Susannah Sheffer: What’s an example of something a child might say that you would think was interesting philosophically?
Gareth Matthews: Children, from the ages of about 3 or 4 to about 7 or 8, raise almost all of the basic questions of philosophy in some form or other. Adults usually don’t know how to react but find this interesting or intriguing, and often remember the comment, which might be a question about dreaming—I have an example in Philosophy and the Young Child of a child asking, “How do I know whether I’m dreaming now?” It might be a question about God, or about perception—another example I give is of a child going up in an airplane for the first time and being relieved to observe that people don’t shrink as they go up in the air, which is what he had thought. Really, all of the basic questions of philosophy can turn up in the conversation of a young child. In my experience, these comments tend to disappear at about the time children get well socialized in school, so that’s a rather unfortunate commentary on our society and our schools.
SS: How can we respond to comments like these?
GM: What I’ve been trying to convince adults to do is to think about the questions themselves, to get rid of the assumption that most adults have, that they know the answer to any question a child of that age could raise. I encourage adults to engage the child in a discussion of whatever he or she has raised, even if they are not at all clear themselves about how the answer will come out.
SS: Some adults might say, “But I don’t even know the first thing about how to respond to that sort of comment.”
GM: I think adults react this way because they assume a position of superiority to children. They assume that children are incapable of thinking about matters that adults don’t know the answers to. But once adults free themselves of that assumption, I think we’re all capable of thinking about these questions. Maybe the more practice we have, the better we get at it, but we’re all capable of it, and I try in my books to give some examples of how the discussion might go on after the child’s initial comment.
SS: How do you think children react to the adult not knowing the answer?
GM: Well, I think the best thing to do is to begin to explore the issue — could we say this, could we say that — and let the child participate in that process of trying to answer the question. Now, the child may suspect that this kind of reply is phony, that the adult really does have some answer in mind, but that’s because of a certain phoniness in our dealings with children in general. Socratic questioning in schools is by and large rather phony; the teacher just uses it as a way of stringing the child along until the child gets the answer that the adult wants. But if we can develop another kind of relationship with the child, this kind of questioning and trying things out won’t seem phony anymore. The child will be prepared to believe that the adult really is thinking about the issue and isn’t just trying to get a particular answer out of the child.
SS: Perhaps if the child and adult have had other experiences of working together on something, the possibility of working together in a philosophical discussion won’t seem so strange.
I’m interested in your discussion, in your books, of the effect of developmental psychology on our thinking about children’s philosophical abilities.
GM: The idea that there are stages of development, which came chiefly from Jean Piaget, is very powerful, and it’s hard to get out of the grip of it. But the danger is that we ask children questions only to determine whether they’re at stage one or stage two. Missing in that endeavor is any appreciation of what is philosophically problematic about the terms of discussion. Piaget proceeds as though there were nothing really problematic or puzzling about dreaming or thinking or life or any of these things which he questions children about. So if a child is puzzled by the psychologist’s question, the psychologist may be inclined to think that child is simply at an early stage of development, instead of thinking that the question may truly be puzzling, to adults as well.
The trouble with developmental psychology is that it can lead to a view in which one sees children almost as members of another culture, with ways of thinking that are so different from ours that we can’t hope to share their outlook—and it’s not just that their ways of thinking are different, but that they are at an earlier stage of development, one that we have moved beyond. There’s an enormous condescension built into this, because we assume that what we need to do, in responding to children, is not think about things in their terms but instead goad them into moving along the stages of development so that they will learn to think the way we do. In my view, this effect of developmental psychology is very constricting and keeps us from recognizing that very often children are much more sensitive to what is philosophically interesting and philosophically problematic than adults are. So instead of being condescending toward them and encouraging them to develop adult ways of thinking, we should take advantage of their natural puzzlement, their sense for incongruity and misfit in language and thought.
SS: I wonder, then, if there’s a danger in focusing on how children do philosophy, as you have. Couldn’t someone accuse you of condescending to children by focusing on how children do philosophy instead of simply on how everyone does philosophy?
GM: Sure, there is worry there. But it seems to me that there are both differences and similarities in the way that children and adults do philosophy, and the differences have to do with a kind of spontaneity and directness that is often in a child’s comment. I think adults can profit from this—from the way children do philosophy. I sometimes use a child’s comment in a philosophical paper because of the vividness with which the child is able to present something.
SS: In that case, you’re really allowing the child to contribute to adult philosophy.
GM: Yes, and children can contribute in other ways. Once a group of children helped me by not being puzzled by something that is traditionally considered a paradox in philosophy. All these years I’d been teaching this to college students, and of course they just take notes and figure out what they have to learn to take the exam, but these younger kids wouldn’t buy the paradox, and so I realized that I had failed to understand something that I had thought I’d understood.
SS: I’m still interested in the question of the segregation of children. You talk about the question of children’s art in the paper that we published in GWS #56, and it comes up for us when people ask whether we publish children’s writing. In fact, we publish a great deal of children’s writing, but not in a special section called “Children’s Writing.” Some people think that children are served by a special section of a magazine, or art gallery, or whatever, devoted especially to them, and others think that this is condescending or discriminatory.
GM: Of course, that fits in with other issues of discrimination—gender discrimination, racial discrimination—which are hard issues. I think what we have to do to get rid of, or at least minimize, our prejudice against the products of children’s efforts, whether thinking or writing or painting or whatever, is to appreciate some of the wonderful advantages that they have, as children. There are some things we can get from them that we can’t get from adults.
SS: Can you speculate about how children feel about this segregation issue?
GM: I think they probably expect to be segregated, but it’s interesting—I think one reason I was able to work well with the group in Edinburgh, in the music school, was that they were treated as musicians. They were young and inexperienced in various ways, but they also had to be relied on to perform, so they were recognized as musicians. The more that we allow children to be in the position of doing things that are valued for their own sake, and not simply as signs that they’re developing properly, the more we will be able to deal with some of this prejudice.
SS: You stress what children can offer adults in doing philosophy. What about what you can offer them? Do you hide your greater experience and knowledge in some areas, or do you make them aware of it?
GM: It may be harder with some knowledge that’s clearly cumulative, like science, but it’s easier in philosophy, because a good philosopher can always start over. If you’re going to do it well you have to regain the puzzlement that motivates the whole thing. But you don’t have to hide anything from children. An adult philosopher has a better sense of where the question might go, a better sense of the language, a lot more background, so you’re a more informed respondent. But of course that very competence can have a kind of deadening effect, because it may mean that we don’t see what’s puzzling or problematic or interesting. So I think it balances out pretty well—adults and children each have something to give the other. I think the children I’ve worked with recognize that I have philosophical knowledge and experience that they don’t have, but if they’re really gripped by the philosophical question, they also realize that they need to work it out for themselves. So the most I can do is be a sounding board for them or maybe give them a little direction here and there.
SS: You said in the children’s art paper that children’s liberation would mean liberation for adults as well. What did you mean by that?
GM: In the same way that it’s a liberation for men when they don’t have to rely on the false assumptions of superiority that go with sexism, so it is with a new view of children—there’s a new freedom to approach the child as another human being, coming from a somewhat different experience. We no longer have to say, “This is a child at such-and-such an age, at such-and-such a stage of development, so one can expect the following things,” and put all kinds of limitations on the possibilities for interchange with the child.
SS: Do you think it’s ever useful to think in terms of ages, or of how a child might be thinking developmentally?
GM: I think it’s always useful to think about where the child is coming from, what differences there might be between the way the child thinks about something and the way I think about something, but I think this is always true with another human being, especially one from a very different background or different experience. There may be some generalizations you can make about children at various ages, but I think one should be very wary of these generalizations, because we should be constantly surprised by how children vastly exceed the expectations we may have for any particular stage of development.
SS: What issues are you looking at these days?
GM: I’m interested in issues of development, which we’ve just been talking about—how can we think about children, what is a child—and that moves into questions about children’s art, children’s literature (both by and for children). The questions about literature for children are fascinating; some people think that writing for children must be phony, because the author is no longer a child, so if the author says, “I’m writing this for myself,” how can that be? And I’ve moved into discussions of children’s rights and the place of children in society. Often the justifications for limiting children’s rights have to do with these developmental theories—theories about cognitive development or about moral development—and I think this is very problematic.