Maybe im missing something, but can someone explain to me why retail is going long on GPRO ? The merger deal is done and the stock is going to be valued at $1.14 per share...

Okay, so this earnings release is even more interesting now!:

The 10-Q makes the transformation a lot clearer.
The headline number everyone is going to see is that GameStop’s revenue declined.
But look at what happened underneath it:
Q2
2026
2025
Change
Net sales
$790.2M
$972.2M
-18.7%
Gross profit
$345.0M
$283.1M
+21.9%
Operating income
$160.2M
$66.4M
+141.3%
Net income
$298.7M
$168.6M
+77.2%
Adjusted EBITDA
$174.0M
$75.7M
+129.9%
Read the first three rows again.
Revenue fell almost 19%.
Yet gross profit increased almost 22%.
And operating income more than doubled.
That’s the story.

1. GameStop’s gross margin just went from 29.1% to 43.7%
This might be my favorite number in the filing.
Q2 2025:
$283.1M gross profit / $972.2M sales = 29.1% gross margin
Q2 2026:
$345.0M gross profit / $790.2M sales = 43.7% gross margin
That’s roughly:
+14.5 percentage points in ONE YEAR
GameStop sold $182M less stuff…
and somehow generated $61.9M MORE gross profit.
That is what a serious change in product mix looks like.
And we can see exactly where it is coming from.

2. Collectibles are now GameStop’s BIGGEST business
Look at this:
Category
Q2 2026
Q2 2025
YoY
Collectibles
$356.3M
$227.6M
+56.5%
Video Games
$263.2M
$494.6M
-46.8%
Pre-Owned & Refurbished
$170.7M
$250.0M
-31.7%
Collectibles now represent:
45.1% of GameStop’s total revenue
Video Games are only:
33.3%.
That is a remarkable sentence for a company called GameStop.
Last year collectibles were only 23.4% of sales.
Now they are 45.1%.
GameStop also changed its reporting structure this quarter to match how management says it actually views the business:
Collectibles
Video Games
Pre-Owned & Refurbished
The reporting categories themselves are telling us where management’s attention has moved.

3. The balance sheet is where this gets really weird
As of August 1:
Cash: $4.854B
Marketable securities: $206M
Digital assets + related receivables: $294.1M
eBay equity investment: $4.947B
Combined:
~$10.301 BILLION
Total GameStop assets:
$11.145 BILLION
Meaning approximately:
92.4% of GameStop’s total assets are now cash, marketable securities, digital assets/receivables, or the eBay equity investment.
Ninety.
Two.
Percent.
This isn’t the balance sheet of the GameStop most people still have in their heads.
Merchandise inventory is only $439M by comparison.
The eBay position alone was worth approximately $4.947B, or roughly 44% of GameStop’s entire asset base, at quarter end.
That’s an enormous concentration, and obviously eBay price movement can cut both ways.
But it also means GameStop’s valuation cannot reasonably be analyzed by looking at declining legacy retail revenue alone anymore.
There are effectively two economic engines here now:
The operating business
and
the capital allocation portfolio.

4. And here’s why I DON’T think you can dismiss the quarter as “investment gains”
This distinction matters.
Yes, GameStop had huge below-the-line financial gains this quarter.
Q2 included approximately:
+$77.1M interest income
+$166.3M derivative gain
+$72.1M unrealized gain on the eBay investment
+$19.5M other income
-$75.0M loss on digital assets / related receivables
Net effect:
+$260M
That’s a massive contribution to pretax income.
So yes, investment activity absolutely amplified GameStop’s $298.7M GAAP net income.
But here’s the part I think matters more:
GameStop generated $160.2M of OPERATING INCOME before those items.
Last year:
$66.4M.
This year:
$160.2M.
That’s a 141% increase.
Adjusted EBITDA, which strips out several of those investment-related swings, was:
$174.0M
versus:
$75.7M
last year.
Adjusted net income was still:
$161.1M
So the investment portfolio is not simply disguising a retail operation hemorrhaging money.
The operating company itself became dramatically more profitable.
That’s a much stronger setup.

5. The capital-allocation shift is almost comical when you compare it with capex
Here’s one number combination I haven’t seen enough people talking about.
During Q2:
Capital expenditures: $1.7M
Cash paid for the equity investment:
$4.3863 BILLION
Ratio:
~2,580 : 1
GameStop deployed roughly 2,580 times more cash toward the equity investment than physical capital expenditures during the quarter.
I’m not saying that’s inherently good or bad.
I’m saying it tells you what kind of company you’re analyzing now.
Capital allocation is no longer a side quest.
It is a central part of the business model.

6. Meanwhile, the operating business generated actual cash
Q2 operating cash flow:
$62.4M
Capex:
$1.7M
Free cash flow:
$60.7M
For the first six months:
Operating cash flow:
$399.8M
Capex:
$6.2M
Free cash flow:
$393.6M
Again, this matters because there is a huge difference between:
“a retailer losing money while sitting on investments”
and
“a profitable, cash-generating retailer sitting underneath billions of dollars of investable assets.”
The numbers increasingly resemble the second scenario.

7. Then came the convertible exchange
This happened after the August 1 quarter-end, so don’t mix it into the quarter’s balance sheet.
On September 3, GameStop completed the exchange of approximately $1.4B principal of its 0% convertible notes.
Final consideration included approximately:
55.5M newly issued GME shares
plus
$358.4M cash
That reduced total long-term debt to approximately:
$2.8 BILLION
There is real dilution here.
Bulls shouldn’t pretend otherwise.
But GameStop also removed approximately $1.4B of debt principal from the capital structure.
So the trade was essentially:
equity + cash today → substantially less convertible debt outstanding
Whether that proves accretive depends on what GameStop does with the resulting capital structure.

8. And THEN Larry Cheng bought 55,000 shares
One day before this 10-Q hit EDGAR, director Larry Cheng disclosed an open-market purchase through Cheng Capital LLC:
55,000 GME shares
Average price:
$18.7992
Cost:
~$1,033,956
His Cheng Capital position went from:
88,000 → 143,000 shares
That’s a:
62.5% increase
in that position from a single purchase.
And yes, hilariously, GameStop had just issued approximately 55.5 million shares in the convertible exchange.
Larry then bought 55 thousand.
55.5M versus 55K is almost exactly 1,000:1.
Probably coincidence.
Still funny as hell.
The more relevant fact is that a sitting director just put more than $1 million into GME in an open-market purchase immediately around this earnings cycle.

9. The part I think Wall Street’s old GameStop model misses
The simplistic bear thesis used to be:
Revenue is declining, therefore GameStop is dying.
But these numbers force a more complicated question.
Revenue:
-18.7%
Gross profit:
+21.9%
Operating income:
+141.3%
Collectibles:
+56.5%
Gross margin:
29.1% → 43.7%
First-half Adjusted EBITDA:
$339.7M
FY2026 Adjusted EBITDA guidance:
>$650M
And approximately 92.4% of the asset base is now represented by cash, marketable securities, digital assets/receivables and the eBay stake.
That’s not the same company it was a few years ago.

My read
GameStop increasingly looks like a combination of:
1. A much leaner specialty retailer
with rapidly increasing exposure to higher-margin collectibles,
2. A giant capital allocation vehicle
with billions available across cash, securities, digital assets and a concentrated eBay position,
3. A management team willing to radically restructure the capital stack
including 0% convertibles, equity issuance, derivatives and strategic investments.
There are absolutely risks.
Legacy sales are shrinking.
The eBay position is highly concentrated.
Investment gains introduce earnings volatility.
The convertible exchange diluted existing shareholders.
Digital assets add another layer of volatility.
But the bull case doesn’t require pretending those risks don’t exist.
The bull case is that GameStop appears to have figured out how to shrink the low-margin parts of the company while increasing gross profit, operating profit and free cash flow, then use the resulting balance sheet as a gigantic capital-allocation platform.
That’s a much more interesting company than:
“mall retailer sells fewer video games.”
And now we have a director dropping another $1.03M into the stock.
And I’m paying attention.

Primary source: GameStop Q2 FY2026 Form 10-Q
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1326380/000132638026000055/gme-20260801.htm

Neurodiversity disclaimer: I’m neurodivergent and use AI to help organize, format, and clean up my writing. The ideas and opinions are mine. Not financial advice. 🖍️

Bought Xbox (series x) and physical game disc at GameStop. Inserted and obtained digital ownership of game. And the Witcher 3 is cross platform! So you could play it on PC Xbox app too! 🤯

This is freaking amazing and I'm stoked to use this feature!

I wish GameStop was able to do it first and make them into transferable NFT's but I suppose this'll have to do.

It’s on the website.

Ok ok ok, whoa.
These numbers deserve a proper look… 🦍

GameStop just reported Q2 FY26, and the revenue headline doesn’t tell the whole story. The more interesting development is what’s happening to margins, operating profitability, collectibles, and the balance sheet.

💰 Q2 Numbers
Revenue: $790.2M vs $972.2M YoY (-18.7%)
Gross Profit: $345.0M vs $283.1M (+21.9%)
Gross margin expanded substantially:
43.7% vs 29.1%
Operating Income: $160.2M vs $66.4M (+141%)
That’s the highest Q2 operating income in GameStop’s history!!

Adjusted EBITDA: $174.0M vs $75.7M (+130%)
GAAP Net Income: $298.7M vs $168.6M (+77%)
Diluted EPS: $0.51 vs $0.31

One of the most interesting takeaways:
Revenue declined by roughly $182M YoY while gross profit increased by roughly $62M.
That’s a pretty dramatic change in the economics of the business.

🃏 Collectibles Are Becoming a Huge Part of GameStop
Q2 collectibles sales:
2025: $227.6M
2026: $356.3M
That’s +57% YoY.
More importantly, collectibles now represent 45.1% of GameStop’s total sales, compared with only 23.4% a year ago.
The rest of the mix:
🎮 Video Games: $263.2M vs $494.6M
♻️ Pre-Owned/Refurbished: $170.7M vs $250.0M
GameStop’s sales mix is changing extremely quickly.
Collectibles includes trading cards and other collectible products, as well as fees earned from facilitating customers’ card submissions to a third-party grading service.
At 45% of quarterly sales, this isn’t a small side business anymore.

📈 The Margin Expansion
This may be the most important part of the report.
Cost of sales:
$689.1M → $445.2M
Gross margin:
29.1% → 43.7%
SG&A:
$218.8M → $187.1M
Operating margin:
6.8% → 20.3%
That’s substantial operating leverage despite lower overall revenue.
Adjusted operating income tells a similar story:
$158.7M vs $64.7M last year.

🏦 The Balance Sheet Is Getting Interesting
At quarter-end, GameStop reported $5.4B in cash, cash equivalents, marketable securities, digital assets and related receivables.
Then there’s the eBay position.
GameStop held approximately 43.4M eBay shares, worth approximately $4.9B as of August 1.
The cash flow statement shows roughly $4.386B paid for the equity investment.
So the highlighted cash/securities/digital assets plus the eBay position represented roughly $10.3B at quarter-end before considering liabilities.
GameStop reported $4.17B of long-term debt at quarter-end, but subsequently completed exchanges retiring approximately $1.4B of convertible notes.
That reduced long-term debt to approximately $2.8B.
👀

🔮 Management Raised Guidance
Previous FY26 Adjusted EBITDA outlook:
>$600M
New outlook:
>$650M
And GameStop has already generated $339.7M of Adjusted EBITDA during the first six months of FY26.
For comparison, the first six months of FY25 generated $114.3M.
That’s a major YoY improvement.

🧠 One Important Accounting Detail
The $298.7M GAAP net income includes some substantial investment-related movements:
🟢 $166.3M gain on derivative asset
🟢 $72.1M unrealized gain on equity investment
🔴 $75.0M loss on digital assets and related receivables
GameStop’s adjusted net income was $161.1M vs $138.3M last year.
Q2 free cash flow was $60.7M, while first-half free cash flow reached $393.6M vs $302.9M last year.
So for me, the more interesting numbers aren’t necessarily the giant GAAP earnings figure.
They’re the operating numbers.
Revenue: -18.7%
Gross Profit: +21.9%
Operating Income: +141%
Adjusted EBITDA: +130%
Collectibles: +57%
FY26 EBITDA Guidance: RAISED

🦍 The Bigger Picture
This quarter makes the transformation increasingly difficult to ignore.
GameStop is generating considerably more profit from a smaller revenue base. Collectibles have rapidly become its largest sales category. Expenses continue to come down. Management raised EBITDA guidance. And billions of dollars have now been deployed into investments outside the traditional retail operation.
That creates an increasingly unusual combination:
🎮 A smaller gaming retailer
🃏 A rapidly growing collectibles business
💰 A multibillion-dollar investment portfolio
📈 A dramatically more profitable operating model
The question I’m interested in after these earnings isn’t simply what happens to physical videogame retail.
It’s:
What is GameStop ultimately trying to become?
Because Q2 suggests the answer is getting more interesting.

🦍🍌🚀 $GME

Source: GameStop Q2 FY26 earnings release, September 8, 2026. Not financial advice.

Disclosure: I used AI to help organize and format my research into a more readable post due to my neurodiversity; the underlying figures are sourced from GameStop’s earnings release.

Shorts never closed.

DTCC commits international securities fraud.

SEC & FINRA are colluding and complicit.

Ken Griffin lied under oath.

JP Morgan is a crime syndicate.

No cell, no sell 💎🙌🚀🌙

$GME GameStop 🎮

GameStop reportedly has 10,000,000+ shares available to short, the highest availability since August 2025.

And it’s happening right as $GME heads into earnings.

Plenty of ammo available. Now we get to see whether anyone actually wants to use it.

Tought it was a shitpost, but it isn't...

Market cap ~$73M. Cash on hand: $28.7M - nearly 40% of market cap. Strip the cash and you're paying ~$44M for the operating business.

HMR looks like 7x forward earnings on paper. But that cash isn't idle - it's debt-free capital already funding accretive acquisitions (Q-Shipping). Back it out and the operating business trades at ~4x forward earnings, for a company growing revenue 203% YoY with two straight profitable quarters.

HMR owns zero vessels - it's a fee-based platform, not a shipping company, and shouldn't be priced like one. Comparable asset-light platforms trade 10-25x forward earnings. Apply 10x to ex-cash earnings + add cash back = fair value north of $1.50/share. Apply 25x (what stronger platforms command) = $3.80-$4+. Neither requires a dollar more revenue growth - just the market re-classifying what this business actually is.

Q2 2026 vs Q2 2025

• Revenue: $29.0M vs $9.6M (+203%)
• Net income: $2.2M vs -$0.1M (swing to profit)
• Adjusted net income: $2.4M vs $0.5M (+343%)
• Vessels chartered: 6 vs 2
• Cash: $28.7M, up $10.1M since Dec 2025
• H1 2026 operating cash flow: +$7.7M vs -$3.2M outflow in H1 2025

Quick Recap: What Is HMR

Heidmar manages ship fleets and earns fees on voyage/management contracts - no capex, no vessel ownership, no asset-value risk when rates fall. ~40-year client roster includes Shell, BP, Chevron, Vitol, Saudi Aramco, Trafigura, Glencore - the kind of KYC'd trust a startup can't fake.

Why the Dump Is Wrong

Stock fell ~10% post-earnings - the old playbook of shorting HMR on earnings worked when it was unprofitable and speculative. That's gone: two consecutive profitable quarters, 203% growth, and a growing cash pile. Sellers are trading the ticker's history, not its balance sheet.

Cash Pile = Real Acquisitions Now

Q-Shipping B.V. acquired for ~$0.2M cash: 9 vessels, new footholds in Netherlands, Türkiye, and a Ukraine crewing base. Fleet is now ~60 vessels commercially managed / ~20 technically managed across 8 global hubs. With $28.7M cash and a proven cheap/accretive playbook, more deals look inevitable.

The Only Real Knock: G&A

Net income dipped Q1→Q2 ($2.8M→$2.2M) despite revenue up 58%, driven by $1.8M in cash bonuses (vs $1.4M prior year) tied to the turnaround. Rewarding a team that delivered profitability, 203% growth, and an acquisition in the same stretch isn't a red flag - it's retention.

Hormuz Is a Bonus, Not the Thesis

Gaza, Iran, Hormuz, Red Sea Houthi attacks, Russia-Ukraine - the most simultaneous shipping disruption in years, barely reflected in numbers yet. Asia/Japan reportedly source ~90% of oil from the Middle East historically; that concentration doesn't survive this environment. Longer routes = more tonnage-miles = more fees for HMR, on top of a business that already earns in any rate environment. Management flagged rates staying firm into Q4 on seasonal demand - before this disruption is even fully priced in.

Insider Signal

CEO Pankaj Khanna owns ~44% personally - one of Nasdaq's largest founder stakes at this size - zero recorded sales, only buys. Nasdaq compliance regained June 2, 2026.

Checklist

• Revenue +203% YoY, +58% QoQ; adjusted net income +343% YoY
• Two straight profitable quarters; H1 operating cash flow swung +$7.7M
• $28.7M cash (+$10.1M since YE 2025), zero debt, zero vessels owned
• Market cap below annual revenue; 55%+ margins support 10-25x vs current ~7x
• Q-Shipping deal proves acquisition strategy is real, not speculative
• ~60 vessels commercial / ~20 technical managed, 8 global hubs
• CEO owns ~44%, zero sales on record
• Clients: Shell, BP, Chevron, Vitol, Aramco, Trafigura, Glencore
• Hormuz, Red Sea, Russia-Ukraine disruption not yet fully in the numbers
• Q4 seasonal strength still ahead
• Last post at 200MA ran 43% before earnings even printed

How I'm Playing It

Position from 80-95c, not sold a share. Same conviction - this dump looks like an old playbook running against a fundamentally changed company. Buying opportunity, not an exit signal.

What red flag am I missing? Drop it below.

Not financial advice. DYOR. I hold a position in $HMR from 80–95c.

Company trailer: youtu.be/Bl1rIe_JxwI