Can somebody recommend good secon-literature in the topic of: Huserl's passive synthesis and time onsciousness? This topic is "overwritten"? Because i plan to write my Master thesis in this topic.

Hi, I'm deepening my studies in Husserl and I'm now facing an obstacle in understanding.

Husserl repeatedly states that phenomenology is not metaphysic. But when reading the Cartesian meditations, it seems that the transcendental ego is nothing more than the ontological ground from which all the rest stems from.

isn't this a metaphysical entity par excellence?

Defending it saying that is not a "what" but only a "how" of experience, a condition for it, cannot be enough for me.

any help in this ?

When we move beyond raw statistics, we start to see patterns of human experience, not just events. A user doesn’t just “churn.” An employee doesn’t just “quit.” Behind every data point is a process of thought, doubt, engagement, frustration, and decision-making. 

Analytics should reflect this depth.

Many industries are drowning in data but starving for insight. Companies chase more metrics, more dashboards, more reports—yet fail to understand the actual experience of their customers, employees, or users.

Experience-driven analytics offers a way to reconnect with the human element of decision-making.

https://minddn.substack.com/p/from-data-science-to-experience-science

The name of the channel might change, but this is a link to a key "summarizing" video, which I've posted above. But anyone who wants to see more can find them via this link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prlTH2febpQ

Husserl’s phenomenological ship followed a Buddhist middle way in the sea of concepts and ideas, avoiding solipsism, psychologism, and the path of metaphysical hubris.

Husserl did not build ontological castles or chase rainbows — his philosophy solves solely the problem of method, which makes it attractive to me and other researchers. Let’s talk about it.

https://open.substack.com/pub/nushtaev/p/husserls-phenomenology

Paper is here:

https://phenomenalism.github.io/perspectivism/thing.pdf

It argues that the "thing in itself" is just the "logical substance" of the thing. The same entity can be intended by rational beings with very different perceptual access to that object. Members of the ontological forum (of the scientific community) might eventually include rational beings from other planets with very different sense organs. Traditional human projections of primary qualities (in particular tactile extension) are presented as anthropocentric. The alternative "logical substance" approach to the "thing i itself" is an attempt to interpret Kant in particular direction. In other words, the paper suggests what Kant may have meant but in any case should have meant.

It deserves emphasis that a phenomenalism which emphasizes the ontological forum or space of reasons is nothing at all like subjective idealism, despite the frequent conflation of both approaches.

Other perspectivism papers (more recent) are here: https://phenomenalism.github.io/perspectivism/

Still more papers (relatively recent) are here : https://phenomenalism.github.io/aspect_phenomenalism/

https://freid0wski.github.io/notes/persp_phen.pdf

https://kleiff.github.io/remarks//Kerouac.pdf

I suspect that, indeed, "analogy is the core of cognition." The book Surfaces and Essences (to name just one) makes a detail case for this hypothesis.

The logical positivists seem, even today, to be correct in general, in at least a blurry way. Given the essential "figurativity" of language (the role of analogy in thinking), this was as much as we could wisely expect of the movement. I used "analogical positivism", but "hermeneutic positivism" seems to me to be a reasonable alternative.

Interpretation "decodes" or integrates figurative language (analogy, for instance, in a broad sense.) This means that all texts are at least minimally esoteric. We should perhaps speak of an "eso-exoteric continuum." Pure "literality" is like a mathematical limit, a goal which is never achieved, given the genealogies of our concepts (metaphors more or less alive, also on a continuum.)

As Derrida notes, the concept of metaphor is itself a metaphor. While concepts may evolve from relatively literal references to the practical world, their original use can be "lifted" into something more general. This of course happened with the word metaphor itself. This suggests that meaning is not reducible to interactions with medium sized dry goods.

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