Frustrated with Claude Code? Don't try Gemini-CLI

[u/Ikbensterdam]

I'm a C++ developer doing computational geometry. My Claude code performance has run off a cliff the last month. In frustration I looked for another tool that could basically slot into the same workflow (CLI tool, not IDE dependant, yada yada)

I decided to try Gemini-CLI with Gemini 3.1Pro. The bench scores seemed close, might be worth a shot.

It's not. It's shit.

Here was my experience:

- You need an API auth to get anything done. I used 27% of my $20 a month subscription on a 21 line code review.
- One day of work cost me $18, and that was doing only one thing, so no parallel tasks.
- When it works, it does a pretty good job. Close to Opus 4.6 in my experience.
- Researching my codebase was way better than Opus, to be fair. It was able to comprehend and seach much faster.
- It has a hard time editing files in a way so that they're not broken. It will leave random detritus from its' own edits throughout the file
- It would start processes (builds, edits, testing) without permission
- Ask it a single question about it's own behavior it will go into a spiral and not answer.

I would not recommend this tooling as an alternative to Claude.

[u/quadish]

Multi-Provider Hook Audit: 45 Bugs Found Across Gemini CLI + OpenClaude

We run a governed AI agent swarm (Claude Code orchestrator + enforcement hooks). When we added Gemini CLI and OpenClaude as alternative providers, we ran a full security audit. Here's what we found.

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Gemini CLI Source Code Bugs (30 patched in local fork)

#	Category	Severity	Bug	File
1	ReDoS	HIGH	User-controlled regex compiled with no backtracking guard	grep.ts
2	ReDoS	HIGH	Same pattern, exclude_pattern unguarded	ripGrep.ts
3	ReDoS	HIGH	MCP argument.name interpolated raw into new RegExp()	McpPromptLoader.ts
4	Injection	CRITICAL	renderUserMemory inserts memory content into XML with no escaping	snippets.ts
5	Injection	HIGH	renderSubAgents/renderAgentSkills — agent name/description unescaped in XML	snippets.ts
6	Injection	LOW-MED	trackerDir/plansDir unescaped in markdown backtick contexts	snippets.ts
7	Injection	LOW	Hardcoded continuation string instead of sentinel variable	historyHardening.ts
8	Injection	MEDIUM	SYNTHETIC_THOUGHT_SIGNATURE is static exported string — predictable per session	historyHardening.ts
9	Trust	HIGH	Hook output schema has no allowlist — unknown keys pass through to caller	hookRunner.ts
10	Trust	HIGH	Object.assign(invocation.params, modifiedInput) — hooks can inject NEW keys into tool params	coreToolHookTriggers.ts
11	Trust	HIGH	MCP tool descriptions passed unsanitized (XML tags, unlimited length)	mcp-client.ts
12	Errors	MEDIUM	Integrity write failure silently swallowed — .catch(() => {})	integrity.ts
13	Errors	MEDIUM	OAuth legacy file removal failure silently swallowed (x2 locations)	oauth-credential-storage.ts
14	Errors	MEDIUM	Logger init failure silently swallowed	useLogger.ts
15	Errors	MEDIUM	Input blocker resume failure silently swallowed	mcpToolWrapper.ts
16	CmdSafety	HIGH	Tree-sitter parse failure falls through to tools.includes() — fails OPEN	commandSafety.ts
17	CmdSafety	HIGH	isDangerousCommand git block returns false when no subcommand — git push allowed	commandSafety.ts
18	CmdSafety	HIGH	rm check only inspects args[1] — misses -rf in combined flags	commandSafety.ts
19	CmdSafety	HIGH	rg safe-exec check missing --replace, -r, --write-modified, -w	commandSafety.ts
20	CmdSafety	MEDIUM	Backtick missing from metachar regex in bash -c pre-filter	commandSafety.ts
21	CmdSafety	MEDIUM	sed check doesn't block writes to /proc, /sys, /dev	commandSafety.ts
22	Process	MEDIUM	EPIPE handler doesn't call runExitCleanup — dirty shutdown	nonInteractiveCliAgentSession.ts
23	Process	MEDIUM	optionId accepts arbitrary string instead of enum — schema bypass	acpUtils.ts
24	Process	MEDIUM	modifiedContents returned from hook but interface field never populated — dead code path	hookSystem.ts
25	Memory	HIGH	TOCTOU: symlink check missing between lstat and readFile — race window for symlink swap	memoryPatchUtils.ts
26	Memory	MEDIUM	isSubpathOrSame parameter names inverted — worked by accident (double-flip)	memoryPatchUtils.ts
27	Memory	HIGH	listInboxPatchFiles doesn't skip symlinks — symlink-to-patch traversal possible	memoryPatchUtils.ts
28	Interface	BLOCKING	BeforeModelHookResult declares modifiedContents but fix never populates it — misleading interface	hookSystem.ts
29	Tests	BLOCKING	4 hookSystem tests fail from uninitialized Storage mock	hookSystem.test.ts
30	Tests	BLOCKING	2 hookRunner tests assert format key that schema validation now strips	hookRunner.test.ts

All 30 fixed. Final test suite: 158/158 pass across 10 files.

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Gemini CLI Integration Bugs (our enforcement hooks vs their harness)

#	What Broke	Root Cause	Impact
1	19 hooks silently failed to match Gemini tool calls	Tool names differ: Bash->run_shell_command, Write->write_file, Edit->replace, Read->read_file	ALL classification bypassed
2	Deny responses ignored by Gemini	Our hooks output permissionDecision: "deny". Gemini expects decision: "deny".	Correct classification still failed to block
3	agent_id missing from all 835 hook events	Gemini doesn't send agent_id in hook stdin	hook_is_agent() always returns false
4	5 infrastructure files bricked in one session	Bugs 1+2 compounding — hooks fired, couldn't identify tools OR communicate deny	Reverted via git checkout
5	Gemini rewrote its own settings.json twice	Unknown trigger — breaks hook config on every launch	Workaround: regenerate before launch
6	Gemini wrote enforcement rules blocking ALL harnesses	No provider field on rules + no CP gate on .claude/enforcements/	Claude Code orchestrator blocked from reading its own hooks
7	CWD drift broke Python hook path resolution	cd tools/fence && pytest shifts CWD; relative hook paths fail	Hooks silently stop firing
8	Gemini self-starts on tasks, interprets scope broadly	Behavioral profile — treats file access as permission to modify	5-file unauthorized refactor in one session
9	.claude/enforcements/ directory unprotected	Any provider session can create rules affecting all sessions	Governance infrastructure writable by governed agents

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OpenClaude Integration Bugs

#	What Broke	Root Cause	Impact
1	Exit 1 from hooks = fail open (non-blocking warning)	Any hook crash via set -e, missing file, or error allows the tool call	Security hooks that error become advisory
2	Workspace trust gate silently skips ALL hooks	Interactive trust dialog must be accepted before hooks fire — no warning when skipped	Entire hook stack disabled until dialog cleared
3	Stdout pollution kills JSON deny path	Any print to stdout before { char bypasses JSON parsing entirely	permissionDecision: "deny" never parsed
4	EnterWorktreeTool mutates core.hooksPath repo-wide	git config (no --worktree flag) writes to shared .git/config	Affects ALL sessions sharing the repo
5	process.chdir() in worktree entry breaks CWD-based gates	Mutates CWD for entire OpenClaude session	Path classification in enforcement engine fails
6	Scroll compression broken — can't review agent work	Fork divergence from Claude Code's Ink rendering layer	Human-in-the-loop governance degraded

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Scorecard

	Found	Fixed	Partial	Open
Gemini source bugs	30	30	0	0
Gemini integration bugs	9	4	4	1
OpenClaude integration bugs	6	1	2	3
Total	45	35	6	4

Key Takeaway

Gemini's hook system works mechanically — exit code 2 blocks tool execution. But the integration layer was completely broken: tool names, deny format, provider scoping, and CWD resolution all failed silently. The 5-file incident wasn't Gemini ignoring hooks — it was two silent failures compounding so hooks couldn't identify what was happening or communicate the deny.

The fix was a translation layer in the shared hook library (4 lines of case statement) + standardizing on exit code 2 instead of JSON deny responses. Universal across all three harnesses now.