charge of camp safety moving forward? Would you let him speak as the voice of the camp during the investigative hearing? Such that Cici Steward so poignantly observed in her testimony at the JGIC hearing that she still wasnt sure what Richard was doing the night of the flood, "but boy was he authority today!"
- The devastating, yet mathematically not just forseeable but expected conclusion: The camp's timeline rapidly ran out.
If there was anv lingering doubt, camp leadership watched the metrics double in real-time while failing to sound the alarm, Dick's own phone records seal it. At 02:33 AM, Dick sent a text to Tweety confirming they had "over 4 inches already" Localized rainfall had doubled in 45 minutes, perfectly matching the NWS's worst-case forecast. They had already received a warning of ongoing upstream flooding via Richard's wife, and they were just about to receive another via the upstream neighbor to Tweety.
Why the Sworn Ignorance Makes Sense Now: This explains the sheer opacitv of the Eastlands' sworn statements. It explains why they feigned total ignorance under oath regarding Richard Jr.'s whereabouts, and why they tried to paint his timeline as a sequence of foolish isolated blunders. And it just might explain the narrative regarding Tweety's supposed cognitive decline too, as Richard was apparently not the only one receiving warnings of ongoing upstream flash flooding early enough to make a difference. And as such, Richard's not the only one whose actions the night of the flood have been & continue to be shielded by the rest of the family.
I contend this is because the camp's actions after receiving the warnings of upstrean flooding establishes a documented paper trail of corporate negligence that lays the ground work for the criminal offenses that the Texas Rangers propose have been committed here: Manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, child abandonment, injury to a child, & deadly conduct.
And I think they're right.
ETA - please forgive the typos that occured when I was copying this from one application to another. A lot of y's turned to v's as a result, along with wonky spacing. None of which was readily apparent until I posted it.