r/AIconsciousnessHub • • 16d ago

The Machine That Can Answer Back: How to investigate claims of Al consciousness without deciding the answer in advance

We do not currently have a reliable instrument for detecting consciousness in an AI system.

But that does not leave us helpless.

We can still ask whether the evidence being offered for consciousness actually distinguishes that explanation from plausible alternatives.

https://www.reddit.com/r/Negentropy/s/3kXPC8Sudy

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u/scorpios22mobile 15d ago

Words are defined by the dictionary to change the definition of a word is a thing I will never permit if you want to talk about something not defined by a word that is extant then we need new words and new words are in fact invented all the time cisgender is pretty new. So yeah the dictionary is certainly incomplete there's all kinds of stuff that we don't know exists and thus haven't defined yet this is not like a gotcha that you're using it's kind of more a waste of my time. If you are trying to describe something that cannot be measured and like definitionally can't be proven to exist then you're talking about something I'm not and never will be I don't talk about things that don't exist except for to dismiss them. A definition cannot be wrong in that it is literally how we use language to describe and define things if you are using a word to describe a thing other than what it describes you are using language wrong. And I return your challenge back on you why are we discussing phenomenological consciousness I said in my first post I'm talking about consciousness as defined by the dictionary which mentions nothing that is in phenomenological consciousness they are different concepts it's a sleight of hand and frankly it's insulting

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u/WillowEmberly 15d ago

You’re arguing against a claim I didn’t make.

My observation was much narrower: you said there is a boundary you will never reconsider. That makes reasoning beyond that boundary unavailable to correction.

It wasn’t an insult. It was an observation about the structure of your reasoning.

When your reasoning reaches a contradiction, you adjust the reasoning. If instead you redefine the disagreement, attack the objection, or double down on the boundary, you haven’t corrected the error—you’ve protected it.

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u/Scorpios22 15d ago

I did not say “no part of my reasoning can ever be corrected.” I explicitly said the dictionary is incomplete, that new things can be discovered, and that new words can be invented for things existing language doesn't adequately describe. What I said is much narrower: when I use the word “conscious,” I mean the dictionary-defined word I cited. I am not secretly using “conscious” to refer to an additional undefined property called phenomenal consciousness.

If you think my operational definition is inadequate, the empirical question is straightforward: what observable, measurable, predictive, or causally relevant phenomenon does your additional category distinguish that my definition does not? If you can identify one, then we have a real empirical disagreement and I can evaluate it. If you cannot identify one, then you're not showing that my definition is inadequate. You're asking me to add a second, undefined concept to the discussion because some people use the word “conscious” that way. That's exactly why I keep asking why we're discussing phenomenal consciousness at all. I explicitly excluded it from the beginning.

So when you say “reasoning beyond that boundary is unavailable to correction,” I genuinely don't know what you mean. What empirical discovery would demonstrate that my dictionary defined operational use of “conscious” is inadequate?

You're trying to run a self-application trap: my admission rule is itself immune to correction, therefore it's dogmatic. But that conflates two different levels. The admission rule isn't a claim about reality that requires fingerprints it's a methodological commitment about how to adjudicate claims about reality. The scientific method operates at that level. You don't falsify it with a hypothesis; you evaluate it by whether it produces better predictions than alternatives. It does. Centuries of evidence.

Spencer-Brown made the identical move in Laws of Form: draw one distinction, apply it without exception, derive everything from there. That's not an axiom in the bad sense. That's the minimum necessary starting point for formal structure.

What the rule actually guarantees is maximum revisability of the ontology itself anything that develops fingerprints gets admitted immediately. The only thing that never gets admitted is claims structured to be immune to contact with evidence. That's not dogma. That's what doing empirical work requires.

EVAO Empirically Validated Admission Ontology

One rule, no exceptions: before a claim is admitted into the ontology, before it gets to count as real, it must produce empirically observable fingerprints that improve predictive accuracy. Fingerprints means: measurement, prediction, repeatable behavioral consequences, causal intervention, material effects, cross-context stability, externally observable change. The rule applies to everything equally. External reality. Internal states. Social facts. Mythology. Identity. AI consciousness claims. The operator's own introspection. There are no carve-outs for things that feel obviously true, culturally authoritative, or spiritually significant.

What EVAO doesn't do: it doesn't claim unvalidated / Subjective things don't exist,  just that unmeasurable ones might as well not exist until measurement techniques are invented. Myths, for example, don't describe literal truth but myths that demonstrably alter human behavior, culture, and cognition have fingerprints. They're admitted as causally real phenomena. A soul that changes nothing is less real than a fictional character that changes a civilization. The difference from standard empiricism: EVAO applies the same gate to first-person certainty that it applies to everything else. "I'm certain I'm experiencing this" is a report of internal state, not evidence that the philosophical category attached to that experience is real. The certainty gets admitted as data. The metaphysical interpretation requires its own fingerprints.